September 13, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 94-1808
ARNALDO MORALES-NARVAEZ, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
PEDRO J. ROSSELLO, ET AL.,
Defendants - Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Gilberto Gierbolini, Senior U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Circuit Judge,
Lynch,* Circuit Judge,
and Boyle,** Senior District Judge.
Manuel Alvarado for appellants.
Vannessa Ram rez, Assistant Solicitor General, Department of
Justice, with whom Pedro A. Delgado-Hern ndez, Solicitor General,
Jos L. Nieto and Dom nguez & Totti, were on brief for appellees.
* Judge Lynch replaces Senior Circuit Judge Campbell who has
recused himself and has taken no part in the consideration of
this case. Judge Lynch has participated in the decision based
upon the briefs, record, and a recording of the oral argument.
** Of the District of Rhode Island, sitting by designation.
BOYLE, Senior District Judge. This case concerns the
BOYLE, Senior District Judge
transfers of the appellants from their positions in the Contracts
Office within the Office of the Governor of Puerto Rico to
positions in another department of the Office of the Governor.
The appellants, claiming that the transfers improperly were based
on their political associations and violated their procedural due
process rights, moved for a preliminary injunction returning them
to their original positions. The district court, without
conducting a hearing, denied the motion, concluding that they
failed to show both a likelihood of success on the merits and a
threat of irreparable harm, and that the harm caused by denying
the motion would not outweigh the potential harm to the
government of Puerto Rico if the motion were denied. 852 F.
Supp. 104, 115-16 (D. P.R. 1994). Appellants argue (1) that the
district court abused its discretion and legally erred by denying
the preliminary injunction, and (2) that the district court
should have conducted an evidentiary hearing before determining
the motion. We conclude that the sparse record did not support a
preliminary injunction. We do not reach appellants' other
argument because the interests of justice would not be served by
remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing on the preliminary
injunction when trial on the merits should be imminent. We
affirm the order of the district court, anticipating that the
matter will be promptly scheduled for a trial on the merits.
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I. BACKGROUND
I. BACKGROUND
We briefly summarize the uncontested facts.
Appellants, Arnaldo Morales-Narvaez ("Morales"), Rosa Ortega-
Torres ("Ortega"), and Isabel Mart nez-Camacho ("Mart nez"), were
employed in the Contracts Office at the Executive Mansion of the
Governor of Puerto Rico. Morales was employed as a contract
analyst, and Ortega and Mart nez were employed as secretaries.
The three appellants were supporters of the Popular Democratic
Party ("PDP").
In November 1992, the New Progressive Party ("NPP")
defeated the PDP in the general election. The NPP
administration, and the appellee NPP administration officials,
assumed office in January 1993. In March 1993, appellants were
notified that they were being transferred from the Contracts
Office to another division of the Office of the Governor, known
as Programa RED ("RED").
Appellants commenced this action under 28 U.S.C.
1983, 1985, and 1986. In support of their claims under 1983,
appellants asserted they were transferred because of their
association with PDP, in violation of their rights under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States. They further asserted that the circumstances of their
transfers violated their procedural due process rights.
Appellants moved the court for a preliminary injunction, seeking
return to their former positions. Briefs and supporting
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documents were filed in support of their motion. Appellees in
turn filed opposing memoranda and supporting documents.
The district court issued its Opinion and Order on May
16, 1994, denying appellants' motion. The court's determination
was based primarily on its conclusion that appellants failed to
show both a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims
and a threat of irreparable harm. See 852 F. Supp. at 110-12,
114-15.
II. DISCUSSION
II. DISCUSSION
A. The 1983 Claims
A. The 1983 Claims
We first address appellants' argument that the
preliminary injunction should issue because the district court
abused its discretion and legally erred. We are not prepared to
say that appellants were entitled to a preliminary injunction on
the basis of the record. In particular, we note that the record
does not support a finding of irreparable harm. First,
appellants failed to submit job descriptions so that the district
court could determine the magnitude of the harm they claim to
have suffered from their transfers to new jobs at the same pay.
Second, appellants waited to file their complaint until July 6,
1993, more than three months after the transfers took effect,
thereby undercutting the claimed irreparable nature of their
injury. The district court determined that plaintiffs' injury
was not irreparable, in part, because plaintiffs did not show
that their new jobs were unreasonably inferior to the old jobs.
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Furthermore, the district court noted how the absence
of evidence on the job descriptions in particular made difficult
the determination of the issues relating to the appellants' claim
for a preliminary injunction. It said: "[t]he absence in the
record of detailed job descriptions hampers our ability to
explore the details of the [appellants'] duties," 852 F. Supp. at
109; "the question remains whether the contract analyst position
as newly reconstituted is a career position[;] [a]gain, neither
party has addressed this issue," id. at 110 (emphasis omitted);
"the proper inquiry is whether the position in question places an
employee intrinsically, not incidentally, in a confidential
position[;] . . . [the court was not provided with] job
descriptions detailing [appellants'] duties and responsibilities
to allow [it] to determine if they involved partisan political
concerns so that political affiliation would be an appropriate
job requirement," id. at 111.
Section 1983 actions concerning transfers of public
employees on the basis of their political affiliations are
especially dependent on detailed factual determinations
concerning claimants' job responsibilities. See, e.g., M ndez-
Palou v. Rohena-Betancourt, 813 F.2d 1255, 1260-62 (1st Cir.
1987); Collazo Rivera v. Torres Gaztambide, 812 F.2d 258, 261-62
(1st Cir. 1987); Jim nez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d
236, 243-44 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014 (1987).
Appellants assert that producing detailed job descriptions is
appellees' burden; appellees assert it is appellants' burden. We
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need not decide this issue in the aftermath of Rutan v.
Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990), given our
disposition of this matter.
Appellants' other argument is that the district court
should have afforded them an evidentiary hearing before making
its determination. We do not reach this issue because we believe
that the interests of justice do not justify remanding the case
for an evidentiary hearing. The papers supporting and opposing
the preliminary injunction had been filed by October 22, 1993,
the district court issued its order on May 16, 1994, and fifteen
months have passed in the interim. Because the judge ordered
expedited discovery, such discovery should have taken place by
now and the matter should be at or near trial on the merits.
If a trial or other final disposition is indeed in
prospect, diverting efforts to a new preliminary proceeding could
disserve the interests of both sides in an expeditious resolution
and could needlessly waste judicial resources. In these
circumstances, we think that the district court may reasonably
insist that the parties proceed promptly to trial instead of
revisiting the preliminary injunction.
B. The 1985 and 1986 Claims
B. The 1985 and 1986 Claims
The district court determined that appellants' claims
under 28 U.S.C. 1985 and 1986 were without merit, and that
appellants were therefore unable to show a likelihood of success
on the merits as to those claims. See 852 F. Supp. at 114-15.
Appellants do not contest this determination, and it is affirmed.
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III. CONCLUSION
III. CONCLUSION
The district court's Order and Opinion is affirmed.
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