Conservation Law Foundation, Inc. v. Busey

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 92-1335

CONSERVATION LAW FOUNDATION, INC.,
Petitioner,

v.

JAMES BUSEY, ADMINISTRATOR,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.,
Respondents.

No. 92-1464

TOWN OF NEWINGTON, NEW HAMPSHIRE,
Petitioner,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ET AL.,
Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER
OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

No. 95-1019

CONSERVATION LAW FOUNDATION, INC.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, ET AL.,
Defendants - Appellees.

No. 95-1020

TOWN OF NEWINGTON, NEW HAMPSHIRE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, ET AL.,
Defendants - Appellees.

No. 95-1047

CONSERVATION LAW FOUNDATION, INC.,
AND TOWN OF NEWINGTON, NEW HAMPSHIRE,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, ET AL.,
Defendants - Appellees.

STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, AND
PEASE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
Defendants - Appellants.

No. 95-1048

CONSERVATION LAW FOUNDATION, INC.,
Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, ET AL.,
Defendants - Appellants.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

[Hon. Martin F. Loughlin, Senior U.S. District Judge]

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Before

Selya and Cyr, Circuit Judges,

and Schwarzer,* Senior District Judge.

Lewis M. Milford, with whom Mark A. Sinclair, Robert A.

Backus and Backus, Meyer & Soloman were on brief for Conservation

Law Foundation.
Perry M. Rosen, with whom Dana C. Nifosi, Cutler &

Stanfield, Malcolm R. McNeill, Jr. and McNeill & Taylor, P.A.

were on brief for Town of Newington, New Hampshire.
Jeffrey P. Kehne, Attorney, Environment & Natural Resources

Division, U.S. Department of Justice, with whom Lois J. Schiffer,

Assistant Attorney General, Beverly Sherman Nash, Richard Sarver,

Edward J. Shawaker, Attorneys, Environment & Natural Resources

Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Douglas J. Heady, Office of

the General Counsel, Department of the Air Force, Daphne A.

Fuller, Attorney, Office of the Chief Counsel, Federal Aviation

Administration, and John R. Michaud, Office of General Counsel,

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, were on brief for the
federal parties.
Donald W. Stever, with whom Jeffrey R. Howard, Attorney

General, Steven M. Houran, Deputy Attorney General, Office of the

Attorney General, Environmental Protection Bureau, and Dewey

Ballantine, were on brief for State of New Hampshire and Pease

Development Authority.

April 2, 1996
April 2, 1996

* Of the Northern District of California, sitting by
designation.

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SCHWARZER, Senior District Judge. We must decide
SCHWARZER, Senior District Judge.

whether defendants have complied with various federal

environmental laws that apply to the conversion of land on Pease

Air Force Base (Pease) in New Hampshire to civilian use incident

to the base's closure. The United States Air Force entered into

a long-term lease of a portion of the base to Pease Development

Authority (PDA). Concerned about the resulting effects on the

clean up of hazardous wastes on the base and the air quality in

the area, the Conservation Law Foundation (CLF) and the Town of

Newington, New Hampshire (Newington) challenge the Air Force's

decision to lease the property and the support of that decision

by other federal agencies. CLF and Newington contend that the

Air Force and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) violated

section 176(c) of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7506(c)

(Supp. III 1991), section 102(2)(c) of the National Environmental

Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C) (1988), and section

120(h)(3) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9620(h)(3)

(1988). PDA, the State of New Hampshire, and several other

interested parties have intervened and, along with the Air Force

and the EPA, oppose the relief sought.

In a lengthy opinion ruling on the parties' cross-

motions for summary judgment, the district court found that the

Air Force had violated NEPA and CERCLA and directed it to submit

a Supplemental Final Environmental Impact Statement (Supplemental

FEIS), including a remedial design for contaminated parcels

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covered by the lease. The district court denied injunctive

relief, however, and dismissed all remaining claims.

Conservation Law Found. v. Department of the Air Force, 864 F.

Supp. 265 (D.N.H. 1994).

Plaintiffs have appealed from the dismissal of their

CAA claims and the denial of injunctive relief. The federal

defendants have cross-appealed from the finding that they

violated CERCLA, but have not appealed the district court's order

directing them to prepare a Supplemental FEIS. We have appellate

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291. We reverse the judgment in

so far as it found a CERCLA violation but affirm in all other

respects.

Also before us are petitions filed by CLF and Newington

to review an order of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

approving PDA's airport development plan. We have jurisdiction

under 49 U.S.C. app. 1486(a) and deny the petitions with

respect to the CAA claim and retain jurisdiction of the NEPA

claim pending completion of the Supplemental FEIS.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS
I. BACKGROUND FACTS

Acting under the Base Closure and Realignment Act of

1988 (the Base Closure Act), Pub. L. No. 100-526, 102 Stat. 2627

(1988) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. 2687 (1988 & Supp. V

1993)), the Air Force closed Pease in March 1991. Located

adjacent to Newington and Portsmouth, New Hampshire, the base

occupies some 4,200 acres and comprises extensive facilities that

supported Air Force operations, including a runway. PDA was

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created as an agency of the State of New Hampshire to acquire

certain parcels of land within the base and to develop and

implement a plan for their reuse. It ultimately developed a plan

envisioning a commercial airport, light industry, various

commercial uses, retail space, and open space.

In preparation for the transfer of land to PDA, the Air

Force in February 1990 launched the process of complying with

applicable environmental requirements. The details of the

process are set out at length in the district court's opinion,

see 864 F. Supp. at 270-72, and a summary will suffice here. In

February 1991, the Air Force published a Draft Environmental

Impact Statement (DEIS) on which CLF and the EPA submitted

comments mainly addressing air quality concerns. In April 1991,

the Air Force entered into a Federal Facility Agreement (FFA)

with the EPA and the State of New Hampshire spelling out its

environmental obligations incident to the transfer. In June

1991, the Air Force prepared a Final Environmental Impact

Statement (FEIS). The FEIS stated that, although development

under the plan, including the increased traffic it would

generate, would not result in violations of state or federal air

quality standards, it would have an impact on New Hampshire's

ability to achieve the ozone precursor reductions required by the

CAA. To resolve these air quality concerns, PDA, the EPA, and

the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services (NHDES) on

August 1, 1991, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).

The EPA then issued its comments on the FEIS, stating that while

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the project would reduce New Hampshire's ability to achieve

compliance with the CAA, the MOU provided a framework for

compliance.

As required by the Base Closure Act, the Air Force then

prepared its initial Record of Decision (ROD), documenting its

decisions regarding the closure of Pease and the disposition of

the property. The ROD addressed, among other things,

environmental issues, including the CAA's requirement that the

project conform with the New Hampshire State Implementation Plan

(SIP) and CERCLA's requirement that the Air Force undertake

certain remedial measures to clean up contaminated sites prior to

the transfer of those sites to PDA. See 42 U.S.C. 7506(c)(1);

42 U.S.C. 9620(h)(3).

Because the PDA plan contemplated civilian airport

operations, FAA approval was required under the Surplus Property

Act of 1944, 50 U.S.C. app. 1622(g) (1988) (subsequently

recodified at 49 U.S.C. 47151-47153 (Supp. 1994)). In

February 1992, the FAA issued an ROD approving elements of the

plan and recommending that the Air Force proceed with its

proposed transfer of property to PDA.

In March 1992, CLF filed this action in the district

court, alleging that the Air Force and the EPA had violated the

CAA and NEPA. In June 1992, Newington filed its action asserting

the same claims, as well as a claim under CERCLA. These actions

were later consolidated. CLF and Newington also filed petitions

in this court for review of the FAA's February 1992 ROD, alleging

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that the FAA violated NEPA and the CAA. The petitions were

stayed pending the outcome of the district court proceedings and

are now before us along with the appeals from the judgment below.

While these actions were pending, the Air Force

continued to pursue the administrative proceedings preparatory to

the transfer. In March 1992, it issued a Memorandum for the

Record updating its earlier conformity determination. In April

1992, it issued a Supplemental ROD in which it rendered its final

determination concerning the disposal of the Pease parcels,

including an acknowledgment that remedial action on contaminated

areas had to be completed before it could transfer those parcels

by deed. The Air Force then prepared a Preliminary Environmental

Survey and, on the basis of the survey, issued its Finding of No

Significant Impact (FONSI). In April 1992, the Air Force entered

into a 55-year lease and contract of conveyance to PDA covering

these parcels.

II. SCOPE OF REVIEW
II. SCOPE OF REVIEW

We review de novo the district court's grant of summary

judgment, Town of Norfolk v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs,

968 F.2d 1438, 1445 (1st Cir. 1992), as well as its

interpretation of the controlling statutes, United Technologies

v. Browning Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96, 98 (1st Cir. 1994), cert.

denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995). Review of the district court's

grant or denial of injunctive relief, in so far as it involves no

question of law, is for abuse of discretion. Sunshine Dev., Inc.

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v. FDIC, 33 F.3d 106, 111 (1st Cir. 1994; Narragansett Indian

Tribe v. Guilbert, 934 F.2d 4, 54 (1st Cir. 1991).

Regarding our review of the district court's

assessment of the record on which agency action was based, we

have taken "a practical approach to deciding what standard of

review to apply." Sierra Club v. Marsh, 976 F.2d 763, 769 (1st

Cir. 1992). When the district court's judgment turns upon its

own assessment of evidence, "or even upon lengthy district court

proceedings in which knowledgeable counsel explain the agency's

decision-making process in detail, we will show appropriate

hesitation to overturn that judgment. . . . But, where the

district court simply reviews a set of agency documents and,

applying the same legal standard as we apply here, reaches a

particular legal conclusion about the 'reasonableness' of an

agency's action, we have greater legal freedom to differ with the

district court's ultimate characterization of agency behavior."

Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 872 (1st Cir. 1985). With

these principles in mind, we turn to the merits of the appeal.

III. THE CLEAN AIR ACT CLAIMS
III. THE CLEAN AIR ACT CLAIMS

The purpose of the CAA, as the district court observed,

is "to protect and enhance the Nation's air quality, to initiate

and accelerate a national program of research and development

designed to control air pollution, to provide technical and

financial assistance to the States in the execution of pollution

control programs, and to encourage the development of regional

pollution control programs." See 864 F. Supp. at 273 (citing 42

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U.S.C. 7401(b) (1988)). Pursuant to the Act, the EPA

established National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)

reflecting the maximum concentration levels of particular

pollutants (criteria pollutants) allowable to protect public

health. See 42 U.S.C. 7409 (Supp. III 1991). Among them were

NAAQS for ozone and carbon monoxide, both of which are relevant

here. See 40 C.F.R. 50.8, 50.9 (1995). Responsibility for

achieving and maintaining the NAAQS falls on the states, which

are required to submit state implementation plans (SIPs)

specifying the manner in which they will achieve and maintain the

NAAQS for the various criteria pollutants. See 42 U.S.C. 7407

(1988 & Supp. III 1991).

The EPA and the states have designated different

regions according to the level of criteria pollutants in each

area. See 42 U.S.C. 7407(d)(1)(A). A region which has not

attained the NAAQS for a certain criteria pollutant is designated

a "nonattainment" area; a region about which there are

insufficient data to determine compliance with the NAAQS is

designated "unclassified" and deemed in compliance with the

NAAQS. See id. At the time the decisions challenged here were

made, the Portsmouth-Dover-Rochester region, where the Pease

project is located, was designated a "serious nonattainment" area

for ozone and an "unclassified" area for carbon monoxide. See 40

C.F.R. 81.330 (1991).

For serious nonattainment areas for ozone, the

statutory deadline for attaining the NAAQS is November 15, 1999.

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42 U.S.C. 7511(a)(1) (Supp. III 1991). To ensure progress

toward that goal, the 1990 amendments to the CAA require states

to revise their SIPs in a manner that will result in attainment

of both the ultimate deadline and interim milestones established

by the 1990 amendments. See 42 U.S.C. 7511a(c)(2) (Supp. III

1991).

To further promote attainment of the NAAQS for

different criteria pollutants, the 1990 amendments also added

specific criteria to section 7506(c)(1) (section 176(c)(1) of the

CAA), the conformity provision of the Act, to wit, subsections

(A) and (B)(i)-(iii). See S. Rep. No. 101-228, 101st Cong., 2d

Sess. 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3414. The

conformity provision prohibits federal agencies from approving or

supporting any activity which does not conform to an SIP. Under

the new criteria, conformity means that the activity will not

cause new violations, increase the frequency or severity of

violations, or delay attainment of various standards,

requirements, and milestones. See 42 U.S.C. 7506(c)(1)(B).

Plaintiffs claim that the EPA, the Air Force and the

FAA violated the conformity provision. Plaintiffs make three

arguments: (1) that no determination of conformity could be made

until NEPA had been complied with; (2) that the EPA failed to

make a conformity determination; and (3) that the Air Force and

the FAA violated the substantive requirements of the conformity

provision. As a preliminary matter, however, we must address

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PDA's contention that the district court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over plaintiffs' CAA claims.

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Plaintiffs assert that jurisdiction over their

conformity determination claims exists under the citizen suit

provision of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. 7604(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. III

1991), or in the alternative, under the Administrative Procedure

Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 702 (1988). Defendants dispute that

jurisdiction exists under either provision. We address first the

knotty question of whether jurisdiction exists under the citizen

suit provision; if it does, jurisdiction under the APA is

precluded. See 5 U.S.C. 704 (1988) ("Agency action made

reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is

no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial

review" under the APA (emphasis added)). See Oregon Natural

Resources Council v. United States Forest Serv., 834 F.2d 842,

851 (9th Cir. 1987); Allegheny County Sanitary Auth. v. EPA, 732

F.2d 1167, 1177 (3d Cir. 1984); Environmental Defense Fund v.

Tidwell, 837 F. Supp. 1344, 1355-57 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (APA provides

a right of review of agency decisions precisely where a

plaintiff's claim is not covered by the citizen suit provisions

of the substantive act).

1. The Citizen Suit Provision, 42 U.S.C. 7604.
1. The Citizen Suit Provision, 42 U.S.C. 7604.

We addressed the issue of citizen suit jurisdiction

over claims of violation of the conformity provision once before

in Conservation Law Found. v. Federal Highway Admin., 24 F.3d

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1465 (1st Cir. 1994) (CLF). Although we held citizen suit

jurisdiction to extend to the conformity provision claims

asserted there, we cautioned that because the "issue is a close

one. . . . [and] because the outcome of [the] case does not

depend upon [the] jurisdictional ruling, this Court remains free

to revisit the issue in a future case where it may be decisive."

Id. at 1478 n.6. We do so now.

a. Legislative History and Precedent. "In enacting
a. Legislative History and Precedent.

[the citizen suit] provision, Congress expanded federal court

jurisdiction by circumventing the diversity of citizenship,

jurisdictional amount, and traditional standing requirements."

Wilder v. Thomas, 854 F.2d 605, 613 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,

489 U.S. 1053 (1989). See S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d

Sess. 64 (1970), reprinted at Natural Resources Defense Council,

Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 725, Appendix B (D.C. Cir. 1974).

Prior to the enactment of the citizen suit provision,

"[g]overnment initiative in seeking enforcement under the Clean

Air Act [had] been restrained." S. Rep. No. 91-1196, reprinted

at 510 F.2d at 723. By authorizing citizens to bring suit for

violations of CAA standards, Congress sought to "motivate

governmental agencies charged with the responsibility to bring

enforcement and abatement proceedings." Id. In recognition of

the fact that "[f]ederal facilities generate considerable air

pollution," the citizen suit provision allowed suits to be

"brought against an individual or government agency." Id. at

724.

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As Congress opened the door to citizen suits, however,

it also sought to limit that jurisdiction to claims that "would

not require reanalysis of technological or other considerations

at the enforcement stage" and would have to meet "an objective

evidentiary standard." Id. To that end, Congress "carefully

restricted [citizen suit jurisdiction] to actions where

violations of standards and regulations or a failure on the part

of officials to act are alleged." Id. at 723.

Conscious of the concerns expressed in the legislative

history, courts interpreting citizen suit jurisdiction have

largely focused on whether the particular standard or requirement

plaintiffs sought to enforce was sufficiently specific. Thus,

interpreting citizen suit jurisdiction as limited to claims "for

violations of specific provisions of the act or specific

provisions of an applicable implementation plan," the Second

Circuit held that suits can be brought to enforce specific

measures, strategies, or commitments designed to ensure

compliance with the NAAQS, but not to enforce the NAAQS directly.

See, e.g., Wilder, 854 F.2d at 613-14. Courts have repeatedly

applied this test as the linchpin of citizen suit jurisdiction.

See, e.g., Coalition Against Columbus Ctr. v. City of New York,

967 F.2d 764, 769-71 (2d Cir. 1992); Cate v. Transcontinental Gas

Pipe Line Corp., 904 F. Supp. 526, 530-32 (W.D. Va. 1995);

Citizens for a Better Env't v. Deukmejian, 731 F. Supp. 1448,

1454-59 (N.D. Cal.), modified, 746 F. Supp. 976 (1990).

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Our decision in CLF and plaintiffs' arguments have

therefore focused on whether the conformity provision meets the

requisite level of specificity to serve as the basis of a citizen

suit. Before asking whether the conformity provision passes the

specificity test, however, we must consider the threshold issue

whether the conformity provision falls within one of the

statutory categories of violations for which citizen suits are

authorized.

b. Terms of the Statute. The CAA permits any person
b. Terms of the Statute.

to bring a civil action "against any person . . . who is alleged

to have violated or to be in violation of . . . an emission

standard or limitation under this chapter . . . ." 42 U.S.C.

7604(a)(1)(A). An "emission standard or limitation" is defined

as "a schedule or timetable of compliance, emission limitation,

standard of performance or emission standard . . . which is in

effect under this chapter . . . or under an applicable

implementation plan." 42 U.S.C. 7604(f)(1) (Supp. III 1991).

The additional definitions in subsections (2), (3), and (4) are

not applicable here.1 Thus, citizen suit jurisdiction over a

violation of the conformity provision is subject to a two-prong

test: (1) the conformity provision must be a schedule or

1 Subsections (2) and (3) deal with controls, conditions,
prohibitions and requirements related to specific situations and
provisions not at issue here. Subsection (4) deals with
conformity requirements under an SIP and does not apply because
the requirements were not incorporated into New Hampshire's plan
at the material times; the only relevant conformity requirements
were those in effect under the Act itself. See 42 U.S.C.

7604(f)(2)-(4).

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timetable of compliance, emission limitation, standard of

performance, or emission standard, and (2) it must be in effect

under this chapter or an applicable implementation plan. See

Cate, 904 F. Supp. at 529. The conformity provision meets the

second prong; as a provision of the Act, it is clearly "in effect

under the Act." See CLF, 24 F.3d at 1477. The sole question is

whether the conformity provision qualifies as (1) a schedule or

timetable of compliance, (2) an emission limitation, (3) a

standard of performance, or (4) an emission standard, as these

terms are defined by other provisions of the Act. If it does not

fall within one of these four cat categories, there is no citizen

suit jurisdiction over the conformity provision claims.

(i) Emission Limitation/Emission Standard. Section
(i) Emission Limitation/Emission Standard.

7602(k) defines the terms "emission standard" and "emission

limitation" to mean "a requirement established by the State or

the Administrator which limits the quantity, rate, or

concentration of emissions of air pollutants on a continuous

basis . . . ." 42 U.S.C. 7602(k) (Supp. III 1991); see also

40 C.F.R. 51.100(z) (1991) (EPA's regulations implementing the

CAA). The conformity provision is not "a requirement established

by the State or the Administrator"; it is a provision of the CAA

enacted by Congress. And while the provision seeks to ensure

conformity with existing emission standards or limitations, it

does not itself limit emissions of air pollutants. Thus, it is

not an emissions limitation or standard.

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(ii) Standard of Performance. Section 7602(l)
(ii) Standard of Performance.

defines "standard of performance" as "a requirement of continuous

emission reduction, including any requirement relating to the

operation or maintenance of a source to assure continuous

emission reduction." 42 U.S.C. 7602(l) (1988 & Supp. III

1991). CLF argues that the conformity provision constitutes a

"standard of performance" within the meaning of section 7602(l)

because it prohibits a federal agency from supporting an activity

unless that activity is "consistent with 'reducing' the severity

and number of violations in a nonattainment area and will not

delay timely attainment of any required emission reductions." In

support of its argument, CLF relies upon this court's decision in

CLF, 24 F.3d 1465, to which we now turn.

In that case plaintiff challenged the Federal Highway

Administration's approval of a highway project on the ground,

among others, that it violated the conformity provisions of the

CAA. Unlike the instant case, CLF involved conformity of a

transportation plan subject to section 7506(c)(3). Under section

7506(c)(3)(A)(iii), a transportation plan or program is in

conformity if it contributes to annual emission reductions in

amounts specified elsewhere in the CAA.

Referring to " 7506(c)(1) & (c)(3)," the court held

that "[t]hese conformity requirements plainly constitute an

emissions 'standard of performance.'" CLF, 24 F.3d at 1477

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(emphasis added).2 In so holding, the court observed that those

provisions "mandate that defendants demonstrate that their

transportation projects 'would contribute to annual emissions

reductions consistent with' the levels set out in 7511a(b)(1)

and 7512a(a)(7)." Id. This language reveals that the court

was relying on 7506(c)(3) for its finding that the conformity

requirements constitute a standard of performance. See 42 U.S.C.

7506(c)(3)(A)(iii) (to be in conformity, transportation plans

or programs in ozone and carbon monoxide nonattainment areas must

"contribute to annual emissions reductions consistent with

sections 7511a(b)(1) and 7512a(a)(7)").

On further reflection, it appears to us that the route

to section 7506(c)(3) lies through section 7506(c)(1). In CLF,

as in the case before us, plaintiffs were challenging government

action in approving an activity that did not conform to an

approved implementation plan or other conformity criteria. See

id. at 1478. While subsection (c)(3) spells out particular

conformity criteria for transportation plans, the crux of the

action remained the noncompliance by a government agency, not the

violation of an emission standard by the activity itself. The

2 The court also held that prior case law limiting citizen suit
jurisdiction to enforcement of specific measures, commitments,
and strategies for ensuring compliance with air quality standards
did not preclude citizen suit jurisdiction over conformity
provision claims because the requirements of the conformity
provision were sufficiently specific and objective. CLF, 24 F.3d

at 1477-78. While we do not disagree with that part of the
analysis, we do not reach the specificity issue unless we find
that the conformity provision otherwise falls within the
statutory definition of an "emission standard or limitation."

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foundation of the plaintiffs' claims, both there and here, is the

subsection (c)(1) prohibition of the federal agency's approval or

support of any activity not in conformity with an approved plan

or other standards, requirements, or milestones.

As noted above, a standard of performance is defined as

"a requirement of continuous emission reduction . . . ." 42

U.S.C. 7602(l) (emphasis added). Nothing in section 7506(c)(1)

imposes an emissions reduction requirement. That section

prohibits a federal agency from approving, supporting, or funding

any activities that do not "conform" to the provisions of an SIP

or other standards, emissions reduction requirements, and

milestones. The sources of those standards, requirements, and

milestones may include the NAAQS or standards and requirements

set out in an SIP or provisions of the CAA itself. Section

7605(c)(1)(A) and (B) define what standards must be met for a

project to be in conformity. In the case of a transportation

plan or program, such as the one at issue in CLF, section

7506(c)(3) imposes additional standards. Thus, the conformity

provision refers to or involves standards, reduction

requirements, and milestones, in the sense that a federal agency

must determine that a project meets those standards in order to

approve or support it. However, the conformity provision itself

imposes no such standards or requirements. It simply imposes a

duty on federal agencies not to approve or support any activity

that does not meet standards, requirements, and milestones set

out in an SIP or the CAA.

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(iii) Schedule or Timetable of Compliance. Section
(iii) Schedule or Timetable of Compliance.

7602(p) defines a "schedule and timetable of compliance" to mean

"a schedule of required measures including an enforceable

sequence of actions or operations leading to compliance with an

emission limitation, other limitation, prohibition, or standard."

42 U.S.C. 7602(p) (1988). CLF argues that the conformity

provision is a "schedule or timetable of compliance" under

section 7604(f) because the "[c]onformity section

176(c)(1)(B)(iii) specifically prohibits federal agencies from

supporting any activity if it will 'delay timely attainment' of

the schedule of compliance set for nonattainment states like New

Hampshire to reach 15% emission reduction milestones in 1996 and

full ozone attainment in 1999." This argument is, however,

inapposite. The issue is not whether the conformity provision

requires the federal agency to determine that a project complies

with a schedule or timetable of compliance found elsewhere;

rather it is whether the conformity provision is itself a

schedule or timetable of compliance. Plaintiffs here are not

suing a polluter for violation of the schedule or timetable of

compliance referenced in section 176(c)(1)(B)(iii); they are

suing three federal agencies for approving and supporting a

project that may violate that schedule or timetable of

compliance.

It might be argued that the conformity provision itself

constitutes a "schedule or timetable of compliance" as defined by

section 7602(p) in that it requires federal agencies to follow

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"an enforceable sequence of actions . . . leading to compliance

with an emission limitation, other limitation, prohibition, or

standard." See 42 U.S.C. 7602(p). The conformity provision

requires federal agencies to follow a sequence of actions to

ensure a project's conformity with limitations and standards in

an existing SIP or with the NAAQS. Those actions, though not

specified in the statute, necessarily include analyses comparing

"the most recent estimates of emissions" in the proposed project

area with the projected emissions in the area were the project to

go forward, an assessment whether the project meets the specific

statutory criteria for conformity based on those analyses, and a

determination whether to support or approve the project. See 42

U.S.C. 7506(c)(1); see also Cate, 904 F. Supp. at 523 (finding

that an agreement requiring gas pipe line company to conduct

certain modeling and analyses for determining what measures would

eliminate violations of the NAAQS and to develop and submit a

plan specifying corrective measures and milestone dates for

instituting corrective measures constituted a "schedule" of

compliance within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 7604(f)(1),

7602(p)).

We reject this argument, however, on the basis of the

EPA's interpretation of "compliance schedule" in its regulations

implementing the CAA. 40 C.F.R. 51.100 (1991). Section

51.100(p) defines "compliance schedule" to mean "the date or

dates by which a source or category of sources is required to

comply with specific emission limitations contained in an

-21-

implementation plan and with any increments of progress toward

such compliance." (Emphasis added.) 40 C.F.R. 51.100(q)

defines "increments of progress" to mean "steps toward compliance

which will be taken by a specific source . . . ." (Emphasis

added.) These definitions make clear that a schedule of

compliance is a sequence of actions that a polluter must

undertake by certain specified dates in order to achieve

compliance with relevant emissions limitations or standards. The

conformity requirements themselves do not fall within that

definition.

2. Review under the APA, 5 U.S.C. 702
2. Review under the APA, 5 U.S.C. 702

Having concluded that citizen suit jurisdiction does

not extend to violations of the conformity provision, we turn to

the question whether judicial review is available under the APA.

In the absence of a contrary statutory provision, the APA

entitles a person aggrieved by final agency action to judicial

review and requires that agency action be set aside if

"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not

in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. 702, 706(2)(A) (1988); see

Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 375

(1989). While the APA does not provide an independent source of

subject matter jurisdiction, it does provide a federal right of

action where subject matter jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C.

1331 (giving district courts jurisdiction of all civil actions

arising under the laws of the United States). See Japan Whaling

-22-

Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 n.4 (1986);

Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104-07 (1977).

Defendants argue that 1331 cannot confer jurisdiction

over the conformity claims against the Air Force because, under

Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n,

453 U.S. 1 (1981), no implied private right of action exists

under the Clean Air Act. Defendants' reliance on Sea Clammers is

misplaced. In Sea Clammers, the Supreme Court held that a

comprehensive statutory enforcement mechanism complemented by

provisions for citizen suits precluded an implied private cause

of action for damages. See Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 17-18. But

an implied right of action is not a predicate for a right of

judicial review under the APA. See, e.g., Oregon Natural

Resources Council, 834 F.2d at 851. The central purpose of the

APA is to "provid[e] a broad spectrum of judicial review of

agency action." Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 903

(1988). Therefore, "[a] cause of action for review of [agency]

action is available [under the APA] absent some clear and

convincing evidence of legislative intention to preclude review."

Japan Whaling, 487 U.S. at 904. The citizen suit provision of

the CAA provides no "clear and convincing evidence of legislative

intention to preclude review"; to the contrary, it includes an

explicit savings clause for other rights of relief. See 42

U.S.C. 7604(e) (1988) (preserving "any right which any person .

. . may have under any statute . . . to seek . . . any other

relief"); Oregon Natural Resources Council, 834 F.2d at 851 n.15

-23-

(same savings clause under Clean Water Act preserves right of

review under APA); Hough v. Marsh, 557 F. Supp. 74, 77-79 (D.

Mass. 1982) (same). Moreover, cases decided after Sea Clammers

have expressly recognized that the APA provides a right of review

of agency decisions precisely where a plaintiff's claim is not

covered by the citizen suit provision of the substantive act.

See, e.g., Oregon Natural Resources Council, 834 F.2d at 851;

Allegheny County Sanitary Auth., 732 F.2d at 1177; Tidwell, 837

F. Supp. at 1355-57. Other cases cited by defendants are equally

inapposite since none involve judicial review of agency action.

See, e.g., Greenfield and Montague Transp. Area v. Donovan, 758

F.2d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1985) ("mere existence of a disputed

question of federal law does not confer federal question

jurisdiction").

Finally, we must consider whether 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)

bars district court jurisdiction under the APA over the

conformity provision claim against the EPA. Section 7607(b)

provides for judicial review of "any . . . final action of the

Administrator" by the filing of a petition in the court of

appeals. In this case, plaintiffs complain that the EPA violated

section 7506 by approving and supporting the Pease project

without making the requisite conformity determination. The

obligation under that section runs to any "department, agency,

[and] instrumentality of the Federal Government." Action by the

EPA to comply with section 7506 is not action taken by it in its

capacity of administrator and enforcer of the CAA. The text of

-24-

the statute supports this distinction. Where it refers to

obligations imposed on the EPA by the CAA, it imposes those

obligations on the Administrator. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.

7506(c)(4)(A)("the Administrator shall promulgate criteria and

procedures for determining conformity . . . of . . . the

activities referred to in [section 7506(c)(1)])"; 42 U.S.C.

7601(a)(1)("the Administrator is authorized to prescribe such

regulations as are necessary to carry out his functions under

this chapter"). And review under section 7607(b) is only "of

action of the Administrator." In summary, plaintiffs' claims

concern action taken by the EPA qua agency of the federal

government, not as administrator or enforcer of the CAA, and

hence are not subject to review under section 7607(b).

B. Conformity Determination in Absence of NEPA Compliance
B. Conformity Determination in Absence of NEPA Compliance

Plaintiffs argue that since the district court found

the air quality analyses used by the federal agencies deficient

and not in compliance with NEPA, it should not have addressed the

merits of the CAA claims. Neither the agencies nor the district

court, the argument goes, could make reasoned conformity

determinations under the CAA based on noncomplying air quality

analyses. The argument raises two separate issues: Was a

conformity determination precluded as a matter of law before

completion of the NEPA process? And, even if it was not, could

the Air Force and the FAA reasonably make such a determination

before the NEPA process had been completed here?

-25-

We can readily dispose of the first issue. Section

7506(c)(1) sets forth its own standards for evaluating

conformity. Nothing in that section or elsewhere in the CAA

requires the information on which a conformity determination is

based to have been subject to review, analysis, or public comment

pursuant to NEPA. Moreover, regulations issued by the EPA in

1993 prescribing procedures and criteria for conformity

determinations suggest no connection between NEPA and CAA

compliance. See 42 U.S.C. 7506(c)(4)(A); 40 C.F.R. Part 51,

Subpart W (1994); 40 C.F.R. Part 93, Subpart B (1994). To the

contrary, they specify that "[w]here multiple Federal agencies

have jurisdiction for various aspects of a project, a Federal

agency may choose to adopt the analysis of another Federal agency

or develop its own analysis in order to make its conformity

determination." 40 C.F.R. 93.154 (1994). And 40 C.F.R.

93.156(b) (1994) states that the 30-day comment period for an

agency's draft conformity determination "may be concurrent with

any other public involvement, such as occurs in the NEPA

process." We see no basis for engrafting a requirement that the

NEPA process be completed before a determination is made.

Plaintiffs next contend that the Air Force and the FAA

could not reasonably make the conformity determination before

completing the NEPA process. If the federal agencies had relied

entirely on the FEIS as the basis for their conformity

determinations, and if the district court had later found the

analyses in the FEIS deficient under NEPA on substantive grounds

-26-

that would also have affected the conformity analysis required by

the CAA, the CAA conformity determination might also have been

deficient. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 980-

83 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 704 F.2d 1251 (1983). That,

however, is not what happened here. The NEPA problem arose from

a failure to comply with the public comment requirement in that

the agencies relied for their conformity determination on

information and analyses that they had failed to include in the

FEIS or a Supplemental FEIS for public comment. The district

court found that those materials were a sufficient basis for the

conformity determinations; they simply should have been subject

to public review and comment to meet the requirements of NEPA.

See 864 F. Supp. at 284-85, 288. Because such public review and

comment are not required under the conformity provision of the

CAA, the NEPA violation did not affect the merits of the

conformity determination and hence does not require that we defer

passing on the conformity claims.

C. Conformity Determination by the EPA
C. Conformity Determination by the EPA

"In accordance with [the EPA's] responsibilities under

. . . [NEPA and CAA]," the EPA issued a review of the Air Force's

FEIS on August 14, 1991. In that review, the EPA addressed air

-27-

quality concerns related to the Pease project. It first reviewed

its earlier conclusions that the project's air impacts would

hinder New Hampshire's ability to achieve required reductions in

ozone precursor emissions and would cause violations of the CO

standards. The EPA then reviewed the terms of the MOU into which

it had entered with PDA and NHDES and concluded that the MOU

"provides a framework that, if successful, gives reasonable

assurance that the Pease development can proceed in compliance

with the CAA." The MOU itself quotes the text of section 7506(c)

and states that its purpose is to "accommodate the statutory

responsibilities of the Parties and provide assurance of orderly

and phased development in compliance with CAA requirements."

Moreover, the commitments in the MOU indicate that the EPA was

considering the specific statutory criteria in the conformity

provision. For example, the MOU specifies that, in the event the

CO air quality analysis required by the MOU shows that proposed

traffic increases from redevelopment "may cause or contribute to

a new violation of the carbon monoxide NAAQS," PDA must implement

measures necessary to reduce projected traffic increases and/or

air emissions impacts to a level which will not result in such a

condition. See infra pp. 48-50.

Section 7506(c) does not specify the form a conformity

determination must take; when the agencies acted, they had only

the statute to guide them because the regulations were not

adopted until 1993. Taking that fact into account, we think the

EPA's actions sufficiently reflect that it considered the

-28-

project's potential impact on air quality in light of the

conformity provision and, based on the commitments in the MOU,

see infra pp. 48-54, determined that the project could be carried

out in conformity with applicable air quality standards.

D. Agencies' Compliance with 42 U.S.C. 7506(c)(1)
D. Agencies' Compliance with 42 U.S.C. 7506(c)(1)

Having found that the EPA made the required conformity

determination, we now consider whether its determination and the

determinations made by the Air Force and the FAA complied with

the statute. As noted, the statute prohibits federal agencies

from supporting or approving a project unless that project

"conforms to an implementation plan after it has been approved or

promulgated under section 7410 of this title." 42 U.S.C.

7506(c)(1). "[C]onformity to an implementation plan means"

(A) conformity to an implementation plan's
purpose of eliminating or reducing the
severity and number of violations of the
national ambient air quality standards; and
(B) that such activities will not--
(I) cause or contribute to any new
violation of any standard in any area;
(ii) increase the frequency or severity of
any existing violation of any standard in any
area; or
(iii) delay timely attainment of any
standard or any required interim emission
reductions or other milestones in any area.

42 U.S.C. 7506(c)(1)(A),(B).

At the outset we note two relevant considerations:

First, no regulations interpreting these provisions had been

promulgated when the agencies made their conformity

determinations; therefore, they had only the words of the statute

to guide them. Second, a conformity determination is inherently

-29-

fact-intensive; therefore, what constitutes conformity is a

function of the unique characteristics of the project being

approved.

1. Substance of the Conformity Determinations.
1. Substance of the Conformity Determinations.

The EPA, the Air Force, and the FAA all determined that

the transfer and redevelopment of Pease met the conformity

requirements of section 7506(c)(1). As discussed above, evidence

that the EPA made a conformity determination is found in the MOU

and the EPA's review of the FEIS. See supra pp. 33-35. The Air

Force's conformity determination is contained in two documents:

its ROD, issued August 20, 1991, and its Memorandum for the

Record, issued March 20, 1992. The FAA's conformity

determination is contained in its ROD, issued February 26, 1992.

Those documents reveal the bases for the agencies' conformity

determinations. We now examine those bases to determine whether

the agencies abused their discretion when they found that the

Pease project met the conformity requirements of section

7506(c)(1).

The agencies relied on information and commitments

contained in various documents in making their conformity

determinations. The EPA, as previously noted, based its

conformity determination on the commitments made in the MOU. The

Air Force based its determination on the MOU, post-FEIS studies

conducted by NHDES and discussed in the letter of certification

written by Robert W. Varney, Commissioner of NHDES (Varney

letter), and the FAA's conditional approval of certain aspects of

-30-

the Pease project. Similarly, the FAA based its conformity

determination on the MOU, the NHDES studies and conclusions

discussed in the Varney letter, the Governor's letter of

assurance,3 and its own conditional approval of certain aspects

of the Pease project. Each of the bases of the agencies'

conformity determinations is briefly summarized below.

a. The Memorandum of Understanding. Because the
a. The Memorandum of Understanding.

FEIS concluded that air emissions likely to be generated by the

expected redevelopment of the airport would add to the level of

ozone precursor emissions4 experienced in the Portsmouth

Metropolitan Statistical Area and because of the EPA's concerns

about the air quality impacts of Pease redevelopment, the EPA,

PDA, and NHDES entered into an agreement--the MOU--"to

accommodate the statutory responsibilities of the Parties, and

provide assurance of orderly and phased development in compliance

with CAA requirements."

The MOU acknowledges that, because the region around

Pease was a serious nonattainment region for ozone, the 1990 CAA

amendments required New Hampshire to revise its SIP to achieve

3 Both the Air Force and the FAA cite Governor Judd Gregg's
February 13, 1992, letter of assurance (Governor's letter) as one
basis for their conformity determinations. Because the
Governor's letter relied primarily on the NHDES studies and the
Varney letter as the grounds for its assurance of conformity, we
do not discuss it separately.

4 Ozone precursors include nitrous oxide (NOx) and volatile
compounds (VOCs) such as hydrocarbons (HC). See 40 C.F.R.

51.852 (1995) (ozone precursors include NOX and VOCs); 40
C.F.R. 51.100(s) (1995) (VOCs include any compound of carbon
except those listed in regulation).

-31-

net reductions of 15% in total volatile organic compound (VOC)

emissions by November 15, 1996, and 3% each year thereafter,

until the region achieved compliance with the NAAQS for ozone.

To ensure compliance with the CAA and the SIP, PDA and NHDES

committed themselves, under the terms of the MOU, to take certain

actions.

With respect to carbon monoxide (CO) emissions, the MOU

provides that:

(1) PDA will undertake a surface transportation study

examining existing vehicle traffic patterns, projected

vehicle traffic increases associated with development,

and potential for alternative modes of transportation.

(2) Based on the results of the transportation study,

PDA will develop a comprehensive traffic model and

surface transportation master plan for the Pease area.

(3) Using the traffic model and periodically updated

traffic counts, PDA will undertake intermittent CO

analyses to determine compliance with the one and eight

hour CO NAAQS and report the results of all CO analyses

to EPA.

(4) In the event that the CO analyses demonstrate

that a proposed traffic increase from Pease

redevelopment may cause or contribute to a new

violation of the NAAQS for CO, PDA, in conjunction with

any other state agency whose participation may be

-32-

necessary, "will implement measures necessary to reduce

projected traffic increases and/or air emissions

impacts to a level which will not result in any

violation of, or any contribution to a violation of,

the NAAQS" for CO.

With respect to hydrocarbon (HC) emissions, PDA agreed

not to develop Pease beyond a level anticipated to generate 3.3

tons per day of HCs until New Hampshire revised its SIP to

accommodate greater emissions and the EPA approved the new SIP.

Finally, with respect to all emissions, NHDES agreed to

consult with PDA in preparing the revised SIP and to evaluate and

incorporate into the new SIP projected emission increases from

Pease redevelopment.

b. NHDES Studies and the Varney Letter. The Varney
b. NHDES Studies and the Varney Letter.

letter considered two possible readings of the conformity

requirements of section 7506(c)(1)(B): (1) that "the federal

agency need only determine that the proposed activity is in

conformity with the terms of the existing SIP," and (2) that "the

determination must address the three elements set forth in

[7506(c)(1)(B] . . . separately, regardless of the terms of the

SIP." The letter concluded that Pease development conformed

under either reading. This conclusion was based on studies of

air emissions completed by NHDES after the FEIS was issued.

These studies compared baseline emissions from 1989 (during full-

scale military operations at Pease) and 1990 (when the CAA

amendments were enacted and some military operations at Pease had

-33-

already ceased) with projected emissions to 1997.5 According to

the Varney letter, the emissions were not projected beyond 1997

because such projections would be too speculative and because by

1997 New Hampshire would adopt a new SIP to address any increases

in emissions.

Based on these studies, NHDES concluded, with respect

to ozone, that by 1997 emissions of HCs, ozone's primary

precursor, would likely reach approximately 2.5 tons per day, the

same level as Pease emitted in 1990, when military operations

were less than full-scale. At full-scale, HC emissions at Pease

had been variously estimated at 3.3 to 4 tons per day, which was

still in compliance with the existing SIP. Overall ozone levels

generated locally were expected to decline because older cars,

which produce more HCs, were slowly being replaced and because

"stage II vapor recovery at gasoline filling stations" was

commencing. For these reasons, projections of overall ozone

levels generated by the Pease area were expected to remain below

the 1989 and 1990 levels through Phase I of redevelopment.

With respect to CO emission levels, the NHDES studies

showed that, comparing 1989 and 1990 to 1997, Pease redevelopment

would not result in a significant increase in the air quality

region. And improvement of the intersection at Spaulding

Turnpike and Gosling Road (Spaulding Turnpike/Gosling Road

5 Projected emissions to 1997 took into account redevelopment
through Phase I of the Pease project, i.e., the first five years.

-34-

interchange) would significantly lessen CO levels locally during

the period studied.6

NHDES ultimately concluded that Pease redevelopment

satisfied the three conformity criteria set out in section

7506(c)(1)(B): that, through 1997, Pease redevelopment would not

cause or contribute to any new violation of any standard in any

area; increase the frequency or severity of any existing

violation of any standard in any area; or delay attainment of any

standard or any required interim emission reductions or other

milestones in any area.

NHDES also concluded that Phase I redevelopment would

not violate any specific provision of the SIP but rather would

"conform to the SIP's purpose of eliminating or reducing the

severity and number of violations of the national ambient air

quality standards, and achieving expeditious attainment of such

standards." See 42 U.S.C. 7506(c)(1)(A). NHDES reached this

conclusion for several reasons: (1) the existing SIP was

developed when Pease was fully operational and incorporated

emissions from Pease at that level of operation; (2) Phase I of

Pease redevelopment was expected to produce fewer emissions than

6 Although the NHDES studies noted that the "air quality region"
had "no historic attainment or maintenance problem with carbon
monoxide" NAAQS, the air quality analysis in the FEIS had shown
present and ongoing violations of the NAAQS for CO at the Gosling
Road/Spaulding Turnpike interchange, the main gate to Pease.
Post-FEIS supplemental air quality modeling of the interchange
area, based on corrected data, showed that CO levels at the
interchange would stay within the NAAQS through Phase I of
redevelopment upon completion of scheduled improvements at the
interchange.

-35-

the base produced during full operation; and (3) increased levels

of emissions from later stages of development would be taken into

account in the future SIP.

c. FAA's Approval of Airport Redevelopment. The FAA
c. FAA's Approval of Airport Redevelopment.

reviewed the Airport Layout Plan (ALP), PDA's proposal to

redevelop airport-related property at Pease, as required by the

Surplus Property Act. In its ROD, it approved each of the items

in the ALP, either unconditionally or conditionally, and

recommended that the Air Force proceed with its proposal to make

property at Pease available for use as a civilian airport. It

gave unconditional approval to the minor, interim and Phase I

redevelopment outlined in the ALP but, to ensure conformity, only

conditional approval to key items in the ALP. It concluded that

its approval "conform[s] with the approved SIP."

Regarding the later phases of the redevelopment, which

could have a significant impact on air quality, FAA approval will

be required once plans for them are made final and proposed for

implementation; that approval will be granted only after the FAA

determines whether additional air quality analysis and a new

conformity finding are required. Further, FAA approval will be

required for any new projects not depicted in the ALP, providing

additional assurances of conformity.

2. Plaintiffs' Challenges of the Conformity
2. Plaintiffs' Challenges of the Conformity

Determinations.
Determinations.

Plaintiffs charge that the agencies' conformity

determinations ignore evidence demonstrating that redevelopment

-36-

would cause new CO violations, increase existing ozone

violations, and delay attainment of the clean air standards.

Instead of properly addressing these problems prior to approval

of the project, they contend, the agencies improperly shifted to

New Hampshire the burden of achieving future conformity through

amendments to the SIP.

a. Evidence of Violation of Conformity Criteria.
a. Evidence of Violation of Conformity Criteria.

Plaintiffs contend that the redevelopment of Pease will cause new

violations of the NAAQS for CO, increase violations of the NAAQS

for ozone, and delay attainment of CAA standards, in

contravention of section 7506(c)(1)(B).

(i) Evidence Regarding Effects of Phase I
(i) Evidence Regarding Effects of Phase I

Redevelopment. The NHDES studies discussed in the Varney letter
Redevelopment.

and the post-FEIS studies on the Spaulding Turnpike/Gosling Road

interchange indicate that Phase I redevelopment activities will

conform to the section 7506(c)(1)(B) criteria, as long as New

Hampshire improves the Spaulding Turnpike/Gosling Road

interchange as required.7 As discussed above, NHDES studies

used 1989 and 1990 emissions estimates as the baseline for

performing the conformity analyses. The EPA, Air Force, and the

FAA adopted those studies in making their conformity

determinations.

7 New Hampshire is committed to making these improvements
because, as noted above, NHDES's conclusion that Pease
redevelopment through Phase I meets the conformity criteria was
based on the assumption that this interchange would be improved.
See supra p. 42 n.6. Similarly the FAA's conformity

determination was based in part on improvement of the Spaulding
Turnpike/Gosling Road interchange.

-37-

Section 7506(c)(1)(B) states that "[t]he determination

of conformity shall be based on the most recent estimates of

emissions . . . ." NHDES explained that it selected 1989 and

1990 rather than 1991 (the year it performed the analysis) as

baseline years because 1989 was

"the most recent year representative of full-
scale military operation at Pease. This
appears to us to be the most relevant
comparison, since Congress's intention in
Section [7506(c)] is clearly to evaluate new
developments in the context of pre-existing
conditions . . . . We assume that Congress
did not intend that a project like Pease
redevelopment would be penalized under
[7506(c)] because there is a temporal gap
between the federal government's decision to
terminate operations at Pease and the start-
up of the State's redevelopment of the base,
during which a temporary reduction in the
emission inventory occurred as a result of
activity phase-down."

Use of 1991 as a baseline, it added, "would unfairly penalize the

Pease redevelopment project, since 1991 emissions of CO, NOX and

VOCs are significantly less than historical norms because of the

Air Force's cessation of activities at Pease."

Under the Chevron doctrine, an agency's interpretation

of a statute is entitled to weight when the statute is silent or

ambiguous. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-3 (1984). As an

abstract matter, the words of the statute, "most recent

estimates," would not be considered ambiguous; a literal

interpretation would require the agencies to use 1991 data. See

42 U.S.C. 7506(c)(1)(B) (conformity determination "shall be

-38-

based on the most recent estimates of emissions . . . .")

(emphasis added).

Courts have, however, recognized that "[a] statute may

be ambiguous if its application leads to an irrational or absurd

result." Ewing v. Rodgers, 826 F.2d 967, 970 n.3 (10th Cir.

1987) (citing In re Rodman, 792 F.2d 125, 128 n.8 (10th Cir.

1986)); see also United States v. Real Estate Known as 916

Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d 490, 492 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,

498 U.S. 1126 (1991). Courts have also recognized that "[t]he

plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the

'rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will

produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its

drafters.'" United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242

(1989), (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc. 458 U.S.

564, 571 (1982)) (emphasis added). This appears to us to be one

of those rare cases where the plain meaning would lead to a

result that is irrational and at odds with the intention of the

legislature. Read literally, the plain language of the statute

as applied in base-closing cases would require conformity

determinations to be based on a wholly artificial situation, the

interval during which military operations have shut down and

civilian activities not yet started. The likely consequence in

many cases would be to preclude any economically beneficial use

of a closed military base. Such a result is irrational and

presumably unintended by Congress. In view of Congress's strong

support of civilian redevelopment of closed military bases, see

-39-

infra pp. 57-58, it would not have wanted to erect a major

obstacle to economically beneficial, post-closing uses of a base.

Thus, the agencies' reliance on the NHDES studies based on 1989

and 1990 estimates was reasonable under the circumstances. Those

studies support the determination that Phase I redevelopment

meets the statutory conformity criteria.

(ii) Evidence Regarding Effects of Post-Phase I
(ii) Evidence Regarding Effects of Post-Phase I

Redevelopment. Other air quality studies conducted by NHDES,
Redevelopment.

however, suggest potential violation of the conformity criteria

in later phases of Pease redevelopment, absent mitigation

measures. With respect to CO emissions, the FEIS indicated that

by the year 2010 redevelopment was expected to generate 68,000

daily vehicle trips into the Pease area. The main area of

concern for traffic congestion causing emissions increases is the

intersection of Spaulding Turnpike and Gosling Road. Post-FEIS

air quality studies of that intersection indicated that, while

construction of the new Spaulding Turnpike/Gosling Road

interchange by NHDOT would bring the area into compliance with

NAAQS for CO through the end of the decade, traffic volumes

associated with Pease redevelopment and regional growth through

the full build-out year 2010 could cause violations unless a

second entrance interchange to Pease was constructed.

Redevelopment would therefore contribute to new violations of the

NAAQS for CO sometime after the turn of the century.

Similarly, an EPA memorandum dated July 24, 1991,

indicated that, while Phase I of Pease redevelopment was expected

-40-

to generate only 2.5 tons per day of HCs (a major ozone

precursor), Phase II extending to the year 2002 was estimated to

generate 4.8 tons per day. At that level, Phase II would

increase existing violations, as well as delay attainment, of the

NAAQS for ozone absent some other changes or the institution of

mitigation measures.

b. Mitigation Measures. Plaintiffs contend that the
b. Mitigation Measures.

supporting agencies improperly shifted the burden of compliance

to New Hampshire and the SIP process and that the mitigation

measures agreed to by the parties failed to meet the statutory

criteria of the conformity provision.

(i) Carbon Monoxide. With respect to CO emissions,
(i) Carbon Monoxide.

the MOU requires PDA to conduct a surface transportation study,

develop a traffic model and master plan for the Pease area,

conduct intermittent CO analyses, and implement mitigation

measures as needed. As to the latter, the MOU states

categorically that "PDA, and if necessary in conjunction with any

other appropriate state agency, will implement measures necessary

to reduce projected traffic increases and/or air emissions

impacts to a level which will not result in any violation of, or

any contribution to a violation of, the NAAQS for carbon

monoxide." (Emphasis added.)

These commitments are sufficient to ensure compliance

with the statutory requirement that Pease redevelopment "will not

cause or contribute to any new violation" of the NAAQS for CO,

see 42 U.S.C. 7506(c)(1)(B)(I), for two reasons.

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First, PDA's open-ended commitment to implement

necessary mitigation measures includes by implication a

commitment to implement the mitigation measures already

identified in the area of the Spaulding Turnpike/Gosling Road

interchange. Specifically, it includes a commitment by PDA,

along with NHDOT and other necessary state agencies, to build the

second access to Pease, unless later studies reveal preferable

alternatives for satisfying the commitment. See supra pp. 38-39.

Corroborating this commitment is a July 31, 1991,

letter from PDA to the Air Force stating that compliance with the

NAAQS would require completion of improvements to the Spaulding

Turnpike/Gosling Road interchange as well as construction of a

second access to Pease prior to the time the improved interchange

reaches maximum capacity. To permit construction of the second

access, PDA requested that a portion of the golf course at Pease

be made available. In the Application and Acceptance for the

transfer of airport property, the Air Force agreed to transfer

the needed portions of the golf course.

Second, the agreement requiring ongoing studies and

analyses and implementation of mitigation measures as needed was

a reasonable way to ensure conformity under the circumstances.

The details of the redevelopment project are not fixed and its

time line is extended. As the FAA pointed out in its ROD, air

quality impacts stemming from certain aspects of the airport

development were speculative when the conformity determinations

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were made because the project-specific design detail necessary to

assess those impacts properly and develop a range of alternative

mitigation measures was lacking. Similarly, the nonaviation

business tenants at the on-airport industrial park had not yet

been selected. In addition, over the 20-year life of Pease

redevelopment, other environmental factors in the region, as well

as technologies available to address them, may change. Given

these uncertainties, a commitment to pursue ongoing studies and

analyses and to implement appropriate mitigation measures based

on demonstrated needs was a reasonable approach to meeting the

statutory requirement.

(ii) Ozone Precursors. With respect to ozone
(ii) Ozone Precursors.

standards, the MOU requires NHDES to work with PDA and

incorporate projected emissions from Pease redevelopment into the

SIP revisions.8 Unless and until the new SIP is approved,

however, it bars PDA from developing Pease "beyond the level

anticipated to generate 3.3 tons per day of hydrocarbon

emissions"--the level of emissions from Pease permitted under the

existing SIP. Thus, the MOU does not place the entire burden of

addressing HC emissions on the SIP process.

To the extent that the MOU does rely on the SIP process

to deal with projected increases in HC emissions, however, it

8 According to the 1990 Amendments, New Hampshire was required
to revise its SIP to achieve at least a 15% reduction in VOC
emissions (including HCs) from 1990 levels on or before November
of 1996 (accounting for any growth in emissions after 1990), and
3% additional annual reductions on average thereafter through
1999. See 42 U.S.C. 7511a(b)(1)(A) & (c)(2)(B) (Supp. III

1991).

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does so properly under the circumstances. The 1990 CAA

amendments required New Hampshire to revise its SIP to address

VOC emissions (which include HC emissions) within approximately

three years. See 42 U.S.C. 7511a(c), (b)(1). See supra p.

14. NHDES's commitment to consult with PDA and incorporate

emissions from Pease development into required revisions of the

SIP is consistent with the SIP process and NHDES's role as the

state agency responsible for developing the SIP. While the EPA

and the legislature set ultimate standards and goals--including

the NAAQS and deadlines for attaining them--the state prescribes

in its SIP how it will achieve those goals. See 42 U.S.C.

7407. Thus, if NHDES chooses to incorporate into the required

revisions of the SIP certain levels of emissions from the Pease

project, that is its prerogative under the statutory SIP process.

By agreeing to incorporate Pease emissions into SIP

revisions that will reduce overall ozone-precursor emissions in

the region, NHDES has enabled PDA to undertake the redevelopment

without increasing the severity of or delaying attainment of the

NAAQS for ozone. Presumably New Hampshire will accommodate

increased HC emissions from Pease and achieve interim required

emissions reductions and timely attainment of the NAAQS for ozone

by cutting VOC emissions in other areas. This will permit later

stages of Pease redevelopment to go forward without increasing

existing violations of the NAAQS for ozone or delaying attainment

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of the NAAQS for ozone or other CAA standards. 42 U.S.C.

7506(c)(1)(B)(ii), (iii).

Unless and until a new SIP incorporating higher levels

of emissions from Pease is approved, however, the MOU prohibits

redevelopment of Pease beyond a level producing 3.3 tons per day

of HC emissions. While the cap is in compliance with the terms

of the existing SIP, it is not so clear it will ensure that Pease

redevelopment activities will not increase the severity of

existing ozone violations and delay compliance with ozone

standards. Whether redevelopment will increase the severity of

existing violations depends in part on the baseline emissions.

When compared to 1989 emissions, 3.3 tons per day represents no

increase in the severity of violations of the NAAQS for ozone.

Because, as we stated earlier, use of 1989 estimates is

reasonable under the circumstances, see supra pp. 45-47, and

because the existing SIP permits this level of emissions, the

provisions of the MOU satisfy the conformity requirements under

section 7506(c)(1)(B)(ii).

Regarding delaying attainment of the ozone standards,

plaintiffs appear to suggest that to meet the section

7506(c)(1)(B)(iii) criteria, emissions from the Pease project

must be consistent with the VOC emissions reductions set out in

42 U.S.C. 7511a(c)(2). Prior to incorporation into a revised

SIP, however, these reductions apply only in conformity decisions

related to transportation plans, programs and projects and

therefore are not relevant here. See 42 U.S.C.

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7506(c)(3)(A)(iii); see also 136 Cong. Rec. S16973 (October 27,

1990) (Statement of Senator Baucus, sponsor and manager of the

Senate bill) ("[Transportation] plans and programs adopted for

areas that are nonattainment for ozone or carbon monoxide during

the interim period shall contribute to annual emission reductions

consistent with the emissions reductions schedules adopted in the

bill for such areas. . . .") (emphasis added).

IV. THE CERCLA CLAIM
IV. THE CERCLA CLAIM

Newington claims that the Air Force's 55-year lease of

portions of Pease to PDA violates section 120(h)(3)(B)(i) of

CERCLA (42 U.S.C. 9620(h)(3)(B)(I)). The district court had

jurisdiction over the claim under 42 U.S.C. 9613(b) (1988).

Section 120 was added by the 1986 Superfund Amendments and

Reauthorization Act (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613

(1986), to address issues concerning hazardous waste on

federally-owned sites. Section 120(a) subjects federal agencies

to CERCLA. Subsections (b) through (f) outline a comprehensive

program to identify and remediate hazardous waste sites.

Subsection (h) deals with transfers of property on which

hazardous substances are known to have been released or disposed

of. Subsection (h)(1) requires notice of such release or

disposal in any contract "for the sale or other transfer of real

property which is owned by the United States."

Subsection (h)(3) addresses the "contents of certain

deeds." Before its recent amendment, it required that

. . . in the case of any real property owned
by the United States on which any hazardous

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substance was stored for one year or more,
known to have been released, or disposed of,
each deed entered into for the transfer of
such property by the United States to any
other person or entity shall contain--
(B) a covenant warranting that--
(i) all remedial action necessary to
protect human health and the environment with
respect to any such substance remaining on
the property has been taken before the date
of such transfer, . . . .

42 U.S.C. 9620(h)(3).

Newington argues that section 120(h)(3) prohibits the

federal government from transferring contaminated property until

it has constructed, installed and is successfully operating clean

up procedures and mechanisms that ensure full remediation.

Although section 120(h)(3) by its terms applies to deeds,

Newington contends that the substance of the transaction should

control and that the government should not be permitted to avoid

the mandate of the statute by labeling the transaction a lease.

The District Court held that the transfer without an approved

remedial design violated section 120(h) of CERCLA, and that the

failure to disclose in the FEIS the decision to transfer by way

of a long-term lease rather than deed violated NEPA. See 864

F.Supp. at 290. Although the court declined to hold the leases

void, it directed the Air Force to prepare a supplemental FEIS

delineating the remedial design. Newington contends that the

relief granted is inadequate to secure compliance with section

120(h).

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Any question about whether section 120(h)(3) applies to

long-term leases has been laid to rest by the 1996 amendment of

that section, adding the following language:

The requirements of subparagraph (B) [of a
covenant warranting completion of all
necessary remedial action] shall not apply in
any case in which the transfer of the
property occurs or has occurred by means of a
lease, without regard to whether the lessee
has agreed to purchase the property or
whether the duration of the lease is longer
than 55 years.

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L.

No. 104-106, 2834, 110 Stat. (1996).

"When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after

the events in suit, the court's first task is to determine

whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper

reach." Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1505

(1994). In this case, Congress left no doubt that the amendment

was to apply to the instant lease. The Conference Report on the

Defense Authorization Act states in part that section 2834

"addresses a recent federal district court decision that could

undermine reuse plans at military installations selected for

closure with similar reuse plans. The provision serves to

clarify the legislative intent on the issue." H.R. Conf. Rep.

No. 450, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. [1996 WL 33108 at 1724 (LH data

base)] (1996). Senator Bob Smith of New Hampshire, the sponsor

of the amendment, explained that the need for the amendment arose

out of the District Court's decision in this case which "has . .

. placed a cloud over redevelopment efforts at Pease . . . [and]

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has helped to hinder the expedited redevelopment of facilities

across the Nation that are being closed under the Base Closure

and Realignment Act . . . . The language that was included in

section 2824 . . . was intended to modify section 120(h)(3) . . .

to provide that the Department of Defense may enter into long-

term . . . leases while any phase of the cleanup is ongoing . . .

. [N]ot only are existing leases appropriate, but future leases

may be entered into . . . ." 141 Cong. Rec. S11557 (daily ed.

Aug. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Smith). The recent amendment

validates the Air Force's lease to PDA under CERCLA.

V. THE NEPA CLAIM
V. THE NEPA CLAIM

The federal defendants do not appeal the district

court's order finding a violation of "the public disclosure

requirements of NEPA" and directing the Air Force to "compile a

Supplemental FEIS." With regard to the NEPA claims against the

FAA, the FAA adopted the FEIS prepared by the Air Force;

therefore, the district court's decision that the FEIS was

deficient under NEPA binds the FAA. The only NEPA issue before

us then is plaintiffs' appeal of the district court's denial of

injunctive relief for the NEPA violations.

Plaintiffs first attack the denial of injunctive relief

on the ground that the district court failed to make findings of

fact and conclusions of law sufficient to meet the requirements

of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52. Plaintiffs contend that the court failed

to provide sufficient factual or legal support for its conclusion

that plaintiffs "have [not] demonstrated the irreparable harm

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necessary for granting a preliminary injunction." See, 864 F.

Supp. at 292. "The purpose of Rule 52(a), pertinent to

injunctions, is to provide the appellate court with a clear

understanding of the decision." Wynn Oil Co. v. Purolator

Chemical Corp., 536 F.2d 84, 85 (5th Cir. 1976). "Rule 52(a)

calls for a level of detail adequate to permit appellate review

on factual issues, and what is adequate depends on the importance

of an issue, its complexity, the depth and nature of evidence

presented, and similar elements that vary from case to case."

Knapp Shoes, Inc. v. Sylvania Mfg. Corp., 15 F.3d 1222, 1228 (1st

Cir. 1994). Although the district court did not discuss its

factual or legal reasons for concluding that the plaintiffs did

not suffer irreparable harm, its lengthy opinion provides a

detailed discussion of the factual and legal bases for its

substantive conclusions. That discussion, along with the

voluminous and undisputed documentary evidence in the record,

provides this court with sufficient information to determine

whether the district court abused its discretion in denying

injunctive relief; thus, the omission of a statement of reasons

for the denial of injunctive relief was at most harmless error.

See, e.g., Associated Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Mid-America Transp.

Co., 931 F.2d 1266, 1272 (8th Cir. 1991) ("failure to make

findings of fact and conclusions of law may be harmless error

where, as here, most relevant facts are undisputed and the law

can be applied without the district court's assistance"); Koerpel

v. Heckler, 797 F.2d 858, 866 n.4 (10th Cir. 1986) (even though

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district court "should have elaborated on the facts which formed

the basis for its conclusions . . . [s]uch an omission is,

however, harmless error because the record supports such

findings") (citation omitted); Huard-Steinheiser, Inc. v. Henry,

280 F.2d 79, 84 (6th Cir. 1960) (failure of district court to put

on record findings of fact and conclusions of law resulted in no

prejudicial error where record clearly disclosed basis upon which

denial of injunction rested). Plaintiffs next challenge the

court's decision to deny injunctive relief on the merits.

Whether to grant injunctive relief under NEPA is governed by

traditional equity standards. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d

497, 503-04 (1st Cir. 1989). The court must consider the

plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits, whether the

plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction,

the appropriate "balance" of harms to the plaintiffs and the

defendants, and the effect upon the public interest. Planned

Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1009 (1st

Cir. 1981).

We review orders granting or denying injunctions for

abuse of discretion. Celebrity, Inc. v. Trina, Inc., 264 F.2d

956, 958 (1st Cir. 1959). "District courts have broad discretion

to evaluate the irreparability of alleged harm and to make

determinations regarding the propriety of injunctive relief." K-

Mart Corp. v. Oriental Plaza, Inc., 875 F.2d 907, 915 (1st Cir.

1989) (quoting Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 566, 575-76 (D.C. Cir.

1987)).

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The district court denied injunctive relief on the

ground that plaintiffs would suffer no irreparable harm.

Plaintiffs challenge this finding, relying on Sierra Club v.

Marsh, 872 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1989), and Massachusetts v. Watt,

716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983). In those cases, we found

irreparable harm to exist when agencies become entrenched in a

decision uninformed by the proper NEPA process because they have

made commitments or taken action to implement the uninformed

decision. See Watt, 716 F.2d at 951-53; Marsh, 872 F.2d at 499-

503. Our rationale derived from the purpose of NEPA: "NEPA is

designed to influence the decision making process" by making

"governmental officials notice environmental considerations and

take them into account." Watt, 716 F.2d at 952. "Thus, when a

decision to which NEPA obligations attach is made without the

informed environmental consideration that NEPA requires, the harm

that NEPA intends to prevent has been suffered." Id. That harm

is not merely a procedural harm, but is "the added risk to the

environment that takes place when governmental decision makers

make up their minds without having before them an analysis (with

prior public comment) of the likely effects of their decision

upon the environment." Marsh, 872 F.2d at 500.

Plaintiffs argue that, without an injunction,

development of Pease will continue and they will suffer the kind

of irreparable harm we described in Watt and Marsh. As we

emphasized there, however, our holdings did not mean "that a

likely NEPA violation automatically calls for an injunction; the

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balance of harms may point the other way." See Marsh, 872 F.2d

at 504 (quoting Watt, 716 F.2d at 952) (emphasis added). In Watt

and Marsh, plaintiffs moved for injunctions in the earliest

stages of development of the projects at issue, when NEPA

injunctions could implement the statutory purpose in the sense

that "bureaucratic decision makers . . . are less likely to tear

down a nearly completed project than a barely started project."

Marsh, 872 F.2d at 500. In contrast, plaintiff here, well aware

of the defective FEIS, waited nearly three years before moving

for injunctive relief. CLF filed its complaint in March 1992,

some six months after the challenged FEIS and ROD were issued;

Newington filed its complaint in June 1992. Both complaints

recited requests for permanent injunctions in their prayers for

relief. Despite these early references to equitable relief,

however, neither CLF nor Newington ever moved to restrain or

enjoin any aspect of the project. When the cases came before the

district court on cross-motions for summary judgment, plaintiffs'

briefs focused on the merits of the substantive claims, not the

need for injunctive relief. Only after the entry of the court's

order granting summary judgment in part did plaintiffs argue, in

a motion to amend, that they were entitled to broad injunctive

relief.

To be taken into account in assessing the balance of

harms is the fact that between the time when plaintiffs filed

suit and when they ultimately moved for injunctive relief,

significant commitments were made to the Pease project. The

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State of New Hampshire issued $8 million in general obligation

bonds to fund the operation of PDA and $40 million in guaranteed

bonds to help finance the location of two major tenants at Pease;

construction contracts aggregating $50 million were entered and

federal grants of more than $6 million received to support the

airport operations; and more than 1,100 persons became employed

by tenants and agencies as a result of the development project.

These commitments would be placed at risk if an injunction were

granted.

Thus, the type of public and private commitments with

which Watt and Marsh were concerned had already been made here by

the time plaintiffs sought injunctive relief. If harm was done,

it largely had been done, not by the court's denial of injunctive

relief, but by plaintiffs' failure to timely seek it. While it

is true that as development continues other actions will be taken

to implement the project, their impact will be only incremental.

Future risks of environmental harm will be minimized, moreover,

by the district court's retention of jurisdiction under its order

that the Air Force compile a Supplemental FEIS, by the Air

Force's commitment to this court that it "will use the SEIS to

review its August 1991 ROD and April 1992 Supplemental ROD," and

by the continuing oversight responsibilities of the FAA under the

Surplus Property Act and of the EPA under the CAA.

Under these circumstances, it was not an abuse of

discretion for the district court to deny the injunctive relief

sought.

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VI. CONCLUSION
VI. CONCLUSION

We reverse the district court's determination that

defendants violated CERCLA and affirm the judgment below in all

other respects. Pending the completion of the Supplemental FEIS

on which the FAA is working in conjunction with the Air Force, we

retain jurisdiction under the petitions of the NEPA claims

against the FAA but dismiss the CAA claims against it.

SO ORDERED.

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