UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 96-2047
JAMES BENJAMIN, JR., M.D.,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
THE AROOSTOOK MEDICAL CENTER, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Morton A. Brody, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Cyr and Boudin,
Circuit Judges.
James Benjamin, Jr., M.D. on brief pro se.
Christopher D. Nyhan, Penny Littell, and Preti, Flaherty,
Beliveau & Pachios, LLC on brief for appellees.
May 9, 1997
Per Curiam. Appellant James Benjamin, Jr., M.D.
appeals from the decision of the district court granting
summary judgment to appellees, The Aroostook Medical Center
("TAMC") and various physicians associated with TAMC. After
carefully reviewing the record and the parties' briefs, we
affirm the district court's judgment for essentially the
reasons stated in its published opinion reported at Benjamin
v. Aroostook Med. Ctr., 937 F.Supp. 957 (D.Me. 1996). We add
the following comments.
1. Appellant's claim that the individual appellees
conspired to restrain trade in violation of 15 U.S.C. 1 is
analyzed under the "rule of reason." See Flegel v. Christian
Hosp., Northeast-Northwest, 4 F.3d 682, 686 (8th Cir. 1993)
(the courts of appeals usually review the denial or
revocation of hospital privileges, especially in cases
involving individual determinations of incompetence, under
the rule of reason) (citing cases). We agree that the
appellant did not make any showing of harm to competition,
either directly or by reasonable inference. Thus, summary
judgment was appropriate. See Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1435 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S.Ct. 515 (1995).
2. Because the facts upon which appellant bases his
claim of discrimination concerning his contract with TAMC
occurred after 1991, the claim is cognizable under 42 U.S.C.
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1981. See 1981(b). After reviewing the record and
appellant's arguments on appeal, however, we find that
appellant has failed to show that TAMC intentionally
discriminated against him based on his race. See Ayala-
Gerena v. Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 86, 95 (1st Cir.
1996).
3. Appellant's claim of malicious abuse of process
is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Under Maine law,
res judicata bars the relitigation of issues that were, or
could have been, decided in a prior case if: "(1) the same
parties or their privies are involved in both actions; (2) a
valid final judgment was entered in the prior action; and (3)
the matters present for decision now were, or might have
been, litigated in the prior action." Currier v. Cyr, 570
A.2d 1205, 1208 (Me. 1990).
In 1996, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, on
appeal from a lower court's decision adverse to appellant,
held that TAMC was immune from appellant's state law tort
claims concerning the peer review process. Benjamin v.
Aroostook Medical Ctr., Law Docket No. Aro-95-569 (Me.
November 14, 1996). In so holding, the court relied on the
federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C.
11101-11152, and the state Health Security Act, 24 M.R.S.A.
2501-2511. Appellant's claim in the case at hand,
although not precisely articulated, also centers on the peer
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review process -- i.e., the filing by TAMC of allegedly false
reports with the National Practitioner Data Bank and the
Maine State Medical Board.
Res judicata applies to the case at hand because
the parties to both the state and federal actions are the
same and the Supreme Judicial Court's decision is a valid
final judgment. Further, there is no reason why appellant
could not have litigated in the state action the claim he now
presents. The fact that the state action was premised on
state tort law while the federal case was based on the
Constitution does not matter. Currier, 570 A.2d at 1205.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
district court is affirmed.
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