June 14, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 94-2316
WILLIAM J. ROBINSON,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
DAVID P. TONIS, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Robert B. Collings, Magistrate Judge]
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
Selya and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
William J. Robinson on brief pro se.
Frank A. Smith, III and Frank A. Smith III & Associates, P.C. on
brief for appellees.
Per Curiam. The court did not abuse its discretion
in first denying plaintiff a continuance and later dismissing
plaintiff's action with prejudice when plaintiff did not
appear for trial. Plaintiff had sufficient notice of the
trial date and adequate time to prepare. Plaintiff's hope or
expectation that his case would not be tried until mid-
November was unjustified, for it was quite possible
throughout that the intervening case would settle.
Consequently, plaintiff should have been ready to proceed
when the case did settle.
Plaintiff argues that dismissal with prejudice was
too harsh because he had not exhibited a pattern of delay
(instead, he had duly appeared at all prior conferences) and
because, plaintiff believes, defendant would not have been
prejudiced had plaintiff been permitted to reinstate his
case. We disagree. A continuance had been properly denied,
the jury had been empaneled, and trial was scheduled to
proceed when plaintiff failed to appear. The district court
was well within its discretion in concluding that plaintiff's
disregard for the court's scheduling order warranted the
harshest sanction. See Goldman, Antonetti, Ferraiuoli,
Axtmayer & Hertell v. Medfit Int'l, Inc., 982 F.2d 686, 691-
92 (1st Cir. 1993); Barreto v. Citibank, 907 F.2d 15, 16 (1st
Cir. 1990) (dismissal warranted to deter litigants from
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misconduct impeding the court's ability to manage its limited
resources).
We reject plaintiff's attack on the court's
allowance of costs to defendant. Even if -- as plaintiff
asserts -- defendant agreed not to seek costs if plaintiff
discontinued his case, plaintiff essentially repudiated that
agreement by moving to vacate the court's order of dismissal
and to set his case for trial.
Affirmed.
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