United States v. Houlihan

October 11, 1996 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
October 11, 1996 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 95-1614
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

JOHN HOULIHAN,

Defendant, Appellant.

No. 95-1615
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

JOSEPH A. NARDONE

Defendant, Appellant.

No. 95-1675
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL D. FITZGERALD

Defendant, Appellant.

ERRATA SHEET
ERRATA SHEET

The opinion of this court issued on August 22, 1996, is corrected
as follows:

On page 52, line 22, change "Boylan" to "O'Bryant"

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 95-1614

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

JOHN HOULIHAN,

Defendant, Appellant.

No. 95-1615

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

JOSEPH A. NARDONE

Defendant, Appellant.

No. 95-1675

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL D. FITZGERALD

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Selya, Circuit Judge,

Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Boudin, Circuit Judge.

Charles W. Rankin, with whom Rankin & Sultan was on brief,

for appellant Houlihan.
Jonathan Shapiro, with whom Angela Lehman and Stern,

Shapiro, Weissberg & Garin were on brief, for appellant Nardone.

Kevin S. Nixon, with whom Robert Y. Murray and Ramsey &

Murray were on brief, for appellant Fitzgerald.

Nina Goodman, Attorney, Dep't of Justice, with whom Donald

K. Stern, United States Attorney, Paul V. Kelly and Frank A.

Libby, Jr., Assistant United States Attorneys, and Daniel S.

Goodman and David S. Kris, Attorneys, Dep't of Justice, were on

brief, for the United States.

August 22, 1996

SELYA, Circuit Judge. These appeals present a hothouse
SELYA, Circuit Judge.

of efflorescent issues set against a backdrop composed of roughly

equal parts of drugs, money, and mayhem. Two of those issues

one implicating the Confrontation Clause and the other involving

Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c) raise important questions of first

impression in this circuit. In the pages that follow, we offer a

skeletal outline of the case and then put flesh on the bones by

addressing, first, the appellants' two flagship claims. We next

consider a series of discovery disputes and conclude by

discussing, albeit in a more abbreviated fashion, a laundry list

of other asseverations. In the end, after careful consideration

of the parties' arguments and close perscrutation of the

compendious record, we affirm the judgments below in large part,

but reverse one defendant's conviction on three related counts

and bring a contingent sentencing determination to closure.

I. BACKGROUND
I. BACKGROUND

Overcoming the temptation to engage in Homeric

recitation of the riveting facts that emerged during a seventy-

day trial, we opt instead to sketch the evidence at this juncture

and reserve greater detail until the need arises to place

specific issues into workable context. We draw our sketch in

colors that coordinate with the jury's verdicts, consistent with

record support. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707,

711 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1063 (1993).

For nearly four years Michael Fitzgerald and John

Houlihan ran a ruthlessly efficient drug ring from an unlikely

4

command post: Kerrigan's Flower Shop, Charlestown,

Massachusetts. The organization commanded the allegiance of

numerous distributors, stationary and mobile, including

Jennierose Lynch, William "Bud" Sweeney, George Sargent, and Alan

Skinner. These minions, and others like them, helped the

organization supply cocaine to hordes of buyers through an

elaborate street-level distribution network that arranged most of

its sales with the aid of electronic pagers, assigned customer

codes, and preset rendezvous points.

Fitzgerald and Houlihan imposed a strict code of

silence on all who came into contact with them, including their

own troops. They dealt severely with persons who seemed inclined

to talk too freely. Joseph Nardone, a professional assassin who

bragged that he was the "headache man" when the organization's

chieftains had a headache, Nardone got rid of it acted as the

principal enforcer. Over time, the gang's targets included

Sargent, Sweeney (who survived multiple attempts on his life, but

was left paralyzed from the chest down), a rival drug dealer,

James Boyden III, and the latter's son and helpmeet, James Boyden

IV.

The Fitzgerald-Houlihan axis dominated the Charlestown

scene through 1993. Ultimately, the authorities broke the code

of silence and a federal grand jury indicted twelve individuals

(including Fitzgerald, Houlihan, and Nardone) on a myriad of

5

charges.1 After trial, the two ringleaders and their enforcer

were found guilty of engaging in a racketeering enterprise (count

1), racketeering conspiracy (count 2), conspiracy to commit

murder in aid of racketeering (counts 5, 7 & 9), and conspiracy

to distribute cocaine (count 20). See 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) &

(d), 1959(a); 21 U.S.C. 846. The jury also convicted

Fitzgerald and Houlihan of aiding and abetting murder and

attempted murder in aid of racketeering (counts 6, 8, 11 & 12),

instigating murder for hire (counts 15, 16 & 17), engaging in a

continuing criminal enterprise (count 19), and distributing

cocaine (counts 21 through 29). See 18 U.S.C. 1959(a), 1958;

21 U.S.C. 848, 841(a)(1). The jury found Nardone guilty of

murder and attempted murder in aid of racketeering (counts 6, 8,

11 & 12), see 18 U.S.C. 1959(a), and using and carrying a

firearm during and in relation to crimes of violence (counts 39,

40, 42 & 43), see 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The jury also returned

special forfeiture verdicts. See 18 U.S.C. 1963; 21 U.S.C.

853. The district court sentenced each defendant to multiple

terms of life imprisonment. These appeals blossomed.

II. THE VOICE FROM THE GRAVE
II. THE VOICE FROM THE GRAVE

The district court admitted over objection portions of

hearsay statements made by George Sargent on the theory that

1Of these twelve, only Fitzgerald, Houlihan, and Nardone
appear as appellants before us. Three of their codefendants
(Skinner, Lynch, and Joseph Houlihan) eventually pled guilty;
five others were granted a separate trial; and one (William Herd)
was acquitted by the same jury that convicted the three
appellants.

6

Sargent's murder constituted a waiver of the Confrontation Clause

vis- -vis the murderers.2 Houlihan and Nardone assign error to

this order and to a salmagundi of related rulings.

A. Setting the Stage.
A. Setting the Stage.

Sargent served as a distributor for the Fitzgerald-

Houlihan organization. The police arrested him twice during 1992

on drug-trafficking charges. Both times, Sargent made voluntary

statements that inculpated Fitzgerald and Houlihan in a sprawling

drug conspiracy and tended to link them with several murders.

The statements also furnished evidence probative of the elements

of the offenses with which Nardone had been charged, but Sargent

did not mention him by name. On June 28, 1992 within a month

after he gave the second statement police found Sargent's

corpse in a parking lot. He had been killed by a bullet wound to

the head inflicted at close range.

The government filed a pretrial motion for an order (1)

authorizing a state trooper, Mark Lemieux, to testify about

Sargent's statements following his March 1992 arrest, and (2)

permitting the jury to hear a redacted version of the taped May

1992 interview conducted by Boston police detectives following

Sargent's second arrest. The government argued that the

appellants who had been charged with Sargent's murder waived

their rights to object to the admission of his out-of-court

2Because the government did not prove to the district
court's satisfaction that Fitzgerald shared his codefendants'
intent to forestall Sargent from cooperating with the police, the
court ruled that Sargent's statements could not be used against
Fitzgerald. The correctness of that ruling is not before us.

7

statements on either Confrontation Clause or hearsay grounds when

they successfully conspired to execute him for the express

purpose of preventing his cooperation with the authorities. The

district court took the motion under advisement and, near the end

of the government's case in chief, admitted the challenged

evidence against Houlihan and Nardone, but not Fitzgerald, see

supra note 2, concluding that the government had shown by clear

and convincing evidence that those defendants conspired to kill

Sargent at least in part for the purpose of preventing him from

cooperating with the police, and that such actions were

tantamount to a knowing waiver of their confrontation rights.

See United States v. Houlihan, 887 F. Supp. 352, 363-65 (D. Mass.

1995).3

B. Waiver by Homicide: The Confrontation Clause.
B. Waiver by Homicide: The Confrontation Clause.

To resolve Houlihan's and Nardone's main objections, we

must decide whether a defendant waives his rights under the

Confrontation Clause by murdering a potential witness to prevent

that witness from turning state's evidence and/or testifying

against him at trial. We believe that he does.

It is apodictic that "in all criminal prosecutions, the

accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the

witnesses against him . . . ." U.S. Const. Amend. VI. This

trial right is designed to assure defendants of a meaningful

opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who testify against

3The district court also published a preliminary opinion,
United States v. Houlihan, 871 F. Supp. 1495 (D. Mass. 1994),

which is of little moment in regard to these appeals.

8

them, see, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678

(1986); United States v. Laboy-Delgado, 84 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir.

1996), thereby enhancing the jury's ability to separate fact from

fiction.

Though the Confrontation Clause is a cornerstone of our

adversary system of justice, it is not an absolute; there are

circumstances in which the prosecution may introduce an unsworn

out-of-court statement without procuring the declarant's presence

at trial. See, e.g., Puleio v. Vose, 830 F.2d 1197, 1205-07 (1st

Cir. 1987) (discussing exception for spontaneous exclamations),

cert. denied, 485 U.S. 990 (1988). Moreover, a defendant may

waive his right to confrontation by knowing and intentional

relinquishment. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969)

(holding that a guilty plea is an express waiver of the

constitutional right to confrontation); see also Johnson v.

Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). While a waiver of the right to

confront witnesses typically is express, the law is settled that

a defendant also may waive it through his intentional misconduct.

See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20 (1973)

(finding such a waiver when a defendant boycotted his trial);

Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970) (ruling that a

defendant waives the right to confrontation by engaging in

disruptive behavior requiring his removal from the courtroom

during the trial).

By the same token, courts will not suffer a party to

profit by his own wrongdoing. Thus, a defendant who wrongfully

9

procures a witness's absence for the purpose of denying the

government that witness's testimony waives his right under the

Confrontation Clause to object to the admission of the absent

witness's hearsay statements. See Reynolds v. United States, 98

U.S. (8 Otto) 145, 158 (1878) (holding that the defendant's

refusal to disclose the whereabouts of a witness constituted such

a waiver); Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1201-02 (6th Cir.

1982) (holding that a defendant who silences a witness by

exploiting an intimate relationship waives the right to

confrontation), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1053 (1983); United States

v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 629 (10th Cir. 1979) (concluding that a

defendant waives his confrontation right by threatening a

witness's life and bringing about the witness's silence), cert.

denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d

1346, 1358-60 (8th Cir. 1976) (similar), cert. denied, 431 U.S.

914 (1977). Moreover, it is sufficient in this regard to show

that the evildoer was motivated in part by a desire to silence

the witness; the intent to deprive the prosecution of testimony

need not be the actor's sole motivation. Cf. United States v.

Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating that the

obstruction of justice statute, 18 U.S.C. 1503, requires proof

that the defendant's conduct was "prompted, at least in part," by

the requisite corrupt motive).

Houlihan and Nardone argue, however, that the waiver-

by-misconduct doctrine, even if good law, should not be employed

here because Sargent was not an actual witness no charges had

10

been lodged against Houlihan or Nardone at the time of Sargent's

murder, and no grand jury had as yet been convened but at most

a turncoat cooperating with the police. Thus, they could not

have been on notice that they were waiving a trial right. We

find this argument unpersuasive. Although the reported cases all

appear to involve actual witnesses, see, e.g., United States v.

Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 798 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 456 &

496 (1994); United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 271-72

(2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984), we can

discern no principled reason why the waiver-by-misconduct

doctrine should not apply with equal force if a defendant

intentionally silences a potential witness.

When a defendant murders an individual who is a

percipient witness to acts of criminality (or procures his

demise) in order to prevent him from appearing at an upcoming

trial, he denies the government the benefit of the witness's live

testimony. In much the same way, when a defendant murders such a

witness (or procures his demise) in order to prevent him from

assisting an ongoing criminal investigation, he is denying the

government the benefit of the witness's live testimony at a

future trial. In short, the two situations are fair congeners:

as long as it is reasonably foreseeable that the investigation

will culminate in the bringing of charges, the mere fact that the

homicide occurs at an earlier step in the pavane should not

affect the operation of the waiver-by-misconduct doctrine.

Indeed, adopting the contrary position urged by the appellants

11

would serve as a prod to the unscrupulous to accelerate the

timetable and murder suspected snitches sooner rather than later.

We see no justification for creating such a perverse incentive,

or for distinguishing between a defendant who assassinates a

witness on the eve of trial and a potential defendant who

assassinates a potential witness before charges officially have

been brought. In either case, it is the intent to silence that

provides notice.

We therefore hold that when a person who eventually

emerges as a defendant (1) causes a potential witness's

unavailability (2) by a wrongful act (3) undertaken with the

intention of preventing the potential witness from testifying at

a future trial, then the defendant waives his right to object on

confrontation grounds to the admission of the unavailable

declarant's out-of-court statements at trial.

Before applying this holding to the case at hand, we

must correctly calibrate the quantum of proof. The lower court,

paying obeisance to United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 629-30

(5th Cir. Unit B), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008 (1982), adopted

the minority view and decided that the government must prove the

predicate facts essential to the waiver by "clear and convincing"

evidence. Houlihan, 887 F. Supp. at 360. This sets too high a

standard. Unlike the Fifth Circuit, we think that the government

need only prove such predicate facts by a preponderance of the

evidence.

The Thevis court compared the waiver-by-misconduct

12

problem to the admissibility of in-court identifications that

follow tainted out-of-court identifications. See, e.g., United

States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240 (1967) (requiring government to

prove by "clear and convincing" evidence in such circumstances

that the proposed in-court identification has a reliable

independent basis). With respect, we believe the better

comparison is to the admission of out-of-court statements under

the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. See Fed. R.

Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). To invoke the coconspirator exception, the

proponent of the statement must "show by a preponderance of the

evidence" certain predicate facts, namely, "that a conspiracy

embracing both the declarant and the defendant existed, and that

the declarant uttered the statement during and in furtherance of

the conspiracy." United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1180

(1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2714 (1994); see also

Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1987).

Proving the conditions precedent to the applicability

of the coconspirator exception is analytically and functionally

identical to proving that a defendant's wrongdoing waives his

rights under the Confrontation Clause. See Steele, 684 F.2d at

1203; United States v. White, 838 F. Supp. 618, 624 (D.D.C.

1993). We therefore align ourselves with the majority of federal

appellate courts that have considered the question, see, e.g.,

Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273; Steele, 684 F.2d at 1202-03;

Balano, 618 F.2d at 629, and set the government's burden of proof

at the preponderance-of-the-evidence level.

13

Measured against this more conventional benchmark, the

district court's findings easily pass muster. The record amply

demonstrates that Houlihan and Nardone knew when they conspired

to murder Sargent that they were depriving the government of a

potential witness. First, the district court supportably found

that they believed Sargent was cooperating with the police and

could harm them and the organization by talking.4 See Houlihan,

887 F. Supp. at 363-64. Second, Sargent was in fact cooperating

with law enforcement officials at the time and made two voluntary

statements in which he provided detailed accounts of the

organization's modus operandi, descriptions of the principals'

roles in various murders, and a frank admission of his own

involvement in the conspiracy. While the defendants' perception

of likely cooperation may well be enough to meet this prong of

the test, the fact of Sargent's cooperation reinforces the

inference that the killers believed Sargent was spilling the

beans and murdered him on that account. Last but not least, the

conspirators knew to a certainty that Sargent had keen insight

into their felonious activities both from his own work in the

distribution network and from sundry conversations in which they

spoke openly to him in retrospect, too openly of their

participation in serious crimes.

This evidentiary foundation sturdily supports the

4It is noteworthy that, after Judge Young ruled on the
admissibility of Sargent's statements, Sweeney testified that
Houlihan told him, flat out, that Sargent had been killed because
he "was talking to the cops."

14

conclusion that Houlihan and Nardone reasonably could have

foreseen Sargent becoming a witness against them and plotted to

kill him in order to deprive the government of his firsthand

testimony. Hence, the district court did not err in overruling

objections to the introduction of portions of Sargent's out-of-

court statements insofar as those objections stemmed from the

Confrontation Clause.5

C. Waiver by Homicide: The Hearsay Objections.
C. Waiver by Homicide: The Hearsay Objections.

Houlihan and Nardone next argue that, even if they

waived their confrontation rights, the district court should not

have admitted Sargent's hearsay statements because they were

tinged with self-interest (having been made in police custody

with a stiff sentence for distributing large quantities of

narcotics in prospect) and therefore lacked "circumstantial

guarantees of trustworthiness." Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5). On the

facts of this case, we agree with the district court, see

Houlihan, 887 F. Supp. at 362, 367, that Houlihan's and Nardone's

misconduct waived not only their confrontation rights but also

their hearsay objections, thus rendering a special finding of

reliability superfluous.

5In a related vein, Houlihan and Nardone complain that the
district court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to
ruling on the admissibility of Sargent's statements. This
complaint strikes us as a thinly-veiled effort to rehash a
discovery dispute that we discuss infra Part IV(B). In all

events, the district court heard arguments of counsel and thirty-
seven days of trial testimony before deciding that the statements
could be utilized. In these circumstances, the court did not
outstrip the bounds of its discretion in declining to convene a
special mid-trial evidentiary hearing.

15

The Supreme Court has yet to plot the crossroads at

which the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay principles

embedded in the Evidence Rules intersect. The question is subtly

nuanced. Though the two bodies of law are not coterminous, they

husband essentially the same interests. See California v. Green,

399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1976). Both attempt to strike a balance

between the government's need for probative evidence and the

defendant's stake in testing the government's case through cross-

examination. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980). As a

result, whether hearsay principles are more or less protective of

a defendant's right to cross-examination than confrontation

principles depends on the point at which the balance is struck in

any particular instance (recognizing, however, that the balance

can be struck at different levels in different cases). See

Green, 399 U.S. at 156.

In this case, we can take matters a step further. In

constructing the balance the main interest that must be offset

against the government's need for evidence is the accused's right

to confrontation (for this is the right from which the right to

cross-examine springs). Once the confrontation right is lifted

from the scales by operation of the accused's waiver of that

right, the balance tips sharply in favor of the need for

evidence. See Thai, 29 F.3d at 841 (holding that a defendant who

waives his confrontation right by wrongfully procuring a

witness's silence also waives hearsay objections vis- -vis that

witness); United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992)

16

(similar); see also Steele, 684 F.2d at 1201 (noting that

"English and American courts have consistently relaxed the

hearsay rule when the defendant wrongfully causes the witness'

unavailability"). Here, then, inasmuch as Houlihan and Nardone

waived their confrontation right by colloguing to murder Sargent,

they simultaneously waived their right to object on hearsay

grounds to the admission of his out-of-court statements.6 Hence,

the district court appropriately eschewed the request for

findings under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5).

Houlihan and Nardone have a fallback position. They

suggest that the district court's admission of Sargent's out-of-

court statements violated their rights to due process because the

admissions allowed them to be convicted on the basis of

unreliable evidence. See Green, 399 U.S. at 163 n.15 (ruminating

that "considerations of due process, wholly apart from the

Confrontation Clause, might prevent convictions where a reliable

evidentiary basis is totally lacking"). We reject this

initiative. Whatever criticisms justifiably might be levelled

against Sargent's statements, the portions of those statements

that Judge Young allowed into evidence are not so unreliable as

6We caution that a waiver of confrontation rights does not
result in the automatic surrender of all evidentiary objections.
For example, a district court still should exclude relevant but
highly inflammatory evidence, misconduct notwithstanding, if the
danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the evidence's
probative value. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. Presumably, such

evidence would have been excludable on a non-hearsay ground if
the declarant were available to testify, so there is no reason to
admit it when the defendant procures the declarant's
unavailability.

17

to raise due process concerns. Other evidence abundantly

corroborates (and in many instances replicates) Sargent's

account. For instance, his description of the organization's

modus operandi and his assessment of Houlihan's leadership role

were confirmed and described in excruciating detail by a galaxy

of live witnesses (e.g., Michael Nelson, Bud Sweeney, Cheryl

Dillon).7 No more is exigible.

D. The Redactions.
D. The Redactions.

After ruling that portions of Sargent's out-of-court

statements were admissible against Houlihan and Nardone, the

court limited the May 30, 1992 statements to those that "would

have been competent and admissible evidence had the declarant

been able to testify in person," and also excluded those portions

that "directly or through innuendo" might offend the rule of

Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968) (holding that

the introduction at a joint trial of a nontestifying defendant's

statements that implicate a codefendant constitutes prejudicial

error). Houlihan, 887 F. Supp. at 365. Houlihan and Nardone

objected, contending that the editing process heightened the

force of Sargent's statements, and that if the interviews were to

be introduced at all, then the entire text should be fair game.

The district court overruled the objections.

7Perhaps the weakest link in the chain is Sargent's
statement regarding a suggestive but ambiguous conversation that
he had with Houlihan shortly before the killing of James Boyden
III. But this tale is relevant principally to the three counts
against Houlihan on which we order his convictions reversed. See

infra Part V(B). Thus, any error in admitting it is harmless.

18

On appeal, Houlihan and Nardone argue less that

Sargent's statements should have been redacted somewhat

differently and more that they should not have been redacted at

all.8 They assert that when a defendant waives his rights to

make Confrontation Clause and hearsay objections through

misconduct, the absent declarant's full out-of-court statement

should be admissible at the behest of either the proponent or

opponent of the statement. This assertion rests on a misguided

notion.

The cardinal purpose of the waiver-by-misconduct

doctrine is to ensure that a wrongdoer does not profit in a court

of law by reason of his miscreancy. By murdering Sargent,

Houlihan and Nardone denied the prosecution the benefit of his

live testimony. To compensate for that denial the court allowed

the government to introduce portions of the interviews that

Sargent gave to the police. The defense, however, was not

entitled to any compensation, and permitting it to introduce

additional hearsay statements (apart from statements necessary to

place the portions used by the government into context and to

render them not misleading) would be to reward bloodthirstiness.

We decline to stamp a judicial imprimatur on a calculated murder.

Thus, we hold that a homicidal defendant may by his misconduct

8Though the district court applied the same redaction
principles to the police officer's testimony concerning the March
interview (which was not recorded or transcribed) and the tape-
recorded May interview, the emphasis on appeal is on the latter.
While we restrict our discussion to that recording, our holding
applies with equal force to the earlier debriefing.

19

waive his hearsay objections, but that waiver does not strip the

government of its right to lodge hearsay objections. It is only

the party who wrongfully procures a witness's absence who waives

the right to object to the adverse party's introduction of the

witness's prior out-of-court statements. See White, 838 F. Supp.

at 625; see also Steele, 684 F.2d at 1202.

To sum up, since courts should not reward parties for

their own misdeeds, a prior out-of-court statement made by a

witness whose unavailability stems from the wrongful conduct of a

party, aimed at least in part at achieving that result, is

admissible against that party as long as the statement would have

been admissible had the witness testified. But the party who

causes the witness's unavailability is not entitled to the same

prophylaxis. Consequently, under settled jurisprudence governing

totem-pole hearsay, see Fed. R. Evid. 805, the tape of Sargent's

interview itself constituted first-level hearsay not within any

recognized exception, and the district court did not err in

admitting some portions at the government's urging and refusing

to admit the rest of the recording at the appellants' behest.

Houlihan and Nardone offer a second reason why the

trial court erred in excluding the balance of Sargent's

statements. This construct pivots on Evidence Rule 106, a rule

that codifies principles of fairness and completeness.9 Under

9The rule provides in pertinent part:

When a . . . recorded statement or part
thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse
party may require him at that time to

20

it, a party against whom a fragmentary statement is introduced

may demand that the rest of the statement (or so much thereof as

is appropriate) be admitted into evidence in order to place the

excerpt in context.

It is readily evident that, as the appellants maintain,

Rule 106 can serve its proper function only if the trial court

from time to time is prepared to permit the introduction of some

otherwise inadmissible evidence. See United States v. Sutton,

801 F.2d 1346, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Be that as it may,

completeness, like beauty, is frequently in the eye of the

beholder. The trial court is in the best position to assess the

competing centrifugal and centripetal forces that bear on this

calculus. Thus, when the trial court, acting in its discretion,

finds that proffered excerpts, standing on their own, are not

misleading, its judgment is entitled to great respect. See

United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 256-57 (1st Cir.), cert.

denied, 498 U.S. 849 (1990). So it is here.

Houlihan and Nardone dwell on incompleteness primarily

because Judge Young declared two sets of comments inadmissible.

(1) Sargent told the police, inter alia, that James Boyden IV was

selling drugs in Lynch's territory; that Fitzgerald warned him

and had him beaten, but to no avail; and that he then told

Sargent that he would "just have to kill" the interloper.

introduce any other part . . . which ought in
fairness to be considered contemporaneously
with it.

Fed. R. Evid. 106.

21

Claiming that Fitzgerald's remarks to Sargent provided Fitzgerald

with a different motive to murder Sargent, Houlihan sought to

have this part of Sargent's statement admitted into evidence.

Houlihan claims that omitting references to Fitzgerald's

involvement in the murder made it appear that he, rather than

Fitzgerald, was the mastermind responsible for that crime. (2)

In a similar vein, Nardone claims that the court's refusal to

permit him to introduce references in the interviews to Herd's

putative involvement in the Boydens' killings made it appear that

Nardone carried out those murders single-handed.

The court found that these incremental excerpts were

"segregable" from the portions of the interviews that the

government had proffered and denied the appellants' requests to

admit them. Houlihan, 887 F. Supp. at 366. In assessing the

court's rulings, three facts are worthy of note: (1) the

interview segments admitted into evidence contained no explicit

reference whatever to the Boydens' murders; (2) neither Houlihan

nor Nardone were charged with the slaying of James Boyden IV; and

(3) Sargent never mentioned Nardone by name anywhere in the

course of either debriefing. Bearing these facts in mind, we

conclude that the lower court acted within the realm of its

discretion in refusing to invoke Rule 106.

Houlihan and Nardone also claim that the court should

have admitted other portions of Sargent's interviews to impeach

his credibility. See Fed. R. Evid. 806 (providing that the

credibility of a hearsay declarant "may be attacked . . . by any

22

evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if [the]

declarant had testified as a witness"). The district court

rejected this claim because it found the additional excerpts "too

convoluted, collateral, or cumulative to be admitted." Houlihan,

887 F. Supp. at 368. Having reviewed the items, we discern no

error in their exclusion.

Trial courts have considerable leeway in imposing

outside limits on cross-examination. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.

at 679; Laboy-Delgado, 84 F.3d at 28. Here, the record

demonstrates that the appellants had a full and fair opportunity

during their cross-examination of the officers who interviewed

Sargent to cast doubts upon his veracity. They made the most of

this opportunity.10 By contrast, the extra material that the

appellants wished to introduce lacked genuine impeachment value

and promised to add virtually nothing of consequence to the

grueling cross-examination. Thus, we cannot fault the district

court for excluding this exiguous material. See Van Arsdall, 475

U.S. at 679 (stating that cross-examination appropriately may be

limited if redundant or marginally relevant); Boylan, 898 F.2d at

255-56 (similar).

To say more would be supererogatory. Because our

painstaking review of the record reveals no solid grounding for

10For example, during cross-examination of Detective Harris
(who taped and testified about the May 1992 interview), the
appellants showed that Sargent had a lengthy criminal record;
that he gave up his confreres while facing the possibility of a
fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence for drug trafficking; and
that he had been promised low bail, among other things, in
exchange for cooperation.

23

the claim that the district court flouted Rule 106 in any

respect, we refuse to meddle.

E. Prejudicial Spillover.
E. Prejudicial Spillover.

There is one last leg to this phase of our journey.

Fitzgerald alleges that the admission of Sargent's statements

resulted in unfair prejudice to him. The record reveals none.

Because the prosecution must show the existence of a

conspiracy to prove a conspiracy charge, evidence implicating one

coconspirator is likely to be directly relevant to the charges

against his codefendants. See United States v. O'Bryant, 998

F.2d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 1993). Even if it is not, mistrials

grounded on spillover prejudice are rare. As long as the

district court limits the admission of the challenged evidence to

a particular defendant or defendants, the other defendants cannot

rewardingly complain unless the impact of the evidence is so

devastating that, realistically, instructions from the bench

cannot be expected to repair the damage. See Sepulveda, 15 F.3d

at 1184.

Silhouetted against this set of rules, the flimsiness

of Fitzgerald's claim come into bold relief. What excites the

emotions in one case may be routine evidence in another case.

The material distilled from Sargent's statements which would

have stood out like a sore thumb in a prosecution rooted in the

relative gentility of white-collar crime does not seem

especially sensational when evaluated in light of the other,

plainly admissible evidence that permeated this seventy-day saga

24

of nonstop violence. Moreover, the district court instructed the

jurors on the spot that they were not to consider Sargent's

statements in deciding Fitzgerald's fate. To complement that

directive, the court redacted all references to Fitzgerald from

the portions of those statements that the jury heard, and it

repeated its prophylactic instruction on several occasions.

Under these circumstances, the presumption that jurors follow the

court's instructions is intact. Ergo, Fitzgerald suffered no

unfair prejudice.

III. ALTERNATE JURORS
III. ALTERNATE JURORS

The appellants calumnize the district court because,

despite their repeated objections, the court refused to discharge

the alternate jurors once deliberations commenced and compounded

its obduracy by allowing the alternate jurors to have

intermittent contact with the regular jurors during the currency

of jury deliberations. This argument requires us to address, for

the first time, the interplay between violations of Fed. R. Crim.

P. 24(c) and the applicable test for harmless error.

The imperative of Rule 24(c) is clear and categorical:

"An alternate juror who does not replace a regular juror shall be

discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict." Fed.

R. Crim. P. 24(c). The rule reflects the abiding concern that,

once a criminal case has been submitted, the jury's deliberations

shall remain private and inviolate.11 See United States v.

11Notwithstanding that Criminal Rule 23(b) permits the
remaining eleven jurors to return a valid verdict if a
deliberating juror is excused for cause, the wisdom of Rule 24(c)

25

Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868, 872 (4th Cir. 1964).

Here, the appellants' claim of error is well founded.

Rule 24(c) brooks no exceptions, and the district court

transgressed its letter by retaining the alternate jurors

throughout the deliberative period. The lingering question,

however, is whether the infraction requires us to invalidate the

convictions. The appellants say that it does. In their view, a

violation of Rule 24(c) automatically necessitates a new trial

where, as here, the defendants preserved their claim of error,

or, at least, the continued contact between regular and alternate

jurors that transpired in this case demands that result. The

government endeavors to parry this thrust by classifying the

error as benign. We find that the Rule 24(c) violation caused no

cognizable harm, and we deny relief on that basis.

The watershed case in this recondite corner of the law

is United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993). There the trial

court permitted alternate jurors, while under instructions to

refrain from engaging personally in the deliberative process, to

remain in the jury room and audit the regular jurors'

deliberations. See id. at 727-29. The jury found the defendants

guilty. The court of appeals, terming the presence of alternate

jurors in the jury room during deliberations "inherently

prejudicial," granted them new trials although they had not

remains debatable. We can understand a district judge's
reluctance, following a long, complicated, and hotly contested
trial, to release alternate jurors before a verdict is obtained.
But courts, above all other institutions, must obey the rules.

26

lodged contemporaneous objections. United States v. Olano, 934

F.2d 1425, 1428 (9th Cir. 1991). The Supreme Court demurred. It

noted that unless an unpreserved error affects defendants'

"substantial rights," Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b), the error cannot

serve as a fulcrum for overturning their convictions. 507 U.S.

at 737. The Court then declared that the mere "presence of

alternate jurors during jury deliberations is not the kind of

error that `affect[s] substantial rights' independent of its

prejudicial impact." Id. Instead, the critical inquiry is

whether the presence of the alternates in the jury room during

deliberations actually prejudiced the defendants. See id. at

739.

The Justices conceded that, as a theoretical matter,

the presence of any outsider, including an alternate juror, may

cause prejudice if he or she actually participates in the

deliberations either "verbally" or through "body language," or if

his or her attendance were somehow to chill the jurors'

deliberations. Id. The Court recognized, however, that a

judge's cautionary instructions to alternates (e.g., to refrain

from injecting themselves into the deliberations) can operate to

lessen or eliminate these risks. See id. at 740 (remarking "the

almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their

instructions") (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206

(1987)). Thus, absent a "specific showing" that the alternates

in fact participated in, or otherwise chilled, deliberations, the

trial court's instructions to the alternates not to intervene in

27

the jury's deliberations precluded a finding of plain error. Id.

at 741.

This case presents a variation on the Olano theme.

Here, unlike in Olano, the appellants contemporaneously objected

to the district court's retention of the alternate jurors, thus

relegating plain error analysis to the scrap heap. This

circumstance denotes two things. First, here, unlike in Olano,

the government, not the defendants, bears the devoir of

persuasion with regard to the existence vel non of prejudice.

Second, we must today answer the precise question that the Olano

Court reserved for later decision. See id. Withal, the

framework of the inquiry in all other respects remains the same.

See id. at 734 (noting that, apart from the allocation of the

burden of proof, a claim of error under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)

ordinarily requires the same type of prejudice-determining

inquiry as does a preserved error). We do not discount the

significance of this solitary difference, see, e.g., id. at 742

(Kennedy, J., concurring) (commenting that it is "most difficult

for the Government to show the absence of prejudice"), but

"difficult" does not mean "impossible." Since Olano teaches that

a violation of Rule 24(c) is not reversible error per se,12 see

id. at 737, we must undertake a particularized inquiry directed

at whether the instant violation, in the circumstances of this

case, "prejudiced [the defendants], either specifically or

12On this score, Olano confirmed what this court

anticipated. See United States v. Levesque, 681 F.2d 75, 80-81

(1st Cir. 1982) (dictum).

28

presumptively." Id. at 739.

Our task, then, is to decide if the government has made

a sufficiently convincing case that the district court's failure

to observe the punctilio of Rule 24(c) did not affect the

verdicts. See, e.g., id. at 734; Kotteakos v. United States, 328

U.S. 750, 758-65 (1946). In performing this task, we find the

Court's reasoning in Olano instructive. Cf. Lee v. Marshall, 42

F.3d 1296, 1299 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding Olano Court's reasoning

transferable to harmless error analysis in habeas case). The

risks that were run here by retaining the alternates were

identical to the risks that were run at the trial level in

Olano,13 and the district judge's ability to minimize or

eliminate those risks was the same in both situations.

The operative facts are as follows. Although the

district court retained the alternates, subsequent physical

contact between them and the regular jurors occurred only

sporadically confined mostly to the beginning of each day (when

all the jurors assembled prior to the commencement of daily

deliberations) and lunch time (when court security officers were

invariably present).14 Judge Young at no time allowed the

13In one respect, treating this case as comparable to Olano

tilts matters in the appellants' favor. There, the undischarged
alternates actually stayed in the jury room during deliberations.
507 U.S. at 729-30. Here, they did not; indeed, the regular
jurors and the undischarged alternates were never in physical
proximity while the deliberative process was ongoing.

14On one occasion when the regular jurors were on a mid-
morning break, an alternate juror retrieved a plate of delicacies
from the jury room. Defense counsel brought this interlude to
Judge Young's attention, and the judge immediately agreed to

29

alternates to come within earshot of the deliberating jurors.

Equally as important, the court did not leave either

set of venirepersons uninstructed. At the beginning of his

charge, Judge Young told the alternates not to discuss the

substance of the case either among themselves or with the regular

jurors. He then directed the regular jurors not to discuss the

case with the alternates. Near the end of the charge, the judge

admonished all the talesmen that "if [the regular jurors are] in

the presence of the alternates or the alternates are in the

presence of the jurors, [there is to be] no talking about the

case, no deliberating about the case." The regular jurors

retired to the jury room for their deliberations, and the

undischarged alternates retired to an anteroom in the judge's

chambers (which remained their base of operations for the

duration of the deliberations).

instruct the alternates to stay out of the jury room during
breaks (except for retrieving snacks from the jury room when
court security officers confirmed that a break in deliberations
had occurred).
On another occasion defense counsel voiced suspicion that
a note from the jury to the judge (requesting transcripts of
several witnesses' testimony) had been written in the presence of
the alternates. At counsels' urging, Judge Young, in the course
of responding to the note in open court, asked each juror whether
"the alternates and the deliberating jurors, or vice versa, [had]
discussed the substance of the case" during the pertinent time
frame. All the jurors responded in the negative, and Judge Young
reinstructed the regular jurors not to discuss the case with, or
deliberate in the presence of, the alternate jurors. The
defendants took no exception either to the form of the inquiry or
to the instructions that the court gave.

30

The deliberations lasted eleven days.15 Each morning,

Judge Young asked the regular jurors and the alternate jurors, on

penalty of perjury, whether they had spoken about the case with

anyone since the previous day's adjournment. On each occasion,

all the jurors (regular and alternate) responded in the negative.

The judge reiterated his instructions to both the regular and

alternate jurors at the close of every court session. In

addition, he routinely warned the venire that, when they

assembled the next morning before deliberations resumed, "no one

is to talk about the case."

On this record, we believe that the regular jurors were

well insulated from the risks posed by the retention of the

alternates. The judge repeatedly instructed the jurors in far

greater detail than in Olano and those instructions were

delicately phrased and admirably specific. Appropriate

prophylactic instructions are a means of preventing the potential

harm that hovers when a trial court fails to dismiss alternate

jurors on schedule. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 740-41; United States

v. Sobamowo, 892 F.2d 90, 97 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Ginsburg, J.)

(attaching great importance to trial court's prophylactic

instructions in holding failure to discharge alternate jurors

harmless); cf. United States v. Ottersburg, 73 F.3d 137, 139 (7th

Cir. 1996) (setting aside verdict and emphasizing trial court's

15On the third day a regular juror had to be excused. With
counsels' consent, Judge Young replaced the lost juror with an
alternate and instructed the jurors to begin deliberations anew.
On appeal, neither side contests the propriety of this
substitution.

31

failure to provide such instructions). Courts must presume "that

jurors, conscious of the gravity of their task, attend closely

the particular language of the trial court's instructions in a

criminal case," Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.9

(1985), and that they follow those instructions.

Here, we have more than the usual presumption that the

jury understood the instructions and followed them. The court

interrogated the entire panel regular jurors and undischarged

alternates on a daily basis, and received an unbroken string of

assurances that the regular jurors had not spoken with the

alternates concerning the substance of the case, and vice versa.

Just as it is fitting for appellate courts to presume, in the

absence of a contrary indication, that jurors follow a trial

judge's instructions, so, too, it is fitting for appellate courts

to presume, in the absence of a contrary indication, that jurors

answer a trial judge's questions honestly.

One last observation is telling. Over and above the

plenitude of instructions, there is another salient difference

between this case and Ottersburg (the only reported criminal case

in which a federal appellate court invalidated a verdict due to

the trial court's failure to discharge alternate jurors). Here,

unlike in Ottersburg, 76 F.3d at 139, the judge at no time

permitted the alternates to sit in on, or listen to, the jury's

deliberations (even as mute observers). Hence, the alternates

had no opportunity to participate in the deliberations, and

nothing in the record plausibly suggests that they otherwise

32

influenced the jury's actions. If the mere presence of silent

alternates in the jury room during ongoing deliberations cannot

in and of itself be deemed to chill discourse or establish

prejudice, see Olano, 507 U.S. at 740-41, it is surpassingly

difficult to imagine how absent (though undischarged) alternates,

properly instructed, could have a toxic effect on the

deliberative process.16

We will not paint the lily. Given the lack of any

contact between regular and alternate jurors during ongoing

deliberations, the trial judge's careful and oft-repeated

instructions, the venire's unanimous disclaimers that any

discussions about the case took place between the two subgroups,

the overall strength of the prosecution's evidence on virtually

all the counts of conviction, and the discriminating nature of

the verdicts that were returned (e.g., the jury acquitted the

appellants on sundry counts and also acquitted the fourth

defendant, Herd, outright), we conclude that the government has

carried its burden of demonstrating that the outcome of the trial

would have been precisely the same had the district court

dismissed the alternate jurors when the jury first retired to

deliberate. It follows that because the appellants suffered no

16In Cabral v. Sullivan, 961 F.2d 998 (1st Cir. 1992), a

case that antedated Olano, we considered a civil analog to

Criminal Rule 24(c) and stated that "[w]hen a trial court allows
an . . . alternate juror[] to deliberate with the regular jurors
. . . an inherently prejudicial error is committed, and the
substantial rights of the parties are violated." Id. at 1002.

In the instant case, unlike in Cabral, there is neither proof nor

reason to suspect that the undischarged alternates participated
in the regular jurors' deliberations.

33

prejudice in consequence of the court's bevue, they are not

entitled to return to square one.

IV. DISCOVERY DISPUTES
IV. DISCOVERY DISPUTES

The appellants stridently protest a series of

government actions involving document discovery. We first deal

with a claim that implicates the scope of the Jencks Act, 18

U.S.C. 3500, and then treat the appellants' other

asseverations.

A. Scope of the Jencks Act.
A. Scope of the Jencks Act.

The Jencks Act provides criminal defendants, for

purposes of cross-examination, with a limited right to obtain

certain witness statements that are in the government's

possession. That right is subject to a temporal condition: it

does not vest until the witness takes the stand in the

government's case and completes his direct testimony. Id.

3500(a). It is also subject to categorical, content-based

restrictions delineated in the statute: a statement is not open

to production under the Jencks Act unless it (i) relates to the

same subject matter as the witness's direct testimony, id.

3500(b), and (ii) either comprises grand jury testimony, id.

3500(e)(3), or falls within one of two general classes of

statements, namely,

(1) a written statement made by [the] witness
and signed or otherwise adopted or approved
by him;
(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical,
or other recording, or a transcription
thereof, which is a substantially verbatim
recital of an oral statement made by said
witness and recorded contemporaneously with

34

the making of such oral statement . . . .

18 U.S.C. 3500(e)(1)-(2).

In this case, the government agents who led the

investigation instructed all but the most senior prosecutors to

refrain from taking notes during pretrial interviews. The

appellants decried this practice in the district court, but Judge

Young found that even the deliberate use of investigatory

techniques designed to minimize the production of written reports

would not violate the Jencks Act. Before us, the appellants

renew their challenge. We, too, think that it lacks force.

The Jencks Act does not impose an obligation on

government agents to record witness interviews or to take notes

during such interviews. After all, the Act applies only to

recordings, written statements, and notes that meet certain

criteria, not to items that never came into being (whether or not

a prudent investigator cynics might say an unsophisticated

investigator would have arranged things differently). See

United States v. Lieberman, 608 F.2d 889, 897 (1st Cir. 1979)

(rejecting a claim that the government has "a duty to create

Jencks Act material by recording everything a potential witness

says"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1019 (1980); accord United States

v. Bernard, 625 F.2d 854, 859 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v.

Head, 586 F.2d 508, 511-12 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.

Fielbogen, 494 F. Supp. 806, 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 657 F.2d

265 (2d Cir. 1981) (table). It has been suggested that if there

were evidence that lawmen "engaged in manipulative or coercive

35

conduct" during the course of an audience with a particular

witness, the failure to record that event might give rise to a

Jencks Act violation. Lieberman, 608 F.2d at 897 (dictum). But

this dictum, even if it might be of some moment in a proper case

(a matter on which we take no view) is cold comfort to the

appellants. There is no proof of such a scenario here,17 and,

without such proof, government interviews with witnesses are

"presumed to have been conducted with regularity." Id.

In the absence of a contrary legislative command and

none currently exists the choice among available investigatory

techniques is, within wide limits, for the Executive Branch in

contradistinction to the Judicial Branch. The practice

challenged here is not beyond the pale. Accordingly, we hold

that the government did not violate the Jencks Act by instructing

agents to minimize note-taking.18

Still, we do not mean to imply that we endorse the

practice. Eschewing tape recordings and ordering law enforcement

agents not to take notes during pretrial interviews is risky

17The appellants claim that instructing agents not to take
notes constitutes a deliberate strategy to manipulate the
quantity of discoverable material. But, this is simply not the
sort of manipulation to which the panel referred in Lieberman.

18In a related vein, we likewise reject the appellants'
assertion that the government violated the Jencks Act by parading
law enforcement officers rather than percipient witnesses before
the grand jury. "Hearsay evidence is a sufficient basis for an
indictment," and the mere fact that the government chooses to
rely on hearsay evidence in presenting its case before a grand
jury raises "no hint of government misconduct." United States v.

Font-Ramirez, 944 F.2d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502

U.S. 1065 (1992).

36

business and not guaranteed to redound either to the

sovereign's credit or to its benefit. By adopting a "what we

don't create can't come back to haunt us" approach, prosecutors

demean their primary mission: to see that justice is done. In

more parochial terms, the government also loses the advantage of

records that it may subsequently need to safeguard against

witnesses changing their stories or to refresh recollections

dimmed by the passage of time. By and large, the legitimate

interests of law enforcement will be better served by using

recording equipment and/or taking accurate notes than by playing

hide-and-seek.

B. Delayed Disclosures.
B. Delayed Disclosures.

The appellants also complain that delays attributable

to governmental foot-dragging unfairly hampered their ability to

cross-examine witnesses. The centerpiece of this complaint is

the appellants' insistence that, in addition to going very slowly

in creating potentially discoverable materials, the prosecutors

withheld extant materials, such as existing notes, under various

pretexts, claiming that the notes comprised attorney work-product

and that they did not contain substantially verbatim recitals of

witnesses' statements.

The appellants' complaint is unproductive. Acting with

commendable thoroughness, the district court reviewed all the

prosecutors' notes and kindred materials in camera to determine

which documents (or portions of documents) were producible under

the Jencks Act. The government turned over what the court

37

ordered it to produce at the time(s) when the court ordered

production to be made.

In all events, we have held with a regularity bordering

on the echolalic that "delayed disclosure claims cannot succeed

unless the aggrieved defendant demonstrates prejudice arising

from the delay." Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1179 (citing cases); see

also United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 781 (1st Cir.

1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1322 (1996). In this context,

demonstrating prejudice demands red meat and strong drink but

the appellants have served up much less hearty fare. They

articulate how the delayed disclosures supposedly impeded their

ability to cross-question witnesses largely by reference to two

examples. Neither example is compelling.

First, the appellants suggest that they were unfairly

surprised because, after Nardone's henchman, Michael Nelson,

testified at trial that Fitzgerald alone had given Nardone a

contract on the life of James Boyden III, they obtained the grand

jury testimony of a subsequent witness (a law enforcement

officer) which indicated that Nardone, in chatting with Nelson,

implicated both Houlihan and Fitzgerald in ordering the hit.19

The appellants claim that the inconsistency between the officer's

grand jury testimony, on one hand, and Nelson's trial testimony,

19When this inconsistency surfaced, the government contended
that the grand jury witness simply made a mistake, and pointed
out that, according to the prosecutors' notes, Nelson stated in
his pretrial interview that Fitzgerald alone issued the order.
At this juncture the court directed the prosecutors to disclose
the summary prepared by a government attorney for the use of the
officer who appeared before the grand jury.

38

on the other hand, could have been exploited to discredit Nelson

on cross-examination. We are skeptical; given that Nelson's

statements during his pretrial interview, see supra note 19, and

at trial were consistent, this tidbit would have been of dubious

value for impeachment purposes. Moreover, while Nelson was still

on the witness stand, the appellants had possession of other

documents that revealed the same inconsistency. For these

reasons, we are fully satisfied that any delay in the disclosure

of the law enforcement officer's grand jury testimony did not

affect the outcome of the trial. Consequently, the incident

fails to prove the appellants' point. See, e.g., United States

v. Devin, 918 F.2d 280, 290-91 (1st Cir. 1990) (explaining that

delayed disclosure of impeachment material does not warrant

reversal if the material would not have altered the verdict).

The second vignette concerns a prosecutor's note to the

effect that Nardone told Nelson that there were two reasons why

Sargent had to be killed: first, because Houlihan felt that

Sargent "was a risk" and "could hurt [Houlihan] by talking"; and

second, "as a showing of respect to the Murrays" (a bookmaking

group to whom Sargent was heavily indebted). Regarding the

second reason, Nelson explained that Fitzgerald and Houlihan

asked the Murrays to post $50,000 bail for Bobby Levallee, an

organization stalwart, in exchange for having Sargent killed.

Because the government did not reveal this note until after

Nelson had completed his testimony, the appellants' thesis runs,

they were unable to cross-examine him efficaciously.

39

This proffer, too, is wide of the mark. Under any

circumstances, the note has only marginal evidentiary value in

light of the extensive proof confirming Houlihan's desire to

silence Sargent in order to keep him from telling the government

what he knew a desire that the note itself acknowledges. Even

more important, the appellants had sufficient notice of the

alternative "gambling debts" motive well before Nelson left the

stand. Nelson himself testified on direct examination that

Fitzgerald and Houlihan wanted Sargent killed for "two reasons":

because they believed that the police had coopted him and because

they were concerned about "all [Sargent's] gambling debts." And,

moreover, the record indicates that the appellants had the rest

of the prosecutors' notes (some of which discussed the

alternative motivation) in hand before Nelson completed his

testimony; indeed, Houlihan's counsel relied on those notes to

elicit information on cross-examination about Sargent's gaming

debts and his connection to the Murrays. Under these

circumstances, no reversible error inhered. See, e.g.,

Saccoccia, 58 F.3d at 781 (finding no prejudice from delay when

defense counsel obtained information in time to prepare cross-

examination); United States v. Hodge-Balwing, 952 F.2d 607, 609

(1st Cir. 1991) (finding no prejudice from late delivery of

documents when the prosecutor's opening statement alerted the

defense to the same information).

If more were needed and we doubt that it is the

sockdolager is the district court's volunteered ruling that the

40

appellants could recall Nelson during their case for further

cross-examination on the basis of the information disclosed in

the note. The appellants chose to let this opportunity pass.

The rule is clear that a defendant's failure to recall a witness,

despite permission to do so, undermines a claim of prejudice

based on a disclosure that materialized after the witness

finished testifying (but before the trial ended). See United

States v. Arboleda, 929 F.2d 858, 864 (1st Cir. 1991); United

States v. Dunn, 841 F.2d 1026, 1030 (10th Cir. 1988).

C. Supervisory Power.
C. Supervisory Power.

In a last-ditch effort to right a sinking ship, the

appellants embrace a dictum contained in United States v. Osorio,

929 F.2d 753, 763 (1st Cir. 1991) ("When confronted with extreme

misconduct and prejudice as a result of delayed disclosure, this

court will consider invoking its supervisory powers to secure

enforcement of better prosecutorial practice and reprimand of

those who fail to observe it.") (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). Based on this dictum, they ask that we unleash

our supervisory power and vacate their convictions as an object

lesson to the government. In the bargain, they suggest that we

issue a blanket rule prohibiting prosecutors from instructing

their colleagues in law enforcement not to take notes during

witness interviews.20

20Respecting, as we do, the coordinate powers of the other
two branches of government, we decline to issue any such blanket
proscription. See supra Part IV(A) (discussing particulars of

appellants' underlying objection).

41

Federal courts should refrain from dismissing charges

or overturning convictions merely as a device to conform

executive conduct to judicially favored norms. Rather, the

courts' supervisory power should be used in this way only if

plain prosecutorial misconduct is coupled with cognizable

prejudice to a particular defendant. See United States v.

Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v.

Pacheco-Ortiz, 889 F.2d 301, 310 (1st Cir. 1989); see also United

States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 507 (1983) (holding that when

prosecutorial misconduct constitutes no more than harmless error,

no relief is warranted under supervisory power).

Here, both prerequisites for judicial intervention are

wanting. First and foremost, the tactics complained of if

improper at all fall far short of a showing of egregious

misconduct that might impel a federal court to consider the

drastic step of vacating a conviction as a sanction against

overzealous prosecutors. Second, the delayed disclosures did not

harm the defendants' substantial rights. See United States v.

Walsh, 75 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1996) (demonstrating prejudice

requires more than mere "assertions that the defendant would have

conducted cross-examination differently").

That ends the matter. The supervisory power is strong

medicine and, as we have said, "[p]otent elixirs should not be

casually dispensed." Santana, 6 F.3d at 10. There is no reason

to write such a prescription in the circumstances of this case.

V. MISCELLANEOUS
V. MISCELLANEOUS

42

The appellants, represented by able counsel, marshal a

plethora of other arguments. We address some of these arguments,

explaining briefly why we accept or reject them. The points that

we do not mention are insubstantial and may be dismissed without

elaboration.

A. Murder for Hire.
A. Murder for Hire.

Fitzgerald and Houlihan, in chorus, challenge the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting their murder-for-hire

convictions arising out of the annihilations of Boyden III (count

15) and Sargent (count 16), and the attempts on Sweeney's life

(count 17). With one exception, the sole ground on which these

challenges rest is the allegation that the prosecution fell short

of establishing the requisite nexus between the use of interstate

facilities and the defendants' biocidal activities.21 The

challenge fails.

The controlling legal standard is prosaic. "When a

criminal defendant undertakes a sufficiency challenge, all the

evidence, direct and circumstantial, must be viewed from the

government's coign of vantage, and the viewer must accept all

reasonable inferences from it that are consistent with the

verdict." United States v. Valle, 72 F.3d 210, 216 (1st Cir.

1995). Though each element of the offense must be proven beyond

a reasonable doubt, the government's burden "may be satisfied by

either direct or circumstantial evidence, or any combination

21The exception relates to count 15, as to which Houlihan
offers a wider-ranging sufficiency challenge. We address that
challenge separately. See infra Part V(B).

43

thereof." United States v. Gifford, 17 F.3d 462, 467 (1st Cir.

1994). If a rational jury, indulging all credibility calls in

favor of the verdict, could find the defendant guilty on this

basis, then the inquiry terminates. See United States v. David,

940 F.2d 722, 730 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1046

(1992).

Moving from the general to the specific, the murder-

for-hire statute makes it unlawful to use or cause another person

to use "any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with

intent that a murder be committed . . . as consideration for . .

. anything of pecuniary value." 18 U.S.C. 1958. In this case,

the prosecution sought to convict by proving, inter alia, that

the plotters used telephone calls as a means of accomplishing

their ends. The appellants did not claim below, and do not now

claim, that telephone lines fall outside the rubric of

"facilities in interstate commerce." We therefore assume that

point in the government's favor, see United States v. Slade, 980

F.2d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 1992) ("It is a bedrock rule that when a

party has not presented an argument to the district court, she

may not unveil it in the court of appeals."); United States v.

Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.) (noting "settled appellate

rule" that issues not briefed and properly developed on appeal

are waived), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1082 (1990), and consider

only the claim that they do advance: that the evidence fails to

show the use of telephones in the course of committing the

charged crimes.

44

In interpreting 18 U.S.C. 1958, it is entirely

appropriate to look to case law construing the Travel Act, 18

U.S.C. 1952. See United States v. Edelman, 873 F.2d 791, 794

(5th Cir. 1989) (explaining that Travel Act jurisprudence is a

proper referent because "the obvious purpose" of the murder-for-

hire statute is "to supplement" the Travel Act); see also S. Rep.

No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 306, reprinted in 1984

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3485 (noting that the murder-for-hire statute

"follows the format" of the Travel Act). In United States v.

Arruda, 715 F.2d 671 (1st Cir. 1983), a Travel Act case, we

stated: "There is no requirement that the use of the interstate

facilities be essential to the scheme: it is enough that the . .

. use of interstate facilities makes easier or facilitates the

unlawful activity." Id. at 681-82 (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted). This is the commonly held view, see,

e.g., United States v. Lozano, 839 F.2d 1020, 1022 (4th Cir.

1988); United States v. Smith, 789 F.2d 196, 203 (3d Cir.), cert.

denied, 479 U.S. 1017 (1986), and we confirm today that the non-

essentiality principle announced in Arruda is embodied in the

murder-for-hire statute.

The key, then, is whether the jury plausibly could have

found that the appellants actually used a telephone to facilitate

Sargent's and Boyden the elder's deaths and the attempts on

Sweeney's life. We hasten to add, however, that there is no

requirement that each accused use a facility in interstate

commerce, or that each accused intend such a facility to be used,

45

or even that each accused know that such a facility probably will

be used. See Edelman, 874 F.2d at 795; see also United States v.

Heacock, 31 F.3d 249, 255 n.10 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying

identical principle under Travel Act); United States v. Sigalow,

812 F.2d 783, 785 (2d Cir. 1987) (same); United States v.

McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1361 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied,

444 U.S. 833 (1979). Hence, if the government proves that one of

the participants used the telephone or some comparable interstate

facility in furtherance of the scheme, then the required

facilitative nexus is established as to all participants.

In this case, we think that the jury rationally could

find a facilitative nexus between the use of telephones and the

criminal activities underlying the counts of conviction. By

March of 1992, Fitzgerald, a parole violator, had taken up

involuntary residence in a state penitentiary. The record,

together with reasonable inferences extractable therefrom,

permitted the jury to find that he made daily telephone calls

from prison to an indicted coconspirator, John Doherty, at

Kerrigan's Flower Shop; and that Doherty, acting as Fitzgerald's

internuncio, supplied Nardone with the weaponry needed to mount

the attacks. Telephone records introduced into evidence also

indicate that Fitzgerald called Nardone several times at Lynch's

apartment in and around the dates on which the murders were to

occur. Since the jury reasonably could regard the various calls

as an important link in the communicative chain that led to

46

murder and attempted murder, the appellants' challenge

founders.22

B. The Murder of James Boyden III.
B. The Murder of James Boyden III.

Houlihan asserts that his convictions on count 5

(conspiring to murder James Boyden III in aid of racketeering),

count 6 (abetting that murder), and count 15 (hiring another to

perform that murder) cannot stand. His major theme is that the

government failed to link him to the murder in any meaningful

way. We find merit in this proposition.

To convict Houlihan for conspiring to murder in aid of

racketeering, see 18 U.S.C. 1959(a), or for abetting the

murder, see id., the government had to prove that (1) the

organization masterminded by Fitzgerald and Houlihan constituted

a racketeering enterprise; (2) that, depending on the count,

Houlihan conspired to commit, or aided and abetted the commission

of, the murder; and (3) that Houlihan participated in the

arrangement "for the purpose of maintaining or increasing [his]

position in a [racketeering] enterprise." Id. By like token,

under the murder-for-hire statute the government had to prove (1)

that Houlihan joined in causing the killing of another, (2)

22Although not an element of the offense, it is pellucid
that the jury easily could have believed Fitzgerald's actions
vis- -vis Sargent and Sweeney were undertaken with Houlihan's
knowledge and consent. To cite just one example, Houlihan
personally paid Nardone his $5,000 "headache elimination" fee at
Kerrigan's Flower Shop on the day after Nardone ended Sargent's
life. Further examples are unnecessary. It suffices to say that
extensive evidence pointed to the conclusion that Fitzgerald and
Houlihan jointly orchestrated both Sargent's slaying and
Sweeney's travails.

47

paying a price or other consideration, (3) with the specific

intent to commit the substantive crime (murder), and (4) that

interstate facilities were used by one or more of the

participants in the course of perpetrating the crime. See 18

U.S.C. 1958.

A common thread runs through all three counts. In one

form or another, the government had to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that in the spring of 1992 Houlihan "conspired to murder

James Boyden III" (count 5), and/or "aided, abetted, counselled,

commanded [or] induced" that murder (count 6), and/or used

"facilities in interstate commerce . . . to hire other

individuals and to arrange the intended murder of James Boyden

III" (count 15). Under each of these counts, the government had

to show at a bare minimum that Houlihan intended the murder of

James Boyden III to take place and that he acted upon that

intent. See, e.g., United States v. Santiago, 872 F.2d 1073,

1079 (1st Cir.) (explaining that proof of a charged conspiracy

requires, inter alia, proof of intent to commit the substantive

offense), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 910 & 493 U.S. 832 (1989);

United States v. Loder, 23 F.3d 586, 591 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating

that an aider and abettor must "consciously share[] the specific

criminal intent of the principals"); 18 U.S.C. 1958

(specifically requiring proof that the defendant acted with

"intent that a murder be committed"). In other words, as Judge

Young instructed the jury, the government had to show that

Houlihan "intentionally arranged for the murder of James Boyden

48

III by Joseph Nardone," or "aided and abetted that crime," and

that he had the "specific intent" of causing the murder.

We have combed the record in light of this highly

specific subset of charges to determine whether the government

satisfied its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that

Houlihan perpetrated these three interrelated crimes. We have

come up empty. In our judgment there is insufficient evidence

that Houlihan, whatever other atrocities he may have committed,

intended to bring about the execution of James Boyden III, or

that he participated in any culpable way in the commission of

that crime.

The evidence depicts Fitzgerald as the leader of the

organization and Houlihan as his second-in-command. The

government's theory is that Nardone killed Boyden III, and that

Fitzgerald and Houlihan jointly directed him to do so. But the

government's star witness, Nelson, testified that, according to

Nardone, Fitzgerald alone ordered the murder.23

This seems reasonable in view of the fact that the

murder grew out of events surrounding the assassination of the

victim's son (Boyden IV). The younger Boyden, against

Fitzgerald's explicit warning, had continued to sell cocaine in

the "sales territory" assigned to Jennierose Lynch (Fitzgerald's

paramour). After several violent encounters, Boyden IV turned up

23Indeed, when it was pointed out that a grand jury witness
had testified otherwise, the government protested that the
witness had made a mistake. See supra note 19. The grand jury

testimony was not admitted at the trial.

49

dead. The government charged Fitzgerald, Lynch, and Herd but

not Houlihan with that murder. As recounted earlier, the judge

granted Fitzgerald's motion for a mistrial on those charges (and

he presumably remains subject to retrial); the judge ordered the

charges against Lynch dropped as part of an overall plea bargain;

and the jury acquitted Herd.

The record strongly suggests that the son's murder set

the stage for the father's murder, and that the killings were

related. The government makes no effort to implicate Houlihan in

the former crime, and there is only a tenuous set of inferences

linking him to the latter crime.

Virtually the only intimation that Houlihan may have

played a role in the killing of Boyden III comes from Sargent's

tape-recorded statement during which the following colloquy

transpired (references in the colloquy to "Boyden, Sr." refer to

James Boyden III):

SARGENT: I was having a couple of drinks,
SARGENT:
and [Houlihan] mentioned . . . that that
there's two . . . that's going to go.

* * *

. . . John Houlihan mentioned before that he
could have somebody kill anybody he wants.

* * *

DET. HARRIS: There was the homicide of James
DET. HARRIS:
Boyden, Sr.

SARGENT: Right.
SARGENT:

DET. HARRIS: Would you tell us about that
DET. HARRIS:
homicide?

SARGENT: All I know is when I had talked to
SARGENT:

50

John in the bar, he had mentioned there was
going to be two . . . people dead, and that
night that same night that I talked to him,
that's when Boyden Sr. got killed . . .

DET. HARRIS: How many hours before Boyden
DET. HARRIS:
Sr. was killed did that conversation with
[Houlihan] take place?

SARGENT: I'd say about three hours.
SARGENT:

Passing obvious questions about the reliability of this

uncorroborated hearsay statement, see supra note 7 & accompanying

text, this seems too porous a foundation on which to rest

homicide charges.

Laying out the inferential chain on which the

government's theory depends illustrates its weakness. From the

dialogue that we have quoted, the government suggests that a jury

could plausibly infer that Houlihan was referring to the upcoming

murder of James Boyden III in his "two . . . that's going to go"

comment; and that, from this inference, the jury could plausibly

infer that Houlihan intended to bring about that murder and

participated in it in some meaningful way. This is simply too

great a stretch. Houlihan did not mention James Boyden III in

his conversation with Sargent, and it is not even clear that

Sargent understood Houlihan to be referring to any particular

individuals. Rather, the import of Sargent's comment seems to be

that succeeding events filled in the blanks. And even if we

accept the first suggested inference, the record hardly will

support the further inference that Houlihan had a specific intent

to murder James Boyden III, or that he abetted the ensuing crime.

At most, the conversation suggests an awareness of a planned

51

slaying, not necessarily participation in it.

The government tries to buttress these strained

inferences by pointing to Sargent's parroting of Houlihan's

statement that he "could have somebody kill anybody" and

labelling this as evidence that Houlihan directed the commission

of this particular murder. But that argument proves too much.

On the government's reasoning, Houlihan could have been charged

and convicted of any murder. The government also points out

that, on the day after the murder, Nardone collected his fee at

Kerrigan's Flower Shop. Because this bore some resemblance to

the method of payment that Houlihan employed after Nardone

murdered Sargent, see supra note 22, the government asks us to

infer that Houlihan also must have arranged this payment. We

think for two reasons that the suggested inference is dubious.

First, the difference in payment methodology is significant: on

the latter occasion (Sargent's murder), the government proved

that Houlihan personally paid the fee to Nardone; on the former

occasion (Boyden the elder's murder), it did not. Second, the

record shows that Fitzgerald not only ordered the murder of James

Boyden III but also, though imprisoned, remained in daily contact

with Doherty, and that Doherty (who was based at Kerrigan's) or

any of several other underlings could have arranged the payment.

Even so, given the working relationship between

Houlihan and Fitzgerald and their use of Nardone as a triggerman

in connection with Sargent's murder and the attempts on Sweeney's

life, the question of evidentiary sufficiency is close. In the

52

end, however, we do not think that the evidence measures up to

the requirement which we apply de novo that a reasonable jury

be able to find each element of the crime to have been proven

beyond a reasonable doubt. Given Nelson's uncontradicted

testimony that only one individual Fitzgerald sanctioned the

execution of James Boyden III, and also given the nexus between

the Boydens' murders, we believe that the chain of inferences

forged by the prosecution is too loose (albeit by the slimmest of

margins) to hold Houlihan criminally responsible for the charged

crimes.

C. Severance.
C. Severance.

The reader will recall that the indictment charged

Herd, Lynch, and Fitzgerald but not Houlihan and Nardone with

offenses related to the murder of James Boyden IV. Houlihan and

Nardone contend that the court had an obligation to sever their

trials from the trial of the counts relating to the Boyden IV

murder.24 We disagree.

When several defendants are named in a unified

indictment, there is a strong presumption that they should be

tried together. See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 538-

39 (1993); O'Bryant, 998 F.2d at 25. To obtain a severance under

such circumstances, a defendant must demonstrate extreme

prejudice, such as by showing a "serious risk that a joint trial

24Ironically, none of the counts related to this murder bore
fruit: the jury found Herd not guilty; the court relieved Lynch
of responsibility when she pleaded guilty to other counts; and
the court granted Fitzgerald a mistrial.

53

would compromise a specific trial right," or would "prevent the

jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence."

Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539.

Houlihan and Nardone cannot scale these heights. Their

central thesis is that the government's evidence concerning the

Boyden IV murder tended to show that the victim was slaughtered

in an organization-related turf battle, and therefore threatened

to infect the jury's consideration of other counts. But they

dress this thesis in the gossamer vestments of speculation and

surmise. That is not enough. "There is always some prejudice in

any trial where more than one offense or offender are tried

together but such `garden variety' prejudice, in and of itself,

will not suffice" as a basis for obligatory severance. O'Bryant,

898 F.2d at 246.

To be sure, there is a gray area in which reasonable

people might disagree about the advisability of a severance. In

the vast majority of those cases, however, the severance battle

is conclusively won or lost in the district court. See O'Bryant,

998 F.2d at 25 (explaining that the court of appeals ordinarily

should defer to the district court's evaluation of the necessity

for separate trials); United States v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302, 308

(1st Cir. 1991) (holding that a denial of severance will only be

reversed for a "manifest abuse of discretion"), cert. denied, 502

U.S. 1079 (1992). This case falls within the sweep of that

generality, not within the long-odds exception to it. Not only

is the inference of undue prejudice that the appellants seek to

54

draw somewhat attenuated, but also any possible prejudice was

dissipated by the trial court's firm, carefully worded, and oft-

repeated instructions to the jurors, forbidding them from

considering the evidence anent the murder of Boyden the younger

in deciding the charges against either Houlihan or Nardone.25 On

this record, we are confident that the trial court did not abuse

its considerable discretion in denying the requested severance.

See, e.g., Boylan, 998 F.2d at 25; United States v. Gomez-Pabon,

911 F.2d 847, 859-60 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1074

(1991).

D. The Ford/McDonald Conundrum.
D. The Ford/McDonald Conundrum.

At trial the government called Steven Ford and Edwin

McDonald as witnesses regarding the murder of James Boyden IV.

Houlihan and Nardone successfully solicited limiting

instructions. Prior to each witness's testimony Judge Young

admonished the jury that the testimony was admissible only

against Fitzgerald, Herd, and Lynch, and not against Houlihan or

Nardone. Notwithstanding these limiting instructions, Houlihan

and Nardone asked to cross-examine Ford and McDonald. The court

blocked that maneuver. Houlihan and Nardone press the point in

this venue, alleging that the court's ruling violated their

confrontation rights and otherwise constituted an improper

exercise of discretion.

25The court enhanced the efficacy of the limiting
instructions by insisting that all the government's evidence
relating to this murder be presented compactly at the same point
in the trial. This is a salutary practice, and we commend it
generally to trial courts confronted with analogous situations.

55

To demonstrate a violation of the Confrontation Clause,

a defendant must show that he was "prohibited from engaging in

otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a

prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness." Van

Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680. Here, there was no abridgement of the

defendants' constitutional rights. The Confrontation Clause

demands that a defendant have the opportunity to confront and

cross-examine the witnesses against him; at least in the absence

of special circumstances and none appear here the Clause does

not create a right to confront or cross-examine persons who

appear as witnesses exclusively against others (even if the

others are codefendants in a joint trial). Because neither Ford

nor McDonald was a witness "against" either Houlihan or Nardone,

the constitutional claim is stillborn.

Absent a constitutional violation, "appellate courts

will grant relief from the shackling of cross-examination only

for manifest abuse of discretion." Boylan, 898 F.2d at 254. We

discern no trace of abuse in this instance. Despite the lack of

cross-examination,26 the limiting instructions fully protected

Houlihan's and Nardone's legitimate interests. Furthermore,

allowing counsel for Houlihan and Nardone to cross-examine Ford

and McDonald could well have had a boomerang effect, leading the

jury to believe that, contrary to the judge's instructions, the

testimony had some relevance to the charges against their

26Of course, these witnesses did not emerge unscathed. Ford
and McDonald were vigorously cross-examined by counsel for the
implicated defendants, Fitzgerald included.

56

clients. Hence, the restriction on cross-examination was well-

tailored to the occasion.

E. Rulings Related to the Partial Mistrial.
E. Rulings Related to the Partial Mistrial.

After granting Fitzgerald a partial mistrial on the

counts pertaining to the murder of James Boyden IV, the district

court refused to grant his motion to strike the testimony of

three witnesses, each of whom testified to some extent about that

murder,27 or in the alternative, to declare a mistrial on the

remaining counts against him. Before us, Fitzgerald claims that

the testimony had no relevance to the surviving counts, and

included details about the slaying of the younger Boyden that

might well have horrified the jurors and prejudiced them against

him.

We review the district court's ruling to admit or

exclude particular evidence for abuse of discretion. See United

States v. Rivera-Gomez, 67 F.3d 993, 997 (1st Cir. 1995); United

States v. Holmquist, 36 F.3d 154, 163 (1st Cir. 1994), cert.

denied, 115 S. Ct. 1797 (1995). The same standard pertains to

motions to strike evidence previously admitted. See Sepulveda,

15 F.3d at 1184. Here, the district court styled the disputed

testimony as being "probative . . . of other counts in the case,"

and denied the motion to strike on that basis. Having

scrutinized the testimony in light of the surviving charges

against Fitzgerald, we are persuaded that, as Fitzgerald

27The witnesses in question are Veronica Boyden (the mother
of James Boyden IV), Marie Boyden-Connors (his sister), and
Frances Hannigan (a former owner of Kerrigan's Flower Shop).

57

maintains, it was prejudicial to some degree. But that is not

the end of the road. "[A]ll evidence is meant to be prejudicial;

it is only unfair prejudice which must be avoided." United

States v. Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 156 (1st Cir. 1989)

(emphasis in original). Thus, our inquiry must proceed.

Fitzgerald cast the motion to strike in "all or

nothing" terms. In ruling on it, the district court had to

compose a balance between the probative value of the evidence as

a whole and the risk of unfair prejudice attendant to keeping it

before the jury. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. And though the evidence

was prejudicial in a sense, it was also plainly probative of

Fitzgerald's role as the kingpin in the organization and bore

directly on the remaining charges against him.28

While the question is admittedly close, we are

unprepared to say that the evidence's unfairly prejudicial impact

substantially outweighed its probative worth. "Only rarely and

in extraordinarily compelling circumstances will we, from the

vista of a cold appellate record, reverse a district court's on-

the-spot judgment concerning the relative weighting of probative

28A few examples may assist in giving texture to this
conclusion. Veronica Boyden testified that she heard Lynch, an
indicted coconspirator, threaten to call Fitzgerald if James
Boyden IV continued to poach on her sales territory. Similarly,
Boyden-Connors testified that Fitzgerald himself warned her to
keep her brother away from Lynch's territory. Hannigan's
testimony, overall, related more to the structure and operating
practices of the Fitzgerald-Houlihan organization and less to the
slaying of James Boyden IV. By way of illustration, Hannigan
testified at length about Fitzgerald's presence at Kerrigan's
Flower Shop, his meetings there with other members of the
conspiracy, and his daily telephone calls to Doherty from his
prison cell during the period of his immurement.

58

value and unfair effect." Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d

1331, 1340 (1st Cir. 1988). This is not such an occasion. It

follows that the lower court did not misuse its discretion in

denying both Fitzgerald's motion to strike and his alternative

motion to declare an across-the-board mistrial.

F. The Armed Robbery Reference.
F. The Armed Robbery Reference.

Nardone had also been charged with committing several

armed robberies. The district court severed the armed robbery

counts before trial. When Nelson (one of Nardone's alleged

coconspirators) testified, Houlihan's counsel cross-examined him.

In the course of the cross-examination, the lawyer proffered a

copy of Nelson's cooperation agreement with the government. No

objection appearing, the court admitted the document into

evidence. Appended to the cooperation agreement (now a full

exhibit) was a copy of the information that the government had

filed against Nelson (which contained, inter alia, a count that

described an alleged Nelson/Nardone armed robbery). Four days

later, Nardone's counsel asked the district court to delete all

references to him from the exhibit before it went to the jury.

The court refused. Nardone assigns error. We uphold the ruling.

There is danger in delay, and the contemporaneous

objection rule is, for the most part, strictly enforced in this

circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 972

(1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Griffin, 818 F.2d 97, 99-100

(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 844 (1987). While it is true

in this case that Nardone's attorney ultimately objected, a

59

belated objection does not cure the original default.

To be sure, we might be impelled to intervene if we

thought that, despite the lack of a contemporaneous objection,

the district court committed plain error by refusing to redact

the references to Nardone which appeared in the information. See

Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-37 (discussing dimensions of plain error

review); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). But here, no plain

error looms. During cross-examination of Nelson two days after

Houlihan's counsel introduced the cooperation agreement into

evidence without objection and two days before Nardone's counsel

broached the idea of redaction the latter questioned Nelson

extensively about the armed robbery and drug conspiracy described

in the information. Although these questions were artfully

phrased to avoid any explicit reference to Nardone's

participation in those crimes, we believe that this harping on

the contents of the information bolsters the district court's

decision not to excuse the lack of a contemporaneous objection.

We conclude, therefore, that the court acted within its

discretion in declining to relax the usual rule and in rejecting

Nardone's tardy request for redaction.29

G. Jury Instructions.
G. Jury Instructions.

29As an aside, we note that there is no inkling of any
prejudice stemming from this ruling. For one thing, the jury
acquitted Nardone on several counts, so it is impossible to argue
convincingly that the unredacted information irretrievably
poisoned the jurors against him. For another thing, given the
powerful evidentiary strands that tied Nardone tightly to two
brutal murders and several other murder attempts, we doubt that
the references about which he now complains could conceivably
have altered the jury's verdicts.

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The appellants posit that the district court's charge

did not impart the degree of participation required to convict a

defendant of conspiracy charges under the Racketeer Influenced

and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1969.

The RICO statute criminalizes "conduct[ing] or participat[ing],

directly or indirectly, in the conduct of [an] enterprise's

affairs" through a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C.

1962(c). To convey this element of the RICO offenses, Judge

Young instructed the jury that the prosecution must prove beyond

a reasonable doubt,

that by engaging in a pattern of racketeering
activity the specific individual accused . .
. conducted or participated in the conduct of
the enterprise's affairs. The term conduct
and participate in the conduct of an
enterprise includes the performance of acts,
functions or duties which are related to the
operation of the enterprise. A person may be
found to participate in the conduct of the
enterprise even though he has no part in the
management or control of the enterprise.

The appellants fault this instruction because it told

the jury that a defendant could be found guilty even if he did

not participate "in the management or control of the enterprise."

In their view, the Court's opinion in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507

U.S. 170 (1993), signifies the opposite. But this asseveration

misconstrues Reves. There, the Court interpreted the words

"conduct or participate" as they appear in section 1962(c), and

determined that those words require a defendant's participation

in either "the operation or management of the enterprise itself."

Id. at 185. But because the defendant in Reves was an outside

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accounting firm that had only a contractual relationship with the

allegedly corrupt enterprise it audited the books and issued

financial reports, but neither controlled the enterprise nor

participated in either its operation or management RICO

liability did not attach. See id. at 186.

The case at hand is of a distinctively different

stripe. Unlike the accountants in Reves, who were classic

"outsiders," the appellants here are quintessential "insiders,"

that is, persons whom the evidence places in the maw of the

criminal activity.30 We have previously held that insiders who

are integral to carrying out the enterprise's racketeering

activities and the appellants clearly fit that description

come within the definitional sweep of section 1962(c). See

United States v. Hurley, 63 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1995), cert.

denied, 116 S. Ct. 1322 (1996); United States v. Oreto, 37 F.3d

739, 750-51 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1161

(1995). The instructions given in this case are in all material

respects identical to those that we approved in Hurley and Oreto.

Consequently, we reject this assignment of error without further

30Nardone's claim that he was an independent contractor is
imaginative but unconvincing. The evidence supports the view
that Nardone was an insider. He maintained regular contact with
Fitzgerald and Houlihan throughout the duration of the
conspiracy; he obtained his armaments directly from them; and he
took orders from them. Indeed, Nardone's description of himself
as the organization's "hit man" and "headache man" belies his
more recently manufactured "independent contractor" label.

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elaboration.31

H. Forfeiture.
H. Forfeiture.

Houlihan contends that the government failed to produce

sufficient evidence to support the forfeiture of a house located

at 80 Ferncroft Road, Tewksbury, Massachusetts. The government

lodged the forfeiture count under 18 U.S.C. 1963(a)32 and the

jury found in its favor. The property had been deeded by a

third-party seller to Francis Jackson (Houlihan's uncle), and

Houlihan's contention is that, because title stood in Jackson's

name, the property could not be forfeited in consequence of his

(Houlihan's) peccadilloes.

"[C]riminal forfeiture is a punishment, not a separate

criminal offense." Saccoccia, 58 F.3d at 783. In such a

31The appellants also claim that the district court erred by
refusing to repeat its concededly correct definition of what
constitutes a racketeering "enterprise" in its instructions to
the jury on those counts that charged murder and attempted murder
in aid of racketeering. Judge Young chose instead to incorporate
by reference his correct definition of a RICO enterprise (given
to the jury earlier in the charge); and, in the same vein, he
specifically informed the jury that, as to all racketeering-
related counts, they must find the existence of an enterprise
meeting the statutory criteria as an element of each offense. In
light of the perfectly sensible course taken by the judge, the
appellants' claim is unfounded. A trial court has broad
discretion to formulate jury instructions as it sees fit, as long
as it touches all the bases. See United States v. DeStefano, 59

F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1995). Here, taking the charge as an
integrated whole, see, e.g., United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d

980, 1003 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 913 (1988), we

find no error.

32Insofar as it is germane to Houlihan's situation, the
statute provides in substance that a RICO offender shall forfeit
to the government any property interest or thing of value
acquired with the proceeds of racketeering activity. See 18

U.S.C. 1963(a).

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proceeding, the government can satisfy its burden of proof by

either direct or circumstantial evidence. See id. at 782. In

this instance we conclude without serious question that a

rational factfinder could determine as this jury did that

Houlihan was the de facto owner of the house, and that it had

been purchased with proceeds derived from racketeering

activity.33

Real estate agents testified that they took Houlihan

and his wife, along with Jackson, on tours of the dwelling

several times during 1993; that Houlihan told them that he was

"interested" in buying it; that Houlihan attended the pre-sale

inspection and the two closings that proved to be necessary; and

that the property was purchased entirely for cash (approximately

$195,000). And, moreover, both Houlihan and his wife were in

residence at the premises when the authorities arrested Houlihan

in October of 1993.

These pieces of evidence combine to form a picture that

33The district court instructed the jury that the government
had the burden of proving entitlement to forfeiture beyond a
reasonable doubt. The proof here is capable of satisfying that
standard. We note, however although we leave the question open
that the government may have conceded too much. Compare United

States v. Tanner, 61 F.3d 231, 234 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that

criminal forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. 853 requires a
preponderance of the evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable
doubt), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 925 (1996) and United States v.

Elgersma, 971 F.2d 690, 695 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (holding

that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies generally
in criminal forfeiture cases involving drug proceeds) with United

States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 906 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that

government, in a criminal forfeiture proceeding under 18 U.S.C.
1963(a), must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the targeted
property was derived from the defendant's racketeering activity).

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reveals Houlihan as the actual owner of the home in Tewksbury,

with Jackson serving merely as a straw. Then, too, the evidence

is reinforced by the utter absence of any proof indicating how

Jackson might have acquired so large an amount of cash. Given

the totality of the circumstances, the jury was entitled to find

that the house was forfeitable as a fruit of Houlihan's

racketeering. See id. ("Jurors, after all, are not expected to

resist common-sense inferences based on the realities of human

experience.").

I. Sentencing.
I. Sentencing.

The sentences imposed by the district court are

unremarkable in most respects. The sole exception relates to

count 20. That count charged Fitzgerald and Houlihan, among

others, with conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance

(cocaine) in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846. As to Fitzgerald and

Houlihan, Judge Young imposed contingent sentences of life

imprisonment, to take effect "only if the sentence on count 19

[which charged a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of

18 U.S.C. 848] is reversed [or] otherwise dismissed." Because

we affirm the conviction and sentence on count 19, the

contingency that Judge Young envisioned has not materialized.

Hence, we now vacate Fitzgerald's and Houlihan's convictions and

sentences on count 20. We explain briefly.

If an indictment charges a defendant with participating

in both a conspiracy and a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE),

and if the former is used as a predicate act to prove the latter,

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then the conspiracy is in actuality a lesser-included offense of

the CCE charge, and the defendant may not lawfully be sentenced

for both crimes. See United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d

148, 152-53 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 862 (1991);

Stratton v. United States, 862 F.2d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1988) (per

curiam). To do otherwise would result in cumulative punishment

violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Jeffers v. United

States, 432 U.S. 137, 154-58 (1977) (plurality op.); Rivera-

Martinez, 931 F.2d at 152-53.

We need not wax longiloquent, for the government, to

its credit, concedes the point. Thus, our affirmance of

Fitzgerald's and Houlihan's convictions and sentences on count 19

necessitates the vacation of their convictions and sentences on

count 20. See Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d at 153 (holding that the

Double Jeopardy Clause requires vacation of conviction and

sentence on conspiracy count when a defendant is convicted and

sentenced on both conspiracy and CCE counts).

VI. CONCLUSION
VI. CONCLUSION

We need go no further. For the reasons we have

discussed at length perhaps at too much length we affirm the

convictions and sentences of all three appellants in all

respects, save only for (a) Houlihan's convictions on counts 5, 6

and 15 (which are reversed), and (b) Fitzgerald's and Houlihan's

convictions on count 20 (which are vacated).

So Ordered.
So Ordered.

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