[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 96-1454
WILLIAM S. SIRES, JR.,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL V. FAIR, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Boudin and Lynch,
Circuit Judges.
William S. Sires, Jr. on brief pro se.
Nancy Ankers White, Special Assistant Attorney General, and
Charles M. Wyzanski, Senior Litigation Counsel, Massachusetts
Department of Correction, on Motion For Summary Disposition and
Memorandum Of Law for appellees.
February 10, 1997
Per Curiam. Appellant William Sires, an inmate in the
Massachusetts prison system, appeals a district court order
denying his motion to hold appellees in contempt for
violation of a previous court order requiring that they use
their best efforts to ensure that he receive proper medical
care while in prison. Sires further alleges the district
court erred in refusing to grant his request for discovery
and the subpoena of witnesses. Sires also appeals a court
order relieving his court appointed counsel of the duty of
further representing him and refusing to appoint new counsel.
Finally, Sires claims that the district court erred in
ordering him not to "file any additional motions without
prior authorization of this court." We affirm the district
court on all claims, except that of the injunction.
The district court in the instant case held a lengthy
hearing at which it heard testimony concerning the quality of
Sires' health care. It then made a factual finding,
supportable in the record, that, while that care had not been
"optimal," appellees had nevertheless made a good faith
effort to comply with the previous order. We have reviewed
the record carefully and find no abuse of discretion in the
court's denial of Sires' contempt motion.
Moreover, the record indicates that Sires suffered no
prejudice from the district court's failure to grant his
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request for the production of documents and the issuing of
subpoenas to witnesses.
Appointment of counsel in a civil proceeding is required
only in "exceptional circumstances." DesRosiers v. Moran,
949 F.2d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 1991). The record indicates that
the issues at the contempt hearing were not complex and that
Sires was well able to represent himself. Therefore, the
court did not abuse its discretion in relieving Sires' court
appointed counsel of the duty of further representation and
refusing to appoint new counsel.
In respect to the injunction, federal courts do "possess
discretionary powers to regulate the conduct of abusive
litigants." Cok v. Family Court of Rhode Island, 985 F.2d
32, 34 (1st Cir. 1993). Accordingly, "in extreme
circumstances involving groundless encroachment upon the
limited time and resources of the court and other parties, an
injunction barring a party from filing and processing
frivolous and vexatious [motions] may be appropriate."
Castro v. United States, 775 F.2d 399, 408 (1st Cir. 1984).
Nevertheless, any bar must be "narrowly tailored." Sires v.
Gabriel, 748 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir. 1984), lest it
"impermissibly infringe upon a litigator's right of access to
the courts," Castro, 775 F.2d at 410. Such an injunction
must "remain very much the exception to the general rule of
free access to the courts" and must be used with particular
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caution against a pro se plaintiff. Pavilonis v. King, 626
F.2d 1075, 1079 (1st Cir. 1980). This court reviews entry of
such injunctions for abuse of discretion. Id. at 408.
The injunction in this case is more problematic. Sires
was not "warned or otherwise given notice that filing
restrictions were contemplated," Cok, 985 F.2d at 35; he had
not been afforded "an opportunity to respond" before entry of
the injunction, see id.; and there was no request from the
defendants for such an order, see Pavilonis, 626 F.2d at 1079
("Generally, this kind of order should not be considered
absent a request by the harassed defendants."). While no one
of these factors, standing alone, would necessarily
invalidate the injunction, they are fatal here because it is
unclear that the record supports the injunction. Denial of
routine access to the courts is an "extreme" measure, and
"[l]itigiousness alone will not support [such] an
injunction." Id. Here, however, the district court made no
findings that Sires' filings had been frivolous, vexatious,
or otherwise of a type and kind that would justify injunctive
relief. Therefore, the fairest course here is to vacate the
injunction and remand the case for such further proceedings,
if any, as the district court desires to undertake.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
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