Garcia-Morales v. ICPR Junior College

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT] United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit No. 97-2422 IDANIS GARCIA MORALES; EDGAR RAFAEL RIVERA DE JESUS; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP RIVERA GARCIA, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. INSTITUTO COMERCIAL DE PUERTO RICO JUNIOR COLLEGE; ANGEL CURBELO, Defendants, Appellees. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO [Hon. Daniel R. Domnguez, U.S. District Judge] Before Selya, Circuit Judge, Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, and Lipez, Circuit Judge. Jesus R. Rabell Mendez and Rossello, Rabell & Salicrup on brief for appellants. Luis N. Blanco Matos on brief for appellees. January 31, 2000 Per Curiam. Plaintiffs appeal from the district court's denial of Rule 60(b) relief from a judgment dismissing plaintiff's employment discrimination claim "without prejudice" for failure to prosecute, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). At the time that plaintiffs filed their Rule 60(b) motion, they had refiled their federal claims in a second suit before the district court, and a motion to dismiss the claims as untimely was pending. Subsequently, the district court did dismiss plaintiffs' second complaint on the grounds that the statute of limitations on the federal claims had already run when the first complaint was dismissed and that the filing of the first complaint had not tolled the limitations period. "Although our case law gives the district court broad discretion to dismiss a case to further its case management responsibilities, disposition on the merits is favored and we repeatedly have held that a case should not be dismissed with prejudice except 'when a plaintiff's misconduct is especially egregious or extreme.'" Ortiz-Anglada v. Ortiz-Perez, 183 F.3d 65, 66 (1st Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Here, the district court dismissed without prejudice and, in refusing to reinstate two weeks later, gave as one of its two reasons the fact that the dismissal was without prejudice, i.e., that the dismissal allowed plaintiffs to refile. Yet later, when it was brought to the court's attention that the running of the statute of limitations could effectively convert the dismissal without prejudice to one with prejudice, the court denied Rule 60(b) relief without further explanation. "Our review of the denial of a motion under Rule 60(b) is for abuse of discretion. Our review is limited to the denial of the 60(b) motion, not the merits of the underlying judgment. We will find an abuse of discretion only when we are left with a definite and firm conviction that the lower court committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached when weighing all the relevant factors." Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 891 (1st Cir. 1997). The district court failed to set forth its reasons for denying the Rule 60(b) motion, stating only that the motion was "denied." This failure hampers our review of the district court's denial in these circumstances, where the reasons for denial are less than obvious. Instead of this court second guessing the reasons for the district court's refusal to vacate the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, it is preferable that the district court articulate its reasons. "A district court, which has direct and continuous contact with attorneys, is best able to judge in the first instance whether an attorney's misconduct is sufficiently egregious to warrant the 'death knell' of a lawsuit, or whether some lesser sanction would be more appropriate." Estate of Solis-Rivera v. United States, 993 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993); cf. Velazquez-Rivera v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 920 F.2d 1072, 1079 (1st Cir. 1990) (explaining benefits of district court's setting forth in writing its reasons for invoking the severest sanction of dismissal). Where a dismissal without prejudice is effectively converted to a dismissal with prejudice, as it was in this case by the running of the statute of limitations, this court has indicated that it may be appropriate for the district court to revisit the issue. See Estate of Solis-Rivera, 993 F.2d at 3 (remanding to district judge "to allow him to decide whether, given the surfacing of the statute of limitations problem, he wishes to give plaintiffs a further chance by allowing the present action to proceed"); Hilton International Co. v. Union de Trabajadores de la Industria Gastronomica de Puerto Rico, 833 F.2d 10, 11 (1st Cir. 1987) (indicating that where district court's intent to dismiss complaint without prejudice was thwarted by running of statute of limitations, "plaintiff's remedy was to go back for a revision"). There was no ruling on the statute of limitations issue at the time that the district court denied plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) motion. Now that the ruling on the statute of limitations issue has converted the district court's dismissal without prejudice into a dismissal with prejudice, the district court should have an opportunity to revisit the request for Rule 60(b) relief in light of the changed circumstances. In ruling on the motion, whether granting it or confirming its denial, the district court should articulate the reasons for its action. The district court's endorsed order dated October 20, 1997, denying plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) motion is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance herewith.