November 14, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 95-1416
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL OLUDE,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Cyr and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
Mark F. Itzkowitz on brief for appellant.
Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, and Michael J.
Pelgro, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for the United
States.
Per Curiam. This is another in the long, grey line of
Per Curiam.
sentencing appeals that trail in the roiled wake of the federal
courts' introduction to guideline sentencing. Defendant-
appellant Michael Olude advances a lone assignment of error. He
claims that he was merely a minor participant in the offense of
conviction, and that the lower court erred in refusing to reduce
his offense level accordingly. See U.S.S.G. 3B1.2(b). We do
not agree.
Absent a mistake of law and we discern none here we
review a district court's factual findings anent a defendant's
role in the offense only for clear error. See United States v.
Akitoye, 923 F.2d 221, 227 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v.
Ocasio, 914 F.2d 330, 333 (1st Cir. 1990). Although this is not
an insurmountable hurdle, it is nevertheless a daunting one. As
we have said before, battles over a defendant's role in the
offense are fact-based and, therefore, "will almost always be won
or lost in the district court." United States v. Graciani, 61
F.3d 70, 75 (1st Cir. 1995). There is no basis for a different
result here.
We will not belabor the obvious. See, e.g., United
States v. Ruiz-Garcia, 886 F.2d 474, 477 (1st Cir. 1989)
(warning, in a sentencing appeal, that an appellate court should
not "wast[e] overtaxed judicial resources razing castles in the
air"). The appellant had the burden of proving his entitlement
to a downward role-in-the-offense adjustment. See Ocasio, 914
F.2d at 332-33. In determining whether the appellant had
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satisfied that burden, the sentencing court was not obligated to
accept the appellant's self-interested account of his
involvement. See United States v. Paz-Uribe, 891 F.2d 396, 399
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 951 (1990). And, moreover,
even if, as appellant claims, he was merely a courier, he was not
automatically entitled to a downward role-in-the-offense
adjustment. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Gil, 965 F.2d
1124, 1131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 484 (1992); United
States v. Cepeda, 907 F.2d 11, 12 (1st Cir. 1990).
We need go no further. Though appellant, represented
on appeal by able counsel, presents a somewhat sympathetic case,
he has not overcome the formidable standard of review. After
all, in the world of guideline sentencing, "where there is more
than one plausible view of the circumstances, the sentencing
court's choice among supportable alternatives cannot be clearly
erroneous." United States v. Ruiz, 905 F.2d 499, 508 (1st Cir.
1990).
Affirmed.
Affirmed.
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