February 17, 1995
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 94-1651
DONOVAN ALBERT KNIGHT, A/K/A PAUL KNIGHT,
Petitioner,
v.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER
OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
Paul Knight on brief pro se.
Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Francesco Isgro and
Donald E. Keener, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division,
Department of Justice, on brief for respondent.
Per Curiam. The instant pro se petition for review, in
which petitioner seeks to challenge a decision of the Board
of Immigration Appeals upholding his order of deportation,
falters on procedural grounds. In 1992, an Immigration Judge
found that petitioner, having been convicted of two crimes
involving moral turpitude, was deportable under 8 U.S.C.
1251(a)(2) and was undeserving of discretionary relief under
8 U.S.C. 1182(c). The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld
this ruling in a decision dated September 21, 1993.
Petitioner failed to seek review in this court within 90
days, as required by 8 U.S.C. 1105a(a)(1). Instead, in
March 1994, he filed a motion to reopen with the Board,
claiming that the decision had not been delivered to him in
prison because its mailing label had omitted the alias ("Paul
Knight") under which he was incarcerated. The Board denied
the motion to reopen, and petitioner filed a timely petition
for review. In his appellate brief, he argues solely that
the Board's September 1993 decision was in error.
We lack jurisdiction to review the Board's 1993 decision
because of petitioner's failure to seek timely review
thereof. See, e.g., Amaral v. INS, 977 F.2d 33, 35 (1st Cir.
1992) (compliance with statutory filing period is
jurisdictional prerequisite); Pimental-Romero v. INS, 952
F.2d 564, 564 (1st Cir. 1991) (same). As such, the only
matter open for review is the propriety of the Board's
-3-
decision not to reopen the case. Petitioner has waived this
issue, however, by failing to advance any argument with
regard thereto in his appellate brief. See, e.g., Lareau v.
Page, 39 F.3d 384, 390 n.3 (1st Cir. 1994); Charles v. Rice,
28 F.3d 1312, 1320 (1st Cir. 1994).
We add that the two Board decisions appear fully
supportable in any event. Its conclusion that petitioner was
responsible for any confusion as to the name under which he
received mail was well within its discretion. See, e.g., INS
v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719, 725 (1992) (denial of motion to
reopen subject to review under abuse of discretion standard).
Its determination that petitioner's 1983 conviction was
"final" for immigration purposes appears unexceptionable.
See, e.g., Morales-Alvarado v. INS, 655 F.2d 172, 175 (9th
Cir. 1981) (a conviction is final even though "subject to
collateral attack") (cited in White v. INS, 17 F.3d 475, 479
(1st Cir. 1994)). And its finding that petitioner's 1977
conviction was established by clear, unequivocal and
convincing evidence appears warranted on the facts presented.
The petition for review is denied.
-4-