Rondeau v. State of NH

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT] United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit No. 98-1802 KEVIN R. RONDEAU, Individually and as Father and Next Friend o/b/o Sarah Ann Rondeau, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET AL., Defendants, Appellees. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE [Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge] Before Torruella, Chief Judge, Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, and Lipez, Circuit Judge. Kevin R. Rondeau on brief pro se. FEBRUARY 26, 1999 Per Curiam. We have carefully reviewed the brief filed by appellant, Kevin Rondeau, and the record on appeal. We reject, as insubstantial, Rondeau's complaints about the accuracy of the factual background of the underlying matter, as recited by the magistrate-judge in his report and recommendation. We affirm essentially for the reasons stated in that report and recommendation, dated June 11, 1998, that was approved by the district court in a judgment, entered on June 25, 1998. We have considered all of Rondeau's arguments on appeal and find no need to address them in detail. We add only the following comment. Rondeau complains that the magistrate-judge and the district court wrongfully treated his complaint as a prisoner filing, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915A. Although Rondeau concedes that he is incarcerated at the New Hampshire State Hospital, he argues that he is not a "prisoner" within the meaning of 1915A because, he says, contrary to the magistrate-judge's contention, the criminal charges are not pending, but rather the charges have been dismissed. We note that Rondeau has been unclear and inconsistent in his own description of the status of the criminal charges. In a previous habeas action, Rondeau initially claimed that he had been convicted of the charges and then claimed that, rather than his having been convicted of the charges, the charges had been dismissed. In the instant civil rights action, Rondeau variously claimed that (i) the charges were dismissed or (ii) the charges were dismissed, reinstated, and then "never adjudicated in court." Whether "never adjudicated in court" means that the charges were dismissed again or simply deferred because of Rondeau's civil commitment to the State Hospital is not clear. However, regardless whether Rondeau is a prisoner for purposes of 1915A, a complaint filed by a non-prisoner may be dismissed pursuant to 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) if it fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See, e.g., McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir. 1997); Bell v. Dobbs Int'l Serv., 6 F. Supp. 2d 863, 864 (E.D. Mo. 1998); Powell v. Hoover, 956 F. Supp. 564, 566 (M.D. Pa. 1997). A dismissal under 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted entails the same analysis as a dismissal under 1915(A) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d at 604. Although the magistrate-judge cited 1915A, we can affirm on any basis supported by the record. See Helveringv. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937); Willhauck v. Halpin, 953 F.2d 689, 704 (1st Cir. 1991). The court's conclusion that certain of Rondeau's claims stated no claim upon which relief may be granted is correct, even if the recited basis, i.e., 1915(A), is inaccurate. The court's conclusion that the remaining claims were subject to dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or because they were not properly brought as claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 is likewise correct. The motion for an evidentiary hearing is denied. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.