UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 96-1152
VALENTINO T. COLASANTO, TRUSTEE OF THE
ROBERT M. COLASANTO REVOCABLE TRUST,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA,
Defendant, Appellee,
v.
STEPHEN A. FARLEY,
Third-Party Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Boyle,* Senior District Judge.
Katherine A. Merolla, with whom Amedeo C. Merolla and Pucci,
Goldin & Merolla were on brief, for appellant.
William B. VanLonkhuyzen, with whom Norman S. Zalkind and
Zalkind, Rodriguez, Lunt & Duncan were on brief, for appellee
Stephen A. Farley.
November 15, 1996
*Of the District of Rhode Island, sitting by designation.
SELYA, Circuit Judge. This appeal summons our review
SELYA, Circuit Judge.
of a jury verdict that awarded certain life insurance proceeds to
the decedent's quondam companion rather than to a family trust.
Upon close perscrutation of the record, the parties' briefs, and
the applicable law, we discern no error.
I. BACKGROUND
I. BACKGROUND
We start with a neutral account of the facts that were
before the jury. The decedent, Robert M. Colasanto, made his
mark as a successful business executive. In September of 1982,
Colasanto met Stephen A. Farley. A relationship developed and
the two men began cohabiting in San Diego, California. They
lived initially in a rented dwelling and later in a luxurious
home that Colasanto purchased. During this time frame Colasanto
founded a health-care organization, Community Care Network, Inc.
(CCN), which became hugely successful. Colasanto enjoyed the
fruits of his good fortune including, inter alia, a beneficial
interest under a group life insurance policy owned by CCN and
issued by Life Insurance Company of North America (LINA) which
afforded him a $140,000 death benefit.
Colasanto's world changed in 1989 when a physician
diagnosed him as HIV-positive. By 1992, he had contracted AIDS.
Yearning for his native New England, he bought a home in
Massachusetts. Colasanto and Farley took up residence there in
the spring of 1993.
As Colasanto's health deteriorated, so, too, his
relationship with Farley. The two men began discussing a
2
property settlement in mid-1993. Despite the assistance of
retained counsel, they were unable to agree on terms. According
to Farley, however, the parties reached an informal agreement on
or about December 3, 1993. Under that accord, Colasanto was to
transfer ownership of five life insurance policies (including the
LINA group life policy) to Farley.
On December 10, Colasanto completed and executed a form
entitled "Application for Conversion of Group or Employee Life
Insurance" (the conversion application) with the intention of
converting his coverage under the group policy to an individual
policy. Line 10(c) of the conversion application bears the
inscription "Pay Death Benefit to," followed by three blank
lines. Underneath the first blank line these instructions
appear: "Print Full Name of Beneficiary and State Relationship."
On the left-hand side of this line Colasanto typed "Stephen A.
Farley." He left a blank space in the middle of the line and on
the right-hand side he typed "Executor."1 On the following two
lines Colasanto added "Issue policy with Mr. Farley as owner.
See enclosed letter." The letter, signed by Colasanto, bore a
caption indicating that it was being transmitted "RE: CONVERSION
OF GROUP COVERAGE TO INDIVIDUAL COVERAGE SPECIFICATION OF OWNER
OF INDIVIDUAL POLICY WHICH IS ISSUED." The body of the letter
made explicit reference to the conversion application and stated
1The parties agree that on December 10, 1993, Colasanto's
will nominated Farley as his executor. Colasanto made a new will
before he died. Farley was not named as executor then and was
not appointed executor of Colasanto's estate upon Colasanto's
demise.
3
in relevant part:
Please note that I am requesting that
the individual policy be issued such that the
owner is as follows:
Stephen A. Farley
10448 Russel Road
La Mesa, CA 91941 D.O.B. 2-21-49
Mr. Farley is currently the beneficiary
of the group coverage. If he needs to fill
out another beneficiary form, please send it
to him since that will be his right as the
policy owner.
The premium statement(s) should be sent
to Mr. Farley at the above address.
Colasanto transmitted the conversion application and
letter to LINA. He sent forms and letters to four other life
insurers on the same date. Each letter instructed the carrier to
transfer ownership of the affected policy to Farley. In each of
the five instances Colasanto contemporaneously furnished Farley
with signed copies of the conversion application or assignment
form, the cover letter, and a certified mail return receipt
request in Colasanto's handwriting asking that the receipt be
forwarded to Farley.2
Farley returned to California on December 22. On
January 19, 1994, Colasanto sent a premium payment to LINA on the
policy in question and accompanied it with a letter reiterating
"that the individual policy should be issued to Stephen A. Farley
as owner." Colasanto added: "If a separate form is required to
change owner, then please send the form. Future premium
2Upon Colasanto's death, Farley apparently collected the
proceeds of the other four policies without incident. In any
event, none of those policies are implicated here.
4
statements should be sent to Mr. Farley as owner." LINA sent the
individual policy to Colasanto in early February together with a
letter admonishing that if Colasanto wished to designate Farley
as owner, he should execute an assignment form and return it to
LINA. Despite the fact that LINA enclosed a blank form with this
letter, Colasanto never signed it.
Later that month, Farley returned to Massachusetts. A
reconciliation ensued.3 Colasanto repaired to California with
Farley, only to return to Massachusetts alone following a bitter
quarrel that took place on March 7, 1994. The next month
Colasanto executed a change-of-beneficiary form in which he
purported to designate one of his brothers, Valentino T.
Colasanto, in his capacity as Trustee of the Robert M. Colasanto
Revocable Trust, as the beneficiary of the LINA policy.
Colasanto died on June 17, 1994.
Both Farley and the Trustee laid claim to the policy
proceeds. The Trustee won the race to the courthouse steps and
filed suit against LINA in a Rhode Island state court. LINA
removed the case to federal district court, 28 U.S.C. 1441,
citing the existence of original jurisdiction arising out of both
diversity and interpleader, see 28 U.S.C. 1332(a), 1335,
impleaded Farley, and deposited the face value of the policy
($140,000) into the registry of the district court. See
3During this period Farley took possession of both the
subject policy and the blank assignment form. The parties
disagree about how this occurred. The appellant contends that
Farley filched the papers; Farley claims that Colasanto gave them
to him.
5
generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 22 (discussing mechanics of
interpleader actions).
LINA's departure from the fray left Farley and the
Trustee locked in mortal combat. After considerable skirmishing,
the case was tried and the jury returned a verdict in Farley's
favor. The district court thereafter denied the Trustee's
motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) (judgment as a matter of law)
and Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) (new trial). This appeal followed.
The Trustee presses several points in support of his
position. We have considered them all, but address in this
opinion only those contentions that have arguable merit and that
are necessary to a resolution of this appeal.
II. OWNERSHIP OF THE POLICY
II. OWNERSHIP OF THE POLICY
The appellant's flagship claim is that no reasonable
juror could conclude that Colasanto transferred ownership of the
subject policy to Farley, and the lower court therefore should
have granted the motion for judgment as a matter of law.4 The
standard of review referable to a trial court's refusal to order
judgment as a matter of law is set in cement. The court of
appeals undertakes plenary review, see Gibson v. City of
Cranston, 37 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir. 1994), and "examine[s] the
evidence and the inferences reasonably to be drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the nonmovant," Wagenmann v. Adams,
4Transfer of ownership is a critical datum since, if
Colasanto remained the owner of the policy on April 21, 1994,
then his execution and delivery of a change-of-beneficiary form
on that date would have been effective, and the policy proceeds
would be payable to the successor beneficiary (the Trustee).
6
829 F.2d 196, 200 (1st Cir. 1987). In so doing the court "may
not consider credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in
testimony, or evaluate the weight of the evidence." Id.
Overriding a jury verdict is warranted only if the evidence "is
so one-sided that the movant is plainly entitled to judgment, for
reasonable minds could not differ as to the outcome." Gibson, 37
F.3d at 735.
A
A
The gist of the Trustee's argument is that Colasanto,
although taking an initial step to transfer ownership of the
policy to Farley, never effectuated that change according to the
terms of the policy. Thus, no reasonable jury could find that
Colasanto substantially complied with the explicit policy
requirements necessary to anoint Farley as the owner.
This argument misses the mark. It is predicated on the
common law doctrine of substantial compliance. The parties agree
that the substantive law of Massachusetts governs this
controversy, and, according to the appellant, the Massachusetts
cases suggest that, if a policy specifies the manner in which
transfers are to be made, the failure of literal compliance with
the policy requirements will be excused only if the insured did
everything that he could do to comply with those provisions.
See, e.g., Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Feinberg, 318 Mass. 246,
250, 61 N.E.2d 122, 124 (1945) (stating that "it is of the
essence of substantial compliance that the insured must have done
all in his power to effect the change, leaving only some
7
ministerial act on the part of the insurer necessary to
consummate it"); Resnek v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 286 Mass. 305,
309, 190 N.E. 603, 604-05 (1934) (similar).
Building on this base, the appellant points to a
provision in the LINA policy that states: "Changes [of ownership
or beneficiary] must be requested in writing on a form
satisfactory to us and sent to our Administrative Office."
Because this condition could have been, but was not, met after
all, the carrier sent Colasanto a blank assignment form, and he
easily could have completed it and mailed it back the appellant
insists that there was no substantial compliance, and, hence,
that the attempted change of ownership was ineffectual. See id.
at 309-10 (indicating that if the insured is put on notice that
he has not done all in his power to comply with the requirements
for changing a beneficiary, as by the insurer's rejection of an
improperly completed form, and the insured does not take the
suggested remedial action, there is no substantial compliance).
Even though Colasanto explicitly designated Farley as owner on
the conversion application, reaffirmed that designation in the
cover letter, and wrote a subsequent epistle reiterating that
Farley owned the policy, the appellant asseverates that Farley's
claim of ownership fails because Colasanto never transmitted the
assignment form to LINA. The appellant then tries to hoist this
asseveration by its bootstraps, noting that LINA never recognized
a transfer of policy ownership to Farley, instead sending the
policy to Colasanto and accepting the change-of-beneficiary form
8
that he subsequently submitted.
There are two visible flaws in the fabric of the
appellant's thesis. In the first place, we do not think that the
doctrine of substantial compliance applies to this case. It is
generally held in Massachusetts that the provisions of an
insurance policy which stipulate what formalities must attend an
assignment are for the benefit of the insurer, not for the
benefit of others. See Abbruzise v. Sposata, 306 Mass. 151, 153-
54, 27 N.E.2d 722, 723-24 (1940); Goldman v. Moses, 287 Mass.
393, 397, 191 N.E. 873, 874 (1934). When, as now, the insurer is
no longer a combatant, and the dispute over the validity of a
transfer is limited to the assignor and the assignee (or those
claiming under them), the assignor is precluded from relying
mechanically on the formalities built into the policy to defeat
the transfer. See Abbruzise, 306 Mass. at 153-54; Goldman, 287
Mass. at 397; Herman v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 218 Mass.
181, 185, 105 N.E. 450, 451 (1914); Merrill v. New Eng. Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 103 Mass. 245, 252 (1869). In other words, the
assignment, though not in compliance with the policy, nonetheless
may be binding as between the assignor and assignee as long as
the evidence of the act and the intent is sufficient to confirm
the assignment's validity.
The second flaw in the appellant's thesis is that, even
if the substantial compliance doctrine retains some relevance in
a contest over life insurance proceeds between parties other than
the insurer, an argument premised on substantial compliance in
9
this case overlooks the obvious. If an insurance policy
regulates the form of an assignment and the insured complies
literally with those terms, the assignment is valid, and the
question of substantial compliance is immaterial.
Here, the policy provides not one, but two, means of
changing the ownership. It stipulates: "The Owner ("you,"
"your") is the Insured unless otherwise designated in the
application or unless changed as provided under the Change of
Ownership or Beneficiary provision [i.e., by use of an assignment
form]." (Emphasis supplied). The jacket of the policy
reiterates this duality: "The Owner ("you," "your") is the
insured unless another person is named in the application or
later becomes the Owner as allowed by the policy." (Emphasis
supplied). Thus, while Colasanto could have effected the desired
change of ownership by returning the assignment form to LINA as
instructed, we see no reason why he could not also have done so
in the application. Since the policy appears explicitly to have
given the policyholder that option, we think that a reasonable
jury could have decided the point on the basis that Colasanto had
chosen this manner of switching the policy's ownership and that
the resultant designation was valid and binding.
A group policy and an individual policy that is spun
off from it ordinarily are deemed a single, continuing contract
of insurance. See Binkley v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 471
F.2d 889, 891 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 877 (1973);
Brindis v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 29 Mass. App. Ct. 368, 369-70,
10
560 N.E.2d 722, 723 (1990). Until Colasanto retired, his
employer owned the group policy. There was no individual policy
(and, hence, no individual owner) until Colasanto exercised his
right of conversion. In all probability, then, the conversion
application is an application within the purview of the quoted
policy language we hesitate only because LINA is not a party
here, and it cannot be heard on the topic in this proceeding
and in any event, the appellant concedes that it is such. He
maintains, however, that the application could not be used to
dictate ownership because there was no line or place on it to
spell out the nature of the change.
We reject this argument. An insurance company cannot
confer a prerogative upon the insured in the policy covenants and
then surreptitiously take it away by omitting any reference to it
on the forms that the company prints to implement the covenants.
Here, the policy told Colasanto that he could designate the owner
of a converted policy by naming that individual in the
application, and he did so. At the very least, a reasonable
jury, faced with this concatenation of circumstances, had a right
to conclude that the policy allowed Colasanto to use the
conversion application as a vehicle to bring about the ownership
arrangement that he preferred. On that basis, the designation of
ownership contained in the application complied literally with
the terms of the policy.
B
B
The appellant advances a second theory that involves
11
substantial compliance. He asserts that, under Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(d),5 the district court's order denying his pretrial motion
for summary judgment precluded presentation of the substantial
compliance issue at trial. The court's order stated:
Although there does not appear to be any
dispute that Robert M. Colasanto failed to
execute and deliver the documents necessary
to transfer ownership of the policy in
question to Stephen Farley, there is a
genuine issue of fact regarding whether
Robert Colasanto ever agreed to make Stephen
Farley an irrevocable beneficiary and/or
owner of such policy and whether adequate
consideration was given for any such
agreement.
(Emphasis supplied).
The appellant interprets the underscored language as
establishing as a matter of law that Colasanto had not
substantially complied with the requirements for transferring
ownership of the policy to Farley.
5The rule provides in pertinent part:
If on motion under this rule judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all the
relief asked and a trial is necessary, the
court at the hearing of the motion, by
examining the pleadings and the evidence
before it and by interrogating counsel, shall
if practicable ascertain what material facts
exist without substantial controversy and
what material facts are actually and in good
faith controverted. It shall thereupon make
an order specifying the facts that appear
without substantial controversy . . . and
directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the
action the facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted
accordingly.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).
12
The appellant's contention is vulnerable on several
grounds. We mention two of them. First, the issue of
substantial compliance is a red herring, as LINA is not
challenging Farley's status and the case turns, in the final
analysis, on Colasanto's discerned intent. See supra Part II(A).
Second, the Rule 56(d) approach is little more than
stultification by tactical semantics. We explain briefly.
Although the appellant is correct in noting that Rule
56(d) empowers a court to specify (and set to one side) facts
that are without substantial controversy, the rule nevertheless
"permits the court to retain full power to make one complete
adjudication on all aspects of the case when the proper time
arrives." 10A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and
Procedure 2737 (2d ed. 1983). Here, it is disingenuous to
suggest that the court relinquished this power. Fairly read, the
underscored language simply acknowledges the lack of any dispute
as to whether the assignment form was executed and delivered to
LINA. To say, as the appellant would have it, that the statement
decides the compliance question as a matter of law would require
us both to torture the district court's words and overlook its
manifest intention. We refuse to do so.
III. THE BENEFICIARY DESIGNATION
III. THE BENEFICIARY DESIGNATION
The appellant's fallback position is that, even if
Colasanto transferred ownership of the policy to Farley, it still
must be found as a matter of law that Farley, as an individual,
is not entitled to the policy proceeds. This reasoning rests on
13
line 10(c) of the conversion application, which solicits the full
name of the beneficiary and the beneficiary's relationship to the
insured. In response Colasanto typed: "Stephen Farley
Executor." The appellant posits that the use of the word
"executor" in this context designates a fiduciary as the
beneficiary and, therefore, Colasanto's executor not Farley
is entitled to the avails of the policy.
The principal authority on which the appellant relies
is Faircloth v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 799 F. Supp.
815 (S.D. Ohio 1992). In Faircloth, the insured wrote "Faircloth
James H. Administrator" on the line in the application that asked
for the name of the beneficiary. The court ruled as a matter of
law that the policy proceeds went to the named beneficiary to be
administered for the benefit of the estate, and not to him as an
individual. See id. at 817. The appellant reads Faircloth to
stand for the proposition that whenever a fiduciary label is
found in close proximity to a beneficiary's name, the beneficiary
designation must be construed as running to the actual fiduciary,
not to the individual named. If Faircloth stands for this
proposition a matter on which we take no view it contradicts
basic tenets of Massachusetts contract interpretation, and we
must therefore disregard it.
Massachusetts law holds that, if an ambiguity exists in
contract documents, its ultimate resolution almost always turns
on the parties' intent. See Smart v. Gillette Co. Long-Term
Disability Plan, 70 F.3d 173, 178 (1st Cir. 1995); Massachusetts
14
Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co. v. Town of Danvers, 411 Mass. 39, 45,
577 N.E.2d 283, 288 (1991). In such a situation, the intent of
the contracting parties is a matter to be discerned by the
factfinder from the circumstances surrounding the ambiguity and
from such reasonable inferences as may be available. See Smart,
70 F.3d at 178.
These rules apply to insurance documents in the same
way as they apply in other contractual settings. See Falmouth
Nat'l Bank v. Ticor Tile Ins. Co., 920 F.2d 1058, 1061 (1st Cir.
1990) (applying Massachusetts law). For instance, two analogous
Massachusetts cases indicate that, when the insured, called upon
by the insurer to designate a beneficiary by name and
relationship, complies by using a descriptive term such as
"wife," it is up to the factfinder to determine whether the
insured meant the particular person named, or, in the
alternative, a person fitting the description on the date of the
insured's death. See, e.g., Strachan v. Prudential Life Ins.
Co., 321 Mass. 507, 509, 73 N.E.2d 840, 843 (1947); Brogi v.
Brogi, 211 Mass. 512, 514, 98 N.E. 573, 573 (1912).6
Of course, it can be argued that the appellation
"executor" is more "legalistic" than the term "wife," and merits
different treatment. We agree that the beneficiary's burden may
be heavier when a fiduciary designation is in play, but, here,
6Interestingly, both cases determined that the named
individual should take, though neither of them was legally
married to the insured at the time of the latter's death. See
Strachan, 321 Mass. at 511; Brogi, 211 Mass. at 514.
15
the end result is the same.
In general, courts construe beneficiary designations
made in connection with insurance policies according to the rules
applicable to the construction of wills. See 5 George J. Couch,
Cyclopedia of Insurance Law 28:7 (2d ed. 1984). "The cardinal
rule in the interpretation of a will is the ascertainment of the
testator's intent from an examination of the language employed by
him construed in the light of the circumstances known to him at
the time he executed the will, and his intent, when determined,
must be given effect unless contrary to some rule of law."
Magill v. Magill, 317 Mass. 89, 92, 56 N.E.2d 892, 894 (1944).
Thus, a testamentary gift will vest in a beneficiary qua
fiduciary absent a plain manifestation of the testator's intent
to accomplish a different result. See Slavik v. Estate of
Slavik, 46 Ark. App. 74, 76, 880 S.W.2d 524, 526 (1994) (en
banc); Baker v. Wright, 257 Ala. 697, 703, 60 So.2d 825, 830
(1952). However, merely inserting the word "executor" in a
change of beneficiary form that requests the policyholder to
state the relationship between the beneficiary and himself
presents presumptively a materially weaker case for holding the
gift to be taken in a fiduciary capacity than leaving property by
will to a donee who is a fiduciary and is so described in the
dispositive clause. See Slavik, 46 Ark. App. at 76. In sum, the
naked fact that the beneficiary's relationship to the insured is
designated in the policy documents by a legal term (e.g.,
"executor") does not compel a finding of a fiduciary disposition;
16
the matter still comes down to a question of the declarant's
intent.
Applying the principles gleaned from these cases, we
descry no error here. It is plain as a pikestaff that
Colasanto's use of the word "executor" in response to line 10(c)
creates an ambiguity. Given the suggestive spacing that appears
on the completed form and the delicate nature of Farley's
relationship to Colasanto a relationship that, in a homophobic
society, he might wish to describe with some tact the response
can plausibly be construed as using the word in a purely
descriptive sense. To be sure, it can be argued that Colasanto
used the word to indicate the legal status of the beneficiary
but this possibility means no more than that the word, taken in
context, is ambiguous. See Fashion House, Inc. v. K mart Corp.,
892 F.2d 1076, 1083 (1st Cir. 1989) ("Contract language is
usually considered ambiguous . . . where the phraseology can
support reasonable difference of opinion as to the meaning of the
words employed and obligations undertaken."). Because such
ambiguities must be resolved according to the insured's intent,
it follows that the district court properly submitted this
question to the jury.
Taking the next step, the jury's finding that Colasanto
intended the term "executor" to describe Farley as an individual,
not as a fiduciary, is amply supported. Since Farley was named
as the executor of Colasanto's estate at the time Colasanto
completed the conversion application, the description was
17
accurate. Here, moreover, Colasanto originally had named Farley
as the beneficiary of the group life policy. While it is true,
as the appellant suggests, that a term such as "friend" or
"companion" might have described Farley's relationship to
Colasanto more fittingly, that is the stuff of jury arguments,
not of appellate review and the jury had a right to assess
Colasanto's word choice with knowledge that emotionally charged
phrases may have been painful to contemplate because a ten-year
relationship was on the rocks. Finally, it is telling (or so the
jurors could have thought) that Colasanto never once referred to
Farley as a fiduciary or in a fiduciary status in subsequent
correspondence or conversations anent the policy.
We need not paint the lily. On this scumbled record, a
rational jury could have inferred as this jury did that the
word "executor" was meant only to describe the particular
individual whom the insured intended to name as the beneficiary
of the policy, and not to portend a disposition to Farley qua
fiduciary.
IV. THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
IV. THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
The appellant tells us that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for a new trial. Appellate review of orders
refusing new trials is tightly circumscribed. We ordinarily will
not disturb such a ruling if a reasonable basis exists for the
jury's verdict. See Wagenmann, 829 F.2d at 200-01. Phrased
another way, we will not intervene unless we ascertain that the
outcome is "against the clear weight of the evidence such that
18
upholding the verdict will result in a miscarriage of justice."
Putnam Resources v. Pateman, 958 F.2d 448, 459 (1st Cir. 1992).
This is not such a case.
We need not tarry. The motion for a new trial hinged
largely on the two issues previously discussed the change of
ownership and the identity of the beneficiary. We have already
explained that the jury had enough evidence on these questions to
support a verdict in Farley's favor. See supra Parts II(A) &
III. We add here only that, on both issues, the totality of the
evidence does not suggest either that justice miscarried or that
the trial court's refusal to overturn the jury's verdict
constituted an abuse of discretion. Consequently, the district
court did not err in denying the appellant's new trial motion
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a). See Sanchez v. Puerto Rico Oil Co.,
37 F.3d 712, 717 (1st Cir. 1994).
V. THE EVIDENTIARY QUESTION
V. THE EVIDENTIARY QUESTION
The appellant contends that the trial court blundered
in refusing to admit into evidence portions of letters written by
Colasanto to Farley on March 17, 1994 and April 1, 1994,
respectively. As a starting point, the appellant claims that the
proffered statements were admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 803(3).
We do not agree.
Evidence Rule 803(3) removes from the hearsay
prohibition statements that exhibit a declarant's "then-existing
state of mind." But, this exception is not to be construed as a
sweeping endorsement of all state-of-mind evidence. To be
19
admissible under this exception, a declaration, among other
things, must "mirror a state of mind, which, in light of all the
circumstances, including proximity in time, is reasonably likely
to have been the same condition existing at the material time."
2 John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence 274 (4th ed. 1992).
Because disputes over whether particular statements come within
the state-of-mind exception are fact-sensitive, the trial court
is in the best position to resolve them. As is true of other
rulings admitting or excluding evidence, appellate review is
solely for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Blinzler v. Marriott
Int'l., Inc., 81 F.3d 1148, 1158 (1st Cir. 1996).
Here, the appellant argues that the proffered
statements reflect Colasanto's intent, as early as February of
1994, not to transfer the converted policy to Farley, and that
they therefore rebut Farley's claim that Colasanto had a donative
intent. The district court excluded the correspondence on the
ground that it did not relate to Colasanto's intent in February,
but only to his intent at or about the time he wrote the letters.
We detect no misuse of the court's wide discretion.
On Farley's version of the case, Colasanto evinced a
donative intent vis- -vis the LINA policy in December of 1993, in
January 1994, and again in early February of that year. Between
the last of these incidents and the first of the letters (which
bore a date of March 17, 1994), a bitter fight between the long-
time companions ensued. That imbroglio, for all practical
purposes, eradicated any vestige of an amicable relationship.
20
Although the subsequent letters clearly reflect Colasanto's
animosity toward Farley on March 17 and thereafter, the
significant intervening events the quarrel and the ensuing
breakup could reasonably be thought to disrupt the
contemporaneity required by Evidence Rule 803(3). Thus, we are
unable to find that the district court abused its discretion by
excluding the proffered state-of-mind evidence.
In a last-ditch effort to stem the tide, the appellant
argues, in the alternative, that the evidence was proper under
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5). That catchall rule permits the
introduction of hearsay evidence, not otherwise admissible, as
long as the declarant is unavailable, the evidence possesses
"circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness," and the trial
court finds that the evidence (i) is offered to prove a material
facet, (ii) is more probative on the point than other available
evidence, and (iii) the interests of justice will be served. See
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5); see also United States v. Panzardi-
Lespier, 918 F.2d 313, 316 (1st Cir. 1990). A trial court's
determinations under Evidence Rule 804(b)(5) are reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard. See Cook v. United States, 904
F.2d 107, 111 (1st Cir. 1990).
The preconditions for deployment of Rule 804(b)(5) are
formidable, and the appellant cannot satisfy them in this
instance. For example, the district court found that the
statements lacked satisfactory assurances of trustworthiness. In
light of the disputatious course of events that had been
21
unfolding for months, leading to the retention of counsel by both
Farley and Colasanto and then to the acrimonious quarrel in
California, we cannot fault the district court's conclusion that
the statements were suspect because litigation was in the wind
when they were made.7
VI. CONCLUSION
VI. CONCLUSION
We need go no further. For aught that appears, the
case was fairly tried and the lower court appropriately permitted
the jury's verdict to stand.
Affirmed.
Affirmed.
7To emphasize the point, we note that the April 1 letter
shows on its face that Colasanto contemporaneously sent a copy to
his attorney.
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