[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 96-1729
JESUS RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
IBERIA LINEAS AEREAS DE ESPANA,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Hector M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya and Stahl, Circuit Judges,
and Woodlock,* District Judge.
Alberto Acevedo Colom on brief for appellant.
James D. Noel, III and McConnell Valdes on brief for
appellee.
December 9, 1996
*Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
Per Curiam. This appeal stems from a suit alleging
Per Curiam.
failure to pay proper overtime and other extraordinary
compensation in violation of both federal statutes and local law.
The plaintiff, Jesus Rafael Rodriguez Rodriguez (Rodriguez),
alleges that his former employer, Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espana
(Iberia), a commercial passenger airline, underpaid him during a
portion of the period in which he served as its traffic manger at
the Luis Munoz Marin International Airport in Carolina, Puerto
Rico. Iberia defended on the ground that the plaintiff's
position was "administrative" and-or "executive" in nature, and
therefore exempt from the statutory sweep.
The district court conducted a three-day bench trial
concerning Rodriguez's allegations. The court thereafter wrote a
carefully reasoned opinion in which it concluded that Iberia had
carried the devoir of persuasion in regard to the applicability
of the cited exemptions. See Rodriguez v. Iberia, 923 F. Supp.
304 (D.P.R. 1996). The court thereupon dismissed the complaint
with prejudice and entered judgment for the defendant. Rodriguez
appeals.
Having read the entire record and carefully considered
the parties' briefs, we find no basis to disturb the district
court's decision. Moreover, we have determined that oral
argument of this appeal would not advance the decisional process.
In the final analysis, we regard this as a suitable case in which
to act upon our previously stated belief that when "a trial court
has produced a first-rate work product, a reviewing tribunal
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should hesitate to wax longiloquent simply to hear its own words
resonate." In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 989
F.2d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 1993). Consequently, we affirm the
judgment for substantially the reasons elucidated in the opinion
below. We add only a brief comment.
Rodriguez rehashes the evidence and essentially asks
that we reweigh the facts de novo. Our proper office, however,
is much more circumscribed. Following a bench trial, an
appellate court is not warranted in rejecting the trial judge's
"findings of fact or conclusions drawn therefrom unless, on the
whole of the record, [the court of appeals] form[s] a strong,
unyielding belief that a mistake has been made." Cumpiano v.
Banco Santander P.R., 902 F.2d 148, 152 (1st Cir. 1990); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Contrary to Rodriguez's suggestion, this
paradigm applies full force to findings of fact concerning the
significance (or lack of significance) of documentary evidence.
See Reliance Steel Prods. Co. v. National Fire Ins. Co., 880 F.2d
575, 576 (1st Cir. 1989); RCI Northeast Servs. Div. v. Boston
Edison Co., 822 F.2d 199, 202-03 (1st Cir. 1987).
The clearly erroneous standard of review is
determinative of the outcome here. The record, read objectively,
does not yield a conviction that a mistake has been made. Thus,
clear error is clearly absent.
This does not mean, of course, that the case was open
and shut at the district court level. But once the trier found
the facts, the dynamics changed. Where, as here, the trial court
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has indulged no error of law and its conclusions following a
jury-waived trial are dependent upon its choices among
conflicting facts and its elections as to which inferences to
draw from the facts as found, appellate tribunals are not at
liberty to meddle. See Foster v. Dalton, 71 F.3d 52, 55 (1st
Cir. 1995); Irons v. FBI, 811 F.2d 681, 684 (1st Cir. 1987). Nor
do the appellant's criticisms of certain testimony suffice to tip
the balance; credibility calls are for the district court, not
for the court of appeals. See Anthony v. Sundlun, 952 F.2d 603,
606 (1st Cir. 1991).
We need go no further. The judgment of the district
court is summarily affirmed. See 1st Cir. R.27.1.
Affirmed.
Affirmed.
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