[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 96-1564
CHUKWU E. AZUBUKO,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BOSTON,
THEIR BOARD OF DIRECTORS,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. George A. O'Toole, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Cyr and Boudin,
Circuit Judges.
Chukwu E. Azubuko on Reply to Motion for Summary Disposition.
Robert L. Klivans on Motion for Summary Disposition for appellee.
August 7, 1996
Per Curiam. Appellant Chukwu E. Azubuko appeals
from the district court's dismissal of his complaint against
appellee First National Bank of Boston. Appellee has moved
for summary disposition of the matter under Local Rule 27.1,
arguing that the appeal does not present any substantial
questions. We agree.
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction. Appellant appears
to confuse personal jurisdiction over a defendant with
subject matter jurisdiction over a cause of action. Only the
latter type of jurisdiction is in question in this case. In
this context, then, we first note that appellant's claims
plainly do not "aris[e] under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States." See 28 U.S.C. 1331.
Rather, he is asserting state law claims. Under 28 U.S.C.
1332(a), the district court has jurisdiction over such
actions where the controversy is between "citizens of
different States." Appellant does not dispute that defendant
is a citizen of Massachusetts.
For individuals, citizenship is equated with
"domicile." See Rodriguez-Diaz v. Sierra-Martinez, 853 F.2d
1027, 1029 (1st Cir. 1988). Domicile, in turn, requires a
home and physical presence in a state. Id. Appellant states
that he is a resident of Massachusetts; he does not claim
citizenship in any other jurisdiction. Thus, he is deemed a
citizen of the Commonwealth. See id. As such, the
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controversy is between citizens of the same state and,
diversity missing, the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the action.
2. Review of State Court Judgments.
Appellant plainly is attacking the state court
judgment against him on the same claim that he is now
asserting. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits lower
federal courts such as the district court and this one from
reviewing state court judgments. See Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Even if appellant's
federal claims never were presented in state court, they are
"inextricably intertwined" with that judgment, thereby
barring review by this or the district court. See Ritter v.
Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 753-54 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Feldman,
460 U.S. at 483 n.16) (internal quotation marks omitted),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1046 (1994).
3. Notice. The district court in its endorsement
granting appellee's motion to dismiss gave three reasons for
its actions. Although succinct, we think that they were
sufficient. Given the basic flaws in the complaint, and
defendant's memorandum explaining the nature of the
jurisdictional flaw, appellant was adequately apprised of the
reasons for the dismissal.
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We therefore summarily affirm the judgment of the
district court. See Local R. 27.1. Appellant's motions to
proceed in forma pauperis and without briefs are denied as
moot.
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