February 16, 1996\ [Not for Publication]
[Not for Publication]
United States Court of Appeals
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
For the First Circuit
No. 95-2154
JOHN STAFFIER AND PAMELA STAFFIER,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
SANDOZ PHARMACEUTICALS CORP.,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Cyr, Boudin and Stahl,
Circuit Judges.
Richard T. Tucker and Weinstein, Bernstein & Burwick, P.C. on
brief for appellant.
Peter O. Hughes, Patrick M. Stanton, Stanton, Hughes, Diana &
Zucker, P.C., Karen L. Carlotto, Keith E. Wexelblatt, and Choate, Hall
& Stewart on brief for appellee.
Per Curiam. Plaintiff-appellants John Staffier and
Per Curiam.
Pamela Staffier appeal from the district court's decision
granting summary judgment for Sandoz Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
("Sandoz"). John Staffier sued Sandoz for employment
discrimination on account of age and/or handicap under the
Massachusetts employment discrimination statute, Mass. Gen L.
ch. 151B, and the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. Gen.
L. ch. 94. Pamela Staffier sued for loss of consortium. On
appeal, Staffier pursues only the employment discrimination
claim under Mass. Gen. L. ch. 151B.
The facts and the applicable law are set forth in
the district court's Memorandum and Order dated June 19,
1995. Staffier v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., 888 F. Supp.
287 (D. Mass. 1995). We have carefully reviewed the parties'
briefs and the record on appeal. The district court
correctly determined that Staffier failed to present evidence
that, viewed most favorably to Staffier, establishes a prima
facie case of discrimination.
In particular, Staffier failed to present facts
that would allow an inference that he applied for and was
qualified for the two sales positions he claims to have
wanted. Those positions were filled before he was medically
cleared to return to work. Staffier argues for an inference
that the medical clearance requirement was a mere pretext,
because Sandoz subsequently waived the requirement with no
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further information than it had at the time the positions
were open. We find it unreasonable to ask a factfinder to
infer that (1) Sandoz did not really require medical
clearance for a job applicant who had been totally disabled
for the previous nine years, and (2) Sandoz's decision
eventually to grant clearance without the additional medical
data it initially sought indicates that the medical clearance
requirement was a sham.
We have considered all of Staffier's other
arguments and they are without merit. There simply are no
reasonable inferences of intentional employment
discrimination to be drawn from the facts in the summary
judgment record, and Staffier's unsupported allegations are
insufficient to make out his case. There being no need to go
further, we affirm the summary judgment for Sandoz on the
basis of the district court's well-reasoned opinion.
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