Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp.

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
____________________
No. 99-1789

NILSA SANTIAGO-RAMOS,

Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.

CENTENNIAL P.R. WIRELESS CORP.;
ABC INSURANCE CO.,

Defendants, Appellees.

____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Salvador E. Casellas, U.S. District Judge]
[Hon. Jesús A. Castellanos, U.S. Magistrate Judge]

____________________

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge,

Campbell and Wallace,* Senior Circuit Judges.
_____________________

Judith Berkan, with whom Mary Jo Méndez and Berkan/Méndez were
on brief, for appellant.
Marshal D. Morgan, with whom Edwin J. Seda-Fernández, Isabel
Abislaiman and Axtmayer Adsuar Muñiz & Goyco, P.S.C. were on brief,
for appellee Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp.

____________________

July 6, 2000
____________________

*
Of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
 WALLACE, Circuit Judge. Nilsa Santiago-Ramos sued her

former employer, Centennial P.R. Wireless Corporation (Centennial),

for sex discrimination and retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the

1964 Civil Rights Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII), and

for violations of Puerto Rico law. A magistrate judge, sitting by

consent of the parties, entered summary judgment for Centennial.

The district court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331, and we have jurisdiction over this timely appeal pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and

remand.

I

Our review of the record is in a light most favorable to
the party opposing summary judgment. Dávila-Pérez v. Lockheed

Martin Corp., 202 F.3d 464, 466 (1st Cir. 2000).
Centennial, a subsidiary of New Jersey-based Centennial
Cellular Corp. (parent company), is a telecommunications business

that began operations in Puerto Rico in early 1996. Amaury Rivera,
Centennial's vice president and general manager, and Thomas Bucks,
chief financial officer and comptroller of the parent company,
interviewed Santiago-Ramos for a position as Centennial's director

of finance and administration. Rivera gave Santiago-Ramos a

written job offer dated June 12, 1996, which she accepted and

returned as requested. Santiago-Ramos was chosen over two male

applicants and received several work assignments before formally

beginning work on July 1, 1996. She also signed a 90-day

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probationary contract dated July 1, but she disputes that the

probationary contract is valid.

Santiago-Ramos was the only female among Centennial's
four high-level executives. She was responsible for Centennial's

finance, certain personnel matters (including oversight

responsibility for the drafting and implementation of an employee
manual), and some inventory assignments. Because Centennial was

beginning operations in Puerto Rico, all employees'

responsibilities were somewhat fluid and all were expected to work

more than the normal 40-hour work week. Santiago-Ramos reported

directly to Rivera in Puerto Rico and to Bucks at the parent

company. Phil Mayberry, the parent company's senior vice president

for Puerto Rico operations, was Rivera's direct supervisor and
oversaw all Puerto Rico operations from his parent company office.

At the time she worked for Centennial, Santiago-Ramos had

one child and planned to have another child within several years.
After beginning work, she was directly asked about her ability to

balance work and family obligations. In one instance, Rivera asked

Santiago-Ramos whether it was possible for her to handle

simultaneously her job, child care, and marital responsibilities.

Several times, he questioned how her husband was managing,

considering she was not home to cook for him. The questions were

not asked only by Rivera: two weeks before she was dismissed,

Mayberry asked Santiago-Ramos how well her work was proceeding in

light of her child. She responded that her work was going well and

that she planned to have a second child within several years.

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Mayberry stated that having another child was a lot of work, and he

questioned whether Santiago-Ramos could perform her job effectively

after having a second child. She responded that she would be able
to meet both work and family obligations. Santiago-Ramos sensed

that Mayberry disliked her response.

Another incident directly involved Santiago-Ramos,
Rivera, and Mayberry. During Santiago-Ramos' tenure at Centennial,

the company planned a major job fair at which a large number of

employees would be hired. In preparation for the event, Rivera met

with Santiago-Ramos and an advertising consultant. Rivera

discussed a profile he drafted identifying the people the company

was and was not interested in hiring. The profile purportedly

excluded from consideration as Centennial employees older persons
with heavy non-work commitments, married women, and women with

children. Rivera told Santiago-Ramos that the profile was "nothing

personal against you," but that he preferred unmarried, childless
women because they would give 150% to the job. Later in this

meeting, Rivera telephoned Mayberry, read the profile to him, and

Mayberry approved it. Santiago-Ramos told Rivera that she opposed

the profile, stating it was discriminatory. However, she never

reported her objection to Mayberry or any other parent company

representative. She did not actually see the profile, and

questions regarding marriage and children were not included on the

interview questionnaire used at the job fair.

Nor were these the only comments made by Rivera and

Mayberry concerning women employees and pregnancy. For instance,

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Rivera allowed Santiago-Ramos to choose his new secretary.

Santiago-Ramos hired Toni Mejías, a mother of two. When Rivera

later discovered that Mejías had two children, he questioned
Santiago-Ramos about whether her choice was a good one. On another

occasion, Mayberry and a number of employees from the parent

company visited Puerto Rico to assist in the Centennial job fair.
Upon noticing that Santiago-Ramos was speaking with another female

employee, Mayberry called out to nearby male employees, "guys watch

out with the females, next thing we know they will be running the

company." Also, Mejías heard Mayberry state that he did not like

women with children working at Centennial. Other evidence puts

Mayberry's comments in perspective: Bucks testified in a

deposition that it did not surprise him that Mayberry questioned
whether women with children could fulfill work responsibilities,

and Rivera referred to Mayberry as a "big time machista."

Mayberry and Rivera were not the only Centennial and
parent company employees who made comments about women, work, and

children. We relate several instances by way of illustration. Two

employees in Santiago-Ramos' department stated that a secretary at

Centennial who was on maternity leave should not have become

pregnant so soon after joining the company and that she would most

likely be fired as a result. These same employees told Santiago-

Ramos and Mejías separately that they should not get pregnant or

they would be fired. On a trip Santiago-Ramos took for training at

the parent company, one of the parent company's directors

complained to Santiago-Ramos that his secretary stopped working

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late after having children, and "that is what happens when we hire

females in the child-bearing years." A parent company employee,

who came to Puerto Rico to assist with the job fair, told Santiago-
Ramos that he was "in the interviewing mood," and asked her in

front of a number of other employees how long she had been married,

how many children she had, and what their ages were.
During her three months' employment at Centennial,

several problems occurred that Centennial, at least partially,

attributes to her. First, when a shipment of 500 telephones

crucial to Centennial's telecommunications operations arrived, five

telephones, with a combined value of $2000, were missing.

Santiago-Ramos had inventory responsibility over this shipment, and

that these units were missing was not discovered until several days
after the telephones arrived. Second, Centennial incurred

demurrage charges on a shipment containing communications towers

because they were picked up at the San Juan docks late. However,
Santiago-Ramos denies that she was responsible for ensuring that

the towers were properly received. Third, electrical service was

cut off at several Centennial locations because utility bills were

unpaid. Santiago-Ramos was responsible to pay these bills, and

Centennial bore reconnect charges to restore power. Fourth, the

Centennial employee manual, over which Santiago-Ramos had ultimate

oversight responsibility, was not completed during her employment.

Because Centennial was a start-up company, its employees

were under constant evaluation. Nevertheless, neither Bucks nor

Rivera ever told Santiago-Ramos that her work was unsatisfactory.

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When Santiago-Ramos came to the parent company for training two

weeks before her dismissal, Mayberry stated that he had no

intention of firing her. Rivera reported that up to the day
Mayberry instructed him to do so, he also had no intention of

firing her.

On September 27, 1996, Santiago-Ramos' 89th day of
employment with Centennial, Mayberry told Rivera to dismiss her.

Rivera did so without providing Santiago-Ramos an explanation. The

events leading up to that decision are not entirely clear. For

instance, Bucks testified in his deposition that he, Rivera, and

Mayberry jointly discussed Santiago-Ramos' employment during the

preceding week and collectively agreed that her employment should

be terminated. Mayberry stated that he discussed firing Santiago-
Ramos and his rationale for doing so several times with Rivera.

However, Rivera recalls only one conversation, held the day

Mayberry told him to fire Santiago-Ramos. The record contains a
memorandum Rivera wrote dated September 27, 1996, stating that

Santiago-Ramos was dismissed and identifying four reasons for doing

so; however, Mejías, who typed the memorandum from Rivera's

dictation, testified in a deposition that the memorandum was not

prepared on September 27, and was only written after Santiago-Ramos

initiated legal proceedings against Centennial. It is clear,

however, that Santiago-Ramos' responsibilities were assumed by

other employees.

Santiago-Ramos filed this action and, after extensive

discovery, Centennial moved for summary judgment. Santiago-Ramos

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moved for partial summary judgment on several of her Puerto Rico

law claims. The magistrate judge granted Centennial's motion for

summary judgment, denied Santiago-Ramos' motion for partial summary
judgment, refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

Puerto Rico law claims, and entered judgment for Centennial.

II

The parties dispute whether the magistrate judge properly

applied the summary judgment standard. "We review summary judgment

de novo, viewing the entire record in the light most hospitable to

the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable
inferences in that party's favor." Dávila-Pérez, 202 F.3d at 466

(internal quotations and citations omitted). Summary judgment is
appropriate only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact" and "the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter

of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "A dispute is genuine if the
evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could
resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party. A fact is

material if it carries with it the potential to affect the outcome
of the suit under the applicable law." Sánchez v. Alvarado, 101

F.3d 223, 227 (1st Cir. 1996) (internal quotations and citations

omitted).
The moving party "bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "Once the

-8-
moving party has properly supported [its] motion for summary

judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, with respect to

each issue on which [it] has the burden of proof, to demonstrate
that a trier of fact reasonably could find in [its] favor."

DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir. 1997), citing

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-25. In opposing summary judgment, the
nonmoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials

of [the] pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue" of material fact as to each issue upon

which he or she would bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986) (internal

quotations, citation, and alteration omitted).

We address one other issue before the merits. Santiago-
Ramos filed a sworn affidavit, in addition to documentary evidence

and transcripts of portions of depositions, in her opposition to

Centennial's motion for summary judgment. Santiago-Ramos cited her
affidavit frequently in her argument. Both Centennial and the

magistrate judge fault her for doing so, stating that the self-

serving statements, produced after her receipt of Centennial's

summary judgment motion, should be given less credibility than

other evidence in the record. Centennial cites Wright and Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 2722, 2738 (1998), for the

proposition that judges should afford less weight to affidavits

than to deposition testimony when deciding summary judgment

motions. Santiago-Ramos relies on Federal Rule of Civil

-9-
Procedure 56, which states that affidavits may be used in

supporting and opposing motions for summary judgment.

The law regarding this dispute is clear. To the extent
that affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary

judgment merely reiterate allegations made in the complaint,

without providing specific factual information made on the basis of
personal knowledge, they are insufficient. Roslindale Coop. Bank

v. Greenwald, 638 F.2d 258, 261 (1st Cir. 1981), citing Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e). However, a "party's own affidavit, containing

relevant information of which he has first-hand knowledge, may be

self-serving, but it is nonetheless competent to support or defeat

summary judgment." Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 961 n.5 (1st

Cir. 1997), citing Nereida-González v. Tirado-Delgado, 990 F.2d
701, 706 (1st Cir. 1993). Santiago-Ramos' affidavit contains more

than the allegations made in her complaint: it provides specific

factual information based upon her personal knowledge. It may be
self-serving, but it complies with the requirements of the federal

rules, and we therefore must consider it together with the other

evidence before the magistrate judge.

III

The first issue is whether the magistrate judge erred in
granting summary judgment to Centennial on Santiago-Ramos' sex
discrimination claim. Title VII makes it "an unlawful employment

practice for an employer . . . to discharge any individual . . .
because of such individual's . . . sex." 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(a)(1). If the employer's decision is made "because of or

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on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical

conditions," it is made "because of sex." Id. § 2000e(k). A

Title VII sex discrimination claim may be proven with direct
evidence of discrimination, such as "an admission by the employer

that it explicitly took actual or anticipated pregnancy into

account in reaching an employment decision." Smith v. Morse & Co.,

76 F.3d 413, 421 (1st Cir. 1996). Such "smoking gun" evidence is

rare, but sex discrimination may also be proven with circumstantial

evidence. Domínguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424,

428-29 (1st Cir. 2000).

When considering circumstantial evidence of sex

discrimination, we apply a three-stage, burden-shifting framework

that was first articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973), and further delineated in Texas Department of

Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), and St. Mary's

Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). The analysis "is
intended progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive

factual question of intentional discrimination." Burdine, 450 U.S.

at 255 n.8.

1.

An employee alleging sex discrimination must first
establish a prima facie case by showing that: (1) she belonged to
a protected class, (2) she performed her job satisfactorily,

(3) her employer took an adverse employment decision against her,
and (4) her employer continued to have her duties performed by a

comparably qualified person. Smith, 76 F.3d at 421. This task "is

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not onerous," Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, and can result in a

rebuttable presumption "that the employer unlawfully discriminated

against the employee." Id. at 254.
Three elements of Santiago-Ramos' prima facie case are

clearly met: she is a woman; she was fired; and comparable persons

continued to perform her work responsibilities. Whether Santiago-
Ramos performed her job satisfactorily at Centennial is not as

clear. However, we need not reach this issue because of our second

inquiry.

2.

At the second stage, the burden shifts to the employer to

state a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506-07. The employer's
burden is merely a burden of production; the employee maintains the

burden of proof throughout. Id. at 507. If the employer meets its
burden, the presumption of discrimination evaporates. Id.

Centennial advanced the following nondiscriminatory

reasons for firing Santiago-Ramos: (1) the missing phones
incident; (2) the communications towers demurrage charges; (3) the
unpaid electrical bills; (4) failure to complete the employee

manual; (5) her general attitude and lack of commitment. Santiago-
Ramos concedes that these reasons are sufficient to drop the
inference of discrimination that she contends arose from the first

step.

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 3.

At the third stage, with the initial presumption of

discrimination removed, it falls upon the employee to "present

sufficient evidence to show both that the employer's articulated

reason . . . is a pretext and that the true reason is

discriminatory." Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 56 (1st

Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1174 (2000) (internal

quotations and citations omitted). "Plaintiffs may use the same

evidence to support both conclusions, provided that the evidence is

adequate to enable a rational factfinder reasonably to infer that
unlawful discrimination was a determinative factor in the adverse

employment action." Id. at 57 (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
We must decide "whether, viewing the aggregate package of

proof offered by [Santiago-Ramos] and taking all inferences in
[her] favor, [Santiago-Ramos] has raised a genuine issue of fact as
to whether the termination was motivated by [sex] discrimination."

Domínguez-Cruz, 202 F.3d at 431 (citations and quotations omitted).

If there is sufficient evidence in the record from which a jury
could infer that Centennial's proffered reasons for firing

Santiago-Ramos were pretextual and that it made its decision
because of discriminatory animus, summary judgment is
inappropriate. See id. We first address whether evidence of

pretext exists, having in mind that courts should exercise
particular caution before granting summary judgment for employers

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on such issues as pretext, motive, and intent. Hodgens v. General

Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 167 (1st Cir. 1998).

Santiago-Ramos can establish that Centennial's stated
reasons for her dismissal are a pretext for discrimination in a

number of ways. One method is to show that discriminatory comments

were made by the key decisionmaker or those in a position to
influence the decisionmaker. Mulero-Rodríguez v. Ponte, Inc., 98

F.3d 670, 675-76 (1st Cir. 1996). There is evidence that Mayberry,

head of Puerto Rico operations for the parent company, was the key

decisionmaker in the termination of Santiago-Ramos' employment. It

is also clear that Rivera, Santiago-Ramos' direct supervisor and

general manager in Puerto Rico, was in a position to influence

Mayberry in that decision. Mayberry was located at the parent
company and Rivera was based in Puerto Rico. The two held "almost

daily conference calls" during the crucial start-up phase when

Santiago-Ramos worked at Centennial. Rivera testified that
Mayberry called him for his opinion regarding Santiago-Ramos'

dismissal. Bucks also testified that Rivera was involved in the

decision. This evidence is sufficient to support an inference that

Rivera was in a position to influence Mayberry, the key

decisionmaker.

The record reveals a number of comments made by both

Mayberry and Rivera suggesting their concern about Santiago-Ramos

possibly having a second child while working at Centennial, as well

as concern about women with children working at Centennial in

general. For purposes of summary judgment, we cannot weigh the

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credibility of witnesses making these comments and must assume they

were made as stated. DeNovellis, 124 F.3d at 308, quoting

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The magistrate judge reviewed
Mayberry's and Rivera's comments and held that they were "stray

remarks," insufficient to enable a jury to conclude that

Centennial's reasons for dismissing Santiago-Ramos were pretextual.
We do not read the record the same way.

For example, two weeks prior to Santiago-Ramos'

termination, she traveled to the parent company for training. At

that time, Mayberry had no intention of firing her, despite knowing

of her work problems. At a dinner held during the training,

Mayberry specifically asked Santiago-Ramos about her ability to

balance her current work and parental responsibilities. In
response to Santiago-Ramos' response that she was balancing her

duties well and that she would have another child, Mayberry

questioned Santiago-Ramos' ability to fulfill her work
responsibilities should she have a second child. The subject

matter of Mayberry's comments (Santiago-Ramos' ability to work as

a mother) coupled with Mayberry's previous impression of Santiago-

Ramos (he was not inclined to fire her), together with the timing

of Santiago-Ramos' dismissal (just two weeks after Mayberry made

the comments), provides circumstantial evidence about the

pretextual nature of Centennial's proffered nondiscriminatory

reasons for Santiago-Ramos' dismissal. Such comments, made by

Mayberry (the key decisionmaker), together with similar comments

from Rivera (one in a position to influence the decisionmaker),

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could lead a jury to conclude that Centennial's proffered reasons

for firing Santiago-Ramos were actually a pretext for

discrimination.
Santiago-Ramos also points to comments made by others at

Centennial and the parent company that illustrate a discriminatory

attitude in the company as a whole. Typically, statements made by
"one who neither makes nor influences [a] challenged personnel

decision are not probative in an employment discrimination case."

Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 10 (1st Cir.

1990). However, evidence of a company's general atmosphere of

discrimination "may be considered along with any other evidence

bearing on motive in deciding whether a Title VII plaintiff has met

her burden of showing that the defendants' reasons are pretexts."
Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 604 F.2d 106,

113 (1st Cir. 1979) (emphasis added). As recounted earlier, a

number of other persons at Centennial and the parent company made
comments to Santiago-Ramos and others concerning the company's

treatment of female employees with children. While these comments
are not proof of discrimination against Santiago-Ramos, they "add

'color' to the decision-making process at [Centennial] and to the

reasons given for [her dismissal]." Id. A jury could reasonably

rely upon these comments, together with other evidence such as

comments by the decisionmakers, in concluding that Centennial's

explanations are pretextual.

Another method of establishing pretext is to show that

Centennial's nondiscriminatory reasons were after-the-fact

-16-
justifications, provided subsequent to the beginning of legal

action. See Mariani Giron v. Acevedo Ruiz, 834 F.2d 238, 239 (1st

Cir. 1987) (section 1983 case); Lex K. Larson, 1 Employment

Discrimination § 8.04 at 8-76 (2d ed. 2000). A jury could

interpret from the timing of such comments that Centennial's

reasons are pretextual. On September 27, 1996, the date of
Santiago-Ramos' dismissal, Rivera did not tell her why her

employment was being terminated. A memorandum dated that same day

identifies several reasons for the decision. However, Mejías, who

typed that memorandum from Rivera's dictation, stated that it was

prepared several weeks subsequent to the termination, after it was

clear that Santiago-Ramos was initiating legal action against

Centennial. A jury could rely upon Mejías' statement to conclude
that Centennial's stated reasons for firing Santiago-Ramos were

merely pretextual post hoc justifications because they were only

provided in anticipation of litigation.
Santiago-Ramos can also establish pretext by showing

"weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or

contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons" such

that a factfinder could "infer that the employer did not act for

the asserted non-discriminatory reasons." Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 168

(internal quotations and citations omitted). A factfinder could do

so here. First, as the magistrate judge held, the evidence

regarding the demurrage charges Centennial incurred because of the

tardy receipt of the communications towers suggests that this

reason could be considered pretextual. There is evidence that

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Santiago-Ramos was never assigned responsibility to pick up the

towers, that she was unaware that the towers had arrived in Puerto

Rico before she was dismissed, and that no one had reprimanded her
about the towers incident during her tenure with Centennial.

Second, Centennial cites the missing telephone incident as an

important reason for firing Santiago-Ramos, stating that the
telephones were crucial to its start-up operations. However, at

the time the incident occurred, Rivera told Santiago-Ramos that it

was "a minor matter." That the incident was minor to Rivera is

supported by his assertion that he had no intention to fire her

before being told to do so. Third, Centennial now stresses

Santiago-Ramos' failure to complete the employee manual as a reason

for her dismissal, although that problem did not appear in Rivera's
memorandum regarding Santiago-Ramos' dismissal. The record reveals

that Santiago-Ramos had ultimate oversight responsibility for the

completion of the manual and that before Santiago-Ramos' dismissal
Mayberry expressed concern that it was not completed. However,

there is also evidence, from both Santiago-Ramos and Lourdes Lucas,

the parent company's legal counsel, that Centennial's outside legal

counsel was asked to provide a first draft of the manual and that

revisions would have to be made to that draft. Santiago-Ramos

testified that outside counsel was tardy in providing the first

draft and that the revision process was underway when she was

fired. Based upon these weaknesses in the nondiscriminatory

reasons Centennial provided, the jury could find that the reasons

were pretextual.

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 Having discussed whether Centennial's nondiscriminatory

reasons were pretextual, we now address whether the record contains

sufficient evidence of discriminatory animus. Domínguez-Cruz, 202
F.3d at 431. There is sufficient evidence here. For instance,

after Santiago-Ramos told Mayberry that she was planning on having

a second child in the next several years, he specifically
questioned whether she would be able to manage her work and family

responsibilities; shortly thereafter, her employment was

terminated.

Having reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable

to Santiago-Ramos, Domínguez-Cruz, 202 F.3d at 433, we conclude

that there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury

could find that Centennial's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons
for her dismissal were pretextual and that the actual reason was

discriminatory. Our view of the facts at this point is necessarily

shaped by the summary judgment standard of review and is only "a
description of the permissible inferences that could be drawn from

the facts and that suffice to defeat summary judgment." Id.

Indeed, after the full presentation of the evidence at trial, a

factfinder might very well decide differently. But Santiago-Ramos

has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to the actual reason

for her dismissal, and this suffices to allow her to present her

sex discrimination case at trial. We reverse the magistrate judge

on this issue.

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 IV

The next issue is whether the magistrate judge erred in

granting summary judgment to Centennial on Santiago-Ramos'

retaliation claim. Pursuant to Title VII:

It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees . . . because
he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under this subchapter.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). A prima facie case of retaliation is made
by a showing that: (1) the employee engaged in conduct that
Title VII protects; (2) the employee suffered an adverse employment

action; and (3) the adverse action is causally connected to the
protected activity. Hernández-Torres v. Intercontinental Trading,

Inc., 158 F.3d 43, 47 (1st Cir. 1998).

Santiago-Ramos argues that she was fired because she
opposed the job fair profile Rivera presented, which allegedly
excluded older persons with commitments, pregnant women, and women
with children. There is evidence that Rivera proposed such a

policy and that Santiago-Ramos opposed it. However, there is also
evidence that Santiago-Ramos never reported her concerns to

Mayberry or anyone else at the parent company.
For a retaliation claim "to survive a motion for summary
judgment, the plaintiff must point to evidence in the record that

would permit a rational factfinder to conclude that the employment

-20-
action was retaliatory." King v. Town of Hanover, 116 F.3d 965,

968 (1st Cir. 1997). Even assuming that Santiago-Ramos established

the first two elements of the retaliation prima facie case, the
magistrate judge correctly granted summary judgment on this claim

because Santiago-Ramos has not established the third element: that

her dismissal was causally related to her opposition to the job
fair profile. The only evidence concerning Santiago-Ramos'

retaliation claim is that Rivera allegedly proposed a

discriminatory policy, Santiago-Ramos stated her opposition of the

policy to Rivera, and Santiago-Ramos was later fired. The parties

dispute whether Mayberry ever knew about Santiago-Ramos' opposition

to the policy; however, this dispute is immaterial to resolution of

the issue. Assuming Mayberry did know about her opposition,
Santiago-Ramos has pointed to no evidence, save the decisionmakers'

knowledge of Santiago-Ramos' opposition to the policy, suggesting

that her dismissal occurred in retaliation for her opposition. "It
is insufficient for [one] to simply recount that [one] complained

and . . . was disciplined . . . ." Id. Because there is no

evidence that Santiago-Ramos' dismissal occurred in retaliation for

her opposition to Rivera's job fair profile, we affirm summary

judgment for Centennial on Santiago-Ramos' retaliation claim. See

id.

V

The last issue is whether the magistrate judge erred in
denying Santiago-Ramos' motion for summary judgment on her Puerto

Rico Law 80 claims. Santiago-Ramos' motion argued that the

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probationary contract she signed was void and, therefore, that she

was entitled to payment for 4.5 vacation days that she accumulated

before her employment was terminated. Centennial opposed Santiago-
Ramos' motion, arguing that it was filed after the date the

magistrate judge set for the filing of dispositive motions and,

alternatively, that the probationary contract was valid. The
magistrate judge denied Santiago-Ramos' motion.

We first turn to Centennial's argument that the

magistrate judge should not have entertained Santiago-Ramos' tardy

motion. We review case management decisions for abuse of

discretion, giving district courts wide latitude. Rosario-Díaz v.

González, 140 F.3d 312, 315 (1st Cir. 1998). A party adversely

affected by a district court's case management decision thus "bears
a formidable burden" in seeking reversal. United States v. One

1987 BMW 325, 985 F.2d 655, 657 (1st Cir. 1993).

In a pretrial conference, the magistrate judge set
January 15, 1998, as the deadline for dispositive motions.

Santiago-Ramos' motion for partial summary judgment, filed
March 17, 1998, was obviously late. However, despite its

tardiness, the magistrate judge chose to entertain the motion,

suggesting that the issues contained therein were related to issues

discussed in Santiago-Ramos' simultaneous and timely filed

opposition to Centennial's motion for summary judgment. Based upon

that fact, as well as the relatively straightforward issue

presented in the motion, we hold that the magistrate judge did not

abuse his discretion by entertaining the motion.

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 We thus examine the magistrate judge's summary judgment

decision on the merits. Puerto Rico Law 80 provides the exclusive

remedy under Puerto Rico law for an employee who is discharged
without demonstrating just cause. 29 L.P.R.A. §§ 185a-185m.

Pursuant to Law 80, dismissed at-will employees are entitled to

certain benefits, including payment for vacation time accrued and
not enjoyed due to work demands. Id. § 185a; Beauchamp v. Holsum

Bakers of P.R., Inc., 16 P.R. Offic. Trans. 641, 116 D.P.R. 522

(1985). However, an employee who is terminated during a

probationary contract period is not entitled to those benefits. 29

L.P.R.A. § 185h. A probationary contract must, among other things,

be "made in writing, stating the date on which said probationary

period commences and ends, which in no case shall exceed three (3)
months." Id. The term "month" is defined as "a period of thirty

(30) consecutive calendar days." Id. If the contract does not

"comply with the above conditions," a court must "render it null
and void." Id.

The probationary contract Santiago-Ramos signed stated it

was a 90-calendar day contract, commencing July 1, 1996, and ending

September 30, 1996. However, the period from July 1 to

September 30 is 92 days, not 90 days. Santiago-Ramos argues this

error makes the probationary contract void, inasmuch as it violates

the mandate in section 185h: a probationary contract never extends

more than 90 days. Centennial argues that the error should be

overlooked, inasmuch as the contract also states it was for 90

days. Alternatively, Centennial points out that the 90th day of

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the probationary contract fell on a Saturday, and that continuing

the deadline through until Monday, September 30, 1996, would be

consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a), which allows
deadlines to be carried over past weekends and legal holidays.

Finally, Centennial argues that the parties intended to enter a

90-day probationary contract, and pursuant to 31 L.P.R.A. § 3471,
if the words of a contract "should appear contrary to the evident

intention of the contracting parties, the intention shall prevail."

The parties have not cited, and our research has not

uncovered, any Puerto Rico or federal case law interpreting the

90-day time limitation in section 185h. We must therefore do so

ourselves. We interpret a Puerto Rico statute according to its

plain meaning. A.M. Capen's Co. v. American Trading and Prod.

Corp., 202 F.3d 469, 473 (1st Cir. 2000).

The statute plainly states that a probationary contract

must specify "the date on which [it] commences and ends," and that
the stated period "in no case shall exceed three (3) months,"

meaning three periods of "thirty (30) consecutive calendar days."
29 L.P.R.A. § 185h. Section 185h contemplates probationary

contracts that are less than 90 days, but it is clear that no

probationary contract may extend longer than 90 days. Section 185h

is also straightforward that noncompliance with its requirements

"shall render [the contract] null and void." Id. Santiago-Ramos'

contract, while purporting to be a 90-day contract, clearly

included a time period of 92 days, making it invalid. Centennial

cites no authority for its argument that we can construe a contract

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governed by Puerto Rico law with reference to the time deadline

provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, we

cannot ignore the plain language of the statute in order to give
meaning to the parties' contractual intent.

Because the contract states that it is a 90-day contract

and also that it extends for 92 days, the party's actual intent is
unclear. Centennial points to no other documentary or testimonial

evidence of the parties' actual intent in entering into this

contract. We are bound to apply the plain language of Puerto Rico

statutory law, which is strict in mandating that a probationary

contract that by its terms extends beyond 90 days be declared void.

We thus reverse the magistrate judge's denial of Santiago-Ramos'

motion for partial summary judgment.
Santiago-Ramos is entitled to costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

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