UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 96-1026
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
ERIC JOEL CARRION-CRUZ,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jose Antonio Fuste, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges,
and McAuliffe,* District Judge.
Benicio Sanchez-Rivera, Federal Public Defender, and Juan E.
Alvarez, Assistant Federal Public Defender, on brief for
appellant.
Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Jose A. Quiles-
Espinosa, Senior Litigation Counsel, and Miguel A. Pereira,
Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for the United States.
August 7, 1996
Per Curiam. Defendant-appellant Eric Joel Carrion-Cruz
Per Curiam.
pled guilty to violating the carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C.
2119(3). At the disposition hearing, the district court departed
upward from the guideline sentencing range to impose a sentence
of life imprisonment.1 Carrion-Cruz assigns error to the upward
departure.
We have carefully examined the transcript of the
disposition hearing, the presentence investigation report, and
the briefs. Since we are persuaded that the assignment of error
lacks merit, we summarily affirm. See 1st Cir. R. 27.1. We add
only four brief comments.
First: U.S.S.G. 5K2.0 allows sentencing courts to
depart from the guideline sentencing range in a given case if the
court finds aggravating or mitigating circumstances that render
the case atypical and take it out of the "heartland" for which
the applicable guideline was designed. See United States v.
Quinones, 26 F.3d 213, 216 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v.
Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 946 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Diaz-
Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 862 (1989). Here, the multiple killings for which the
defendant was responsible murdering four individuals (two of
whom were good samaritans who had stopped to offer assistance)
within an abbreviated time frame transport the defendant's
1In effect, the court raised the defendant's offense level
by three levels (from 40 to 43). Even for a first-time offender,
Offense Level 43 commands a sentence of life imprisonment. See
U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A (Sentencing Table).
2
activities well outside the mine-run of carjacking cases. See
U.S.S.G. 5K2.1 (encouraging courts to consider upward departure
from the otherwise applicable guideline sentencing range if the
relevant offense conduct results in multiple deaths).
Second: The defendant points to his youth and limited
intellect as mitigating factors. But his counsel made much the
same argument below, and the district judge specifically
commented upon these factors in passing sentence and took full
account of them. Given the sentencing court's special coign of
vantage, see Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d at 49, we cannot brush
aside that court's considered judgment on so interstitial a
matter.
Third: The defendant's challenge to the reasonableness
of the upward departure is unavailing. Offense Level 40 permits
sentences of up to 365 months for first offenders. The magnitude
of the ensuing departure to a life sentence (Offense Level
43) is reasonable, considering the sordid facts of the case.
See, e.g., Quinones, 26 F.3d at 218 (explaining that "unusually
brutal, cruel, and degrading treatment" of victims "is emblematic
of the very sort of sociopathic behavior" that will sustain a
substantial upward departure). The departure here meets any
conceivable test of reasonableness. See, id. at 219-20
(upholding 60% increase as reasonable); Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d
at 52 (upholding departure that more than doubled defendant's
sentence as reasonable).
Fourth: Relatedly, the Supreme Court's recent opinion
3
in Koon v. United States, 64 U.S.L.W. 4512 (U.S. June 13, 1996),
makes it clear that we must respect a district court's special
competence in sentencing matters, see id. at 4516-17, and uphold
a departure sentence unless the court has abused its discretion,
see id. at 4517. In light of the stark facts of this brutal
crime, a convincing case of discretion abused simply cannot be
mustered.
We need go no further.2 The Supreme Court has
instructed us that "it is not the role of an appellate court to
substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to
the appropriateness of a particular sentence." Williams v.
United States, 503 U.S. 193, 205 (1992) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). In essence, the defendant invites us
to contravene that precept. On these facts, we have no reason to
take so precipitous a step.
Affirmed.
2Because the upward departure is fully justified by the
incidence of multiple deaths, we need not address the sentencing
court's alternative justifications for the sentence.
4