United States v. Grant

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 96-1697

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

JONATHAN A. GRANT, II,

Defendant - Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge,

Boudin and Lynch, Circuit Judges.

Miriam Conrad, Federal Defender Office, for appellant.

Sheila W. Sawyer, Assistant United States Attorney, with

whom Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, was on brief for

appellee.

May 30, 1997

TORRUELLA, Chief Judge. On February 28, 1996,
TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.

Defendant-Appellant Jonathan Grant ("Grant") entered an

unconditional plea of guilty to four counts of being a felon in

possession of eleven different firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C.

922(g). Each count stated a different location or a different

time of possession of the relevant firearms. Count One charged

Grant with possessing three firearms "[o]n or about April 22,

1995, at Fairhaven, . . . Massachusetts." Count Two charged him

with possessing two firearms "[o]n or about April 26, 1995, at

Fairhaven, . . . Massachusetts." Count Three charged him with

possessing two firearms "[o]n or about April 26, 1995, at

Westport, . . . Massachusetts." Count Four charged him with

possessing four firearms "[o]n or about May 1, 1995, at Westport,

. . . Massachusetts."

At the May 31, 1996, sentencing hearing, the district

court determined that Grant was an Armed Career Criminal ("ACC")

under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. 924(e),

and accordingly imposed a minimum mandatory sentence of 15 years.

In the event that this court determined on appeal that the ACC

finding was erroneous, the district court imposed an alternative

sentence of a total of fifteen years, ten years for Counts One,

Two, and Three, to run concurrently, and five years for Count

Four, to run consecutively. As to the district court's first

ground, Grant contends that the district court erroneously held

that Grant's earlier Massachusetts conviction for carrying a

dangerous weapon constituted a violent felony under the ACCA.

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This allegedly erroneous finding provided the third conviction

necessary to deem Grant an ACC. Grant next contends that the

district court erred, on its alternative grounds, in enhancing

his offense level four levels under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(5) and

abused its discretion when it denied his request to conduct an

evidentiary hearing on disputed facts in the Pre-Sentencing

Report ("PSR"). Finally, Grant argues that the district court

violated his Double Jeopardy rights by imposing a consecutive

sentence on Count Four. Because we find that Grant's second and

third claims lack merit, and therefore affirm the district

court's alternative sentence, we need not reach Grant's ACC

argument.

BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND

In presenting the facts, we consult the uncontested

portions of the PSR, as well as the sentencing hearing

transcript. United States v. Lagasse, 87 F.3d 18, 20 (1st Cir.

1996).

Michael Rivera ("Rivera") agreed to buy guns for Grant,

in return for $50 for each gun purchased. Rivera purchased, on

Grant's behalf, a total of thirteen guns from licensed gun

dealers in Massachusetts. Rivera turned over all thirteen guns

to Grant, who paid over $6,400 in cash for the guns. Grant paid

Rivera $650 in cash for making the purchases.

A federal Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("ATF") agent,

who had received a tip about the purchases from a licensed

dealer, interviewed Rivera on May 11, 1995. Rivera agreed to

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cooperate with federal agents and, on June 2, 1995, introduced

Grant to an undercover agent. Grant indicated in a tape recorded

conversation with Rivera that he was interested in purchasing

five fully automatic Tec-9 firearms with attached silencers,

bulletproof vests, and a silencer for a .40-caliber Smith and

Wesson pistol that Rivera had purchased for him earlier. As part

of the sting operation, Rivera made arrangements with the

government agent to purchase these items for Grant. When Grant

was arrested by ATF agents at the sham sale, he was carrying the

.40-caliber firearm and $3,000 in cash.

DISCUSSION
DISCUSSION

I. Sentence enhancement
I. Sentence enhancement

Under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(5), the district court is to

impose a four-level enhancement

[i]f the defendant used or possessed any
firearm or ammunition in connection with
another felony offense; or possessed or
transferred any firearm or ammunition with
knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that
it would be used or possessed in connection
with another felony.

The district court found that this enhancement was warranted.

Grant contends that the district court abused its discretion when

it failed to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding contested

portions of the PSR, and that the Section 2K2.1(b)(5) enhancement

was unsupported by the remaining uncontested evidence.

A. Failure to hold an evidentiary hearing
A. Failure to hold an evidentiary hearing

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We review the district court's failure to hold an

evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. United States v.

Jim nez Mart nez, 83 F.3d 488, 498 (1st Cir. 1996).

Grant contested some of the facts contained in the PSR,

specifically facts derived from an ATF agent's grand jury

testimony regarding statements allegedly made by Rivera but that

were not contained in Rivera's grand jury testimony or in his

written statement to the ATF. These statements assert that the

purpose of Grant's firearms purchases was to "arm persons who

sold drugs for defendant in the greater New Bedford area." PSR

at 25. In the proceedings below, Grant sought an evidentiary

hearing into the factual basis for the agent's statements that

were not supported by Rivera's own testimony. Grant proffered to

the probation department and the sentencing court copies of

Rivera's written statement and cited to Rivera's grand jury

testimony;1 neither source, Grant argued, indicates Grant's

purpose in purchasing the weapons. Grant argued that the

1 Part of Rivera's testimony consisted of the following:

Q. Did he tell you what he intended to do
with the guns?

A. Yes. I think he was -- at one point, he
mentioned he was going to get rid of them to
his family members and to some friends.

Q. Were these individuals who sold drugs
with and for Grant?

A. Yes, the ones that I know of that he
mentioned.

Grand Jury Testimony of Michael Rivera at 9.

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"inconsistency" between the agent's testimony regarding Rivera's

statements and Rivera's own statements warranted resolution in an

evidentiary hearing.

Grant further contends on appeal that neither the

statements of Rivera nor those of the ATF agent were sufficiently

reliable for the district court to credit them in determining

Grant's knowledge or intent regarding the future use of the

firearms. Grant asserts that neither Rivera's statement nor

Rivera's testimony displayed sufficient knowledge of Grant's

state of mind to make the statements reliable for the purposes of

this enhancement.

He further asserts that the ATF agent's statements are

unreliable because they are nothing more than claims regarding an

informant's uncorroborated statements. Grant claims that the

rationale of this court's decision in United States v. Jim nez

Mart nez applies to his case. See Jim nez Mart nez, 83 F.3d at

494-95 (finding reliability concerns after the defendant made a

proffer contesting the reliability of an informant's statements

regarding the defendant's statements because the defendant and

the informant did not share a common language). Grant argues

that, just as the defendant's uncontested proffer in Jim nez

Mart nez sufficiently called into question the reliability of the

informant's statements, the ATF agent's statements were

sufficiently called into question by Rivera's statements and

testimony. The argument fails. There is no "inconsistency"

between the ATF agent's statements and Rivera's written statement

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and grand jury testimony -- the ATF agent's testimony regarding

statements made by Rivera in the context of the investigation is

consistent with the testimony provided by Rivera. Moreover, at

the end of his grand jury testimony, Rivera stated that he was

engaged in ongoing discussions with the ATF that encompassed

subjects beyond those to which he had testified.

More fundamentally, Grant made no proffer regarding any

possible, let alone relevant or material, evidence that would be

brought forward at an evidentiary hearing. Without a reason to

believe that any benefit would derive from convening an

evidentiary hearing, the district court surely did not abuse its

discretion in refusing Grant's request.

B. Failure to resolve factual disputes
B. Failure to resolve factual disputes

Prior to sentencing, Grant objected to various facts in

the PSR. Grant argues that the district court failed to comply

with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(1), which requires

a sentencing court that is presented with a factual dispute to

make either a finding on the allegation or a
determination that no finding is necessary
because the controverted matter will not be
taken into account in, or will not affect,
sentencing. A written record of these
findings and determinations must be appended
to any copy of the presentence report made
available to the Bureau of Prisons.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1). We have held that the strictures of

Rule 32(c)(1) bind the sentencing court to compliance. See

United States v. Bruckman, 874 F.2d 57, 64 (1st Cir. 1989)

(finding a violation of Rule 32[(c)(1)] when the district court

fails to make or append such findings); United States v. Hanono-

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Surujun, 914 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1990) (collecting cases). The

purposes of this rule are two-fold: (1) to protect "a

defendant's due process rights to be sentenced on the basis of

accurate information"; and (2) to provide "a clear record of the

disposition of controverted facts in the presentence report,

which, in turn, reduces the likelihood that subsequent appellate

or administrative decisions will be made based on improper or

incomplete information." Bruckman, 874 F.2d at 63-64.

With regard to the first concern, we have held,

however, that "a court may make implicit findings with regard to

sentencing matters." United States v. Ovalle-M rquez, 36 F.3d

212, 227 (1st Cir. 1994); accord United States v. Cruz, 981 F.2d

613, 619 (1st Cir. 1992) ("A court may make implicit findings on

disputed factual questions by accepting the government's

recommendations at the sentencing hearing." (internal quotations

omitted)). During the sentencing hearing, the court gave each

party the opportunity to discuss the basis for relying on the ATF

agent's testimony regarding what Rivera had told him when

Rivera's own words did not include the same statements. The

contested statements concerned Grant's alleged knowledge that he

was giving the firearms to individuals who would use them in

connection with a felony. After both parties were heard on the

statements of the ATF agent and the informant, the district court

ruled that Grant "had reason to believe that the weapons would be

used or possessed in connection with another felony offense."

Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 26. The court indicated in

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writing, as part of the judgment, that it "adopt[ed] the factual

findings . . . in the presentence report." We find this case

virtually indistinguishable from United States v. Savoie, 985

F.2d 612, 621 (1st Cir. 1993), which found, on similar, if not

identical, facts, that the sentencing court had implicitly ruled

that the contested statements were sufficiently reliable. Under

Savoie, the district court's ruling and written adoption of the

PSR amounts "necessarily [to a] finding against [Grant] on all

disputed matters of fact," id., that are the subject of this

appeal.

Moreover, although Grant objected to certain facts in

the PSR that stated he had the requisite knowledge, Grant did not

provide the sentencing court with evidence to rebut the factual

assertions that he was in charge of a drug operation in the New

Bedford area and that he intended to provide the firearms to

friends and family members in furtherance of their work in that

operation. Consequently, the court was justified in relying on

the contested facts. See United States v. Mir, 919 F.2d 940, 943

(5th Cir. 1990) (explaining that, although defendant objected to

facts contained in the PSR, his failure to present rebuttal

evidence to refute those facts left the district court free to

adopt the facts contained in the PSR without further inquiry),

cited in United States v. Morillo, 8 F.3d 864, 873 (1st Cir.

1993); United States v. Ruiz, 905 F.2d 499, 508 (1st Cir. 1990).

Having concluded that the court implicitly resolved

these factual disputes, we turn to the second concern implicated

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by Rule 32(c)(1), namely that a court's determination be appended

to the PSR. Although the district court implicitly resolved the

factual disputes, it failed to comply with Rule 32(c)(1)'s

mandate that the sentencing court append to the PSR either a

determination regarding the contested facts or a statement that

the contested facts were not considered in reaching the sentence.

Consequently, we remand to the sentencing court to allow it to

append its determination. Cruz, 981 F.2d at 619 (explaining

that, where the sentencing court merely fails to append its

findings, remanding without resentencing is appropriate); United

States v. Santana-Camacho, 931 F.2d 966, 969 (1st Cir. 1991)

(finding "technical" failure to append findings to PSR did not

entitle appellant to resentencing).

C. Support for the enhancement
C. Support for the enhancement

We review the sentencing court's interpretation of the

sentencing guidelines de novo and its factual conclusions, which

must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence, for clear

error. United States v. Ruiz, 105 F.3d 1492, 1504 (1st Cir.

1997). Having concluded that the district court was entitled to

rely on all of the facts provided in the PSR, we review its

imposition of the four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G.

2K2.1(b)(5) in light of the facts contained in the PSR.

The findings on which the sentencing court relied for

the four-level enhancement were supported by the factual

statements in the PSR and amply justify the enhancement. See

United States v. Van, 87 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996) ("In the

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absence of legal error, the district court's ruling will be

sustained so long as the information upon which it relied is

sufficient to support the findings under a clearly erroneous

standard."). According to the PSR, Grant was a drug dealer who

used friends and family members to distribute drugs. He

indicated to his "gopher" in the firearms transactions, Rivera,

that he needed the firearms to protect him and his associates in

connection with the drug operation. These facts alone support

the sentencing court's finding that Grant possessed or

transferred the firearms "with knowledge, intent, or reason to

believe that [they] would be used or possessed in connection with

another felony." U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(5). We find no error here.

II. Double Jeopardy challenge
II. Double Jeopardy challenge

The Double Jeopardy Clause states: "[N]or shall any

person for the same offense be twice put in jeopardy of life or

limb." U.S. Const. amend. V. In the context of sentencing, the

Double Jeopardy Clause bars a sentencing court from imposing

multiple punishments for the same offense. See Rutledge v.

United States, 116 S. Ct. 1241, 1245 (1996). Grant contends that

the imposition of consecutive sentences for four counts that

amounted to the same offense violates this principle. The

government responds that Grant waived any challenge to the

indictment on Double Jeopardy grounds by his plea agreement and

unconditional plea of guilty to all four counts in the

indictment. It argues in the alternative that if Grant is

permitted to pursue a Double Jeopardy challenge to his sentence,

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to prevail he must establish that the felon-in-possession charges

in the indictment were facially multiplicitous.

We reject the government's initial argument. The

caselaw establishes that a defendant may under certain

circumstances mount a Double Jeopardy challenge to a sentence

arising out of a conviction to which he pled guilty. United

States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 576 (1989); Menna v. New York, 423

U.S. 61, 63 n.2 (1975) (per curiam); Blackledge v. Perry, 417

U.S. 21 (1974). The government's focus here on the plea

agreement in addition to the plea itself does not advance the

argument or provide an exception to the general principle.

The government's alternative argument is correct.

Grant must show that the indictment was facially multiplicitous

to prevail on his Double Jeopardy challenge.

When a criminal defendant pleads guilty, he admits not

only that he committed the factual predicate underlying his

conviction, but also "'that he committed the crime charged

against him.'" Broce, 488 U.S. at 569 (quoting North Carolina v.

Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 32 (1970)). "Just as a defendant who pleads

guilty to a single count admits guilt to the specified offense,

so too does a defendant who pleads guilty to two counts with

facial allegations of distinct offenses concede that he has

committed two separate offenses." Id. at 570.

At the plea hearing, the district court repeatedly

directed Grant's attention to the fact that he had been charged

with four different crimes. See Transcript of Change of Plea

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Hearing, Feb. 28, 1996, at 6, 11. After being so apprised, Grant

entered an unconditional plea on each count. Having conceded the

facts in the indictment, he cannot now contend that the counts

constitute the same offense unless they are facially

multiplicitous.

Here, the facial allegations of the four counts

consisted of distinct offenses, charging Grant with the

possession of eleven different weapons in two separate cities on

three different dates. While it is true that Counts Two and

Three charge Grant with possession of certain weapons on the same

day, the two counts allege possession of different weapons in

different cities. Count Two alleges possession in Fairhaven of

two Glock semi-automatic pistols, and Count Three alleges

possession in Westport of another Glock semi-automatic pistol

(with a different serial number from either of the two other

Glocks) and a Ruger semi-automatic pistol. Grant's guilty plea

constituted an admission to each of the distinct factual

predicates underlying the separate counts and, consequently, the

plea "conceded guilt to [four] separate offenses." Broce, 488

U.S. at 571. The four counts being distinct from one another in

time, place, or both, and weapon possessed, they are not facially

multiplicitous.

Grant's efforts to dodge this conclusion are two-fold.

First, he contends that, because neither the PSR nor the plea

colloquy establish where Rivera turned the firearms over to

Grant, we must disregard the distinction between the reference in

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Counts One and Two to possession of different firearms in

Fairhaven and the reference in Counts Three and Four to

possession of other firearms in Westport. Because Grant's guilty

plea to all four counts conceded that his possession of the

different firearms took place in the locations alleged in each

count, however, no such showing was required.

Grant's second argument is that the sentencing court

found that the possession of these weapons amounted to a single

course of conduct. Accordingly, Grant reasons, the acts alleged

in the four separate counts constitute this single course of

conduct, making them the same offense for Double Jeopardy

purposes. Again, Grant's argument fails. First, Grant's claim

that the district court made a finding that his possession of

these firearms constituted a single scheme or course of conduct

is belied by the record. Second, the four separate counts simply

do not allege simultaneous possession.

The two multiple possession cases on which Grant

relies, United States v. Mullins, 698 F.2d 686, 687 (4th Cir.

1983), and United States v. Frankenberry, 696 F.2d 239, 245 (3d

Cir. 1982), are different from his situation in one dispositive

way. In those two cases, the defendants were tried on and

convicted of the multiple possession counts. Here, in contrast,

Grant pled guilty to each separate offense and thereby admitted

the factual predicates underlying the offense. He cannot now

argue that a factual issue remains regarding the location or time

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of his possession of these different firearms. See Broce, 488

U.S. at 569-71.

Based on the foregoing, we reject Grant's Double

Jeopardy challenge and affirm the district court's imposition of

a five year sentence on Count Four to run consecutively to the

concurrent ten year sentences imposed on Counts One, Two, and

Three.

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Grant's sentence
affirm

and remand to the district court to append to the PSR its
remand

findings regarding contested facts.

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