UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-50594
FRANK GUERRERO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
ANTONIO TORRES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(SA-96-CV-159)
January 18, 2000
Before KING, Chief Judge, DUHÉ and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
Frank Guerrero (“Guerrero”) sued several corrections officers,
including Antonio Torres (“Torres”), at the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”), Institutional Division, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983"). Guerrero alleged that corrections
officers used excessive force against him on two occasions in
December 1995. He sued for monetary and injunctive relief, and
accused the officers of due process violations, excessive force,
retaliation, denial of access to the court, assault and battery,
threats of terror, and violations of TDCJ use of force policy.
A jury found Torres liable under Section 1983 for excessive
1
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
force, and assault and battery. It acquitted the other officers.
The jury awarded Guerrero compensatory damages of one dollar.
The district court award Guerrero an attorney's fee of
$11,737.50 and costs of $81.25 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(“Section 1988"). The court concluded that the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (“Section 1997e(d)”), did
not apply retroactively to Guerrero's claim, which he filed prior
to the PLRA's enactment. Section 1977e(d)(2) of the PLRA limits an
attorney's fee award to 150 percent of the judgment. The district
court also determined that Guerrero's recovery of fees should not
be denied or limited even though he achieved only a minimal
monetary victory. We vacate and remand in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 119 S.Ct. 1998,
144 L.Ed.2d 347 (1999)2, focusing on the retroactive application of
PLRA Section 1997e(d).
The Court in Hadix3 held that under Section 1997e(d) the PLRA
limits “attorney's fees with respect to postjudgment monitoring
services performed after the PLRA's effective date but it does not
so limit fees for postjudgment monitoring performed before the
effective date.” Hadix, 119 S.Ct. at 2001. In this case, Guerrero
commenced his lawsuit on February 12, 1996, and filed his
complaint, upon approval of his petition to proceed in forma
pauperis, on March 18, 1996. The court appointed his attorney the
2
Decided after the district court ruled in this matter.
3
A class action requiring post judgment monitoring of
compliance.
2
following day. The PLRA was enacted on April 26, 1996.
The district court noted that a majority of counsel's fees
were generated after the PLRA's enactment. Therefore, we find that
the district court must apply the PLRA to all work by counsel after
April 26, 1996. The district court must apply the traditional
lodestar analysis to work completed by counsel prior to the PLRA's
enactment. Appellant contends the district court committed clear
error when calculating the lodestar fee. Under the facts of this
case, we decline to review the district court's basis for the fee
award.
Appellant also contends that the district court abused its
discretion by awarding any attorney's fees because the jury awarded
Guerrero only one dollar in compensatory damages. See Farrar v.
Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (The
Court affirmed a denial attorney's fees under Section 1988 where
plaintiff sought $17 million in damages pursuant to Section 1983
but received only one dollar.) The Court in Farrar noted that
“[w]hen a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his
failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary
relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” Id. at
115 (internal citations omitted).
Nevertheless, we have said that attorney's fees may be
warranted in some instances even though the plaintiff has received
only nominal relief. Riley v. City of Jackson, 99 F.3d 757, 760
(5th Cir. 1996) (commenting that a nominal recovery “may very well
not derogate from the importance of the victory”). We find that
3
this is such a case. As the district court noted in distinguishing
Farrar and relying on Riley, “[the jury's] verdict sent a message
to Torres and to the Texas Prison System that the unjustified use
of force, even when a prisoner is not severely injured, is
intolerable in a civilized society.”
VACATED and REMANDED.
4