Ali v. Hubbard

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT No. 97-1047 YUSUF M. ALI, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. SHEILA HUBBARD, ET AL., Defendants, Appellees. [Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Judge] APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS Before Torruella, Chief Judge, Stahl and Lynch, Circuit Judges. Yusuf M. Ali on brief pro se. Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General and Susanne G. Levsen, Assistant Attorney General, on brief for appellees. Brian W. Brady and Gillespie & Associates on brief for appellees, John Chapman and Harry Collins. Roger H. Randall and Law Offices of Bruce R. Fox on brief for appellee Barbara Quinn. August 27, 1997 Per Curiam. Plaintiff/appellant Yusuf M. Ali appeals the dismissal of his federal civil rights claims arising out of the revocation of his parole in 1994. We affirm. Only one of Ali's claims merits extended discussion. Ali claims that defendant parole board members violated his right to due process when they failed to disclose to him, during his parole revocation hearing, the actual documents on which they based their decision. Assuming arguendo that such a failure to disclose is a violation of federal due process, see United States ex rel. Carson v. Taylor, 540 F.2d 1156, 1161-63 (2d Cir. 1976); see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (due process requires "disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him"), we nevertheless find that Ali's claim was properly dismissed. "[A] state prisoner's claim for damages [and declaratory relief] is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 if 'a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,' unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated." Edwards v. Balisok, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 1585 (1997) (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994)). This is true not only when the prisoner challenges the judgment as a substantive matter but also when he challenges "procedures . . . such as necessarily to imply the invalidity of the judgment." Id. at 1587. This -2- principle applies to prison disciplinary hearings, id., as well as to revocation and denials of parole, Butterfield v. Bail, 1997 WL 414250 (9th Cir. July 25, 1997) (denial of parole); Littles v. Board of Pardons and Paroles Div., 68 F.3d 122, 123 (5th cir. 1995) (revocation of parole); Schafer v. Moore, 46 F.3d 43, 44-45 (8th Cir. 1995) (denial of parole). Ali claims that, "because the evidence used by the hearing panel was withheld from him, . . . he was denied the opportunity to meet the case against him in a meaningful manner and was thus wrongfully condemned to reincarceration." Appellant's Brief at 12. Thus, a judgment in favor of Ali's due process claim would "necessarily imply the invalidity of [the revocation of his parole]." Heck 512 U.S. at 487; see also DeWitt v. Ventetoulo, 6 F.3d 32, 36-37 (1st Cir. 1993) (granting habeas relief to prisoner whose parole had been revoked in violation of due process), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1032 (1994). Since Ali has not shown that the revocation of his parole has been invalidated, his claim for monetary and declaratory relief must be dismissed. See Butterfield, 1997 WL 414250 (no cognizable claim under 1983 where prisoner alleged that defendants violated his due process rights in finding him ineligible parole on the basis of incorrect information); Stone-Bey v. Barnes, 1997 WL 409423 (7th Cir. July 22, 1997) (claim that due process rights of prisoner -3- were violated because record was devoid of evidence supporting disciplinary action barred by Balisok). As to Ali's other federal and state law claims, we affirm the dismissal essentially for the reasons given by the district court in its memorandum and order, dated January 26, 1996. Affirmed. -4-