Boivin v. Black

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 99-2085

RAYMOND P. BOIVIN,
Plaintiff, Appellee,

v.

LT. DONALD BLACK,
Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

[Hon. Morton A. Brody, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Selya, Circuit Judge,

Wallace,* Senior Circuit Judge,

and Boudin, Circuit Judge.

Diane Sleek, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Andrew
Ketterer, Maine Attorney General, and Paul Stern, Deputy
Attorney General, were on brief, for appellant.
Stuart W. Tisdale, Jr., with whom Mary A. Davis and Tisdale
& Davis, P.A. were on brief, for appellee.

September 5, 2000
_______________
*Of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
 SELYA, Circuit Judge. The Prison Litigation Reform Act

of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (Supp. II 1996), altered the

legal landscape in regard to several types of civil actions

brought by prison inmates. Certain of these changes curtailed

the amount of attorneys' fees that a prevailing prisoner-

plaintiff could expect to obtain from his vanquished opponent.

One such provision involves suits for money damages; when a

prisoner secures a monetary judgment in a civil action covered

by the PLRA, the statute caps the defendants' liability for

attorneys' fees at 150% of the judgment. See id. § 1997e(d)(2).

This appeal raises the novel question of whether the

"monetary judgment" cap applies to nominal damage awards.

Contrary to the district court, we hold that it does. We

proceed to reject the plaintiff's alternative argument that the

cap, so construed, is unconstitutional. Consequently, we set

aside the lower court's order granting a more munificent counsel

fee than the statute allows and remand with instructions to

reduce that award to $1.50.

I. BACKGROUND

Raymond P. Boivin, a pretrial detainee housed at Maine

Correctional Institute—Warren, sued correctional officer Donald

Black following an incident in which Boivin lost consciousness

after being locked in a restraint chair, his mouth covered by a

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towel.1 On January 20, 1999, a jury found that Black, who was

in charge at the time, had violated Boivin's due process rights,

but awarded Boivin only $1.00 in nominal damages. Following

entry of the judgment, Boivin moved for an award of $3,892.50 in

attorneys' fees. Black opposed the motion, arguing that section

1997e(d)(2) capped attorneys' fees at $1.50 (150% of the

monetary judgment).

The trial court ruled that the term "a monetary

judgment," as used in the PLRA, did not include a judgment for

nominal damages and, accordingly, held the fee cap inapplicable.

See Boivin v. Merrill, 66 F. Supp. 2d 50, 51 (D. Me. 1999). The

court rested its decision on two grounds. First, it found that

applying the PLRA's percentage-based fee cap to a nominal damage

award would lead to an absurd result — exemplified here by

Boivin's counsel being entitled to a maximum stipend of $1.50

despite having tried the case to a successful conclusion. See

id. Second, the court posited that applying the PLRA in so

mechanistic a fashion would discourage lawyers from accepting

meritorious prisoner civil rights suits. See id. Finding no

proof in the PLRA's legislative history that Congress intended

1
Boivin also sued several other defendants, but all of them
have long since departed from the litigation. We therefore
treat the case as if Black had been the sole defendant from the
outset.

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to create such a disincentive, the court decreed that the plain

meaning of the provision must yield. See id. The court

proceeded to award the full amount of attorneys' fees requested.

See id. at 52. Black appeals from this determination.

II. ANALYSIS

In order to frame the issues on appeal, we deem it

useful to start with an overview of the parties' positions. As

a threshold matter, Boivin maintains that this appeal is

untimely. Black demurs. Next, Boivin asseverates that the fee

cap should not apply to nominal damage awards because that

application would lead to anomalous results. Black counters

that the plain meaning of section 1997e(d)(2) requires its

application to nominal damage awards, and that, in all events,

it is the failure to apply the fee cap to such awards that would

promote anomalies. Finally, Boivin asserts that if the PLRA fee

cap applies to nominal damage awards, the statute violates the

guarantee of equal protection found in the Due Process Clause of

the Fifth Amendment.2 Black disagrees, averring that the

statute, so construed, is rationally related to legitimate

2
Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment does
not contain an Equal Protection Clause. The Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, however, prevents the federal sovereign from
practicing unjustifiable discrimination. See Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 500 n.3 (1975); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 499 (1954).

-5-
governmental ends. We address each of these three sets of

conflicting contentions in the discussion that follows.

Throughout, we apply de novo review. See Inmates of Suffolk

County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649, 653 (1st Cir. 1997).

A. The Timeliness of the Appeal.

Boivin's claim that Black failed to appeal within the

thirty-day window of opportunity provided by Federal Rule of

Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) is baseless. The lower court

entered the disputed order on August 12, 1999. The thirty-day

period began the next day. See Fed. R. App. P. 26(a)(1).

Simple arithmetic, confirmed by a glance at last year's

calendar, indicates that the thirtieth day fell on September 11,

1999. Because that day was a Saturday, the thirty-day period

was automatically extended to Monday, September 13. See Fed. R.

App. P. 26(a)(3) (specifying that the last day of the appeal

period automatically extends to the next day if the last day "is

a Saturday, Sunday, [or] legal holiday"). Black filed his

notice of appeal on that date. Hence, the appeal was timely.

See id.

B. The PLRA Fee Cap.

In the American civil justice system, the spoils that

belong to the victor ordinarily do not include payment of

-6-
attorneys' fees. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness

Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). Except when a statute or an

enforceable contractual provision dictates otherwise, litigants

generally pay their own way. See id. at 257. Congress has the

power, however, to revise this schematic, and if it elects to do

so, it may delineate both the circumstances under which

attorneys' fees are to be shifted and the extent of the courts'

discretion in that respect. See id. at 262. Furthermore, this

power may be exercised selectively, that is to say, Congress may

"pick and choose among its statutes and . . . allow attorneys'

fees under some, but not others." Id. at 263.

In perhaps the most striking use of this power to date

— the Fees Act, adopted in 1976 — Congress gave the courts

discretion to award reasonable attorneys' fees to prevailing

civil rights litigants. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (Supp. II

1996). Congress later enacted other statutes that hewed roughly

to this prototype. See, e.g., City of Burlington v. Dague, 505

U.S. 557, 562 (1992) (noting that many federal statutes that

shift attorneys' fees share similar language); Pennsylvania v.

Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546,

562 (1986) (noting that more than 100 federal statutes provide

for attorneys' fees). In enacting the PLRA, Congress deviated

from this pattern, choosing to place some explicit limitations

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on the fees that courts can award to prisoners' lawyers in civil

cases:

(1) In any action brought by a prisoner who
is confined to any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility, in which attorney's
fees are authorized under section 1988 of
this title, such fees shall not be awarded,
except to the extent that—
(A) the fee was directly and
reasonably incurred in proving an
actual violation of the plaintiff's
rights protected by a statute
pursuant to which a fee may be
awarded under section 1988 of this
title; and
(B)(i) the amount of the fee is
proportionately related to the court
ordered relief for the violation; or
(ii) the fee was directly and
reasonably incurred in enforcing the
relief ordered for the violation.
(2) Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded
in an action described in paragraph (1), a
portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25
percent) shall be applied to satisfy the
amount of attorney's fees awarded against
the defendant. If the award of attorney's
fees is not greater than 150 percent of the
judgment, the excess shall be paid by the
defendant.
(3) No award of attorney's fees in an action
described in paragraph (1) shall be based on
an hourly rate greater than 150 percent of
the hourly rate established under 3006A of
title 18, for payment of court-appointed
counsel.
(4) Nothing in this subsection shall
prohibit a prisoner from entering into an
agreement to pay an attorney's fee in an
amount greater than the amount authorized
under this subsection, if the fee is paid by
the individual rather than by the defendant
pursuant to section 1988 of this title.

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42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (footnotes omitted).

The particular limitation around which this appeal

revolves relates to monetary judgments. When a prisoner-

plaintiff garners a monetary judgment, section 1997e(d)(2)

imposes a ceiling on the defendants' liability for attorneys'

fees equal to 150% of the amount of that judgment. This appeal

raises the question of whether a nominal damage award counts as

"a monetary judgment" within the purview of section 1997e(d)(2).

We begin, as we must, with the language of the statute.

See Bonilla v. Muebles J.J. Alvarez, Inc., 194 F.3d 275, 277

(1st Cir. 1999). We assume that the words that Congress chose

to implement its wishes, if not specifically defined, carry

their ordinary meaning and accurately express Congress's intent.

See Rouse, 129 F.3d at 653-54. If the gist of the statute is

obvious and the text, given its plain meaning, produces a

plausible scenario, "it is unnecessary — and improper — to look

for other signposts . . . ." United States v. Charles George

Trucking Co., 823 F.2d 685, 688 (1st Cir. 1987).

While section 1997e(d)(2) is awkwardly phrased, its

import and its essence are transparently clear: "[w]henever a

monetary judgment is awarded" in an action covered by the PLRA

and the prevailing party seeks attorneys' fees, the defendant

shall pay such fees up to a maximum of 150% of the judgment

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amount, and no more.3 Since an award of $1.00 is just as much

a monetary judgment as an award of $1,000,000, the plain

language of the statute makes the fee cap applicable to such an

award. This reasoning becomes especially compelling when one

reflects that, although nominal damage awards long have been

commonplace in civil rights cases, see, e.g., Farrar v. Hobby,

506 U.S. 103, 107 (1992); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266

(1978); O'Connor v. Huard, 117 F.3d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1997);

Maldonado Santiago v. Velazquez Garcia, 821 F.2d 822, 829 (1st

Cir. 1987), section 1997e(d)(2) neither makes any express

exception for nominal damage awards nor excludes from its sweep

judgments of less than "X" dollars.

In a Briarean effort to blunt the force of this logic,

Boivin argues that Congress could not have intended so eccentric

a result. Capping attorneys' fees at $1.50 for a prevailing

plaintiff who has won a nominal damage award, he tells us,

serves to discourage counsel from accepting meritorious

prisoners' rights cases and thereby frustrates prison reform

litigation. We agree with Boivin that the plain-meaning

3
This language contrasts with section 1997e(d)(1)(B)(i),
which deals with other types of judgments in prisoner cases.
That section requires any attorneys' fees awarded in such cases
to be proportionally related to the relief obtained. In section
1997e(d)(2), Congress presumably decided to take advantage of
the precision available when relief is limited to money damages
and to define proportionality in more specific terms.

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doctrine is not a categorical imperative, and that the

unambiguous text of a statute may yield if its application tends

to produce absurd results. See United States v. Ron Pair

Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989); see also Greenwood

Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 825 (1st Cir. 1992)

("[A] court must always hesitate to construe words in a statute

according to their apparent meaning if to do so would defeat

Congress's discovered intendment."). This exception, however,

is to be employed cautiously, see Rouse, 129 F.3d at 655, and it

does not apply at all in this case.

Congress enacted the PLRA out of a concern that

prisoner litigation, much of it frivolous, was wasting taxpayer

money and clogging the courts. See, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. S10576

(daily ed. Sept. 16, 1996) (statement of Sen. Abraham); 141

Cong. Rec. S7526 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen.

Kyl). Congress could well have reasoned that applying the fee

cap to nominal damage awards would encourage both prisoners and

members of the bar to weigh the likely value of claims before

proceeding to court, thus reducing the overall number of

prisoner suits and easing the perceived burden of prisoner

litigation on the justice system. One can argue with the policy

behind such a legislative choice, but one hardly can classify

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the end result of that policy — measured in the large, and not

by the occasional anomalous outcome — as absurd or chimerical.

Indeed, exempting nominal damage awards from the cap

on attorneys' fees, as Boivin urges, itself would run an equally

great (or greater) risk of bringing about bizarre results.

Under such a regime, a prisoner who had won a judgment of $1,000

in compensation for a physical injury suffered in the course of

a constitutional violation could be awarded a maximum of $1,500

in attorneys' fees, but a prisoner subjected to the same

violation who sustained no physical injury and was awarded $1.00

in nominal damages would face no such limitation. There is no

hint in the record that Congress wished to foster these kinds of

inequities. We hold, therefore, that Congress, in enacting

section 1997e(d)(2), meant what it said. The statutory cap on

attorneys' fees applies to all monetary judgments, including

nominal damage awards.4

C. The Constitutionality of the Fee Cap.

4
We add a caveat. In this case, the plaintiff sought and
received only monetary relief. Thus, the fee cap applies. In
a case in which the court orders non-monetary redress (say, an
injunction) along with a monetary judgment, the fee cap
contained in section 1997e(d)(2) would not restrict the total
amount of attorneys' fees that the court could award. In such
a "hybrid" case, the court would be free to take into account
all the provisions of section 1997e(d).

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 We turn next to the constitutionality of the PLRA's cap

on attorneys' fees. Two of our sister circuits recently have

addressed the same general question. The Ninth Circuit has

upheld the cap against a constitutional challenge. See Madrid

v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 1999). The Third Circuit,

sitting en banc, split evenly on the issue. See Collins v.

Montgomery County Bd. of Prison Inspectors, 176 F.3d 679, 686

(3d Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 932 (2000).

This court has not yet spoken to the question.

Like the challengers in Madrid and Collins, Boivin

grounds his claim of unconstitutionality in concepts of equal

protection. See supra note 2. The centerpiece of his argument

is that section 1997e(d)(2) treats prisoner civil rights

litigants differently from all other civil rights litigants:

whereas a non-prisoner civil rights litigant who wins only a

nominal damage award can receive substantial attorneys' fees

under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, see, e.g., Wilcox v. City of Reno, 42

F.3d 550, 557 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming award of $66,535 in

attorneys' fees to section 1983 plaintiff who had secured a

$1.00 damage award), the fee cap deprives a prevailing prisoner

civil rights litigant of the possibility of any comparable

emolument.

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 In light of the Supreme Court's recent pronouncement

in Farrar, the contrast that Boivin seeks to depict may be more

apparent than real. See 506 U.S. at 115 ("When a plaintiff

recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an

essential element of his claim for monetary relief, the only

reasonable fee is usually no fee at all." (citation omitted)).

Leaving that point to one side, the first step in evaluating his

claim is to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny. We

take that step and then proceed to the constitutional question.

1. The Level of Scrutiny. Typically, a law will

withstand an equal protection challenge if it bears a rational

relationship to a legitimate governmental end. See Vacco v.

Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997). This level of scrutiny

intensifies, however, if the law infringes a fundamental right

or involves a suspect classification. See id. Boivin puts

forth two reasons why the PLRA fee cap, which draws a line

between prisoners and non-prisoners, should receive such

heightened scrutiny. First, he declares that prisoners are a

suspect class. Second, he maintains that the fee cap

impermissibly burdens the fundamental right of access to the

courts.

We need not linger long over Boivin's first suggestion.

From a constitutional standpoint, prisoners simply are not a

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suspect class. See Webber v. Crabtree, 158 F.3d 460, 461 (9th

Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (holding that prisoners are not a

suspect class); Zehner v. Trigg, 133 F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir.

1997) (calling the idea that prisoners constitute a suspect

class "completely unsupported"). Thus, heightened scrutiny

cannot be justified on this basis.

Boivin's second suggestion requires a somewhat longer

answer. It is axiomatic that prisoners have a constitutionally-

protected right of meaningful access to the courts. See Bounds

v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). This means that prisoners

must have a reasonably adequate opportunity to bring before the

courts claims that their constitutional rights have been

violated. See id. at 825. To ensure this opportunity,

correctional authorities must "assist inmates in the preparation

and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners

with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons

trained in the law." Id. at 828, distinguished by Lewis v.

Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). Boivin asserts that, without

counsel, prisoners have little chance of meaningfully presenting

their claims to the courts, and that the PLRA fee cap therefore

interferes with the right of access by destroying the only real

incentive for lawyers to take prisoners' civil rights cases.

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 Boivin's arguments are wrong on the law. The

constitutionally-protected right of access to the courts is

narrow in scope. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 360 (explaining that

constitutional concerns are satisfied as long as prisoners

receive "the minimal help necessary" to present legal claims).

To illustrate, the right of access to the courts does not extend

to enabling prisoners to litigate with maximum effectiveness

once in court. See id. at 354. Similarly, the right of access

to the courts does not require the provision of counsel in civil

cases. See Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18,

26-27 (1981); DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 23 (1st Cir.

1991). A statute which, like section 1997e(d)(2), does nothing

more than limit the availability of an attorney paid for by the

target of a prisoner's suit does not implicate the right of

access to the courts in any cognizable way. Cf. Rouse, 129 F.3d

at 660 (explaining that "while there is a constitutional right

to court access, there is no complementary constitutional right

to receive or be eligible for a particular form of relief").

Boivin's arguments also are wrong on the facts. First

and foremost, the suggestion that prisoners who proceed pro se

do not have a meaningful opportunity to prosecute their claims

is highly debatable. While pro se litigants are not exempt from

procedural rules, courts are solicitous of the obstacles that

-16-
they face. Consequently, courts hold pro se pleadings to less

demanding standards than those drafted by lawyers. See Haines

v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Instituto de

Educacion Universal Corp. v. United States Dep't of Educ., 209

F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000). By the same token, courts

endeavor, within reasonable limits, to guard against the loss of

pro se claims due to technical defects. See, e.g., Balistreri

v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

The net result is that pro se litigants sometimes enjoy stunning

success. See Jon O. Newman, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation:

Looking for Needles in Haystacks, 62 Brook. L. Rev. 519, 519 n.2

(1996) (collecting representative cases in which prisoners

acting pro se have won significant victories).

In all events, the PLRA fee cap does not make it

impossible for a prisoner to secure the services of a lawyer.

Cynics and naysayers notwithstanding, we are reluctant to

conclude that all attorneys accept or reject prisoners' cases

solely on the basis of financial considerations. Moreover,

prisoners may hire attorneys with their own funds. See 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(4) ("Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit

a prisoner from entering into an agreement to pay an attorney's

fee . . . ."). Then, too, the PLRA contains other provisions

that allow for differential compensation (including shifted fees

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not subject to the section 1997e(d)(2) cap, see supra note 4)

where injunctive or declaratory relief is obtained. See 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1). Finally, the PLRA does not eliminate all

prospect of shifted attorneys' fees even in cases that involve

only money damages. After all, the statutory cap allows for an

award of attorneys' fees in an amount up to 150% of a monetary

judgment — which is 150% more than the norm in civil litigation.

We doubt that a lawyer who believes that a prisoner has a

meritorious claim for damages will be deterred by that

limitation.

To say more on this topic would be supererogatory. We

agree with Judge O'Scannlain that, in the last analysis, "[t]he

PLRA does not restrict access to the courts; at most, it

restricts prisoners' access to the most sought-after counsel who

insist on their going rate for representation." Madrid, 190

F.3d at 995. Heightened scrutiny is, therefore, inappropriate

in this case.5

5
At any rate, a prisoner must show actual injury in order to
demonstrate a violation of the right of access to the courts.
See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349. The Lewis Court defined actual
injury as "a nonfrivolous legal claim [being] frustrated or . .
. impeded." Id. at 353 (footnotes omitted). Boivin's claim was
neither frustrated nor impeded by the PLRA fee cap. On the
contrary, he secured the services of able counsel and won his
case. Consequently, he has not suffered an actual injury that
would allow him to claim a violation of his fundamental right of
access to the courts.

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 2. Rationality Review. Since the PLRA fee cap neither

involves a suspect classification nor infringes on the

fundamental right of access to the courts, we analyze its

constitutionality under the rational basis test.

Rationality review in equal protection cases "is not

a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of

legislative choices." FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508

U.S. 307, 313 (1993). Rather, an inquiring court must ask

whether "there is a rational relationship between the disparity

of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose." Heller

v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993). If "any reasonably

conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis

for the classification" exists, the classification must be

upheld. Beach, 508 U.S. at 313. As long as this modest burden

is satisfied, Congress's handiwork will endure "even if the law

seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular group,

or if the rationale for it seems tenuous." Romer v. Evans, 517

U.S. 620, 632 (1996).

Consistent with these tenets, the Supreme Court has

made it pellucid that a person who challenges the rationality of

a statute must negate every plausible basis that conceivably

might support it. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 320; Lehnhausen v.

Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973). Boivin

-19-
fails to discredit the legitimacy of no fewer than three

purposes that are served by the cap on attorneys' fees:

discouraging frivolous suits, protecting the public fisc, and

bringing prisoner incentives to litigate more in line with non-

prisoner incentives.6

We need not pause to analyze these legislative purposes

separately. It suffices to say that the prison setting is sui

generis, and Congress's choice to treat prisoners differently

than non-prisoners is plainly justified by the idiosyncratic

characteristics of that setting. Prisoners' living costs are

paid by the public and prisoners have nowhere to go — a

combination that gives them more free time than non-prisoners to

pursue claims (whether or not valid). The problem of prisoner

6
The legislative history provides ample evidence that
Congress had these goals in mind in passing the PLRA. See 141
Cong. Rec. S14626 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) ("This landmark legislation will help bring relief to a
civil justice system overburdened by frivolous prisoner
lawsuits."); 141 Cong. Rec. S7526 (daily ed. May 25, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Kyl) ("[P]risoners have all the necessities
of life supplied, including the materials required to bring
their lawsuits. For a prisoner who qualifies for poor person
status, there is no cost to bring a suit and, therefore, no
incentive to limit suits to cases that have some chance of
success."); 141 Cong. Rec. H1042 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995)
(statement of Rep. Hoke) ("[T]here is an element of the bar that
makes a full-time living in contacting prisoners and then using
shotgun approach lawsuits . . . . [T]he reason they do this is
because [they] can actually be reimbursed their fees, all of
them . . . . [W]e have said . . . you can only be paid if you
win, and you can only be paid on the part that you do win on.").

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litigiousness is exacerbated by the nature of prison life, as

inmates tend to egg each other on. This problem is further

complicated by the constitutionally-protected right to a certain

level of legal assistance, see Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828.

Experience has shown that these and other factors, acting in

concert, encourage inmates to bring large numbers of

insubstantial claims — or so Congress rationally could have

thought. See Madrid, 190 F.3d at 996 ("[I]t is certainly

conceivable that, because of significant potential gains and low

opportunity costs, prisoners generally file a disproportionate

number of frivolous suits as compared to the population as a

whole."). Thus, we reject Boivin's plaint that the statute

distinguishes impermissibly between prisoners and other civil

rights plaintiffs.

Boivin attempts to elude the inevitability of this

result in a variety of ways. Citing the uncontroversial

principle that a court ought not to uphold a law motivated by "a

bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group," United

States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973), he

insists that the fee cap discriminates against prisoners with

meritorious claims, leaving them bereft of counsel so their

claims can more easily be thwarted. But given the legitimate

governmental purposes that underlie the fee cap, see supra, the

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claim of a bare desire to harm will not fly. Consequently, the

Moreno principle has no application on these facts.

As a fallback, Boivin deplores what he envisions as the

complete lack of fit between the means that Congress chose

(capping attorneys' fees) and the end that it sought to achieve

(reducing frivolous prisoner litigation). Although this argument

is presented only in skeletal form, it is phrased in terms

reminiscent of the Supreme Court's decision in Lindsey v. Normet,

405 U.S. 56, 77-78 (1972) (holding unconstitutional a double-bond

requirement imposed on tenants who seek to appeal landlords'

verdicts in rent disputes on the ground that the requirement "not

only bars nonfrivolous appeals by those who are unable to post

the bond but also allows meritless appeals by others who can

afford the bond"). Thus, we assume that Boivin means that since

attorneys' fees are awarded only to prevailing parties, the fee

cap could have no possible deterrent effect on the filing of

meritless actions.

Common sense suggests that this ex post view is

untenable. Congress presumably feared the motivating effect of

the prospect of attorneys' fees, ex ante, and the fee cap quells

that effect by capping the potential payoff. This changes the

odds and forces both lawyer and client, out of self-interest, to

assess likely outcomes with greater care before filing a suit

-22-
that, even if nominally successful, might leave them holding a

nearly empty bag.

To be sure, it can be argued that discouraging lawyers

from filing frivolous prisoner suits will fail to reduce the

overall number of meritless claims because the suits eschewed by

lawyers simply will be prosecuted by prisoners acting pro se. In

that event, all that the fee cap will achieve is a reduction in

the number of frivolous cases in which prisoners are represented

by counsel. While the argument that we have posited is not

illogical, there are still two conceivable ways in which the fee

cap might serve to reduce the aggregate number of frivolous

prisoner suits. First, Congress may have believed that at least

some prisoners would abandon their claims if they could not

secure the services of an attorney. Second, to the extent that

Congress thought lawyers were exhorting prisoners to pursue

frivolous claims in the hope that lightning would strike — that,

say, a runaway jury would hand down a favorable verdict or a

sympathetic judge would couple a smidgen of relief with a large

fee award — the fee cap would tend to curtail that behavior,

thereby reducing the overall number of frivolous suits in the

system. Recognizing that rationality review is highly

deferential to legislative choices, see Beach, 508 U.S. at 313,

these possibilities are sufficient to sustain the statutory fee

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cap. "Under the rational basis test, duly enacted socioeconomic

legislation should be upheld so long as any set of facts could

suffice to establish a rational relationship between the law and

the government's legitimate objectives." Montalvo-Huertas v.

Rivera-Cruz, 885 F.2d 971, 978 (1st Cir. 1989).

Nor does Boivin's analogy to Lindsey compel a different

result. The case before us differs from Lindsey in two important

respects. First, unlike the double-bond requirement, the cap on

attorneys' fees is not a barrier to court access, but a

limitation on relief: the double-bond requirement operated

directly to bar appeals by individuals who could not afford the

extra cost, whereas the fee cap only affects how claims are

presented and does not preclude any prisoner from actually

bringing a claim. Second, the Lindsey Court found a very poor

correlation between the double-bond requirement and the goal of

reducing frivolous appeals. See 405 U.S. at 78. The fee cap

fits much more snugly with the goal of reducing the volume of

frivolous suits because it has the principal effect of

encouraging both prisoners and lawyers who are mulling whether to

bring covered cases to ask if the game is worth the candle, given

the relief available.

Let us be crystal clear. We do not suggest that there

is a seamless fit between section 1997e(d)(2) and the goals that

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Congress aspired to achieve. However, rational basis review does

not require a perfect accommodation between means and ends. See

Heller, 509 U.S. at 321. Because a cap on attorneys' fees,

particularly when linked with the requirement that the prisoner

contribute part of the award to the payment of the fee, see 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2), conceivably may discourage prisoners and

their counsel from filing frivolous or low-value suits, we think

that the fit is close enough to pass constitutional muster. See

Metropolis Theater Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69 (1913)

("The problems of government are practical ones and may justify,

if they do not require, rough accommodations . . . .").

III. CONCLUSION

We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated

herein, we hold that PLRA § 1997e(d)(2) applies to nominal damage

awards and that, as applied, the statute does not offend the

Fifth Amendment because there is a rational relationship between

the fee cap and a clutch of legitimate governmental purposes.

Accordingly, we vacate the lower court's award of attorneys' fees

and remand for the setting of a fee that comports with section

1997e(d)(2).

Vacated and remanded. No costs.

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