IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-60318
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ISAAC COLEMAN, also known as Ike,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
(97-CR-150)
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January 21, 2000
Before POLITZ, JONES, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Defendant-Appellant Isaac Coleman argues that because (1) he
was not aware that he was being stopped by law enforcement
officials and (2) he did not assault the officers with the intent
to create a substantial risk of harm to them, the district court
erred at sentencing in increasing his offense level pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(b).
The preponderance of the evidence presented at sentencing and
in the presentence report (PSR) reflects that Coleman was stopped
by officers wearing clothing identifying them as policemen and that
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
the officers made their official status known to Coleman as they
approached his vehicle. Additionally, Coleman’s subsequent conduct
of abandoning his vehicle and not reporting the incident to the
police further indicated that he was aware that he was being
pursued by law enforcement officers.
The preponderance of the evidence also reflects that Coleman
struck one of the officers causing him injury, and that Coleman
recklessly operated his vehicle in a manner which subjected all the
officers present to a substantial risk of bodily harm. See §
3A1.2, comment. (n.5, n.6). The district court’s imposition of the
enhancement under § 3A1.2(b) was a correct application of the
guidelines and its factual findings were not clearly erroneous.
See United States v. Montoya-Ortiz, 7 F.3d 1171, 1179 (5th Cir.
1993).
Coleman also argues that the district court erred in
increasing his offense level pursuant to § 2D1.1(b)(1) for
possession of a weapon. The preponderance of the evidence shows
that the weapon was found in Coleman’s bedroom in the house where
he had conducted a drug transaction with a confidential informant.
Also, large amounts of drugs and drug paraphernalia were found in
the house. The cash given to Coleman by the confidential informant
was discovered in close proximity to the gun. The evidence did not
reflect that it was clearly improbable that the weapon was
connected to the drug-trafficking offense. The district court was
correct in making the adjustment under § 2D1.1(b)(1). See §
2
2D1.1(b)(1), comment. (n.3); United States v. Mitchell, 31 F.3d
271, 277 (5th Cir. 1994).
Coleman further argues that the district court plainly erred
at sentencing in determining the amount and type of drugs
attributable to him. Coleman did not make these objections in the
district court and, thus, this issue is subject to review for plain
error only. United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162 (5th Cir.
1994) (en banc). As this is a challenge to the district court’s
factual findings and the sentence imposed on Coleman was within the
statutory range, his claim does not rise to the level of plain
error. See Robertson v. Plano City of Texas, 70 F.3d 21, 23 (5th
Cir. 1995).
Finally, Coleman argues that the district court plainly erred
in failing to advise him at the time of his guilty plea that he was
subject to an enhanced sentence under the guidelines. The district
court advised Coleman of the mandatory minimum and the maximum
penalty that he could receive. Coleman was also advised that the
Sentencing Guidelines would be considered at sentencing. The
district court’s advice was sufficient under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11
and did not constitute plain error.
Coleman’s conviction and sentence are
AFFIRMED.
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