[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 96-1283
ANGEL M. DIAZ-ZAYAS,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Cyr and Boudin,
Circuit Judges.
Paul Ramos Morales on brief for appellant.
Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Charles E. Fitzwilliam,
Assistant United States Attorney, and Donna McCarthy, Assistant
Regional Counsel, Social Security Administration, on brief for
appellee.
December 3, 1996
Per Curiam. Claimant-appellant Angel M. Diaz-Zayas
appeals from a decision of the district court affirming the
decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services
denying him social security disability benefits. We affirm.
Appellant applied for disability insurance benefits
alleging disability since November 15, 1979 due to nerves, a
heart condition, and sinusitis. After a hearing, an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that prior to the
expiration of his coverage--on March 31, 1983--appellant had
preventricular contractions, sinusal tachycardia, chronic
anxiety disorder, and Ativan dependence. These conditions,
the ALJ found, were severe but not equal to a listing. The
ALJ also found that appellant possibly had occasional
discomfort associated to these conditions, but that he did
not have disabling physical or mental distress for a
continuous period of twelve months. Based on these findings,
and a finding that appellant could perform light work, the
ALJ concluded that appellant was not disabled prior to the
expiration of his coverage because he could have performed
his former jobs as a machine operator or production helper.
Appellant does not argue that the ALJ erred in
finding that he has the capacity for light work. Instead, he
argues that the ALJ erred in his findings regarding
appellant's mental condition. We review the Secretary's
decision under a "substantial evidence" standard; we will
affirm that decision if it is supported by "'such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.'" Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,
401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.
197, 229 (1938)); see also Manso-Pizarro v. Secretary of
Health & Human Servs., 76 F.3d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1996).
Contrary to appellant's suggestion, the ALJ was not
required to accept the opinion of Dr. Garcia Saliva that
appellant's mental condition disabled him from working.
Assuming solely for the sake of argument that Dr. Garcia, who
saw appellant on only one occasion, could be considered a
treating physician, we note that there was conflicting
evidence from other treating sources regarding appellant's
ability to work. Indeed, appellant's therapists at the
Mental Health Center encouraged him, on more than one
occasion, to look for a job. In any event, the determination
of disability is reserved to the Secretary. See 20 C.F.R.
404.1527(e). We think the ALJ adequately explained his
reasons for finding that appellant's mental condition did not
preclude him from performing his past jobs as a machine
operator or production assistant.1
1
1We add that it is not obvious that Dr. Garcia's opinion
1
is inconsistent with this finding. Dr. Garcia opined that
appellant was disabled from performing his "usual work."
Read in context, "usual work" appears to refer to appellant's
past job as a service station attendant (the only job Dr.
Garcia mentions). Dr. Garcia did not specifically address
whether appellant was able to work as a machine operator or
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Similarly, the ALJ was not required to accept the
diagnoses of schizophrenia made by Dr. Carlos J. Nogueras and
Dr. Luis Lozada Rivera, or the more specific findings made by
Dr. Lozada regarding appellant's mental impairment. These
diagnoses and findings were made in 1992, approximately nine
years after appellant's insurance coverage expired. Cf.
Deblois v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 686 F.2d 76,
79 (1st Cir. 1982) (observing that a claimant has the burden
of establishing that his mental impairment was of a disabling
level of severity prior to the expiration of his coverage).
There is ample evidence in the record from both treating and
non-treating sources to support the ALJ's finding that
appellant suffered from an anxiety disorder--rather than
schizophrenia--during the critical period. Moreover, the
only mental residual functional capacity assessments in the
record which focus on the critical period support the ALJ's
finding of no disability.
Affirmed.
production helper.
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