UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 95-1881
JOSE AYALA, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
UNION DE TRONQUISTAS DE PUERTO RICO, LOCAL 901, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Hector M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Aldrich and Coffin, Senior Circuit Judges.
John Ward Llambias on brief for appellants.
Ana Rosa Biascoechea, Raquel M. Dulzaides, and Jimenez,
Graffam & Lausell on consolidated brief for appellees.
January 24, 1996
SELYA, Circuit Judge. This is a hybrid action brought
SELYA, Circuit Judge.
pursuant to section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. 185 (1994). In it, the plaintiffs complain that Union
de Tronquistas de Puerto Rico, Local 901 (the Union) acted in
dereliction of its duty of fair representation, and that their
employer, Crowley American Transport, Inc. (Crowley), violated
the collective bargaining agreement (the CBA) that was in effect
at the times relevant hereto. The defendants denied the
plaintiffs' allegations. In due course, the district court
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. See Ayala
v. Union de Tronquistas de P.R., Local 901, C.A. No. 94-2234
(HL), slip op. (D.P.R. June 16, 1995). The plaintiffs appeal.
We summarily affirm.
There is no need to tarry. Having read the record and
carefully considered the parties' briefs, we find no basis to
disturb the district court's well-reasoned decision. To the
precise contrary, we regard this as a paradigmatic case in which
to put into practice our stated belief that, when "a trial court
has produced a first-rate work product, a reviewing tribunal
should hesitate to wax longiloquent simply to hear its own words
resonate." In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 989
F.2d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 1993). Consequently, we affirm the
judgment for substantially the reasons elucidated in the opinion
below. We add only three brief comments.
First: The plaintiffs (who are members of Local 901)
First:
urge that they were entitled to seniority rights by
2
classification, and that, therefore, the Union should have
safeguarded them against being "bumped" from their laborers' jobs
by non-laborers with greater company-wide seniority. This
exhortation is unavailing. While the CBA is admittedly ambiguous
on the key point of what sort of seniority (company-wide or in-
classification) prevails in respect to laborers' positions, past
practice over many years the so-called law of the shop makes
it transpicuously clear that the most plausible reading of the
CBA favors company-wide seniority as the appropriate measure.1
In this situation, the law of the shop controls. See United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navig. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580
(1960).
Second: In all events, disaffected employees do not
Second:
possess an absolute right to have their union shepherd a
complaint through the grievance process to the bitter end. "In
the context of employee grievances, the duty of fair
representation is not a straitjacket which forces unions to
pursue grievance remedies under the collective bargaining
agreement in every case where an employee has a complaint against
the company. . . . A union is accorded considerable discretion
in dealing with grievance matters, and it may consider the
interests of all its members when deciding whether or not to
press the claims of an individual employee." Seymour v. Olin
Corp., 666 F.2d 202, 208 (Former 5th Cir. 1982). Put another
1It is worthy of note that several of the plaintiffs were
themselves, on earlier occasions, beneficiaries of the
interpretation that they now strain to repudiate.
3
way, a union, caught in the middle between dueling employees, is
not obliged to throw some union members to the wolves merely to
placate others.
In this case, the Union offered to process a grievance
that presented both sides of the story. The plaintiffs asked to
have this proposed grievance withdrawn. They sought to
substitute in its place a grievance containing a one-sided
presentation and adamantly insisted that the Union embrace this
version. Understandably, the Union declined to do so. The
undisputed facts reveal that the Union acted reasonably both in
offering to press a balanced grievance and in refusing to grieve
on the plaintiffs' terms. No more is exigible. See, e.g., Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190-91 (1967); De Arroyo v. Sindicato de
Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 284 n.2 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
This observation leads directly to a further
observation. Vaca teaches that, even if a union misconstrues the
CBA, its misconstruction, simpliciter, does not constitute a
breach of its duty of fair representation. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at
190. There is no breach unless the union's "conduct toward a
member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary,
discriminatory or in bad faith." Id.; accord Air Line Pilots
Ass'n v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991); Alicea v. Suffield
Poultry, Inc., 902 F.2d 125, 130 (1st Cir. 1990). In this
instance, no rational factfinder could conclude that the Union
crossed that line.
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Third: The plaintiffs' case against Crowley is no more
Third:
robust than their case against the Union. In point of fact, the
inadequacy of the plaintiffs' claim against the Union presages
the inadequacy of their claim against Crowley. In order to
excuse their failure to exhaust contractual remedies in the
conventional manner and prevail in a hybrid section 301 action on
a theory that the employer violated the CBA, disgruntled
employees must first prevail on their unfair representation
claim. See Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l, 493 U.S. 67,
82 (1989); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462
U.S. 151, 164-65 (1983); Chaparro-Febus v. International
Longshoremen Ass'n, Local 1575, 983 F.2d 325, 330 (1st Cir.
1992). Failing in the first instance, the plaintiffs also fail
in the second instance.
Mindful, as we are, of the district court's more
exegetic treatment of these (and other) matters, we need go no
further. The judgment below is summarily affirmed. See 1st Cir.
R. 27.1.
Affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Ayala v. Union
Combined Opinion