July 12, 1996
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 95-2235
IKE WEEMS,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
GEORGE A. VOSE, ETC., ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Francis J. Boyle, Senior U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
Stahl and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
Ike Weems on brief pro se.
Michael B. Grant, Senior Legal Counsel, Rhode Island Department
of Corrections, on Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Disposition, for appellees.
Per Curiam. Having carefully examined the record in
this case, we affirm the dismissal of appellant Weems'
complaint.
First, since the Morris rules are state law, an alleged
violation of them, without more, is not a sufficient
predicate to sustain a damage action under federal law.
Complaints of such violations should be directed to state
court. Furthermore, insofar as Weems seeks injunctive or
declaratory relief for these alleged violations, he is
precluded by our prior holding that inmates may not bring
individual section 1983 actions for injunctive or relief
which are based on consent decree violations. See Martel v.
Fridovich, 14 F.3d 1, 3 n.4 (1st Cir. 1993).
Second, even if we assume without deciding that Weems'
disciplinary hearings deprived him of a constitutionally
protected liberty interest, Weems has still failed to allege
sufficient facts to sustain a claim that his right to due
process has been violated. Liberally construed, his
complaint alleges: (1) that he was not provided sufficient
notice of the charges prior to the disciplinary hearings;
and (2) that the board's findings of guilt were not based on
some evidence in the record. As to the first, Weems concedes
that he received notice of the disciplinary reports at least
24 hours prior to the hearings and this is sufficient to
satisfy due process. See Langton v. Berman, 667 F.2d 231,
234 (1st Cir. 1981). As to the second, the record shows that
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in each instance the board relied on disciplinary reports
which contained eyewitness accounts of the infractions with
which Weems was charged. Moreover, Weems never controverted
the essential factual allegations on which the board relied
at the disciplinary hearing nor does he do so in his
complaint. In these circumstances, the board's reliance on
the written reports was proper and no due process violation
occurred. See Forbes v. Trigg, 976 F.2d 308, 318-19 (7th
Cir. 1992) (finding no due process violation in similar
circumstances), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 950 (1993).
Third, as the Supreme Court has recently made clear, the
right of access to the courts is the "right to bring a
grievance that the inmate wishe[s] to present." Lewis v.
Casey, 1996 WL 340797, at *5 (U.S June 24, 1996). It is not
a right "to litigate effectively once in court." Id. Thus,
in order to prevail on his claim that his constitutional
right was violated, Weems must show an "actual injury" by
"demonstrat[ing] that the alleged shortcomings in the library
or legal assistance hindered his efforts to pursue a legal
claim." Id. Not only has Weems alleged no such actual
injury but the record makes clear that he was able to present
his alleged grievances to the court and that, as a pro se
plaintiff, his complaint was liberally construed. Thus, this
claim is meritless.
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Finally, essentially for the reasons given by the
magistrate judge in his report and recommendation, dated
September 29, 1995, Weems' allegation that the punishment
assessed him violated his right to equal protection is
without merit.
Affirmed. See 1st Cir. Loc. R. 27.1.
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