[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 00-1723
ESPERANZA MORALES,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Hector M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lipez, Circuit Judge,
Campbell and Cyr, Senior Circuit Judges.
Melba N. Rivera-Camacho on brief for appellant.
Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Lilliam Mendoza Toro,
Assistant U.S. Attorney, and Robert J. Triba, Chief Counsel,
Social Security Administration, on brief for appellee.
February 15, 2001
Per Curiam. Claimant Esperanza Morales appeals from
the judgment of the district court. This judgment affirmed
the denial by the Commissioner of Social Security of
claimant's application for disability benefits. We affirm
the district court's judgment for the following reasons.
The findings of fact of the administrative law
judge (ALJ) "are conclusive when supported by substantial
evidence, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), but are not conclusive when
derived by ignoring evidence, misapplying the law, or judging
matters entrusted to experts." Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d
31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999) (per curiam). It also is important
to keep in mind that resolution of conflicts in the evidence
and the ultimate determination of disability are for the ALJ,
not the courts. See Rodriguez v. Secretary of Health and
Human Services, 647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir. 1981). Based on
the following, it is apparent that the record contains
conflicting evidence and that a sufficient amount of this
evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion that claimant retained
the residual functional capacity (RFC) to engage in her past,
sedentary work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) (1997)
(sedentary work requires the ability (1) to lift no more than
10 pounds at a time, and (2) to occasionally lift items like
small tools; the capacity to sit also is required, along with
the capacity to occasionally walk and stand).
First, of course, is the RFC assessment completed
by the non-examining physician which indicates that claimant
frequently can lift and carry 25 pounds and is able to sit,
stand, and walk for about six hours each, in an eight-hour
work day. As for claimant's heart condition, the record
reveals that she has good cardiac function and a fair
tolerance for exercise. The ALJ, in his decision, also read
one of the heart studies as concluding that claimant could
perform sedentary work and claimant does not dispute the
ALJ's reading of this report. Further, Dr. Marti noted that
claimant experienced chest pain on "light," not sedentary,
exertion and that, in any event, the pain was relieved with
nitroglycerin tabs.
In relation to claimant's musculoskeletal
condition, the most striking evidence, aside from the non-
examining RFC assessment, is the conclusion of Dr. Cintron,
one of the examining consultants, that claimant essentially
is not disabled at all. Indeed, claimant showed no atrophy
and exhibited a full range of motion in her arms, neck, and
back. There also is the "objective" medical evidence – the
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x-rays – which showed only spondylotic changes and mild
osteopenia; there were no bulging or ruptured discs.
We also reject claimant's argument that the ALJ did
not give controlling weight to the opinions of Drs. Marti and
Diaz, claimant's treating physicians. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(d)(2) (1997). Here, the ALJ, in deciding not to
give such weight to the RFC assessments of Drs. Marti and
Diaz, stated that the assessments were not corroborated by
clinical studies or findings and were refuted by the rest of
the record evidence. Given the results of the tests
concerning claimant's heart and spine, this seems an adequate
reason. That is, the tests are not consistent with the
conclusion of these doctors that claimant could not perform
even sedentary work. Further, the diagnosis of carpal tunnel
syndrome made by Dr. Diaz is not confirmed by any tests and
the opinions of both treating sources that claimant was
limited in the use of her hands conflicts with the reports
of both of the consultative physicians, who failed to note
any problems with claimant's hands.
In regard to her mental impairment, claimant's
primary argument is that her condition meets, or at least
equals, a listed impairment. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart
P., App. 1. In particular, claimant refers to § 12.05, the
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listing for mental retardation and autism. According to §
12.05, "[m]ental retardation refers to a significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning with deficits in
adaptive behavior initially manifested during the
developmental period (before age 22)."
The problem with claimant's argument is that there
simply is no evidence in the record that claimant had any
"deficits in adaptive behavior initially manifested . . .
before age 22." Indeed, claimant herself reported to Dr. de
Jesus that, prior to 1992, she had been physically and
emotionally healthy. Further, claimant stated that she had
obtained fair grades through the sixth grade and had left
school due to a skin condition. Thus, claimant has failed
to establish that she fits within the basic definition of
mental retardation set out in § 12.05. Finally, although
claimant averred that she "equaled" this listing, she does
not explain how.
Affirmed.
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