United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 00-1472
WESLEY WALSH,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Frank H. Freedman, Senior District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
William T. Walsh, Jr. for appellant.
Karen L. Goodwin, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, was on brief for
appellee.
March 2, 2001
CYR, Senior Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Wesley Walsh
challenges the summary judgment ruling which prompted the
district court to dismiss his Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”)
suit for compensatory damages associated with a “slip and fall”
on snow and ice outside the United States Post Office in East
Longmeadow, Massachusetts, on January 10, 1996, during the
waning hours of an extended snowstorm. Two days earlier, a
blizzard had blanketed the area with approximately two feet of
snow, which was followed by a further accumulation the next day
and windblown snow showers on the day of the accident.
The district court ruled that summary judgment was in
order under the controlling Massachusetts caselaw, see Sullivan
v. Town of Brookline, 416 Mass. 825, 827, 626 N.E.2d 870, 872
(1994), absent evidence that the snow and ice at the accident
site was anything other than a “natural accumulation.” We
affirm the judgment.
I
BACKGROUND
According to Walsh, it was snowing as he exited his car
to walk to the post office. The snow on the sidewalk leading to
the post office was “packed down,” “very, very uneven,” and
“discolored.“ Since the conditions appeared somewhat worse on
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the sidewalk, Walsh decided to walk to the post office through
the adjacent parking lot. He did so without incident.
Upon exiting the post office, however, Walsh chose to
return to the car by way of the sidewalk, largely because it
afforded a more direct route than the one he had taken earlier
through the parking lot. Moments later, at the point where a
handicap-access ramp meets the sidewalk and the sidewalk slopes
slightly to accommodate wheelchairs, Walsh suddenly slipped, his
“leg came right down underneath [him] and [he] went down full
force.” Walsh could recall no preexisting footprints in the snow
where he fell, nor had he noticed any difference between the
conditions at the accident site than elsewhere along the route
through the parking lot.
II
DISCUSSION
The FTCA subjects the United States to tort liability
“in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
Well in advance of its reconfirmation by the Supreme Judicial
Court in 1994, see Sullivan, 416 Mass. 825, 626 N.E.2d 870, this
court had concluded that the “natural accumulation” doctrine
remained alive and well in Massachusetts. See Athas v. United
States, 904 F.2d 79, 82 (1st Cir. 1990) (failure of postal
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employees to remove water accumulation on post office steps,
during ongoing rainstorm, held insufficient to subject landowner
to liability under Massachusetts law) (citing Lowe v. National
Shawmut Bank of Boston, 363 Mass. 74, 77, 292 N.E.2d 683, 685
(1973); Wexler v. Stanetsky Mem’l Chapel of Brookline, Inc., 2
Mass. App. Ct. 750, 751, 321 N.E.2d 686, 687 (1975)). Nor do we
discern any material change in the “natural accumulation”
doctrine since Athas.
The district court, quoting Sullivan, 416 Mass. at 827,
626 N.E.2d at 872, ruled that “[h]ere, just as in Sullivan, ‘the
plaintiff’s evidence tend[ing] to show that the shovelling of the
[handicap access] ramp by the [post office] employees exposed ice
that was already there’ is insufficient to generate liability .
. . .” District Court Order, at 2 (quoting Sullivan, 416 Mass.
at 827-28, 626 N.E.2d at 872). The district court further
observed that, as in Sullivan, “there is ‘no evidence that the
employees’ shovelling altered the condition of the ice on the
[handicap access] ramp.’ Id. (no liability where ‘a property
owner removes a portion of an accumulation of snow or ice and a
person is injured by slipping and falling on the remainder
because the snow or ice remains as a natural accumulation’).”
Id.
III
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CONCLUSION
As the district court correctly ruled that the United
States was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
Massachusetts law, we affirm its judgment.
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