United States v. Hernandez-Rosario

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT] United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit No. 98-2267 UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. RAFAEL HERNANDEZ-ROSARIO, Defendant, Appellant. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO [Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge] Before Torruella, Chief Judge, Stahl and Lipez, Circuit Judges. Olga M. Shepard on brief for appellant. Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Jorge E. Vega-Pacheco, Assistant United States Attorney, and Camille Velez-Rive, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee. November 4, 1999 Per Curiam. Rafael Hernandez-Rosario appeals from his sentence. He pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and received the statutory mandatory minimum sentence of ten years. Hernandez' argument on appeal is that the district court erred in refusing to grant him the benefit of the "safety valve" provision of 18 U.S.C. 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. 5C1.2. On the third day of sentencing hearings in this case, after hearing testimony from and questioning Hernandez and the Police Agent who had arrested him, the district court found that Hernandez had failed to meet the fifth requirement of the "safety valve" provision: to truthfully provide the government with all information and evidence that defendant has concerning the offense and related offenses. See 18 U.S.C. 3553(f)(5). Specifically, the sentencing judge found that "the testimony of defendant Hernandez Rosario concerning the events surrounding the commission of the [offense], was not credible." This court "reviews for clear error the factual findings relating to whether a defendant has qualified for the 'safety valve' provisions." United States v. White, 199 F.3d 70, 73 n.6 (1st Cir. 1997). The burden is on the defendant to prove entitlement to the benefit of the "safety valve" provision. See United States v. Montanez, 82 F.3d 520, 521 (1st Cir. 1996). The district court did not clearly err in determining that Hernandez did not meet that burden. The judge's finding that Hernandez did not truthfully recount the events surrounding the offense is amply supported by the record. The testimony of Police Agent Juan Carreras, who arrested Hernandez at the airport, was directly contradictory to the testimony of Hernandez with respect to two important facts: whether Hernandez was alone when he crossed through the checkpoint and whether he had luggage with him at that time. The investigation report prepared by another police agent on the day of arrest and testimony by a third police agent who was present at the airport during the arrest are consistent with Agent Carreras' version of the facts. Hernandez' reliance upon United States v. Miranda- Santiago, 96 F.3d 517 (1st Cir. 1996), is misplaced. There, we remanded for the district court to revisit the issue of application of the "safety valve" provision where the court had rested its decision on a "bare conclusion" that defendant had failed to cooperate fully, "absent either specific factual findings or easily recognizable support in the record."Id. at 529-30. Here, by contrast, the district court heard testimony from and closely questioned Hernandez and Agent Carreras before making a specific factual finding that Hernandez had not told the truth about the events surrounding his offense. There was no clear error. See White, 119 F.3d at 74 (affirming sentence and refusal to grant benefit of "safety valve" provision where "district court, based on extensive evidence and after vigorous argumentation by counsel, made the carefully considered determination that White lacked credibility"). Hernandez argues that his rights under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. 3500 et seq., were violated because the district court refused his request to cross-examine Agent Carreras a second time for the purpose of using the arrest report to impeach his testimony at the sentencing hearing. The impeachment argument is that because important details included in Agent Carreras' testimony were omitted from the perfunctory arrest report prepared by him, the details must have been fabricated. On the basis of that impeachment evidence, Hernandez asks this court to vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing without regard to the statutory mandatory minimum sentence. In light of the record as a whole, which includes an investigation report prepared on the day of the arrest and testimony of another police agent present at the airport at the time of the arrest, we conclude that the impeachment value of the arrest report is minimal. We need not decide whether the district court erred in denying Hernandez' request to cross- examine Agent Carreras for a second time because any such error was harmless. The sentence is affirmed. See Loc. R. 27(c) (formerly Loc. R. 27.1).