June 29, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 95-1119
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
ROBYN L. ANDERSON,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Cyr, Boudin and Lynch,
Circuit Judges.
Robert M. Napolitano, on brief for appellant.
Jay P. McCloskey, United States Attorney, and Michael M. DuBose,
Assistant United States Attorney, on Motion For Summary Disposition
for appellee.
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Per Curiam. Defendant Robyn Anderson was
convicted of wire fraud, bank fraud and credit card fraud.
She appeals only from one aspect of her sentence -- a two-
level enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3C1.1, for
obstruction of justice. In so doing, defendant does not
challenge the district court's determination that she
committed perjury in testifying at the trial. Rather, she
argues that the district court made insufficiently specific
factual findings as to each element of a perjury violation.
Thus, she concludes, the matter must be remanded so the
district court may make the requisite findings.
Once a district court determines that a defendant's
testimony constitutes perjury, 3C1.1 mandates a two-level
enhancement in that defendant's base offense level. United
States v. Austin, 948 F.2d 783, 788 (1st Cir. 1991). A
witness who testifies under oath commits perjury "if she
gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the
willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a
result of confusion, mistake or faulty memory." United
States v. Dunnigan, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 1116 (1993). In deciding
whether a defendant's BOL should be enhanced on the basis of
perjury, the district court must make "independent findings"
that "encompass[] all of the factual predicates for a finding
of perjury." Id. at 1117. "A sentencing court, however, is
not required to address each element of perjury in a separate
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and clear finding." United States v. Matiz, 14 F.3d 79, 84
(1st Cir. 1994).
Here, the district court judge stated that the
"testimony the defendant gave was clearly false, was false in
material ways to the issue of guilt or innocence, and . . .
was willful." He stated also that "all of the factual
predicates for a finding of perjury have been met." It is
difficult to distinguish this language from the language the
Court approved in Dunnigan. In determining that defendant
had committed perjury, the Dunnigan sentencing court stated
only that the defendant had been "untruthful at trial with
respect to material matters" and that the statements were
"designed to substantially affect the outcome of the case."
Dunnigan, 113 S.Ct. at 1114-15 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Defendant argues that the Court in Dunnigan
intended to limit its endorsement of such conclusory language
to the facts of that case. Thus, she posits, Dunnigan
requires sentencing courts, in future cases, to make
"separate and clear" findings. There is no support in
Dunnigan or elsewhere for this interpretation. Indeed, in
Matiz, we relied on Dunnigan to reject a challenge to equally
terse phrasing. Matiz, 14 F.3d at 84 (the sentencing court
stated that it "did not credit" defendant's testimony, that
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defendant "knowingly told a false story" and that defendant
"did commit perjury").
The judgment of the district court is summarily
affirmed. See Local Rule 27.1.
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