Coll v. PB Diagnostic Systems, Inc.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 94-1680

WILLIAM G. COLL,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

PB DIAGNOSTIC SYSTEMS, INC.,

Defendant - Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge,

Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Stahl, Circuit Judge.

David Rapaport, with whom Rapaport & Rapaport, was on brief

for appellant.
Scott C. Moriearty, with whom Laurie F. Rubin and Bingham,

Dana & Gould, were on brief for appellee.

March 30, 1995

TORRUELLA, Chief Judge. This appeal comes to us on the
TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.

basis of diversity jurisdiction. The parties agree that it is

governed by the substantive law of the state of Massachusetts.

The plaintiff is the former chief executive officer of the

defendant corporation, and his claims stem from an alleged breach

of his employment agreement with the defendant. Specifically,

the plaintiff maintains that the district court improperly

granted the defendant's summary judgment motion because there

were genuine issues of material fact as to whether 1) the

defendant breached its agreement to create a long-term incentive

plan and communicate its goals to the plaintiff; 2) the doctrine

of promissory estoppel required that the defendant create a long-

term incentive plan; 3) the defendant fired the plaintiff in bad

faith, in order to deprive him of a benefit to which he was

entitled; and 4) the defendant deceived the plaintiff concerning

its intention to establish a long-term incentive plan. For the

following reasons, we affirm the district court's grant of

summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND
I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff William G. Coll ("Coll") sued defendant PB

Diagnostic Systems, Inc. ("PB") in the United States District

Court for the District of Massachusetts. Coll asserted various

claims regarding PB's alleged promise to develop a long-term

incentive bonus program in connection with Coll's employment as

PB's Chief Executive Officer ("CEO"). After extensive discovery,

the court granted PB's motion for summary judgment.

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Although the parties heatedly dispute many of the

issues on appeal, the facts central to our inquiry are largely

uncontroverted.1 The defendant, PB, was founded in 1985 to

develop and market medical diagnostic instruments. PB was

started as a joint venture owned in equal shares by Polaroid

Corporation ("Polaroid") and a German company called

Behringwerke, A.G. ("Behring"). In 1987, PB representatives

contacted the plaintiff, Coll, and informed him that PB was

looking for a CEO to run the start-up company.

A. Pre-hire statements
A. Pre-hire statements

Coll agreed to an interview to discuss the position,

and met with PB Board Chairman Peter Kliem ("Kliem") and

Polaroid's Donald Fronzaglia ("Fronzaglia") at the Pillar House

restaurant. Coll expressed concern that PB would not be able to

offer him an equity share in the company because it was a "50/50"

joint venture. Kliem confirmed that PB could not offer an equity

share in the company, but explained that PB intended to create a

Long Term Incentive Plan ("LTIP") that would give the CEO the

opportunity to earn up to $1,000,000 provided that PB met certain

performance goals. Kliem indicated that PB did not yet have the

LTIP in place, but that the company looked forward to developing

it with the new CEO. In his deposition, Coll admits that he

understood this to mean that any payout under the LTIP would be

1 Much of the factual background recited here comes from PB's
Statement of Material Facts Concerning Which There Is No Genuine
Triable Issue, the remainder coming from our scrutiny of the
exhibits and depositions.

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contingent upon the achievement of yet-to-be-defined performance

goals. Coll also testified that he understood that PB had not

yet extended him an employment offer.

B. The offer letters
B. The offer letters

After meeting with several other PB representatives,

Coll determined that he was interested in managing PB. On

December 4, 1987, Kliem sent Coll a letter offering Coll the CEO

position at PB (the "First Offer Letter"). The First Offer

Letter set forth the salary and annual bonus to be paid Coll, and

further stated: "It is our intent, that in 1989, we would jointly

engage in establishing criteria to appropriately reflect your

direct contribution to the success of the venture in 1990." Coll

called Fronzaglia and expressed his concern that the First Offer

Letter did not adequately address the LTIP or what would happen

in the event that the venture failed.

In response to Coll's concerns, Kliem sent Coll another

offer letter, dated December 14, 1989 (the "Second Offer

Letter"). This letter stated:

As we have discussed, we are pleased
to confirm our offer of employment as
General Manager, PB Diagnostic Systems,
Inc. (PBDS, Inc.) . . . .

You will be an employee of PBDS, Inc.
at a starting salary of $160,000.00 per
year, with a guaranteed bonus of
$40,000.00 per year for 1988 and 1989,
payable on your first and second
anniversary of employment. You must be
an employee of PBDS, Inc. on those dates
to receive payment of these bonuses.

During 1989, we intend to jointly

explore with you appropriate methods of

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compensation to reflect your contribution

to the success of the venture in 1990 and

beyond.

In the event PBDS, Inc. initiates your
termination of employment in the period
between your employment date and
December 31st, 1989, PBDS, Inc. will
provide you one year's base salary.

Further, in the event of your
separation, for any reason, you will
refrain from working directly or
indirectly for a competitor in the field
of medical diagnostics for a period of
one year. This provision, of course,
will not apply if PBDS, Inc. has chosen
to cease this joint venture.

For purposes of administration only,
Polaroid Corporation will provide
benefits in areas of medical and dental
insurance, life insurance and 401K
savings plans.

We are enthusiastic about your
contribution and leadership as we look
forward to the long-term success of PBDS,
Inc.

(emphasis added).

After Coll received the Second Offer Letter, he

telephoned Fronzaglia and accepted the offer. During this

conversation, Fronzaglia said: "Does that take care of it?" Coll

replied, "You and I understand what it is, so I guess it's O.K."

Coll admitted in his deposition that at that time he believed

that the Second Offer Letter incorporated all the terms and

conditions of his employment, and that he believed that there was

no material difference between the First and Second Offer Letters

with regard to the LTIP.

C. Coll's tenure at PB
C. Coll's tenure at PB

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In October 1988, the PB Board of Directors formed a

Compensation Committee to develop compensation packages for PB's

senior executives. In April 1989, the Compensation Committee

developed an executive compensation proposal which included an

Annual Bonus Plan and a LTIP. The proposal, which was shown to

Coll prior to being presented to the Board of Directors, included

a payout package that gave Coll the opportunity to earn over

$1,000,000 in incentive compensation.

On April 20, 1989, PB's Board of Directors met and

unanimously approved both the Annual Bonus Plan and the LTIP.

Payout under the LTIP was contingent upon the achievement of

certain long term goals, described in the LTIP as:

Milestones as developed by PBDS in
accordance with the business plan and
subject to approval of the Board.
Evaluation of business progress made by
the Board prior to the 1992 and 1994
payouts.

On July 18, 1989, in response to the Board's request, Coll

submitted a written memorandum suggesting payout milestones for

the LTIP:

The Board of Directors has approved
conceptually a LTIP for PBDS senior staff
(7 persons). The Board has also approved
specific funding for this Plan, 1/3
payable in 1992 and 2/3 payable in 1994.
Per your request, we have considered
targets appropriate to such a long term
plan and our recommendation follows.

Since the Annual Bonus Plan has
targets approved each year which are
tactical and short-term in nature, we
believe that the company's interests can
be best served by emphasizing strategic
and results-oriented goals in the Long

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Term Plan.

For 1992 (year end), criteria should
include
-entrance into US market
-entrance into European market
-profitability
-positive cash flow

Criteria for 1994,
-profitability at "x" level or better
-internal rate of return at "y%" or
better

I look forward to discussing with you the
utilization of these strategic goals.

PB claims that in October 1989, its Board of Directors

considered and approved the goals proposed by Coll for the LTIP.

The relevant minutes from this meeting read: "Various

compensation and incentive matters were discussed and approved."

In April 1990, Coll presented his revised five-year

business plan for PB, projecting "profitability" and "positive

cash flow" by the end of 1992. A year later, it became clear

that PB would not meet the profitability and positive cash flow

goals embodied in the revised five-year plan. To the contrary,

PB suffered tremendous losses in the years 1989, 1990, 1991, and

1992. On April 4, 1991, Coll wrote to the Compensation

Committee, proposing to lower the original goals of the LTIP:

This memo will address several issues
related to the [LTIP] and to the
discussion points raised at the
Compensation Committee meeting on
March 27, 1991. . . .

1. The goals originally established

for the 1992 payout of the [LTIP] are

conceptually satisfactory. The goal of

"entrance into the US market" is already
met and the goal of "entrance into the

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European market" is well underway.
Perhaps the more critical goals are,
however, "profitability" and "positive
cash flow." I believe that we should use
the concepts of profitability and
positive cash flow, but that we should
look at these numbers not as absolute
dollar amounts within absolute time-
frames, but as measures of progress
against marketplace, product and business
goals. To state that "our goal is to
become profitable and to have positive
cash flow by Q4, 1992" is an excellent
tool to motivate managers and their
organizations and we have communicated
profitability and cash flow goals and
responsibilities to our employees. . . .

Certainly, we will not use these tools
indiscriminately and without the
concurrence of the Board. Further, we
agree that we must continuously show
positive results in profitability and
cash flow. As a result, the management
should be measured against its ability to
deliver positive profitability on the
incremental shipments/revenue that are
made in 1992.

. . . .

Therefore, my recommendations for the
goals are
-entrance into US market
-entrance into European market
-25% operating profit on incremental 1991
to 1992 revenues

. . . .

(emphasis added).

PB's Board of Directors was scheduled to meet on

September 5, 1991. Just prior to this meeting, Coll submitted a

lengthy memo in which he again proposed to lower the targets of

the LTIP. He informed the Board that the current targets of the

LTIP were unattainable and that, therefore, the LTIP was unlikely

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to create the desired incentives. He urged the Board to lower

the targets of the LTIP so that there would be a potential in

1992 for payout under the LTIP. In pertinent part, the memo read

as follows:

Background: In 1989 the Board
approved the basic Long Term Incentive
(LTI) plan concepts, including the split
of goals to effect 1992 and 1994
payments. At that time, the targets for
1992 were suggested to be:
-entrance into US market
-entrance into European market
-profitability
-positive cash flow

. . . .

Half of the goals cited above will not be
met. . . . Profitability and positive
cash flow are now forecast for 1993, not
1992.

The retentive and motivational
capabilities of the LTI are therefore
compromised for 1992, and the original
reason the Compensation Committee had for
designing a 1992 payment was to "keep
people interested."

The dilemma therefore is do we keep a

plan that in its current construct is

unlikely to fulfill its purpose?

Do we keep the original plan or do we
review other options?

. . . .

(emphasis added).

At its September 5, 1991, meeting, the Board considered

Coll's proposal and rejected it. The minutes of that meeting

read as follows:

A management proposal to replace the
Company's Long-Term Incentive Plan was

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considered. The existing Plan appears
unlikely to produce incentive
compensation payments under the Company's
present business forecasts. The
management proposed replacing the plan
with one that would provide realistic
incentives to the Company's management.

. . . Directors pointed out the
inadvisability of lowering the objectives
of an incentive plan to match lowered
performance expectations. . . .

After further discussion, the Board did
not accept the proposal to modify the
current plan. The Board approved in
principle the adoption of a successor
long-term incentive compensation plan for
later years, with the prospect of a one-
third payout in 1993 and a two-thirds
payout in 1995.

D. Coll's termination
D. Coll's termination

On January 14, 1992, Coll's employment at PB was

terminated by unanimous decision of the Board of Directors. PB

wrote Coll, explaining that the sponsor companies -- Polaroid and

Behring -- were disappointed with PB's business performance.

Nevertheless, the letter explained, because Coll's termination

was due in part to corporate restructuring, PB would pay Coll one

year's salary as a lump sum severance payment, in accordance with

his employment contract. Moreover, the letter continued, "in the

unlikely event of a payout under the long term bonus plan, you

will be eligible for participation on a pro-rated basis." PB

never achieved the two of the four goals originally proposed by

Coll to be the 1992 targets of the LTIP.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment

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de novo and read the record in a light most favorable to the

non-moving party, drawing all inferences in the non-moving

party's favor. LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841

(1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 1398,

128 L.Ed.2d 72 (1994). Summary judgment is appropriate when "the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A "material" fact is one "that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law."

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct.

2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute about a material

fact is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.

Essentially, Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment

"against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party's

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct.

2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The nonmoving party "may not

rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the . . . pleadings,

but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). See Anderson,

477 U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct. at 2510.

We have advocated a cautious approach to summary

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judgment motions where issues of motive and intent must be

resolved. Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 109 (1st

Cir. 1988). Nevertheless, "[e]ven in cases where elusive

concepts such as motive or intent are at issue, summary judgment

may be appropriate if the nonmoving party rests merely upon

conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported

speculation." Medina-Mu oz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896

F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION
III. DISCUSSION

A. The Contract Claim
A. The Contract Claim

The crux of Coll's breach of contract claim is that PB

breached its agreement to implement a long-term incentive plan.

He further alleges that the parties' agreement required PB to

communicate to Coll the goals on which the incentive bonuses

would be premised, and that PB failed to do so.

To recover damages for breach of contract at trial,

Coll would have been required to demonstrate (1) that the parties

reached a valid and binding agreement with regard to the LTIP;

(2) that PB breached the terms of this aspect of his employment

contract; and (3) that he suffered damages from the breach. To

survive PB's summary judgment motion, Coll was required to put

forth competent evidence on each of these issues.

The district court offered alternate holdings in

support of its summary judgment ruling against Coll. As one

basis, the district court held that Coll's employment agreement

did not obligate PB to create and implement a LTIP but, rather,

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was only a non-binding "agreement to agree." As an alternative

basis, the district court found that, even assuming that the

parties reached a binding agreement regarding the LTIP, PB had

not breached it. The court held that the contract merely

obligated PB to "jointly explore . . . appropriate methods of

compensation to reflect [Coll's] contribution to the success of

the venture in 1990 and beyond," and that PB had fulfilled this

obligation.

The pertinent law is well settled. "Under

Massachusetts law, interpretation of a contract is ordinarily a

question of law for the court." Fairfield 274-278 Clarendon

Trust v. Dwek, 970 F.2d 990, 993 (1st Cir. 1992) (quoting Edmonds

v. United States, 642 F.2d 877, 881 (1st Cir. 1981) (citing

Freedlander v. G. & K. Realty Corp., 357 Mass. 512, 516, 258

N.E.2d 786, 788 (1970))). "Only if the contract is ambiguous is

there an issue of fact for the jury." Id. (citing cases).

"Moreover, where the contract is unambiguous, it is to be

enforced according to its terms." Id. (citing cases). In the

absence of fraud or mistake, an agreement is presumed to express

the intent of the parties. Id. (citing Hess Oil & Chemical Corp.

v. Ristuccia, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 772, 772, 331 N.E.2d 823, 823

(1975)).

"Evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral agreements

cannot be admitted to vary or modify the terms of an unambiguous

written contract." Fairfield 274-278 Clarendon Trust, 970 F.2d

at 993 (citing New England Financial Resources, Inc. v.

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Coulouras, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 140, 145, 566 N.E.2d 1136, 1139

(1991) (parol evidence rule precludes use of oral evidence to

modify integrated agreement)). Moreover, "parol evidence may not

be used to 'create ambiguity where none otherwise exists.'" Rey

v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1385 (1st Cir.) (quoting Boston Car

Co. v. Acura Auto. Div., American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 971 F.2d

811, 815 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 94 (1993)).

Instead, "parties are bound by the plain terms of their

contract," Hiller v. Submarine Signal Co., 325 Mass. 546, 550,

91 N.E.2d 667, 669 (1950), and their subjective contemplations

are immaterial where the agreement is unambiguous. Blakeley v.

Pilgrim Packing Co., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 19, 24, 340 N.E.2d 511, 514

(1976).

Language within a contract "is usually considered

ambiguous where an agreement's terms are inconsistent on their

face or where the phraseology can support reasonable

difference[s] of opinion as to the meaning of the words employed

and obligations undertaken." Rey, 990 F.2d at 1384. "Where

possible, words should be given their natural meaning, consistent

with the tenor of contractual terms." Fashion House, Inc. v. K

Mart Corp., 892 F.2d 1076, 1084 (1st Cir. 1989).

Of course, the parol evidence rule only applies where

the parties have created a partially or completely integrated

document. Restatement (Second) of Contracts 213.2 An

2 "(1) A binding integrated agreement discharges prior
agreements to the extent that it is inconsistent with them. (2)
A binding completely integrated agreement discharges prior

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integrated agreement is a writing that constitutes a final

expression of one or more terms of an agreement. See id. 209.

"Where the parties reduce an agreement to a writing which in view

of its completeness and specificity reasonably appears to be a

complete agreement, it is taken to be an integrated agreement

unless it is established by other evidence that the writing did

not constitute a final expression." Id.; see also Ryder v.

Williams, 29 Mass. App.Ct. 146, 150, 558 N.E.2d 1134,1136 (1990).

With regard to long-term incentive compensation, Coll's

employment contract contains the following language: "During

1989, we intend to jointly explore with you appropriate methods

of compensation to reflect your contribution to the success of

the venture in 1990 and beyond." Coll maintains that this

language embodies a previously reached agreement on the subject

and thus obligated PB to develop a LTIP, establish clear and

reasonable goals for the plan, and communicate those goals to

Coll. He relies on his contractual negotiations as evidence that

PB intended to obligate itself to create a LTIP that would

provide Coll with the opportunity to earn at least $1,000,000 in

incentive compensation. To prevail on this theory, Coll

initially must show either (1) that his employment contract with

PB was not an integrated agreement with respect to incentive

compensation, or (2) that the contractual language is consistent

with his assertions. We think he has done neither.

agreements to the extent that they are within its scope."
Restatement (Second) of Contracts 213.

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All the relevant evidence indicates that the employment

contract was an integrated and final expression of the parties'

agreement with respect to compensation matters. The agreement

lists Coll's base salary, his annual bonus, his severance

compensation, and a non-competition agreement. In short, the

face of the document contains nothing that would indicate that

the parties did not intend it to be a complete and final

expression of their rights and obligations. Moreover, Coll

admitted in his deposition that he thought at the time that the

contract embodied all the material terms and conditions of his

employment. Given these considerations, we find that Coll's

employment agreement was an integrated document subject to the

tenets of the parol evidence rule, and as such must be enforced

according to its terms unless the terms are ambiguous on their

face.

Coll asserts that the relevant contractual language is

ambiguous and should be submitted to the jury to determine

whether it obligated PB to develop a LTIP and communicate its

goals to Coll. We disagree. The clear language of the contract

states only that PB "intend[s] to jointly explore with [Coll]

appropriate methods of compensation." Any ambiguity in this

language centers around whether it obligates PB to do anything.

Assuming it creates a binding obligation,3 the language clearly

3 As we stated above, the district court held that the parties
had merely created a non-binding agreement to agree with respect
to long-term compensation. For the purposes of this appeal, we
assume arguendo that the language is binding, and base our
analysis on whether PB breached its contractual obligations.

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does not support Coll's assertions. To turn the words "we intend

to jointly explore appropriate methods of compensation" into a

binding obligation to develop, fund, and implement a LTIP that

would provide up to $1,000,000 of incentive compensation would be

completely at odds with the common and natural meaning of the

words. Rather, we assume that the parties intended what they

wrote: that PB intended to make a good faith effort to explore an

appropriate compensation package for Coll, including incentive

bonuses.

The evidence presented for summary judgment

demonstrates clearly that PB fulfilled this obligation. Not only

did it explore new incentive packages, it developed and funded a

LTIP plan for Coll and his senior executives. And although Coll

disputes the point, the evidence shows that Coll himself proposed

the plan's goals, which PB failed to meet under his stewardship.

Under these circumstances, there was no breach of contract and

summary judgment on that claim was certainly appropriate.

B. The promissory estoppel claim
B. The promissory estoppel claim

As an alternative to his contract claim, Coll argues

that he is entitled to damages on the basis of promissory

estoppel. Specifically, Coll alleges that during contract

negotiations PB promised to develop a LTIP in order to persuade

Coll to accept the CEO position at PB. The district court

Because we conclude that there was no breach, we need not address
whether the employment contract was in fact binding regarding
long-term compensation or whether it was, as the district court
found, merely a non-binding agreement to agree.

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rejected Coll's promissory estoppel claim, holding that Coll

could not have reasonably relied on the pre-hire discussions

regarding the LTIP. We agree.

"An element of promissory estoppel is that the party

invoking it must have reasonably relied on the alleged promise to

his detriment."4 Hall v. Horizon House Microwave, 506 N.E.2d

178, 184 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987)(emphasis added). Where a written

statement conflicts with a prior oral representation, reliance on

the oral representation is generally held to be unreasonable.

See Trifiro v. New York Life Insurance Co., 845 F.2d 30, 33-34

(1st Cir. 1988)("The conflicting content of [the defendant's]

oral statement with [his] written statement . . . should have

placed [the plaintiff] on notice that he should not rely on

either statement."). As this Court has noted,

[c]onfronted by such conflict a
reasonable person investigates matters
further; he receives assurances or
clarification before relying. A
reasonable person does not gamble with
the law of the excluded middle, he
suspends judgment until further evidence
is obtained. Explicit conflict engenders
doubt, and to rely on a statement the
veracity of which one should doubt is
unreasonable. The law does not supply
epistemological insurance. Nor does it

4 "The theory of promissory estoppel, as embodied in the
Restatement [(First)] of Contracts 90 (1932), permits recovery
if (1) a promisor makes a promise which he should reasonably
expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and
substantial character on the part of the promisee, (2) the
promise does induce such action or forbearance, and (3) injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." Loranger

Construction Corp. v. E.F. Hauserman Co., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 152,

154, 374 N.E.2d 306, 308, aff'd, 376 Mass. 757, 384 N.E.2d 176

(Mass. 1978) (citations omitted).

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countenance reliance on one of a pair of
contradictories simply because it
facilitates the achievement of one's
goal.

Id.

In a case similar to the one at bar, an employee sought

entitlement to stock options allegedly promised him during

compensation-package negotiations with his employer. Hall, 506

N.E.2d at 184. In rejecting the promissory estoppel claim, the

court held that "[g]iven the extended and persistently

inconclusive nature of his negotiations . . . about an over-all

employment and compensation package, [the plaintiff] could not

have had more than a well founded hope that the stock option

aspect of the deal would work out satisfactorily for him.

Inchoate negotiations are no better basis for reliance than for

an action on the purported contract as such." Id. (citing Tull

v. Mister DonutDev. Corp., 389 N.E.2d 447 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979)).

Assuming arguendo that PB in fact promised Coll that it

would create a LTIP worth $1,000,000, Coll could not have

reasonably relied on it. Coll's employment offer was clearly at

odds with his understanding of PB's prior oral representations

regarding long-term compensation. Upon receipt of the First

Offer Letter, Coll called PB and raised his concern that the

language in the offer did not seem to obligate PB to create a

LTIP that could pay him up to $1,000,000.5 When the Second

5 The First Offer Letter stated, in pertinent part: "It is our
intent, that in 1989, we would jointly engage in establishing
criteria to appropriately reflect your direct contribution to the
success of the venture in 1990."

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Offer Letter essentially rephrased the same noncommittal language

contained in its predecessor, Coll should have been aware that

there was a potential disagreement over the LTIP. Nevertheless,

Coll acquiesced to the language in the Second Offer Letter,

purportedly because he did not want PB to think that he did not

trust them. He cannot now second-guess his negotiating strategy

and claim the benefit of a bargain he did not negotiate. As we

discussed above, the language in the Second Offer Letter clearly

did not obligate PB to do anything more than explore the

feasibility of a LTIP. Moreover, Coll admitted that, despite the

concerns he had raised, he recognized that the terms of the offer

letters were essentially identical regarding long-term

compensation. In short, PB's refusal to "firm up" the language

regarding long-term compensation rendered any reliance on prior

oral representations unreasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the

district court's grant of summary judgment for PB on Coll's

promissory estoppel claim.6

C. The bad-faith-termination claim
C. The bad-faith-termination claim

Lastly, we turn to Coll's claim that PB fired him in

bad faith in order to deprive him of a benefit to which he was

entitled.

Under Massachusetts law, the implied covenant of good

faith and fair dealing prohibits an employer from terminating an

6 Coll's claim for deceit also fails because, like promissory
estoppel, it requires that the plaintiff demonstrate reasonable
reliance. See Trifiro, 845 F.2d at 33-34. Accordingly, we

affirm the district court's summary judgment ruling on this issue
as well.

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employee in order to deprive him of a benefit to which he is

entitled. Fortune v. National Cash Register, Inc., 364 N.E.2d

1251, 1257 (Mass. 1977). Essentially, "[a]n employer may not

discharge an employee in order to . . . reap for itself financial

benefits due [the] employee." Maddaloni v. Western Mass. Bus

Lines, Inc., 438 N.E.2d 351, 356 (Mass. 1982)(citing Fortune, 364

N.E.2d 1251). An employer's obligation of good faith and fair

dealing imposes liability for the loss of compensation clearly

related to an employee's past service when that employee is

discharged without good cause. Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,

429 N.E.2d 21, 27-29 (Mass. 1981). As we noted in Biggins,

[T]he Gram court was careful to

distinguish between recovery based on the
employee's loss of future wages for past
services, and any claim for recovery
based on loss of future income for future
services. The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court explicitly limited this
theory of "wrongful discharge" to
situations in which the employee's
discharge without good cause deprives the
employee of compensation for services
previously earned or past services.

Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co., 953 F.2d 1405, 1416 (1st Cir. 1992)

(discussing Gram, 429 N.E.2d at 27-29). Fortune liability does

not encompass situations where the employee merely was fired

arbitrarily. Id. Rather, in order to establish a claim of

wrongful termination, the plaintiff must demonstrate that his

discharge was "contrived to despoil [him] of earned commission or

similar compensation due for past services." Id.

In the present case, we do not find that Coll's

termination deprived him of any particular benefit to which he

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was entitled. Coll contends that because his termination

occurred just as he was "pressing [PB's Board] to define the

goals of the LTIP," there is a genuine issue as to whether the

Board terminated him to avoid paying him nearly $1,000,000 under

the LTIP. Brief for Appellant at 44. The undisputed facts do

not support this contention. Coll's own writings indicate that

two of the four goals of the LTIP would not be met, and that

there was thus no potential for payout in 1992 under the LTIP:

"Half of the goals . . . will not be met . . . . Profitability

and positive cash flow are now forecast for 1993, not 1992. The

retentive and motivational capabilities of the LTI are therefore

compromised for 1992 . . . ." The Board's minutes echo this: "A

management proposal to replace the Company's Long-Term Incentive

Plan was considered. The existing Plan appears unlikely to

produce incentive compensation payments under the Company's

present business forecasts." Accordingly, we agree with the

district court that Coll's termination did not strip him of

compensation due for past services, and affirm the dismissal of

Coll's wrongful termination claim.

We have considered the other issues raised by Coll and

find them equally meritless.

Affirmed.

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