July 12, 1995
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 94-2237
DR. AMARENDRA TUNGA,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
PROF. LOUIS D. QUIN, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Michael A. Ponsor, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
Dr. Amarendra Tunga on brief pro se.
Joyce A. Kirby, General Counsel, U. of Mass., and Special
Assistant Attorney General, and Deirdre Heatwole, Associate Counsel,
U. of Mass., on brief for appellees.
Per Curiam. Dr. Amarendra Tunga filed similar actions
in state and federal court complaining of the termination of
his temporary appointment as a visiting scientist at the
University of Massachusetts at Amherst. Some months after
the state court suit was dismissed, the district court
dismissed the instant action (1) on claim preclusion grounds,
(2) for failure to state a claim, and (3) because plaintiff
had not adequately justified his failure to file an
opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss. As the first
rationale provides ample support for the court's action
(especially now that plaintiff's appeal from the state court
judgment has been dismissed), we affirm on that basis alone.
Little discussion is required. A federal court "must
give preclusive effect to state court judgments in accordance
with state law," Mulrain v. Board of Selectmen of Town of
Leicester, 944 F.2d 23, 25 (1st Cir. 1991); we thus look to
Massachusetts res judicata principles. In Isaac v. Schwartz,
706 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1983), we summarized those principles
as follows:
Massachusetts courts apply res judicata in a
perfectly traditional manner. That is to say, the
doctrine prevents the relitigation of "issues that
were or could have been dealt with in an earlier
litigation." The entry of a valid and final
judgment on the merits "extinguishes ... all rights
of a plaintiff to remedies against the defendant
with respect to all or any part of the transaction,
or series of connected transactions, out of which
the complaint arose."
....
.... In Massachusetts, as elsewhere, a second
claim is barred "even though the plaintiff is
prepared in the second action ... to present
evidence, grounds, or theories of the case not
presented in the first action ...." The issue is
"not whether the plaintiff in fact argued his
[civil rights] claims in the state proceeding, but
whether he could have."
Id. at 16-17 (citations omitted); accord, e.g., Willhauck v.
Halpin, 953 F.2d 689, 704-05 (1st Cir. 1991).
The instant case clearly falters under these standards.
Indeed, the state and federal complaints (both as amended)
are virtually verbatim copies of one another--to the point of
sharing the same typographical errors. Plaintiff protests
that the respective legal theories diverge, in that his state
action focused on slander while the federal action advanced a
host of civil rights and constitutional claims. Even if true
(and the language of the complaints indicates otherwise), all
such allegations "grow[] out of the same transaction, act, or
agreement and seek[] redress for the same wrong." Mackintosh
v. Chambers, 285 Mass. 594, 596 (1934) (quoted in Isaac, 706
F.2d at 17). Plaintiff's suggestion that claim preclusion
does not apply in civil rights actions is mistaken. See,
e.g., Mulrain, 944 F.2d at 25. And contrary to his further
assertion, "a dismissal for failure to state a claim, under
Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), operates as a dismissal on the
merits, see Mass. R. Civ. P. 41(b)(3), with res judicata
effect." Isaac, 706 F.2d at 17.
Affirmed.
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