Figueroa v. Vose

June 13, 1995
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES OF COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRUIT

No. 94-1578

BERNARDO FIGUEROA,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

GEORGE VOSE, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Timothy M. Boudewyns U.S. Magistrate Judge]

Before

Selya, Circuit Judge,

Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, and

Boudin, Circuit Judge.

Bernardo Figueroa on brief pro se.

David J. Gentile, Esq., On Memorandum In Support of Motion for

Summary Disposition for appellees.

Per Curiam. Bernardo Figueroa appeals from the

district court's decision that a prison disciplinary board

did not violate his federal due process rights under 42

U.S.C. 1983 when it found him guilty of planning to murder

Captain Ronald Brodeur, a correction officer. We affirm.

Since the facts have been described in the district court's

opinion, we do not repeat them here except as is necessary to

explain our affirmance. We turn immediately to Figueroa's

contentions on appeal.

1. Notice of Time of Disciplinary Hearing

Figueroa claims that he was not given a required

24-hour notice of his disciplinary hearing and that delivery

of the disciplinary report to him two days before the hearing

was insufficient notice. Federal law does not require 24-

hour advance notice of a disciplinary hearing, however. It

requires only that inmates be given written notice of the

charges against them at least 24 hours before the

disciplinary hearing. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,

564 (1974). This court has said that delivering a

disciplinary report describing the charges against an inmate

to the inmate meets that requirement. See Langton v. Berman,

667 F.2d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 1981). Since Figueroa does not

dispute that he received a copy of the disciplinary report

describing the charge against him two days before the

disciplinary hearing, the district court correctly concluded

that the notice given to Figueroa satisfied due process.1

2. Provision of Interpreter

Figueroa alleges that he should have been given a

Spanish-speaking counselor to assist him at the disciplinary

hearing rather than an English-speaking counselor. He

acknowledges that he understands English, except for an

occasional word, but says he does not speak English well and

so could not participate "fully" in the hearing. (His spoken

English can be hard to understand, as the hearing and trial

transcripts show.) At trial, Figueroa said that he had asked

both Jack Ward, his English-speaking counselor, and Captain

Andrew Anderson, the chairman of the disciplinary board, for

Maria Pezza's assistance, but was told that she was

1. On appeal, Figueroa appears to claim as well that failure
to provide 24-hour advance notice of the hearing violated the
Morris Rules, which are regulations governing the discipline
and classification of inmates at the state facility where
Figueroa is incarcerated and which have the force and effect
of state law. See Rodi v. Ventetuolo, 941 F.2d 22, 26-28

(1st Cir. 1991). The version of the Morris Rules at issue is
appended to Morris v. Travisono, 499 F. Supp. 149 (D.R.I.

1980). Figueroa's state law claims are not before us.
Although his complaint asserted both state and federal
claims, in his pre-trial memorandum Figueroa argued only his
due process claims, relying on cases discussing federal due
process. Without objection by Figueroa, the district court
issued a pre-trial order limiting the evidence to be
presented at trial to the federal due process issues. The
court's decision resolved only the federal due process
claims. Since the court never asserted pendent jurisdiction
over Figueroa's state law claims and did not resolve those
claims, Figueroa remains free to bring his state law claims
in state court if not otherwise barred from doing so by state
law, e.g., by any applicable statute of limitations.

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unavailable.2 Figueroa wanted her to assist him at the

hearing because she could explain words he did not understand

and she would have "defend[ed]" him.

We agree with the district court that no due

process violation occurred here. In part, Figueroa seems to

have hoped that Pezza could have presented his case more

persuasively to the disciplinary board than he did. In other

words, Pezza would have been useful to him as an advocate.

In Wolff, the Supreme Court held that inmates do not have a

right to counsel in disciplinary proceedings, 418 U.S. at

570, a position it confirmed in Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425

U.S. 308, 315 (1976). The Court suggested, however, that

illiterate inmates or inmates with complex cases should be

able to "seek the aid of a fellow inmate, or . . . to have

adequate substitute aid in the form of help from the staff .

. . ." See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570. Assuming that Figueroa

should have been treated as an illiterate inmate, any right

that he may have had to staff assistance under Wolff was

satisfied when Ward was assigned to help him. In addition,

nothing in the record suggests that any deficiency in

2. The district court apparently discredited Figueroa's
testimony at trial that he had asked for Pezza's assistance,
relying on the transcript of the disciplinary hearing which
did not record any such request. Anderson testified that
Figueroa had never asked him for a Spanish-speaking counselor
or interpreter and that he would have readily granted any
such request. However, Figueroa testified that he had also
asked Ward for Pezza's assistance.

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Figueroa's English adversely affected the disciplinary

proceedings. As the transcript of the hearing confirms,

Figueroa understands spoken English. Despite sometimes

unclear syntax, he can also make himself understood in

English. At the hearing, he denied his guilt, explained why

he wanted to call Captain Brodeur as a witness, challenged

his lack of access to confidential reports, and denied that

he had been working in the prison kitchen at the time the

alleged murder weapon disappeared. Furthermore, Ward

appeared with him at the hearing and, according to Figueroa's

post-trial brief, participated in questioning Investigating

Officer Joseph Forgue.3 Figueroa presented his own case and

the transcript does not reflect that he ever sought Ward's

aid in making his presentation.4 Moreover, Figueroa

testified that Anderson and Ward had told him that Pezza was

unavailable, but does not allege any unconditional denial of

the assistance of a Spanish-speaking counselor. Although his

3. Ward's participation is not evident from the hearing
transcript which apparently incorrectly attributes his
questions to disciplinary board members.

4. At trial, Figueroa stated that Ward had been of no help
to him, but he does not suggest that Ward's alleged failure
to help him is actionable under section 1983. In any event,
because there is no right to counsel at prison disciplinary
hearings, an inmate has no cause of action for a staff
assistant's allegedly ineffective assistance. See Bostic v.

Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1274 (9th Cir. 1989); Harrison v.

Seay, 856 F. Supp. 1275, 1281 (W.D. Tenn. 1994); cf. Coleman

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755 (1991) (because an inmate has

no right to counsel to collaterally attack his conviction, he
has no claim for ineffective assistance of such counsel).

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testimony may suggest that he was told to proceed with the

hearing or to proceed with Ward as his counselor,5 he

apparently did not actually ask prison officials to postpone

his hearing until Pezza was available. Anderson testified at

trial that he had never denied any inmate the counselor of

his choice and that he had postponed hearings if the inmate's

preferred counselor was absent. We therefore affirm the

district court's determination that defendants did not

violate Figueroa's constitutional rights by not appointing a

Spanish-speaking counselor or interpreter to aid him at the

hearing.

3. Denial of Witnesses

According to Figueroa, he should have been

permitted to call as witnesses at his disciplinary hearing

Captain Brodeur, the correction officer Figueroa allegedly

intended to murder; an Officer Fletcher, who apparently

investigated the alleged murder plot and/or prepared the

disciplinary report against Figueroa; and two inmates, Larry

Botton (also given as Boton or Baton in the record) and Gary

Ortiz. At the hearing, Figueroa stated that he wanted to

call Brodeur to confirm that he and Brodeur had had no

problems with each other. On appeal, Figueroa says that, if

5. Figueroa testified as follows: "I ask [Ward and
Anderson] if I can have Spanish counsellor, specific, Maria
Pezza. I was told that Maria Pezza was embarcation at the
time, [inaudible]. I have to proceed."

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Fletcher, Botton and Ortiz had appeared at the hearing, their

"testimony could have brought forth new or previous[ly]

unsolicited facts."

At the disciplinary hearing and again at trial,

Captain Anderson, the chairman of the disciplinary board,

explained the board's determination that testimony by Brodeur

about his relationship with Figueroa would not be relevant.

Although lack of animosity might normally seem relevant in

determining whether one individual might be motivated to kill

another, Officer Joseph Forgue, who had investigated the

charge against Figueroa, explained at the hearing that such

evidence would be irrelevant in Figueroa's case. According

to Forgue, it was "well known" in the prison that there was a

"contract" on Brodeur's life and that confidential informants

had reported that Figueroa had "pick[ed] up" that contract.

For that reason, an inmate would not "have to have a problem

with someone to stick them. That's irrelevant whether you

had a problem with them or not." Given Forgue's statement,

the board did not abuse its discretion in not calling Brodeur

as a witness. See Smith v. Massachusetts Department of

Correction, 936 F.2d 1390, 1399-1400 (1st Cir. 1991)

(applying abuse of discretion standard in reviewing

disciplinary board's failure to call inmate witnesses);

Turner v. Caspari, 38 F.3d 388, 391, 392 (8th Cir. 1994)

(noting that prison disciplinary boards have great discretion

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to decline to call inmate witnesses whose testimony would be

irrelevant or unnecessary).6

Nor is there merit in Figueroa's claims respecting

Botton and Ortiz. The transcript of the disciplinary hearing

shows that he never asked the board to call them as

witnesses, and so the board obviously did not violate his due

process rights in not calling them. See Harrison v. Seay,

856 F. Supp. 1275, 1281 (W.D. Tenn. 1994).7

On appeal, Figueroa alleges that Officer Fletcher's

testimony "could have brought forth new or previous[ly]

unsolicited facts."8 The record indicates that Figueroa

6. Brodeur's testimony would also have been cumulative and
was unnecessary for that reason. Figueroa told the board
that he had had no problems with Brodeur, and Forgue agreed,
telling the board that Figueroa had no motive to kill Brodeur
that he knew of and that, as Figueroa had said, he and
Brodeur did not appear to have problems with each other.

7. In his pre-trial memorandum, Figueroa told the district
court that Botton would testify at trial that Figueroa had
been "set up" by a correction officer and another inmate and
that Ortiz would testify that an Officer Martinez and inmate
Armando Perez had plotted to set him up. The district court
would not let Botton and Ortiz testify, ruling, correctly,
that the question before the court was not whether Figueroa
was actually innocent of the charge against him. On appeal,
Figueroa appears to have abandoned the claim that Botton and
Ortiz would have testified that he had been set up.

8. In his post-trial memorandum, Figueroa stated that
Fletcher was the original investigating officer, that another
inmate had been under investigation, and that Fletcher would
testify that Figueroa was the "wrong man." In his pre-trial
memorandum, however, Figueroa had shown no interest in
calling Fletcher as a witness, proffering instead the
distinctly different theory described above that another
inmate and a correction officer had set him up. On appeal,
he has obviously abandoned his claim that Fletcher would have

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had told the board that Fletcher would either offer favorable

character testimony or would corroborate Figueroa's trouble-

free relationship with Brodeur. The disciplinary transcript

indicates that Figueroa told the board that Fletcher would

testify that Figueroa was "not of that type of character" and

that the board regarded his testimony to be irrelevant.9

According to Anderson's trial testimony, Figueroa had said

that Fletcher would testify that Figueroa and Brodeur had not

had any problems with each other.10 Under the

circumstances, the court did not err in concluding that the

board had not violated due process by declining to call

Fletcher as a witness. As noted above, testimony about

Figueroa's relationship with Brodeur was irrelevant and

unnecessary. In addition, without further specifics, the

simple testimony that Figueroa was not the "type" of person

testified that a different inmate than Figueroa had plotted
to murder Brodeur.

9. The disciplinary hearing transcript shows that Figueroa
asked to call Fletcher as a witness, but does not record any
discussion of the substance of Fletcher's testimony. That
discussion apparently occurred, however. The transcript
indicates that Figueroa assented to Anderson's statement that
"you request . . . Officer Fletcher to come up here to
testify that you're not of that type of character" and his
explanation that the proposed testimony was irrelevant. In
addition, in his appellate statement of facts, Figueroa
states that he told the board that Fletcher would have
testified that he was not the "type of person who would
commit the act alleged."

10. Although Figueroa objected to Anderson's statement, he
did not explain his basis for disagreeing and did not tell
the court that Fletcher would have given different testimony.

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to commit murder would not have impugned the confidential

informants' clear identification of Figueroa as the inmate

who planned to kill Brodeur. See Graham v. Baughman, 772

F.2d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 1985) (prison officials who had to

determine whether an inmate had started a fire outside of his

cell were well within their discretion in concluding that

character evidence was either irrelevant or unnecessary).

4. Sufficiency of Evidence and Related Claims

Figueroa claimed below that the board's decision

was not supported by substantial evidence. The district

court concluded that its task in a section 1983 action

alleging a violation of federal due process was to determine

whether "some evidence" supported the board's decision,

citing Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution

v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985). In Hill, the Supreme Court

held that federal due process is satisfied if "some evidence"

in the record supports a disciplinary decision, defining that

term to mean "any evidence in the record that could support

the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board." Id. at

455-56. Using that standard, the district court found that

"some evidence" supported the board's decision, and we

agree.11 We also agree with the court that the Hill

11. The district court cited the following facts: that
different informants, who had had no contact with each other,
had identified Figueroa as the inmate who was to stab
Brodeur; that each informant's information corroborated the
information proffered by the other informant; that the

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standard describes the relevant federal due process standard

even though state law imposes a stricter evidentiary

standard.12 See id. at 456 ("We decline to adopt a more

stringent evidentiary standard [than the some evidence

standard] as a constitutional requirement."); see Goff v.

Dailey, 991 F.2d 1437, 1441 n.9 (8th Cir.) (state regulations

may provide more protection than the federal Constitution,

but cannot raise the standard of due process under the

Constitution), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 564 (1993); but see

Brown v. Fauver, 819 F.2d 395, 399 n.4 (3d Cir. 1987) (Hill

did not establish whether the Constitution requires a

particular burden of proof in disciplinary proceedings, but

spoke only to appellate review standards).

In connection with his argument that the board's

decision was not supported by substantial evidence, Figueroa

asserts two additional claims, which we consider in turn.

First, he complains that neither he nor his counselor, Jack

Ward, had access to a confidential investigative report based

on information provided by unidentified informants "as did

informants had personal knowledge of the matter and had
provided accurate information in the past; that there was
evidence that the informants were credible; that the weapon
the informants claimed Figueroa intended to use -- a soup
ladle honed to a knife blade -- had disappeared from the
kitchen when Figueroa worked in the kitchen; and, finally,
that Figueroa had offered no rebuttal information or any
exonerating evidence.

12. Accordingly, we do not decide whether substantial
evidence in the record supported the board's decision.

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the disciplinary board." Figueroa recognizes that granting

him access to the confidential report "could have violated

institutional security and other investigations."13 But he

claims that Ward could have reviewed the report and inquired

into the informants' mutual corroboration, personal knowledge

of the matter, and reliability. His point seems to be that

Ward might have uncovered evidence discrediting the

informants or their information, so that Ward's inability to

see the report not only violated Figueroa's due process

rights, but should also preclude the district court from

considering evidence deriving from the report. Under the

circumstances present here, we disagree. First, as the

chairman of the disciplinary board testified at trial, the

board did not rely on the confidential report in finding

Figueroa guilty; it did not even see that report. Although

13. Therefore, Figueroa is apparently not challenging the
district court's finding that he was not entitled to see the

confidential report which apparently identified at least one
of the inmates who had reported that Figueroa had planned to
kill Brodeur. It is well established that inmates have no
federal due process right to obtain evidence which could
identify confidential informants. See, e.g., Langton, 667

F.2d at 235 (rejecting an inmate's contention that he had the
right to cross-examine a confidential informant or review the
informant's statement because Wolff left such matters to

prison officials' discretion); Mendoza v. Miller, 779 F.2d

1287, 1294 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that Wolff and Seventh

Circuit cases establish "unequivocally" that an inmate does
not have a due process right to be informed of the identity
of confidential informants), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1142

(1986); Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir.

1987) ("Due process does not require that an informant's
identity be revealed to an inmate."), cert. denied, 487 U.S.

1207 (1988).

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the report had been attached to Figueroa's disciplinary

report at one time, it had been removed before the hearing.

Instead, the board relied solely on Officer Forgue's

statements at the hearing describing the nature and

reliability of the informants' information. (According to

Anderson's trial testimony, Forgue authored the confidential

report). Figueroa was present at the hearing and obviously

knew what Forgue had said. Accordingly, he was in exactly

the same position as the board in terms of his familiarity

with the evidence against him. Figueroa was permitted to

speak freely during the hearing and had the right to cross-

examine Forgue. See Morris v. Travisono, 499 F. Supp. 149,

169 (D.R.I. 1980) (Disciplinary Procedures, III.C.4: An

inmate has "the right to call a reasonable number of

witnesses, both adverse and favorable and examine said

witnesses."). At no time during the hearing did Figueroa

attempt to question Forgue about the confidential informants'

information, reliability, or personal knowledge of the

matter. Second, Figueroa never asked the disciplinary board

to let Ward review the confidential report, nor did he

present that issue to the district court.14 Accordingly,

this issue is not even properly before us. Finally, prison

officials have no general federal due process obligation to

14. In his pre-trial memorandum, he argued only that he had
the right to see the report.

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disclose confidential reports to staff members assisting

inmates charged with disciplinary infractions. See Mendoza

v. Miller, 779 F.2d 1287, 1298 (7th Cir. 1985) (declining to

adopt a general rule that inmate counsel should have access

to confidential investigative reports used in disciplinary

hearings), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1142 (1986); Freitas v.

Auger, 837 F.2d 806, 810 n.7 (8th Cir. 1988) (rejecting an

inmate's contention that the court should have made

confidential reports available to him or his attorney after

the informants were transferred to a different prison); see

also Wagner v. Williford, 804 F.2d 1012, 1017-18 (7th Cir.

1986), and on appeal after remand Wagner v. Henman, 902 F.2d

578, 581 (7th Cir. 1990) (both confirming that there is no

"general rule" in the Seventh Circuit that confidential

reports may be disclosed to inmates' counsel and describing

the circumstances under which a "limited release of redacted

material information" to counsel might be possible); White v.

Nix, 43 F.3d 374, 378 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding that case

law concerning the discovery of confidential investigative

files during prison disciplinary hearings "uniformly" sets

certain conditions on an inmate's counsel's access to such

files).

Next, Figueroa challenges the district court's

reliance on evidence that the intended murder weapon was a

sharpened soup ladle which had disappeared from the prison

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kitchen at the time Figueroa worked there.15 At the

hearing, Officer Forgue told the board that confidential

informants had reported that the murder weapon was a honed

soup ladle. He also reported that Figueroa had worked in the

kitchen at the time the ladle disappeared. On appeal,

Figueroa denies that he ever worked in the kitchen and that

he ever had access to the soup ladle. At the disciplinary

hearing, however, Figueroa acknowledged that he had worked in

the kitchen. He also indicated that he had heard that a soup

ladle was missing, but denied that he had been working in the

kitchen at the time the ladle disappeared. Thus, the

undisputed evidence before the board was that Figueroa had

worked in the kitchen and that a soup ladle was missing. A

controversy existed on the important question whether

Figueroa had worked in the kitchen at the time the ladle

disappeared. On that point, the board obviously discredited

Figueroa, choosing to believe the results of Forgue's

investigation. On review, neither we nor the district court

may revisit the board's decision not to credit Figueroa's

testimony. Cf. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455 (indicating that a

disciplinary board's factual findings are not subject to

"second-guessing" upon review, nor is the reviewing court

required to independently assess the credibility of witnesses

15. As of the date of the hearing, the alleged weapon had
not been found.

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or weigh the evidence); Turner v. Scroggy, 831 F.2d 135, 140

(6th Cir. 1987) ("it is not our task nor the magistrate's to

substitute credibility determinations contrary to the

[disciplinary] committee's ultimate finding") (majority

opinion); Harrison, 856 F. Supp. at 1280 ("Reexamination of a

prison disciplinary board's credibility choices is beyond the

scope of federal court review of disciplinary proceedings.")

(citing Turner v. Scroggy).

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5. Remaining Claims

Figueroa complains that defendants failed to give

him a copy of the disciplinary hearing tape in advance of

trial as ordered by the district court. Figueroa did not

bring that fact to the court's attention until the day of the

trial. When he did so, the court recessed the trial to

permit the parties to listen to the tape. After the parties

had listened to the tape, the court asked Figueroa if he was

ready to proceed. Figueroa said that he was and the trial

was conducted without any subsequent objection by

Figueroa.16 The trial transcript shows that Figueroa was

familiar with the contents of the disciplinary hearing tape

and knew what had gone on at the hearing. Nothing in the

transcript suggests that his inability to listen to the tape

in advance had prejudiced his presentation of evidence at

trial. Under those circumstances, his claim is meritless.

In an "Addendum" to his appellate brief, Figueroa

claims that Officer Forgue sat on the disciplinary board in

violation of the Morris Rules. See Morris v. Travisono, 499

F. Supp. at 169 (Disciplinary Procedures, III.B: "Any

16. In his post-trial memorandum, Figueroa alleged only that
the transcription of the tape did not accurately reflect the
tape of the hearing. He did not argue that any
mistranscription had caused the court to misconstrue any
critical fact, however, but only that responses of his which
were transcribed as inaudible "could have been a response"
asking for an interpreter or indicating that he did not
understand the proceedings.

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officer who initiates a violation report or who investigates

and reviews the initiating officer's report is not eligible

to sit on the disciplinary board to hear that case."). This

claim, which is apparently based on an inadvertent error in

the district court's description of the facts, was not

presented below and is clearly refuted by the record.

Affirmed.

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