Rivera v. Social Security

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT] United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit No. 98-1377 VICTOR A. RIVERA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant, Appellee. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO [Hon. Salvador E. Casellas, U.S. District Judge] Before Torruella, Chief Judge, Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges. Melba N. Rivera-Camacho and Melba N. Rivera Camacho & Assocs.on brief for appellant. Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Lilliam Mendoza-Torro, Assistant U.S. Attorney and Wayne G. Lewis, Assistant Regional Counsel on brief for appellee. December 9, 1998 Per Curiam. After carefully considering the full record and the parties' briefs, we agree that there was substantial evidence to support the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security that claimant's back condition, emotional impairment, and diabetes did not render claimant disabled prior the date he (claimant) reached 60 years of age. The judgment of the district court in regard to these conditions is therefore affirmed for essentially the reasons stated in the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation which was adopted by the district court on January 22, 1998. We reach a different conclusion in relation to the carpal tunnel syndrome. Where, as here, sedentary work is involved, "good use of the hands and fingers" is required. See Heggarty v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 990, 996 (1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining that claimant's carpal tunnel syndrome did not result in any significant manipulative limitations, the only medical evidence before the administrative law judge (ALJ) was the diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome, the test report confirming the diagnosis, and the observation that claimant had lost strength in his left hand. The physicians who reported on the carpal tunnel syndrome, however, did not apply their findings to any vocational criteria as required by the regulations. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1513(b) and (c) (medical reports should include "[a] statement about what you can still -2- do despite your impairment(s)," including a statement about the ability to do work-related activities such as "handling objects"). Thus, the ALJ was confronted with only "raw medical data." We have held that, as a lay factfinder, an ALJ lacks sufficient expertise to interpret such data. See Rivera- Figueroa v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 858 F.2d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 1988) (per curiam); Berrios v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 796 F.2d 574, 576 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (a lay person such an ALJ is not competent to interpret "raw, technical medical data"). Given this state of the record, the evidence, at the least, is ambiguous regarding the disabling effects of the carpal tunnel syndrome. One question, for example, is whether the carpal tunnel syndrome precluded any sedentary work claimant could do i.e., whether claimant was disabled prior to the date he turned 60. Since (1) the burden is on the Commissioner at step five of the sequential process, (2) claimant was not represented at the hearing by an attorney, (3) the claim regarding the carpal tunnel syndrome "itself seems on its face to be substantial," and (4) there are significant gaps in the record, a remand is required for the Commissioner to obtain further evidence. See Heggarty, 947 F.2d at 997-98. Such evidence should include a consultation with an MA for the purpose of having the MA interpret the medical data in lay terms. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 408 (1971) (approving the use of medical advisors "in complex cases for explanation of medical problems in terms understandable to the layman-examiner"). Only after obtaining such information can a decision regarding the extent of claimant's disability, if any, be made. The judgment of the district court is vacated only in relation to the carpal tunnel syndrome, and the matter is remanded with directions to remand to the Secretary for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.