United States v. Newman

March 2, 1995
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 91-1963

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

THOMAS E. NEWMAN,

Defendant, Appellant.

ERRATA SHEET
ERRATA SHEET

The opinion of this Court issued on February 28, 1995, is
amended as follows:

Page 1: change "Ronald R. Lagueux, U.S. District Judge" to

"Francis J. Boyle, Senior U.S. District Judge".

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 91-1963

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

THOMAS E. NEWMAN,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Francis J. Boyle, Senior U.S. District Judge]

Before

Selya, Circuit Judge,

Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Stahl, Circuit Judge.

John A. Macfadyen for appellant.

Margaret E. Curran, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom

Sheldon Whitehouse, United States Attorney, and Edwin J. Gale,

Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.

February 28, 1995

2

CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge. Defendant Thomas

Newman appeals from final judgment and sentence entered by

the district court after a three-week criminal trial. The

jury convicted Newman of five counts of wire fraud (18 U.S.C.

1343 (1988)) and four counts of transporting stolen

property in interstate commerce (18 U.S.C. 2314 (1988)),

all arising out of his allegedly fraudulent acquisition of an

insurance company and the diversion of almost $400,000 of its

funds for his personal use. Newman alleges that the district

court committed a variety of errors at trial and at

sentencing. We affirm the judgment, and most, but not all,

aspects of the sentence.

I.
I.

In late 1989, Newman, a self-described businessman,

met with the owner and officers of Rumford Property and

Liability Insurance Company ("RPLIC") to discuss his possible

purchase of the Rhode Island-based insurance company. After

a series of discussions and negotiations, Newman purchased

RPLIC for $200,000 on December 11, 1989. RPLIC's stock was

immediately transferred to the newly-created Rumford Holding

Company ("RHC"), which was wholly owned by Newman.

Prior to the purchase, RPLIC had been facing

financial difficulties. In part because of these

difficulties, RPLIC had been under investigation by Rhode

Island's Department of Business Regulation ("DBR") and had

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entered into several consent orders concerning its

operations. The most recent of these orders, dated May 1989,

was still in effect at the time of purchase and restricted,

inter alia, certain uses of RPLIC's assets without DBR

approval. At the time of purchase, these assets consisted of

approximately $1.2 million in cash, $1 million in common

stock, $200,000 in bonds, and various other assets. RPLIC's

liabilities exceeded its assets. Under Rhode Island law, a

sale of an insurance company is subject to approval by the

DBR. R.I. Gen. Laws 27-35-2. When first notified of the

possibility that RPLIC might be sold, the DBR indicated that

it would not approve the sale unless the purchaser added $2.5

to $5 million in capital.

At the time of the purchase, Newman was aware of

these facts. During the course of the negotiations, various

drafts of the purchase agreement were circulated, all of

which referred to the consent order and the need to obtain

approval from the DBR. Newman had also been given a letter

documenting RPLIC's financial condition and indicating that

its liabilities exceeded its assets. The final agreement

required Newman to seek DBR approval of the sale immediately.

Furthermore, at the closing on December 11, Newman read the

most recent consent order, dated May 1989. Although Newman

first expressed surprise and concern over the content of the

consent order, he was assured that it would not bar the

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4

normal operation of the business, although it would bar any

extraordinary transfers of funds. After a lengthy discussion

Newman went ahead and purchased RPLIC, as noted above, for

$200,000 ($100,000 in cash, which he had borrowed, and

$100,000 in a promissory note).1

The next day, December 12, Newman met with a number

of RPLIC officers and announced that he needed to make

disbursements of approximately $400,000 from RPLIC's

accounts. Over their objections, Newman directed them to

transfer from RPLIC's accounts (and the accounts of RPLIC's

subsidiaries) the following funds: a $120,000 check from a

RPLIC subsidiary's checking account; $79,100 from various

money market accounts; and $184,3002 from a number of

brokerage accounts. The check was given to Newman

personally, and the other funds were transferred to a

checking account in the name of Rumford Holdings, for which

Newman was the sole signatory. Altogether, $380,400 was

removed from RPLIC's accounts.

Newman subsequently used the $120,000 check to pay

back the loan that he had taken out for the cash he had

needed at the closing. From the Rumford Holdings checking

1. Under Rhode Island law, the signing of a purchase
agreement without prior DBR approval is permitted. However,
final legal control over the company does not change hands
until the purchase has been approved.

2. This sum consisted of four separate transfers, which
formed the basis of counts I through IV (wire fraud).

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account, Newman made the following disbursements: $150,000

to the brokerage firm that had helped him acquire RPLIC;

$21,0003 in a check payable to himself; $7,000 in cash to

himself; $15,0004 in three checks, one to himself and two to

his wife; and $50,0005 in a wire transfer to an account in

his name and that of his wife at the First Virginia Bank.

The funds from this last transfer were used to pay his

personal bills, including mortgage payments on a house.

Included in the above were the disbursements and transfers

that formed the basis for the five counts of wire fraud and

four counts of interstate transport of stolen property set

forth in the indictment. Newman subsequently made additional

transfers of funds from RPLIC,6 although these transfers

were not a part of the indictment. Although the purchase

agreement required Newman to seek DBR approval of the sale

immediately, he did not notify the DBR of the sale until

3. This sum formed the basis of count VI (interstate
transport).

4. These three checks formed the basis of counts VII
through IX (interstate transport).

5. This sum formed the basis of count V (wire fraud).

6. In January of 1990, Newman leased office space in
Washington D.C., for which Rumford Holdings paid the rent.
In February, Newman appointed himself the president, chief
executive officer, and chairman of the board of Rumford
Holdings, and began to draw an annual salary of $100,000.
Between February and July, Newman charged approximately
$50,000 in personal expenses on the Rumford Holdings credit
card.

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March of 1990. In April, the DBR sent a letter to Newman

demanding that he formally seek approval from the DBR by

filing a "Form A" by mid-April. Then in May, the DBR learned

that Newman had diverted nearly $490,000 of RPLIC's funds.

The DBR wrote Newman, notifying him that he had no authority

to divert the funds and demanding that he return the funds to

RPLIC immediately. After receiving no response from Newman,

the DBR in June of 1990 petitioned for an order placing RPLIC

in receivership.

Newman was indicted in February of 1991. The

government argued that Newman had acquired the company with

no intent of revitalizing it, but with the sole intent to

divert its assets for his own personal use. The government

contended that Newman knew that RPLIC was in financial

trouble and that the consent order precluded transfer of

RPLIC's assets, yet removed those assets without making any

attempt to provide the company with the needed capital

infusion.

Newman's defense at trial was that he was an

innocent victim who had been deceived by the other

participants involved in the purchase of RPLIC, namely, the

former owner, various RPLIC executives, and the broker of the

purchase. Newman claimed that he was unaware of RPLIC's dire

financial position and that his counsel had advised him that

the consent order did not apply to him. Newman further

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claimed that, after the purchase of RPLIC, he had tried

desperately to find investors to provide the necessary

capital, and that the transferred funds were simply loans

that he intended to repay. Newman also argued that he failed

to seek DBR approval because he believed he had more time

under the contract before he was required to do so.

The jury convicted Newman of all nine counts. In

September of 1991, the district judge sentenced Newman to

concurrent terms of 71 months for the four counts of

interstate transport of stolen property and 60 months for the

five counts of wire fraud. The judge also imposed concurrent

three-year terms of supervised release on the condition that

Newman pay $489,779 in restitution and the costs of his

supervised release.7

II.
II.

Newman argues that the district court made errors

at the trial and at sentencing. These errors can be grouped

into four categories: (1) the district court excluded

7. The government in its brief acknowledges that, although
Newman has not raised this point, the district court appears
to have erred in imposing the costs of supervised release.
Such costs constitute an additional fine that can only be
imposed in conjunction with a punitive fine. See United

States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 461 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,

115 S. Ct. 80 (1994). Because the district court did not
impose a fine, the government asks this court to vacate that
part of the judgment. United States v. Pineda, 981 F.2d 569,

576 (1st Cir. 1992). As requested, we accordingly vacate the
part of the sentence imposing the costs of supervised
release.

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evidence that should have been allowed; (2) the district

court allowed evidence that should have been excluded; (3)

the district court permitted the prosecutor to question

Newman unfairly; and (4) the district court erroneously

applied the sentencing guidelines. Only in the last category

do we find any claim of merit.

A. Improperly Excluded Evidence

Newman argues that the district court abused its

discretion in refusing to admit into evidence a series of

letters exchanged in May of 1990 between Newman and Daniel K.

Jackson & Associates, an investment firm. The correspondence

included a form filled out by Newman containing basic

information about RPLIC and requesting investment capital.

The correspondence also included a response from the company

indicating it was interested in perhaps arranging financing.

According to Newman, the correspondence was clearly relevant

in that it corroborated his testimony at trial that he was in

fact actively seeking capital investment for the continuing

operation of RPLIC. It would supposedly have rebutted the

government's contention that Newman had bought the company

with the sole intent of diverting its assets.

We agree with the government that the district

court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence

as irrelevant. The correspondence was exchanged in May of

1990, four months after Newman had purchased RPLIC and

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diverted its assets. Given the timing of the correspondence,

the district court could reasonably have found that it said

nothing about the relevant issue: Newman's state of mind at

the time of the purchase and diversion of assets. The

correspondence, moreover, was cumulative. Even assuming

arguendo its relevance, its exclusion was unprejudicial,

since Newman had already testified that he sought investment

financing from Daniel K. Jackson & Associates as well as a

number of other investment companies, and the government

never disputed this assertion.

Newman next argues that the district court abused

its discretion when it excluded certain proffered testimony

by the director of the DBR. This testimony concerned the

circumstances that led up to the consent orders entered into

with RPLIC prior to Newman's purchase of the company. The

district court concluded that this testimony was not relevant

to whether Newman had known of the consent orders. Newman

argues, however, that the testimony would have indicated that

the consent orders had been entered into prior to his

involvement with RPLIC and were directed primarily at RPLIC's

former owner. This, Newman suggests, would have bolstered

his claim that his lawyers had advised him that the consent

orders did not apply to him, thereby countering the

government's argument that Newman's flagrant violation of the

consent orders was evidence of his intent to defraud.

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Again, we think that this evidentiary ruling did

not constitute an abuse of discretion. The district court

could reasonably have concluded that the specific events that

led up to the consent orders were not relevant to whether

Newman was aware of the restrictions imposed by the decrees

at the time he purchased RPLIC. The testimony sought by

Newman concerned the events that led up to the consent order;

it did not suggest that Newman was unaware of the order or

the limits it imposed on the transfer of RPLIC's assets.

Indeed, the consent order clearly stated on its face the

restrictions imposed upon RPLIC, and it is undisputed that

Newman had read the order prior to his purchase of the

company. Newman, moreover, could not have been prejudiced by

exclusion of this testimony since there was already

considerable testimony from other witnesses concerning the

history of the consent orders.

Finally, Newman argues that the district court

abused its discretion when it excluded a DBR report from a

1987 investigation of RPLIC. The report indicated that RPLIC

was in financial trouble and that RPLIC's records were in

such disarray that it was difficult to determine whether

RPLIC was solvent. Newman contends that an RPLIC executive

first received a copy of this report in January of 1990, but

failed to show it to Newman (who by then had purchased the

company). Newman argues that the report is therefore

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relevant in that the failure to show it to him supports his

claim that the same executives withheld information about the

financial status of RPLIC from him before his decision to

purchase RPLIC.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in

excluding the report as irrelevant. The report was received

by RPLIC after Newman had already purchased the company and

thus says nothing about what information might have been

withheld from him before the purchase. The report, moreover,

was cumulative of other evidence and its exclusion could not

have prejudiced Newman. The record shows that Newman had

repeatedly been informed of RPLIC's precarious financial

state prior to his purchase of the company. In particular,

the $200,000 purchase price and the letter stating that

RPLIC's liabilities exceeded its assets would have told

Newman of RPLIC's situation.

B. Improperly Included Evidence

Newman argues that the district court erred in

allowing testimony by the government's witnesses to the

effect that Newman's actions violated the law. Specifically,

Newman points to the following three pieces of evidence:

1. a letter from the DBR director to
Newman dated May 16, 1990, stating: "It
has come to our attention . . . that
certain funds have been diverted from
these Companies in violation of the laws
of the State of Rhode Island . . . . The
transactions referred to are grave
violations of the insurance laws of the

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State of Rhode Island and subject both
the Companies and the individuals
involved to criminal penalties."

2. DBR legal counsel's testimony that
she told the broker of the sale of the
company "that I believed that he should
return [the broker's fee], because it had
been illegally appropriated."

3. RPLIC counsel's testimony that he
told RPLIC's comptroller that Newman
should return "the monies which had been
wrongfully taken immediately."

Newman argues that these statements amounted to legal

opinions about Newman's guilt, and were hence inadmissible

and extremely prejudicial in that they effectively told the

jury what result to reach. See, e.g., Hygh v. Jacobs, 961

F.2d 359, 363 (2d Cir. 1992); Torres v. County of Oakland,

758 F.2d 147, 150 (6th Cir. 1985); see also Marx & Co. v.

Diners' Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 512 (2d Cir.) ("It is not

for witnesses to instruct the jury as to applicable

principles of law, but for the judge."), cert. denied, 434

U.S. 861 (1977).

We agree that opinions as to the ultimate legal

issue of guilt or innocence are generally not admissible.

See, e.g., United States v. Espino, 32 F.3d 253, 257 (7th

Cir. 1994); Hogan v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 812

F.2d 409, 411-12 (8th Cir. 1987); Fed. R. Evid. 704 advisory

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committee's notes.8 However, Newman failed to object to the

first two statements, and, absent any objections, the

district court had little reason to exclude the statements on

its own accord. The above statements were not offered as

opinion testimony per se; rather, the DBR director's opinion

was part of a letter demanding that Newman return the

diverted assets, and the second statement was offered in the

ordinary course of describing certain events and discussions

surrounding the discovery of Newman's diversion of funds.

Without objection to the specific items, the district court

could well have concluded that the evidence, overall, was

helpful to the jury in understanding the course of events.

Admission of the first two statements clearly did not rise to

the level of plain error. See United States v. Williams, 809

F.2d 75, 82 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906

(1987).

Newman did object to the third statement, and while

its admission was erroneous, the error was harmless. The

8. Although Newman couches his argument in terms of
improper expert opinion (which he apparently argues is

inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 702), we construe his
argument as objecting to improper lay opinion (subject to

Fed. R. Evid. 701), since the above statements were not
offered as expert testimony. This does not significantly
alter Newman's argument, however, as ultimate legal opinion
may be equally inadmissible under both Fed. R. Evid. 701 and
702. See Fed. R. Evid. 704 advisory committee's notes

("Rules 701 and 702 . . . afford ample assurances against the
admission of opinions which would merely tell the jury what
result to reach . . . .").

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general concern with statements of ultimate legal opinions is

that juries may be confused or may accept the offered

opinions in lieu of the legal rulings of the judge. See 3

Jack Weinstein & Margaret Berger, Weinstein's Evidence

704[02] (1994). The third statement did not present this

risk. Like the second statement, it was made in the course

of describing events and discussions surrounding Newman's

diversion of the funds. The statement was made in passing

and was not held out as authoritative or expert opinion on

Newman's guilt for the charges on trial. See, e.g., Hygh,

961 F.2d 363 (finding that erroneous admission of legal

opinion was harmless error).

C. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Newman argues that the district court erred in

allowing the government to ask him grossly improper and

argumentative questions during the opening of the cross-

examination. Newman points to two specific sets of

questions. In the first, the prosecutor asked Newman if he

knew the meaning of the terms "intent" or "state of mind."

We find these questions to be clearly harmless. Indeed,

Newman does not indicate that this line of questioning

unfairly prejudiced him in any way.

The second set of questions is more troublesome:

PROSECUTOR: Do you know what a con man
is, sir?
NEWMAN: What a what, I'm sorry?
P: A con man, C-O-N?

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N: I've seen it on
television.
P: Is that the only place?
N: Yes.
P: Con man stands for
confidence man, is that
correct?
N: I don't know that.
P: You don't know that?
N: No.
P: Con game stands for
confidence game, doesn't
it?
N: If you say so, I don't
know that.
P: You don't know that?
N: No.
P: Are you telling this jury
you don't know what a con
man is?
N: I said I saw it on
television, I didn't
really know what the word
meant in the sense of what
it wasan abbreviation for.
P: And you don't know what
confidence game is?
N: I've heard of confidence
games, yes.
P: But you don't know what
they are?
N: Well, purely from the
superficial point of view.
P: Well, superficially a
confidence game is a game,
is it not, conducted by a
con man where through
certain representations or
through an absence of
providing certain
information, the victims
of the con game will do
something or refrain from
doing something that they
would otherwise do without
those misrepresentations,
correct?
N: Are you asking me if
that's the definition of a
con man?

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P: Is that an accurate
definition?
N: I don't know.
P: You were blessed with a
good education, is that
correct, sir?
N: I was blessed with an
education, yes, God
allowed me to get an
education, a good
education.

Newman argues that these questions had nothing to do with his

guilt or innocence, but were designed solely to discredit him

by insinuation. Newman argues that this constituted

prosecutorial misconduct and that the district court erred in

allowing it to occur. Newman urges us to use our supervisory

powers to reverse his conviction in order to deter future

such misconduct. See United States v. Capone, 683 F.2d 582,

585-86 (1st Cir. 1982). We agree with Newman that the

prosecutor's questions were extremely inappropriate. There

seems to have been no justifiable purpose for that line of

questioning, other than, as Newman suggests, to discredit him

by insinuation. Not directed at ascertaining any relevant

fact, the questions should not have been allowed.

Newman did not, however, object to the questioning.

Our review is therefore limited to determining if the judge's

failure to cut off the questioning sua sponte amounted to

plain error. See United States v. Smith, 982 F.2d 681, 682

(1st Cir. 1993). We conclude that they did not. See United

States v. Sgro, 816 F.2d 30, 34 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied

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484 U.S. 1063 (1988). The questioning was only a small part

of the lengthy cross-examination; it was isolated and not

characteristic of other questioning by the prosecutor. The

judge, on several occasions during the trial, advised the

jury that questions asked by the attorneys were not evidence.

The evidence of Newman's guilt was extensive. In all the

circumstances, the prosecutor's improper questions did not

"so poison[] the well" that the verdict was affected and a

new trial is required. See Smith, 982 F.2d at 682; Sgro, 816

F.2d at 34.

D. Sentencing Guidelines Errors

Newman argues that the district court wrongly

applied the sentencing guidelines. Specifically, the

district court allegedly erred: (1) in enhancing the sentence

for "abuse of a private trust"; (2) in enhancing the sentence

for violation of a consent order; and (3) in imposing

restitution in the amount of $489,779.

1. Abuse of Private Trust

Newman argues that the district court erred in

enhancing his sentence under U.S.S.G. 3B1.3 for abuse of a

position of private trust.9 The district court found that

9. U.S.S.G. 3B1.3 provides in relevant part:

If the defendant abused a position of
public or private trust . . . in a manner
that significantly facilitated the
commission or concealment of the offense,
increase by two levels.

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the insurance industry is heavily regulated and that persons

in control of insurance companies occupy a position of trust

which obligates them to act in the interests of their

policyholders and employees. The district court found that,

by diverting RPLIC's funds for his own use, Newman abused

this position of trust. Newman argues, however, that the

enhancement does not apply since he never legally occupied a

"position of trust." Newman argues that he technically never

obtained legal control of RPLIC, having failed to obtain

approval of the purchase from the DBR as required under Rhode

Island law. At most, Newman argues, the evidence suggests

that he committed an ordinary fraud. Never having occupied

the position legally, Newman argues, he cannot be subject to

the enhancement.10

While Newman may never have legally occupied the

position, he indisputably had de facto control over the

company and thus in fact occupied a position of trust. The

application note to the sentencing guidelines in effect at

the time of sentencing provides that: "[t]he position of

trust must have contributed in some substantial way to

10. The government argues that, although Newman objected to
this enhancement at sentencing, he did not object on this
precise ground and this argument is therefore not properly
preserved on appeal. See United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d

707, 717 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1005

(1993). Since it is not entirely clear to us that Newman
failed to object on this ground, we choose instead to dispose
of the claim on its merits.

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facilitating the crime and not merely have provided an

opportunity that could as easily have been afforded to other

persons." U.S.S.G. 3B1.3 comment. (n.1) (1991). Newman's

position and his effective discretionary control over the

company enabled him to transfer the funds for his own use.

This is exactly the type of behavior that the enhancement was

aimed at. It would be perverse to allow the lack of formal,

legal control, for which Newman was responsible by failing to

file the appropriate forms, to insulate him from the

consequences of his breach of trust. Cf. United States v.

Innamorati, 996 F.2d 456, 489-90 (1st Cir.), (former state

registry police officer subject to enhancement where prior

position of trust facilitated his crime), cert. denied, 114

S. Ct. 409 (1993).

Newman also argues that the enhancement cannot

apply to him since his acquisition of the position of trust

was itself a part of the crime. Drawing an analogy to cases

dealing with enhancements under 3B1.3 for abuse of "special

skills", see United States v. Young, 932 F.2d 1510, 1513-14

(D.C. Cir. 1991), he argues that the enhancement applies only

to the abuse of a preexisting position of trust, and

therefore cannot apply to him. However, even assuming

arguendo that this theory has validity, Newman misconstrues

the crimes of which he was convicted. He was not convicted

of the fraudulent acquisition of an insurance company.

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Rather, he was convicted of wire fraud and interstate

transport of stolen property, crimes which were substantially

facilitated by his prior acquisition of control over the

insurance company. His abuse of the position was precisely

the behavior targeted by the enhancement. We find no error

in the application of this sentence enhancement.

2. Violation of Consent Order

Newman further argues that the district court erred

in imposing a two-level increase under U.S.S.G.

2F1.1(b)(3)(B) for a knowing violation of the consent

order.11 Newman argues that the enhancement applies only

when a defendant violates an order directed at the defendant

personally or at an entity that is controlled by the

defendant. Newman argues that the order was not directed at

him personally nor was he a party to the order, as it was

entered into prior to his purchase of the company. Newman

further argues, as above, that he never legally controlled

RPLIC, since the DBR never approved the sale. Accordingly,

Newman argues, the enhancement could not apply to him.

We find no error in the district court's

application of this enhancement. The commentary to the

11. U.S.S.G. 2F1.1(b)(3)(B) provides in relevant part:

If the offense involved . . . violation
of any judicial or administrative order,
injunction, decree or process, increase
by two levels.

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guidelines provides: "If it is established that an entity the

defendant controlled was a party to the prior proceeding, and

the defendant had knowledge of the prior decree or order,

this provision applies even if the defendant was not a

specifically-named party in that prior case." U.S.S.G.

2F1.1, comment. (n.5) (1991). Even though not a party to the

order, Newman was subject to the enhancement if he controlled

the company and knew of the prior order. As already said,

Newman had de facto control of the company. Moreover, he was

aware of the consent order and could be found to have acted

in deliberate contravention of it. Newman's violation of the

order was thus subject to enhancement under

2F1.1.(b)(3)(B).12

3. Restitution

Newman argues that the district court erred in

ordering, as a condition of his supervised release,

restitution in the amount of $489,179 under the Victim and

Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663-3664 (1988). Newman

first argues that the court erred when it failed to consider

Newman's inability to pay restitution. In fashioning a

restitution order, a court must consider "the amount of the

12. Newman additionally argues that the enhancement does not
apply since it requires that the defendant have controlled
the entity at the time the order was entered into. The

guideline, however, contains no such requirement of
contemporaneousness, and Newman cites no cases imposing such
a requirement.

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loss sustained by any victim as a result of the offense, the

financial resources of the defendant, the financial needs and

earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's

dependents, and such other factors as the court deems

appropriate." 18 U.S.C. 3664(a) (1988). Newman argues

that nothing in the district court opinion indicates that the

court considered Newman's financial resources. Newman points

to his presentence report which indicates that he is

currently indigent, has a negative net worth, and "has little

current ability to pay a fine."13 Newman further argues

that he has no reasonable prospect of paying the restitution

in the future. Accordingly, he argues, the district court's

imposition of restitution despite evidence of his inability

to pay evinced a lack of adequate consideration of the

statutory factors and constituted abuse of discretion. See

United States v. McIlvain, 967 F.2d 1479, 1481 (10th Cir.

1992); United States v. Ramilo, 986 F.2d 333, 336 (9th Cir.

1993).

13. The presentence investigation report detailed Newman's
employment history and then stated: that Newman's only asset
is $50,000 in equity in his former residence; that Newman has
$68,000 in outstanding liabilities; that Newman has no
current income; and that Newman's monthly expenses are
currently $1,476. The report concluded: "Based upon the
defendant's financial profile, it would appear that he has
little current ability to pay a fine; however, once his legal
matters are resolved, he would be in a position to secure
gainful employment."

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Although the district court did not explicitly

consider Newman's ability to pay the restitution, the court

was not required to make specific findings of fact. See

United States v. Savoie, 985 F.2d 612, 618 (1st Cir. 1992).

Rather, it is sufficient if "the record on appeal reveals

that the judge made implicit findings or otherwise adequately

evinced his consideration of those factors." Id. Here, the

record is sufficient to indicate that the district court

considered the requisite factors in arriving at the

restitution amount. The district court considered and

explicitly adopted the findings in the presentence report,

which included information about Newman's financial

condition, earning ability, and ability to pay. Although we

agree that the evidence in the presentence report may not be

able to support a finding that Newman has the ability to pay

restitution in that amount, the statute does not require such

a finding; it requires only that the district court consider

the defendant's financial resource as a factor in arriving at

the figure. See United States v. Lombardi, 5 F.3d 568, 573

(1st Cir. 1993). Newman's possible future ability to pay may

also be sufficient to support a restitution order. See

United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 461 (1st Cir.)

(imposing $500,000 restitution order, even though defendant

had no current ability to pay, based on defendant's future

prospects of employment), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 80 (1994);

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Lombardi, 5 F.3d at 573. Here, the presentence report stated

that "once [Newman's] legal matters are resolved, he would be

in a position to secure gainful employment." Thus, we cannot

say that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court

to impose restitution. See Lombardi, 5 F.3d at 573 ("While

the judgment requiring restitution may be fruitless, it may

also be of some use if [the defendant] ever secures new

assets . . . . In all events, the statute merely requires

the court to 'consider' financial condition, among other

factors; there is no requirement that the defendant be found

able to pay now.") (citations omitted).

Newman further argues that, even if the district

court adequately considered his ability to pay, the court

erred in fixing the amount of restitution at $489,179, as

that amount far exceeds the unlawful transfers for which he

was convicted. Newman notes that, in this circuit,

restitution under the pre-November 1990 version of 3663(a)

is limited only to loss caused by the conduct for which the

defendant has been convicted. United States v. Cronin, 990

F.2d 663, 666 (1st Cir. 1993).14 The $489,179 represents

all of the sums paid out by RPLIC as a result of Newman's

fraudulent scheme. However, the indictment charges Newman

14. As the offenses occurred in 1989 and early 1990, Newman
is subject to the restitution statute as it stood prior to
amendment in November of 1990 by Pub. L. No. 101-647, 2509,
104 Stat. 4789, 4863 (1990).

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only with the diversion of $184,300. Thus, Newman argues,

the court erred in charging Newman with the entire sum.

We agree. Under the law in this circuit, the

district court should have fixed the amount of restitution at

$184,300, the amount that Newman was convicted of diverting.

See Cronin, 990 F.2d at 666. The government concedes that

under Cronin restitution is limited to that lesser sum, but

urges nonetheless that we adopt the alternative position,

taken by a minority of circuits, under which a court may

award restitution for all of the harm caused by the scheme to

defraud, not simply the specific harm for which the defendant

was convicted. See, e.g., United States v. Stouffer, 986

F.2d 916, 929 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 115

(1993). In most circumstances, a panel in this circuit is

bound to adhere to precedent established by a prior panel

unless departure is mandated legislatively or by the Supreme

Court. The en banc court alone can reconsider circuit

precedent. We follow our precedent in Cronin.

III.
III.

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm Newman's

conviction. We also affirm all aspects of Newman's sentence

except: (1) the restitution order, which we direct the

district court to reduce from $489,179 to $184,300; and (2)

the order to pay the costs of supervised release, which we

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direct the district court to vacate per the government's

request, see supra, note 7.

So ordered.

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