UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-20748
Summary Calendar
TIM DAWSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
VERSUS
CITY OF HOUSTON, TEXAS, HOUSTON FIRE DEPARTMENT; SAMUEL RUFFINO,
Individually, and In His Official Capacity as Captain of the
Houston Fire Department; A B WHITEHORN, Individually, and In His
Official Capacity as Deputy Chief of the Houston Fire Department;
DANIEL D SHARP, Individually, and In His Official Capacity as Fire
Fighter of the Houston Fire Department; STAN P NADOLSKI,
Individually, and In His Official Capacity as Investigator of the
Internal Affairs Division of the Houston Fire Department; CITY OF
HOUSTON,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(H-99-589)
DECEMBER 22, 1999
Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellant Timothy Dawson filed suit in the Southern District
of Texas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged procedural and
substantive due process violations and for state tort law claims of
intentional infliction of emotional distress and civil conspiracy.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
1
Dawson’s injuries allegedly arose out of a four day suspension
without pay from the Houston Fire Department due to
insubordination. Dawson received notice of the suspension on June
22, 1996, and on July 8, 1996, he requested review by an
independent hearing examiner. On June 27, 1997, the independent
hearing examiner reduced the suspension to three days. Dawson
filed suit on February 25, 1999. The district court granted
summary judgment for the Appellees finding 1) the claims barred by
the applicable two-year statute of limitations; 2) a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction by operation of the Texas Local
Government Code; and 3) that the Appellees are but one entity and
are thus incapable of conspiring against Dawson. The district
court also denied Dawson’s motion for a new trial. Dawson
appealed.
Having carefully reviewed the record and fully considered the
arguments of the parties, we conclude that the district court
correctly determined that the suit was barred by the statute of
limitations both because the period commenced upon Dawson’s
notification of the suspension on June 22, 1996, See Freeze v.
Griffith, 849 F.2d 172, 175 (5th Cir. 1988), and because the
limitations period was not tolled during the pendency of the review
by the independent hearing examiner. See Holmes v. Texas A & M
University, 145 F.3d 681, 684-85 (5th Cir. 1998). We also
conclude, therefore, that the district court properly denied
Dawson’s motion for a new trial.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM without reaching the district court’s
2
alternative bases for the summary judgment.
3