United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 99-2085
RAYMOND P. BOIVIN,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
LT. DONALD BLACK,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Morton A. Brody, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Wallace,* Senior Circuit Judge,
and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
Diane Sleek, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Andrew
Ketterer, Maine Attorney General, and Paul Stern, Deputy
Attorney General, were on brief, for appellant.
Stuart W. Tisdale, Jr., with whom Mary A. Davis and Tisdale
& Davis, P.A. were on brief, for appellee.
September 5, 2000
_______________
*Of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
SELYA, Circuit Judge. The Prison Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (Supp. II 1996), altered the
legal landscape in regard to several types of civil actions
brought by prison inmates. Certain of these changes curtailed
the amount of attorneys' fees that a prevailing prisoner-
plaintiff could expect to obtain from his vanquished opponent.
One such provision involves suits for money damages; when a
prisoner secures a monetary judgment in a civil action covered
by the PLRA, the statute caps the defendants' liability for
attorneys' fees at 150% of the judgment. See id. § 1997e(d)(2).
This appeal raises the novel question of whether the
"monetary judgment" cap applies to nominal damage awards.
Contrary to the district court, we hold that it does. We
proceed to reject the plaintiff's alternative argument that the
cap, so construed, is unconstitutional. Consequently, we set
aside the lower court's order granting a more munificent counsel
fee than the statute allows and remand with instructions to
reduce that award to $1.50.
I. BACKGROUND
Raymond P. Boivin, a pretrial detainee housed at Maine
Correctional Institute—Warren, sued correctional officer Donald
Black following an incident in which Boivin lost consciousness
after being locked in a restraint chair, his mouth covered by a
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towel.1 On January 20, 1999, a jury found that Black, who was
in charge at the time, had violated Boivin's due process rights,
but awarded Boivin only $1.00 in nominal damages. Following
entry of the judgment, Boivin moved for an award of $3,892.50 in
attorneys' fees. Black opposed the motion, arguing that section
1997e(d)(2) capped attorneys' fees at $1.50 (150% of the
monetary judgment).
The trial court ruled that the term "a monetary
judgment," as used in the PLRA, did not include a judgment for
nominal damages and, accordingly, held the fee cap inapplicable.
See Boivin v. Merrill, 66 F. Supp. 2d 50, 51 (D. Me. 1999). The
court rested its decision on two grounds. First, it found that
applying the PLRA's percentage-based fee cap to a nominal damage
award would lead to an absurd result — exemplified here by
Boivin's counsel being entitled to a maximum stipend of $1.50
despite having tried the case to a successful conclusion. See
id. Second, the court posited that applying the PLRA in so
mechanistic a fashion would discourage lawyers from accepting
meritorious prisoner civil rights suits. See id. Finding no
proof in the PLRA's legislative history that Congress intended
1
Boivin also sued several other defendants, but all of them
have long since departed from the litigation. We therefore
treat the case as if Black had been the sole defendant from the
outset.
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to create such a disincentive, the court decreed that the plain
meaning of the provision must yield. See id. The court
proceeded to award the full amount of attorneys' fees requested.
See id. at 52. Black appeals from this determination.
II. ANALYSIS
In order to frame the issues on appeal, we deem it
useful to start with an overview of the parties' positions. As
a threshold matter, Boivin maintains that this appeal is
untimely. Black demurs. Next, Boivin asseverates that the fee
cap should not apply to nominal damage awards because that
application would lead to anomalous results. Black counters
that the plain meaning of section 1997e(d)(2) requires its
application to nominal damage awards, and that, in all events,
it is the failure to apply the fee cap to such awards that would
promote anomalies. Finally, Boivin asserts that if the PLRA fee
cap applies to nominal damage awards, the statute violates the
guarantee of equal protection found in the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.2 Black disagrees, averring that the
statute, so construed, is rationally related to legitimate
2
Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment does
not contain an Equal Protection Clause. The Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, however, prevents the federal sovereign from
practicing unjustifiable discrimination. See Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 500 n.3 (1975); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
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governmental ends. We address each of these three sets of
conflicting contentions in the discussion that follows.
Throughout, we apply de novo review. See Inmates of Suffolk
County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649, 653 (1st Cir. 1997).
A. The Timeliness of the Appeal.
Boivin's claim that Black failed to appeal within the
thirty-day window of opportunity provided by Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) is baseless. The lower court
entered the disputed order on August 12, 1999. The thirty-day
period began the next day. See Fed. R. App. P. 26(a)(1).
Simple arithmetic, confirmed by a glance at last year's
calendar, indicates that the thirtieth day fell on September 11,
1999. Because that day was a Saturday, the thirty-day period
was automatically extended to Monday, September 13. See Fed. R.
App. P. 26(a)(3) (specifying that the last day of the appeal
period automatically extends to the next day if the last day "is
a Saturday, Sunday, [or] legal holiday"). Black filed his
notice of appeal on that date. Hence, the appeal was timely.
See id.
B. The PLRA Fee Cap.
In the American civil justice system, the spoils that
belong to the victor ordinarily do not include payment of
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attorneys' fees. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness
Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). Except when a statute or an
enforceable contractual provision dictates otherwise, litigants
generally pay their own way. See id. at 257. Congress has the
power, however, to revise this schematic, and if it elects to do
so, it may delineate both the circumstances under which
attorneys' fees are to be shifted and the extent of the courts'
discretion in that respect. See id. at 262. Furthermore, this
power may be exercised selectively, that is to say, Congress may
"pick and choose among its statutes and . . . allow attorneys'
fees under some, but not others." Id. at 263.
In perhaps the most striking use of this power to date
— the Fees Act, adopted in 1976 — Congress gave the courts
discretion to award reasonable attorneys' fees to prevailing
civil rights litigants. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (Supp. II
1996). Congress later enacted other statutes that hewed roughly
to this prototype. See, e.g., City of Burlington v. Dague, 505
U.S. 557, 562 (1992) (noting that many federal statutes that
shift attorneys' fees share similar language); Pennsylvania v.
Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546,
562 (1986) (noting that more than 100 federal statutes provide
for attorneys' fees). In enacting the PLRA, Congress deviated
from this pattern, choosing to place some explicit limitations
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on the fees that courts can award to prisoners' lawyers in civil
cases:
(1) In any action brought by a prisoner who
is confined to any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility, in which attorney's
fees are authorized under section 1988 of
this title, such fees shall not be awarded,
except to the extent that—
(A) the fee was directly and
reasonably incurred in proving an
actual violation of the plaintiff's
rights protected by a statute
pursuant to which a fee may be
awarded under section 1988 of this
title; and
(B)(i) the amount of the fee is
proportionately related to the court
ordered relief for the violation; or
(ii) the fee was directly and
reasonably incurred in enforcing the
relief ordered for the violation.
(2) Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded
in an action described in paragraph (1), a
portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25
percent) shall be applied to satisfy the
amount of attorney's fees awarded against
the defendant. If the award of attorney's
fees is not greater than 150 percent of the
judgment, the excess shall be paid by the
defendant.
(3) No award of attorney's fees in an action
described in paragraph (1) shall be based on
an hourly rate greater than 150 percent of
the hourly rate established under 3006A of
title 18, for payment of court-appointed
counsel.
(4) Nothing in this subsection shall
prohibit a prisoner from entering into an
agreement to pay an attorney's fee in an
amount greater than the amount authorized
under this subsection, if the fee is paid by
the individual rather than by the defendant
pursuant to section 1988 of this title.
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42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (footnotes omitted).
The particular limitation around which this appeal
revolves relates to monetary judgments. When a prisoner-
plaintiff garners a monetary judgment, section 1997e(d)(2)
imposes a ceiling on the defendants' liability for attorneys'
fees equal to 150% of the amount of that judgment. This appeal
raises the question of whether a nominal damage award counts as
"a monetary judgment" within the purview of section 1997e(d)(2).
We begin, as we must, with the language of the statute.
See Bonilla v. Muebles J.J. Alvarez, Inc., 194 F.3d 275, 277
(1st Cir. 1999). We assume that the words that Congress chose
to implement its wishes, if not specifically defined, carry
their ordinary meaning and accurately express Congress's intent.
See Rouse, 129 F.3d at 653-54. If the gist of the statute is
obvious and the text, given its plain meaning, produces a
plausible scenario, "it is unnecessary — and improper — to look
for other signposts . . . ." United States v. Charles George
Trucking Co., 823 F.2d 685, 688 (1st Cir. 1987).
While section 1997e(d)(2) is awkwardly phrased, its
import and its essence are transparently clear: "[w]henever a
monetary judgment is awarded" in an action covered by the PLRA
and the prevailing party seeks attorneys' fees, the defendant
shall pay such fees up to a maximum of 150% of the judgment
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amount, and no more.3 Since an award of $1.00 is just as much
a monetary judgment as an award of $1,000,000, the plain
language of the statute makes the fee cap applicable to such an
award. This reasoning becomes especially compelling when one
reflects that, although nominal damage awards long have been
commonplace in civil rights cases, see, e.g., Farrar v. Hobby,
506 U.S. 103, 107 (1992); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266
(1978); O'Connor v. Huard, 117 F.3d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1997);
Maldonado Santiago v. Velazquez Garcia, 821 F.2d 822, 829 (1st
Cir. 1987), section 1997e(d)(2) neither makes any express
exception for nominal damage awards nor excludes from its sweep
judgments of less than "X" dollars.
In a Briarean effort to blunt the force of this logic,
Boivin argues that Congress could not have intended so eccentric
a result. Capping attorneys' fees at $1.50 for a prevailing
plaintiff who has won a nominal damage award, he tells us,
serves to discourage counsel from accepting meritorious
prisoners' rights cases and thereby frustrates prison reform
litigation. We agree with Boivin that the plain-meaning
3
This language contrasts with section 1997e(d)(1)(B)(i),
which deals with other types of judgments in prisoner cases.
That section requires any attorneys' fees awarded in such cases
to be proportionally related to the relief obtained. In section
1997e(d)(2), Congress presumably decided to take advantage of
the precision available when relief is limited to money damages
and to define proportionality in more specific terms.
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doctrine is not a categorical imperative, and that the
unambiguous text of a statute may yield if its application tends
to produce absurd results. See United States v. Ron Pair
Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989); see also Greenwood
Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 825 (1st Cir. 1992)
("[A] court must always hesitate to construe words in a statute
according to their apparent meaning if to do so would defeat
Congress's discovered intendment."). This exception, however,
is to be employed cautiously, see Rouse, 129 F.3d at 655, and it
does not apply at all in this case.
Congress enacted the PLRA out of a concern that
prisoner litigation, much of it frivolous, was wasting taxpayer
money and clogging the courts. See, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. S10576
(daily ed. Sept. 16, 1996) (statement of Sen. Abraham); 141
Cong. Rec. S7526 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Kyl). Congress could well have reasoned that applying the fee
cap to nominal damage awards would encourage both prisoners and
members of the bar to weigh the likely value of claims before
proceeding to court, thus reducing the overall number of
prisoner suits and easing the perceived burden of prisoner
litigation on the justice system. One can argue with the policy
behind such a legislative choice, but one hardly can classify
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the end result of that policy — measured in the large, and not
by the occasional anomalous outcome — as absurd or chimerical.
Indeed, exempting nominal damage awards from the cap
on attorneys' fees, as Boivin urges, itself would run an equally
great (or greater) risk of bringing about bizarre results.
Under such a regime, a prisoner who had won a judgment of $1,000
in compensation for a physical injury suffered in the course of
a constitutional violation could be awarded a maximum of $1,500
in attorneys' fees, but a prisoner subjected to the same
violation who sustained no physical injury and was awarded $1.00
in nominal damages would face no such limitation. There is no
hint in the record that Congress wished to foster these kinds of
inequities. We hold, therefore, that Congress, in enacting
section 1997e(d)(2), meant what it said. The statutory cap on
attorneys' fees applies to all monetary judgments, including
nominal damage awards.4
C. The Constitutionality of the Fee Cap.
4
We add a caveat. In this case, the plaintiff sought and
received only monetary relief. Thus, the fee cap applies. In
a case in which the court orders non-monetary redress (say, an
injunction) along with a monetary judgment, the fee cap
contained in section 1997e(d)(2) would not restrict the total
amount of attorneys' fees that the court could award. In such
a "hybrid" case, the court would be free to take into account
all the provisions of section 1997e(d).
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We turn next to the constitutionality of the PLRA's cap
on attorneys' fees. Two of our sister circuits recently have
addressed the same general question. The Ninth Circuit has
upheld the cap against a constitutional challenge. See Madrid
v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 1999). The Third Circuit,
sitting en banc, split evenly on the issue. See Collins v.
Montgomery County Bd. of Prison Inspectors, 176 F.3d 679, 686
(3d Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 932 (2000).
This court has not yet spoken to the question.
Like the challengers in Madrid and Collins, Boivin
grounds his claim of unconstitutionality in concepts of equal
protection. See supra note 2. The centerpiece of his argument
is that section 1997e(d)(2) treats prisoner civil rights
litigants differently from all other civil rights litigants:
whereas a non-prisoner civil rights litigant who wins only a
nominal damage award can receive substantial attorneys' fees
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, see, e.g., Wilcox v. City of Reno, 42
F.3d 550, 557 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming award of $66,535 in
attorneys' fees to section 1983 plaintiff who had secured a
$1.00 damage award), the fee cap deprives a prevailing prisoner
civil rights litigant of the possibility of any comparable
emolument.
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In light of the Supreme Court's recent pronouncement
in Farrar, the contrast that Boivin seeks to depict may be more
apparent than real. See 506 U.S. at 115 ("When a plaintiff
recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an
essential element of his claim for monetary relief, the only
reasonable fee is usually no fee at all." (citation omitted)).
Leaving that point to one side, the first step in evaluating his
claim is to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny. We
take that step and then proceed to the constitutional question.
1. The Level of Scrutiny. Typically, a law will
withstand an equal protection challenge if it bears a rational
relationship to a legitimate governmental end. See Vacco v.
Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997). This level of scrutiny
intensifies, however, if the law infringes a fundamental right
or involves a suspect classification. See id. Boivin puts
forth two reasons why the PLRA fee cap, which draws a line
between prisoners and non-prisoners, should receive such
heightened scrutiny. First, he declares that prisoners are a
suspect class. Second, he maintains that the fee cap
impermissibly burdens the fundamental right of access to the
courts.
We need not linger long over Boivin's first suggestion.
From a constitutional standpoint, prisoners simply are not a
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suspect class. See Webber v. Crabtree, 158 F.3d 460, 461 (9th
Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (holding that prisoners are not a
suspect class); Zehner v. Trigg, 133 F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir.
1997) (calling the idea that prisoners constitute a suspect
class "completely unsupported"). Thus, heightened scrutiny
cannot be justified on this basis.
Boivin's second suggestion requires a somewhat longer
answer. It is axiomatic that prisoners have a constitutionally-
protected right of meaningful access to the courts. See Bounds
v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). This means that prisoners
must have a reasonably adequate opportunity to bring before the
courts claims that their constitutional rights have been
violated. See id. at 825. To ensure this opportunity,
correctional authorities must "assist inmates in the preparation
and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners
with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons
trained in the law." Id. at 828, distinguished by Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). Boivin asserts that, without
counsel, prisoners have little chance of meaningfully presenting
their claims to the courts, and that the PLRA fee cap therefore
interferes with the right of access by destroying the only real
incentive for lawyers to take prisoners' civil rights cases.
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Boivin's arguments are wrong on the law. The
constitutionally-protected right of access to the courts is
narrow in scope. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 360 (explaining that
constitutional concerns are satisfied as long as prisoners
receive "the minimal help necessary" to present legal claims).
To illustrate, the right of access to the courts does not extend
to enabling prisoners to litigate with maximum effectiveness
once in court. See id. at 354. Similarly, the right of access
to the courts does not require the provision of counsel in civil
cases. See Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18,
26-27 (1981); DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 23 (1st Cir.
1991). A statute which, like section 1997e(d)(2), does nothing
more than limit the availability of an attorney paid for by the
target of a prisoner's suit does not implicate the right of
access to the courts in any cognizable way. Cf. Rouse, 129 F.3d
at 660 (explaining that "while there is a constitutional right
to court access, there is no complementary constitutional right
to receive or be eligible for a particular form of relief").
Boivin's arguments also are wrong on the facts. First
and foremost, the suggestion that prisoners who proceed pro se
do not have a meaningful opportunity to prosecute their claims
is highly debatable. While pro se litigants are not exempt from
procedural rules, courts are solicitous of the obstacles that
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they face. Consequently, courts hold pro se pleadings to less
demanding standards than those drafted by lawyers. See Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Instituto de
Educacion Universal Corp. v. United States Dep't of Educ., 209
F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000). By the same token, courts
endeavor, within reasonable limits, to guard against the loss of
pro se claims due to technical defects. See, e.g., Balistreri
v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
The net result is that pro se litigants sometimes enjoy stunning
success. See Jon O. Newman, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation:
Looking for Needles in Haystacks, 62 Brook. L. Rev. 519, 519 n.2
(1996) (collecting representative cases in which prisoners
acting pro se have won significant victories).
In all events, the PLRA fee cap does not make it
impossible for a prisoner to secure the services of a lawyer.
Cynics and naysayers notwithstanding, we are reluctant to
conclude that all attorneys accept or reject prisoners' cases
solely on the basis of financial considerations. Moreover,
prisoners may hire attorneys with their own funds. See 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(4) ("Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit
a prisoner from entering into an agreement to pay an attorney's
fee . . . ."). Then, too, the PLRA contains other provisions
that allow for differential compensation (including shifted fees
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not subject to the section 1997e(d)(2) cap, see supra note 4)
where injunctive or declaratory relief is obtained. See 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1). Finally, the PLRA does not eliminate all
prospect of shifted attorneys' fees even in cases that involve
only money damages. After all, the statutory cap allows for an
award of attorneys' fees in an amount up to 150% of a monetary
judgment — which is 150% more than the norm in civil litigation.
We doubt that a lawyer who believes that a prisoner has a
meritorious claim for damages will be deterred by that
limitation.
To say more on this topic would be supererogatory. We
agree with Judge O'Scannlain that, in the last analysis, "[t]he
PLRA does not restrict access to the courts; at most, it
restricts prisoners' access to the most sought-after counsel who
insist on their going rate for representation." Madrid, 190
F.3d at 995. Heightened scrutiny is, therefore, inappropriate
in this case.5
5
At any rate, a prisoner must show actual injury in order to
demonstrate a violation of the right of access to the courts.
See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349. The Lewis Court defined actual
injury as "a nonfrivolous legal claim [being] frustrated or . .
. impeded." Id. at 353 (footnotes omitted). Boivin's claim was
neither frustrated nor impeded by the PLRA fee cap. On the
contrary, he secured the services of able counsel and won his
case. Consequently, he has not suffered an actual injury that
would allow him to claim a violation of his fundamental right of
access to the courts.
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2. Rationality Review. Since the PLRA fee cap neither
involves a suspect classification nor infringes on the
fundamental right of access to the courts, we analyze its
constitutionality under the rational basis test.
Rationality review in equal protection cases "is not
a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of
legislative choices." FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508
U.S. 307, 313 (1993). Rather, an inquiring court must ask
whether "there is a rational relationship between the disparity
of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose." Heller
v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993). If "any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis
for the classification" exists, the classification must be
upheld. Beach, 508 U.S. at 313. As long as this modest burden
is satisfied, Congress's handiwork will endure "even if the law
seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular group,
or if the rationale for it seems tenuous." Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
Consistent with these tenets, the Supreme Court has
made it pellucid that a person who challenges the rationality of
a statute must negate every plausible basis that conceivably
might support it. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 320; Lehnhausen v.
Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973). Boivin
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fails to discredit the legitimacy of no fewer than three
purposes that are served by the cap on attorneys' fees:
discouraging frivolous suits, protecting the public fisc, and
bringing prisoner incentives to litigate more in line with non-
prisoner incentives.6
We need not pause to analyze these legislative purposes
separately. It suffices to say that the prison setting is sui
generis, and Congress's choice to treat prisoners differently
than non-prisoners is plainly justified by the idiosyncratic
characteristics of that setting. Prisoners' living costs are
paid by the public and prisoners have nowhere to go — a
combination that gives them more free time than non-prisoners to
pursue claims (whether or not valid). The problem of prisoner
6
The legislative history provides ample evidence that
Congress had these goals in mind in passing the PLRA. See 141
Cong. Rec. S14626 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) ("This landmark legislation will help bring relief to a
civil justice system overburdened by frivolous prisoner
lawsuits."); 141 Cong. Rec. S7526 (daily ed. May 25, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Kyl) ("[P]risoners have all the necessities
of life supplied, including the materials required to bring
their lawsuits. For a prisoner who qualifies for poor person
status, there is no cost to bring a suit and, therefore, no
incentive to limit suits to cases that have some chance of
success."); 141 Cong. Rec. H1042 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995)
(statement of Rep. Hoke) ("[T]here is an element of the bar that
makes a full-time living in contacting prisoners and then using
shotgun approach lawsuits . . . . [T]he reason they do this is
because [they] can actually be reimbursed their fees, all of
them . . . . [W]e have said . . . you can only be paid if you
win, and you can only be paid on the part that you do win on.").
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litigiousness is exacerbated by the nature of prison life, as
inmates tend to egg each other on. This problem is further
complicated by the constitutionally-protected right to a certain
level of legal assistance, see Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828.
Experience has shown that these and other factors, acting in
concert, encourage inmates to bring large numbers of
insubstantial claims — or so Congress rationally could have
thought. See Madrid, 190 F.3d at 996 ("[I]t is certainly
conceivable that, because of significant potential gains and low
opportunity costs, prisoners generally file a disproportionate
number of frivolous suits as compared to the population as a
whole."). Thus, we reject Boivin's plaint that the statute
distinguishes impermissibly between prisoners and other civil
rights plaintiffs.
Boivin attempts to elude the inevitability of this
result in a variety of ways. Citing the uncontroversial
principle that a court ought not to uphold a law motivated by "a
bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group," United
States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973), he
insists that the fee cap discriminates against prisoners with
meritorious claims, leaving them bereft of counsel so their
claims can more easily be thwarted. But given the legitimate
governmental purposes that underlie the fee cap, see supra, the
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claim of a bare desire to harm will not fly. Consequently, the
Moreno principle has no application on these facts.
As a fallback, Boivin deplores what he envisions as the
complete lack of fit between the means that Congress chose
(capping attorneys' fees) and the end that it sought to achieve
(reducing frivolous prisoner litigation). Although this argument
is presented only in skeletal form, it is phrased in terms
reminiscent of the Supreme Court's decision in Lindsey v. Normet,
405 U.S. 56, 77-78 (1972) (holding unconstitutional a double-bond
requirement imposed on tenants who seek to appeal landlords'
verdicts in rent disputes on the ground that the requirement "not
only bars nonfrivolous appeals by those who are unable to post
the bond but also allows meritless appeals by others who can
afford the bond"). Thus, we assume that Boivin means that since
attorneys' fees are awarded only to prevailing parties, the fee
cap could have no possible deterrent effect on the filing of
meritless actions.
Common sense suggests that this ex post view is
untenable. Congress presumably feared the motivating effect of
the prospect of attorneys' fees, ex ante, and the fee cap quells
that effect by capping the potential payoff. This changes the
odds and forces both lawyer and client, out of self-interest, to
assess likely outcomes with greater care before filing a suit
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that, even if nominally successful, might leave them holding a
nearly empty bag.
To be sure, it can be argued that discouraging lawyers
from filing frivolous prisoner suits will fail to reduce the
overall number of meritless claims because the suits eschewed by
lawyers simply will be prosecuted by prisoners acting pro se. In
that event, all that the fee cap will achieve is a reduction in
the number of frivolous cases in which prisoners are represented
by counsel. While the argument that we have posited is not
illogical, there are still two conceivable ways in which the fee
cap might serve to reduce the aggregate number of frivolous
prisoner suits. First, Congress may have believed that at least
some prisoners would abandon their claims if they could not
secure the services of an attorney. Second, to the extent that
Congress thought lawyers were exhorting prisoners to pursue
frivolous claims in the hope that lightning would strike — that,
say, a runaway jury would hand down a favorable verdict or a
sympathetic judge would couple a smidgen of relief with a large
fee award — the fee cap would tend to curtail that behavior,
thereby reducing the overall number of frivolous suits in the
system. Recognizing that rationality review is highly
deferential to legislative choices, see Beach, 508 U.S. at 313,
these possibilities are sufficient to sustain the statutory fee
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cap. "Under the rational basis test, duly enacted socioeconomic
legislation should be upheld so long as any set of facts could
suffice to establish a rational relationship between the law and
the government's legitimate objectives." Montalvo-Huertas v.
Rivera-Cruz, 885 F.2d 971, 978 (1st Cir. 1989).
Nor does Boivin's analogy to Lindsey compel a different
result. The case before us differs from Lindsey in two important
respects. First, unlike the double-bond requirement, the cap on
attorneys' fees is not a barrier to court access, but a
limitation on relief: the double-bond requirement operated
directly to bar appeals by individuals who could not afford the
extra cost, whereas the fee cap only affects how claims are
presented and does not preclude any prisoner from actually
bringing a claim. Second, the Lindsey Court found a very poor
correlation between the double-bond requirement and the goal of
reducing frivolous appeals. See 405 U.S. at 78. The fee cap
fits much more snugly with the goal of reducing the volume of
frivolous suits because it has the principal effect of
encouraging both prisoners and lawyers who are mulling whether to
bring covered cases to ask if the game is worth the candle, given
the relief available.
Let us be crystal clear. We do not suggest that there
is a seamless fit between section 1997e(d)(2) and the goals that
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Congress aspired to achieve. However, rational basis review does
not require a perfect accommodation between means and ends. See
Heller, 509 U.S. at 321. Because a cap on attorneys' fees,
particularly when linked with the requirement that the prisoner
contribute part of the award to the payment of the fee, see 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2), conceivably may discourage prisoners and
their counsel from filing frivolous or low-value suits, we think
that the fit is close enough to pass constitutional muster. See
Metropolis Theater Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69 (1913)
("The problems of government are practical ones and may justify,
if they do not require, rough accommodations . . . .").
III. CONCLUSION
We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated
herein, we hold that PLRA § 1997e(d)(2) applies to nominal damage
awards and that, as applied, the statute does not offend the
Fifth Amendment because there is a rational relationship between
the fee cap and a clutch of legitimate governmental purposes.
Accordingly, we vacate the lower court's award of attorneys' fees
and remand for the setting of a fee that comports with section
1997e(d)(2).
Vacated and remanded. No costs.
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Boivin v. Black
Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Date filed: 2000-09-07
Citations: 225 F.3d 36
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