UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 95-1594
DIANE WOJCIK, ETC., ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
TOWN OF NORTH SMITHFIELD, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Cyr, Boudin and Stahl,
Circuit Judges.
Miriam Weizenbaum with whom Amato A. DeLuca and Mandell, DeLuca &
Schwartz, Ltd. were on brief for appellants.
Andrew B. Prescott with whom Steven M. Richard and Tillinghast
Collins & Graham were on brief for appellees Rhode Island Rape Crisis
Center, Inc., Marion Marceau and Carl Costanza.
Kathleen M. Powers with whom Marc DeSisto and DeSisto Law Offices
were on brief for appellees Town of North Smithfield, Henrietta
Delage, Christine Davidson, Lorraine Nault, Richard Smith, Terri
Leoni, Richard Brady, Charles T. Shunney and Deborah Mancuso.
February 1, 1996
Per Curiam. In the district court, John and Diane
Wojcik filed a 32-count complaint including claims under 42
U.S.C. 1983 and under state law for an array of offenses
including kidnapping. The defendants included the Town of
North Smithfield, the Rhode Island Rape Crisis Center, Inc.
("Crisis Center") and a number of school officials, teachers
and others. All of these claims derived from two reports of
possible child abuse, one initiated by a teacher and the
other by a Crisis Center employee teaching a special class in
school. The facts are set out at some length in Chief Judge
Lagueux's thorough opinion in Wojcik v. Town of North
Smithfield, 874 F. Supp. 508 (D.R.I. 1995), and we confine
ourselves to a skeletal summary.
The first incident occurred in March 1990 in connection
with a program conducted by the Crisis Center on child abuse
and other topics for sixth grade children at a North
Smithfield elementary school. The Wojciks' daughter Mary was
a student in the class. Based on her reactions to the
program and what she said, the Crisis Center "teacher"
advised the Rhode Island Department of Children and Their
Families ("DCF") that she suspected that Mary might be the
victim of child abuse in the form of excessive corporal
discipline. A DCF investigator visited the Wojcik home,
asked questions, and concluded that no abuse had occurred.
-2-
-2-
The second incident, involving a different teacher and a
different Wojcik child, occurred almost a year later in
January 1991. The child, Katherine Wojcik, made statements
to her fifth grade teacher that led the teacher to believe
that excessive physical punishment was being used against
Katherine. Later, reading journal entries made by Katherine,
the teacher's concerns grew, and she and the school principal
jointly called DCF. Another DCF investigation occurred in
January 1991. After talking to the Wojciks and their
children, DCF closed this case as well. The lawsuit
followed.
In January 1995, the district court on a motion for
summary judgment dismissed a number of the Wojciks' claims
against various defendants. 874 F. Supp. at 530. The
remaining claims were tried in April and May 1995, but at the
close of the plaintiffs' case, the district court granted
judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 in favor
of the remaining defendants on all remaining claims. From
the bench Judge Lagueux delivered a substantial oral opinion
that is unreported. These appeals followed challenging both
the summary judgment and the directed verdict.
So far as the reports to DCF were concerned, the
district court concluded that those defendants involved in
the making of the reports acted reasonably and in good faith.
As to the section 1983 claims, these determinations
-3-
-3-
established both the lack of a constitutional violation,
DeCosta v. Chabot, 59 F.3d 279, 280 (1st Cir. 1995), and the
presence of qualified immunity. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 547
U.S. 800 (1982). As for the state claims, Rhode Island law
requires anyone with reasonable cause to suspect child abuse
to report it to DCF and provides that a good faith report
creates immunity to a civil or criminal suit. Rhode Island
General Laws 40-11-3(a), -4. The district judge found the
reports were protected under this provision against state
claims based on the reports.
On appeal, the Wojciks argue cogently that the Crisis
Center counselor, and later Katherine's teacher,
misunderstood what the children were saying; and, in the case
of the journal entries, we are told that Katherine now says
that the entries were inaccurate. But state law required
reports to be made if a reasonable suspicion existed; it is
DCF's role--not the teacher's--to carry out the
investigation; and nothing in this record seriously suggests
any culpable mishandling or malice in the filing of the
reports with DCF.
The only novel element in the claims is the Wojciks'
charge that the reports aside, the Fourth Amendment was
violated when school officials transported Katherine by car
from one school to another to permit a DCF investigator to
talk with her about the second incident. The Wojcik sisters
-4-
-4-
were in different schools, and the school officials thought
that it would be more comfortable, in a manifestly
uncomfortable situation, if the children were together when
questioned. Katherine was upset by the trip and went with
reluctance, if not actual resistance. It is on this trip
that the Wojciks also based their kidnapping, false
imprisonment and assault claims.
The Fourth Amendment has been applied to public schools
officials, primarily in the investigation of student
misconduct or crime. E.g., Vernonia School District v.
Alton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325 (1985). The Fourth Amendment, however, protects against
unreasonable seizures. Nothing in the present facts made it
unreasonable for the school, acting in loco parentis, to move
one of the children from one school to another school in the
vicinity, so that both children could be questioned together
by a state official following upon a possible abuse report
made by one of the teachers. The claim fails both on the
merits and the qualified immunity grounds.
Although the Wojciks renew their many state claims on
appeal, the principal weight of their brief is on the federal
claims that we have just discussed. The state claims made by
the Wojciks are largely answered by the district court's
determinations of reasonableness and good faith. The
district court discussed the state claims both in its
-5-
-5-
published opinion and its oral one, and we have nothing to
add to the discussion. 874 F. Supp. at 524-25. However the
state immunity statute may be construed, it clearly covers
reports made reasonably and in good faith.
The district court, of course, was not the fact finder.
In granting summary judgment, its rulings were based on the
lack of material facts in dispute; and in granting the
directed verdict, the court's rulings determined that no
reasonable jury could find that the conduct in question was
unreasonable or that the defendants acted in bad faith. We
too think that the material facts were essentially beyond
reasonable dispute. The Wojciks say that the reasonableness
of the defendants' conduct is a proper issue for the jury;
but issues of characterization, like issues of raw fact, are
properly resolved by the court when no reasonable jury could
find otherwise.
We appreciate the Wojciks' sense of outrage that they
have been subject to two embarrassing inquiries that found no
merit to any charge of child abuse. But there is no way for
the government to protect children without making inquiries
that in many cases do turn out to be baseless; so, too, the
prosecution of crimes leads in some cases to acquittals and
intrusive tax audits sometimes produce refunds. Where the
government officials act reasonably and in good faith, there
-6-
-6-
is usually no federal remedy. If the Wojciks were encouraged
to think otherwise, their advisors were mistaken.
Official misconduct does occur and local officials
sometimes do act out of malice or incompetence. We have
ourselves reversed the district court where we thought there
was enough suspicion of official misconduct to defeat summary
judgment or to require a section 1983 case to proceed to a
jury. Rubinovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906 (1st Cir. 1995).
But here Judge Lagueux was scrupulously careful: he granted
summary judgment only on certain claims and after exhaustive
discussion; and on the balance of the case conducted a trial
that other judges might well have deemed unnecessary to the
point where he concluded that the claims were hopeless. With
that, the Wojciks will have to be content.
There is a substantial question whether the Wojciks'
appeal from the summary judgment order was timely, and a
motion to dismiss that appeal is before us. The notice of
appeal was filed late and the Crisis Center defendants
contest on appeal the district court's finding of excusable
neglect in allowing the Wojciks' belated motion to extend the
time to appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). This is a
difficult question, see Gochis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 16 F.3d
12, 15 (1st Cir. 1994), but we conclude that it need not be
addressed because the affirmance on the merits amply
vindicates the interests of those defendants.
-7-
-7-
Affirmed.
-8-
-8-