[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 97-1370
MANUEL GONZALEZ-FIGUEROA, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Daniel R. Dominguez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Aldrich and Coffin, Senior Circuit Judges.
Jesus Hernandez Sanchez and Hernandez Sanchez Law Firm on
brief for appellants.
Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Guillermo Gil,
United States Attorney, Robert S. Greenspan and E. Roy Hawkens,
Attorneys, Appellate Staff, United States Department of Justice,
and Jacklyn L. Ringhausen, Associate Field Counsel, United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development, on brief for
appellee.
September 12, 1997
Per Curiam. The plaintiffs in this case, most of whom
Per Curiam.
are former employees of the Puerto Rico Public Housing
Administration (PRPHA), have been struggling since 1992 first to
block, and now to secure money damages for, the privatization of
certain aspects of the public housing program in Puerto Rico.1
Their current initiative represents an effort to obtain damages
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b),
2671-2680 (1994). When the United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) denied their timely administrative
claim, 28 U.S.C. 2675, the plaintiffs filed suit in the
district court and later amended their complaint. The government
responded by filing a motion for dismissal. On February 25,
1997, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs' amended
complaint for want of subject matter jurisdiction. See Gonzalez-
Figueroa v. United States, No. 94-2761, 1997 WL 117750 (D.P.R.
Feb. 25, 1997). This appeal ensued.
We have carefully read the parties' briefs, evaluated
their legal arguments, and studied the papers in the case. We
conclude, on whole-record review, that this is a suitable case in
which to act upon our long-held belief that "when a lower court
produces a comprehensive, well-reasoned decision, an appellate
court should refrain from writing at length to no other end than
to hear its own words resonate." Lawton v. State Mut. Life
Assur. Co. of Am., 101 F.3d 218, 220 (1st Cir. 1996); accord In
1The underlying facts are limned in an earlier opinion of
this court. See Acevedo-Villalobos v. Hernandez, 22 F.3d 384,
385 (1st Cir. 1994).
2
re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 989 F.2d 36, 38 (1st
Cir. 1993). Hence, we affirm the judgment for substantially the
reasons set forth in the lower court's discussion of the
discretionary function exception to the FTCA. See Gonzalez-
Figueroa, 1997 WL 117750, at *5-7. We add only a small coda.
It is not our role to pass judgment upon the wisdom (or
lack of wisdom) of the housing policies which PRPHA and HUD have
decided to follow. Rather, our role, in the context of this
appeal, is to determine only whether HUD (the federal agency
involved) had the statutory authority to enter into the
challenged agreement with PRPHA and whether it acted within the
realm of its discretion when it exercised that authority. See
Magee v. United States, No. 96-2357, 1997 WL 419551, at *3 (1st
Cir. July 31, 1997). Because these questions must be answered in
the affirmative,2 for the reasons already elucidated by the court
below, the FTCA's discretionary function exception, 28 U.S.C.
2680(a), bars the maintenance of the plaintiffs' action. See
Magee, 1997 WL 419551, at *3. After all, a complaint under the
FTCA cannot survive a motion to dismiss if it alleges only the
sort of statutory conduct that is plainly grounded in the policy
imperatives of an applicable regulatory regime. See United
States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 324-25 (1991); Berkovitz v.
2We have considered and rejected, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, the plaintiffs' argument that, under 42 U.S.C.
1437d(j)(3)(A), the Secretary of HUD was required to declare
PRPHA in "substantial default" before entering into an agreement
that permits privatization. The text of the statute simply will
not bear the weight that the plaintiffs load upon it.
3
United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-37, (1988); United States v.
Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984).
In any event, as the district court also recognized,
Gonzalez-Figueroa, 1997 WL 117750, at *4, the absence of a
comparable cause of action against a private individual precludes
FTCA liability here.
We need go no further. The judgment below is summarily
affirmed. See 1st Cir. R. 27.1.
Affirmed. No Costs.
Affirmed. No Costs.
4