United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 98-1538
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
CARLOS RIVERA-RUIZ,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
Lynch and Lipez, Circuit Judges.
Ramón M. González for appellant.
Ruth J. Vernet, with whom Guillermo Gil, United States
Attorney, Jorge E. Vega-Pacheco, Assistant United States
Attorney, Chief, Criminal Division, and Camille Vélez-Rivé,
Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.
April 5, 2001
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Carlos Rivera-Ruiz appeals his
conviction for one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute cocaine. He also appeals his sentence of 121 months.
Rivera claims that the evidence presented at trial, consisting
largely of the testimony of one cooperating witness about one
transaction, was insufficient to convict him of participating in
a conspiracy. He also argues that there was an impermissible
variance between the allegations in the indictment and the proof
offered at trial, and that the prosecutor's closing argument
denied him due process of law. Finally, he claims that the
district court made an error in sentencing. Although we
acknowledge the closeness of the sufficiency issue, we affirm
the conviction and sentence.
I. Background
Carlos Rivera-Ruiz ("Rivera") was charged in count six
of a ten-count indictment charging various individuals with
violations of federal drug laws. While some of the other counts
charged substantive drug offenses, Rivera was charged with
conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
-2-
841(a)(1)1 and 846.2 The indictment alleged that Rivera,
together with Jaime Padilla Rodríguez ("Padilla"), Jorge Arroyo-
Rivera ("Arroyo"), and two unindicted co-conspirators,3 conspired
to possess and distribute cocaine. All of the other individuals
named in the indictment pled guilty. Trial for Rivera commenced
in mid-September, 1997. Following a three-day trial, the jury
returned a verdict of guilty. The court sentenced Rivera to 121
months in prison.
II. The Sufficiency of the Evidence
Rivera moved for a judgment of acquittal after the
government rested and again at the close of all the evidence.
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. The district court denied that motion,
and we review that ruling de novo. See United States v.
Hernández, 146 F.3d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1998). In considering the
evidence presented at trial, we view the facts and draw all
121 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) provides that "it shall be unlawful
for any person knowingly or intentionally . . . to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance."
2 21 U.S.C. § 846 provides: "Any person who attempts or
conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall
be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the
offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt
or conspiracy."
3Unindicted co-conspirator No. 1 was identified as William
Negrón Zapata ("Negrón"), and unindicted co-conspirator No. 2
was identified as Víctor Ramírez de Arellano ("Ramírez").
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reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution. See United
States v. Baldyga, 233 F.3d 674, 678 (1st Cir. 2000). We have
a limited role in reviewing this evidence.
An appellate court plays a very
circumscribed role in gauging the
sufficiency of the evidentiary foundation
upon which a criminal conviction rests. The
court of appeals neither weighs the
credibility of the witnesses nor attempts to
assess whether the prosecution succeeded in
eliminating every possible theory consistent
with the defendant's innocence.
United States v. Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, 56 (1st Cir. 1998)
(quoting United States v. Noah, 130 F.3d 490, 494 (1st Cir.
1997)). Our inquiry is only whether "the guilty verdict finds
support in a 'plausible rendition of the record.'" United States
v. Echeverri, 982 F.2d 675, 677 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting United
States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 711 (1st Cir. 1992)).
A. The Evidence
The evidence presented by the government at Rivera's
trial consisted largely of the testimony of William Negrón
Zapata, who testified that he met Rivera in 1986 through a
mutual friend, Ricardo Maldonado. He further stated that he saw
Rivera on several occasions in 1986, as well as in 1990. The
two would meet at Rivera's home, and Negrón stated that Rivera
sometimes visited him at his automobile repair shop which he
operated out of his home. He successfully identified
-4-
photographs of property owned by Rivera at trial and knew that
Rivera also ran an automobile repair shop out of his home.
Regarding the transactions charged in the indictment,
Negrón testified that he agreed to purchase two kilograms of
cocaine on April 15, 1991 from Amador Irizarry Sanabria, a man
he had known since 1989 and had purchased drugs from on prior
occasions. Negrón paid him a total of $26,000 for the drugs, or
$13,000 for each kilogram. Jaime Padilla Rodríguez, a friend of
Irizarry's, arrived at Negrón's house that day to deliver the
cocaine. Because Negrón had customers in his auto repair shop
when Padilla arrived, he asked Padilla to leave and follow a
specified road to a point where they could exchange the cocaine
more privately. Padilla complied with these instructions.
Negrón, accompanied by his personal bodyguard, Jorge Arroyo
Rivera, met Padilla at the specified location and collected the
package of cocaine.4
After obtaining the two kilograms of cocaine from
Irizarry, Negrón contacted his friend Víctor Ramírez de
Arellano, an attorney. Negrón first met Ramírez in December
1989 when he retained him to represent his uncle in a criminal
matter. Ramírez had purchased drugs from Negrón on several
4
Negrón's testimony regarding this transaction was not
corroborated by other witnesses. Padilla died in 1996, one year
before the trial.
-5-
occasions beginning in February 1991. On April 15, Ramírez
agreed to buy one kilogram of cocaine for $13,500. Ramírez
corroborated Negrón's account of this transaction at trial.
Negrón also called Rivera on the afternoon of April 15,
and Rivera agreed to buy the other kilogram of cocaine from him
for $13,500. The two agreed that they would meet at Rivera's
house at the Anones Ward in Las Marías the following morning.
The prosecution did not offer a record of this phone call at
trial, and Negrón testified on cross-examination that he did not
remember what phone he used to place the call. Early on April
16, Negrón arrived at Rivera's home, unaccompanied, and gave him
the drugs in exchange for $13,500. He stated that this
transaction occurred in a living room on the first floor of
Rivera's house and that only he and Rivera were present when
they exchanged the drugs.
After leaving Rivera's house, Negrón called Padilla
from his cellular phone and asked him to bring an additional two
kilograms of cocaine from Irizarry. As before, Padilla arrived
at Negrón's home and auto shop and the two then left separately
to meet at the same specified location. Negrón gave Padilla
$26,000 for the two kilograms of cocaine he had received the day
before, and Padilla gave him an additional two kilograms.
-6-
Negrón sold one kilogram to Roberto Rivera Ortiz, to
whom he had sold cocaine on several prior occasions. He sold
the other kilogram to Ramírez the following morning, April 17.
Ramírez testified that he then sold the cocaine to two other
people. Padilla arrived at Negrón's house to collect the
$26,000 payment for the cocaine after Negrón made these sales.
Negrón's testimony about his drug transactions in April
1991 was uncorroborated, except by Ramírez who corroborated
Negrón's account of their two transactions. However, Negrón's
testimony was also uncontradicted. The only witness offered by
Rivera was Ramonita Malavé, his ex-wife. The two were married
for 18 years and divorced in 1989, two years prior to the events
described in the indictment. Malavé testified that a man named
José López, together with his family, was renting the first
floor of the home owned by Rivera where Negrón alleged that the
transfer of cocaine had occurred. She stated that López moved
from the first floor of the home to the second floor sometime
after April 1991, but she was uncertain of the exact date when
questioned on cross-examination. Malavé also testified that
Rivera was able to purchase and maintain several properties
because of the rents he collected and the income he earned from
his automobile repair shop.
-7-
B. Applicable Principles
To establish Rivera's guilt on the conspiracy charge,
the government needed to show "the existence of a conspiracy,
the defendant's knowledge of the conspiracy, and the defendant's
voluntary participation in the conspiracy." United States v.
Morillo, 158 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 1998). Rivera conceded, both
below and on appeal, that a conspiracy to distribute cocaine
existed. He only disputes his own involvement with that
conspiracy.
Rivera's voluntary participation in the conspiracy
could have been demonstrated by evidence that he intended to
enter into an agreement with the other parties to the conspiracy
and that he intended "to effectuate the commission of the
substantive offense." United States v. Piper, 35 F.3d 611, 615
(1st Cir. 1994). "The agreement itself 'need not be express,
but may consist of no more than a tacit understanding.'"
Echeverri, 982 F.2d at 679 (quoting United States v. Glover, 814
F.2d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1987)). The proof of Rivera's involvement
in the conspiracy "may consist of indirect evidence, including
reasonable inferences drawn from attendant circumstances." Id.
In determining whether a single conspiracy exists, we
have considered whether the participants shared a common goal.
See United States v. Portela, 167 F.3d 687, 695 (1st Cir. 1999).
-8-
The common goal of selling cocaine for profit satisfies this
element. See id. We have also examined whether there was
overlap among the participants to the conspiracy. See id. Such
overlap exists where a conspiracy is marked by the "pervasive
involvement of a single 'core conspirator,'" or "hub character."
Id. (quoting United States v. Wilson, 116 F.3d 1066, 1076 (5th
Cir. 1997)).
There is no need for a conspirator to know the other
participants in the conspiracy. See United States v. Sepúlveda,
15 F.3d 1161, 1191 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Nueva, 979
F.2d 880, 884 (1st Cir. 1992) ("[T]he government need not prove
that the defendant knew all the details or all the members of
the conspiracy."). Additionally, there is no requirement that
a conspirator realize the full extent of the conspiracy to be
found guilty. See United States v. Walters, 904 F.2d 765, 770
(1st Cir. 1990). As we said in Portela, the requisite level of
interdependence among conspirators exists where the defendant
realized that the success of his own drug transactions depended
on the ability of others to obtain drugs from suppliers and to
sell them for profit to other purchasers:
[T]here was sufficient evidence for the jury
to conclude that [the appellant] understood
that his transaction's success depended on
the health of the trafficking and
distribution network focused around [the
seller of drugs], which in turn depended on
-9-
continued transactions between [the seller]
and other suppliers. Although these other
suppliers were perhaps unknown individually
to [the appellant], the jury could have
reasonably inferred that he must have been
aware of their existence.
Portela, 167 F.3d at 697. Ultimately, our analysis of whether
Rivera was part of a conspiracy does not rest on any particular
element because "this court has looked beyond any . . . lists of
factors to the 'totality of the evidence' in determining whether
there is factual support for a finding of a single conspiracy."
Id. at 696 (quoting United States v. Drougas, 748 F.2d 8, 17
(1st Cir. 1984)).
C. Applying the Principles to the Evidence
1. Transaction between Negrón and Rivera
Rivera claims that Negrón's uncorroborated testimony
regarding the single transaction between them is unreliable
because Negrón agreed to cooperate with the government.
However, credibility determinations are uniquely within the
province of the jury, and we do not evaluate those judgments on
appeal. See Woodward, 149 F.3d at 56. Moreover, Rivera's trial
counsel subjected Negrón to lengthy cross-examination about his
cooperation with the government and his other drug transactions.
Despite these efforts to impeach Negrón, the jury could have
rationally concluded that Negrón was telling the truth about his
sale of cocaine to Rivera.
-10-
Rivera also attempted to contradict this testimony by
offering the testimony of his ex-wife, Malavé, that his
residence was occupied by a tenant at the time of the alleged
transaction. However, the jury could reasonably have found
Negrón's testimony to be more credible than Malavé's. Malavé's
recollection of the relevant dates was uncertain, especially on
cross-examination, and Rivera's attorney even conceded in his
closing argument that Malavé's testimony had been "all over the
place."
Rivera further contends that, even if the jury found
credible Negrón's uncorroborated testimony that Negrón sold
cocaine to him, this single transaction cannot, as a matter of
law, establish his guilt of the crime of conspiracy. We agree
that a single drug transaction for the personal use of the
purchaser, without prearrangement or other factors indicative of
conspiratorial intent, does not establish a conspiracy. See
United States v. Moran, 984 F.2d 1299, 1304 (1st Cir. 1993).
Nonetheless, we have found, under certain circumstances, that
one drug transaction may provide sufficient evidence for a jury
to find the existence of a conspiracy to distribute cocaine.
See, e.g., Portela, 167 F.3d at 698 ("The evidence . . . was
thus sufficient to have led a reasonable jury to conclude that
[the defendant] was a party to a tacit agreement relating to
-11-
[the seller's] entire continuing enterprise, despite the fact
that there was only a single transaction between them."); Moran,
984 F.2d at 1303 ("Even a single sale for resale, embroidered
with evidence suggesting a joint undertaking between buyer and
seller, could suffice."); United States v. Carbone, 798 F.2d
21, 27 (1st Cir. 1986). Drawing on the body of conspiracy law
we have just described, we evaluate the circumstances that
support the conspiracy conviction.
2. Knowing participation in a conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute cocaine
Negrón admitted that he sold cocaine for profit, and
he testified that he sold one kilogram of cocaine to Rivera.
Such a large quantity of drugs supports the inference that
Rivera did not intend to use the cocaine merely for personal
consumption, but rather intended to acquire it for
redistribution. See United States v. Jesús-Ríos, 990 F.2d 672,
680 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Geer, 923 F.2d 892, 895
(1st Cir. 1991) ("The jury could infer the fact of a conspiracy
to distribute drugs from the quantities of cocaine and hashish
involved - quantities far larger than needed for personal
use."). The inference that Rivera's purchase was for resale is
strengthened by Ramírez's testimony that Ramírez resold the one
kilogram of cocaine he purchased from Negrón.
-12-
Rivera's cash payment of $13,500 to Negrón also
supports an inference that Rivera was engaged in the business of
buying and selling cocaine. Negrón testified that Rivera agreed
to purchase the cocaine on the afternoon of April 15. Slightly
more than twelve hours later, in the early morning of April 16,
Rivera gave Negrón $13,500 in exchange for the drugs. The
ability to gather such a large amount of cash overnight supports
an inference that Rivera was more than a one-time, casual
purchaser of cocaine. That inference draws further support from
the promptness of Negrón's phone call to Rivera after coming
into possession of the cocaine. Negrón did not make random
calls. He called Ramírez, to whom he had sold drugs on several
occasions, and Rivera, whom he knew. As the government said
during its closing argument: "This is not a supermarket where
you go and you select the product that you want. If you want
drugs you have to know where to get them and who sells them
because William Negrón Zapata would not sell you or any one of
you any drugs unless he knew that you were in the same business
he was."5
5Although Rivera claims on appeal that this was improper
argument, inviting the jury to convict Rivera "merely as a
result of knowing Negrón-Zapata," we find that this was a fair
argument given the evidence presented.
-13-
Additionally, there was evidence that Rivera owned
multiple properties in Puerto Rico. As the government argues,
it is reasonable to question the source of this wealth,
particularly because Rivera's automobile shop in his home was
not likely to generate the quantity of cash Rivera had available
to purchase cocaine from Negrón.6 A reasonable jury could find,
on these facts, that Rivera's income was supplemented by money
he earned from buying cocaine and selling it for profit.
There is ample evidence, in short, that Rivera and
Negrón shared the common objective of buying and selling cocaine
for profit, agreed on a transaction for that purpose, and
carried it out. See Portela, 167 F.3d at 695. This transaction
was far different than the "unplanned spot sale with no
agreement beyond that inherent in the sale" noted in Moran.
Moran, 984 F.2d at 1302. "[W]here advanced plans are made
regarding the sale of narcotics in wholesale quantities, the
6
Rivera objects to the government's comment, in closing
argument, about his ownership of these properties.
Specifically, he contends that the following comments by the
prosecutor were misleading and may have led the jury to convict
him for an improper reason: "The defendant, you know from the
evidence, is the owner of at least four structures . . . . And
what is the occupation of the defendant? Mechanic body repair
shop. How many people do you know who own a mechanic shop, auto
body repair shop, you see them all over the island, that own
four houses. . . . Look at that house. Big. Commercial
antennas, solar system. The works. What a house. Two stories.
We know that he owns a house. Good." There was no error in
this closing argument, which was based on the evidence.
-14-
participants in the transaction may be presumed to know that
they are part of a broader conspiracy." United States v. Harris,
8 F.3d 943, 946 (2d Cir. 1993) (quotation marks omitted).
With respect to that broader conspiracy, Ramírez
testified that he and Negrón engaged in cocaine transactions on
numerous occasions, and Negrón provided the details of his sale
of cocaine to Rivera. Negrón also testified that he had
"participated in endless numbers of drug transactions with Mr.
Amador [Irizarry]"7 prior to 1991. Negrón and Rivera had known
each other since 1986 and met on several occasions in 1990.
These contacts over a several year period provided an
opportunity for Rivera to know of Negrón's involvement in other
drug transactions, particularly because Negrón had a long
history as a drug dealer. Indeed, Negrón's familiarity with
Rivera is demonstrated by the fact that Negrón chose not to
bring his bodyguard with him when he delivered the cocaine to
Rivera, although he did bring his bodyguard along when he
received the two kilograms of cocaine from Padilla. This
routine quality of Rivera and Negrón's one kilogram transaction
in April 1991 supports an inference of Rivera's awareness of
Negrón's involvement with these other transactions. This
7
For unexplained reasons, the indictment did not allege
that Irizarry was part of this conspiracy.
-15-
knowledge, coupled with Rivera's cash purchase of a large
quantity of cocaine for resale, suffices to establish that
Rivera was aware that his purchase was part of a larger
conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and that he furthered the
purpose of that conspiracy with his purchase. That Rivera did
not fully understand the details of Negrón's many drug
transactions is of no import. See Walters, 904 F.2d at 771 ("It
is not necessary that the government prove that the defendant .
. . knew the extent of the conspiracy."). Thus, a rational jury
could have concluded that Rivera tacitly acquiesced in the
scheme of Negrón and the other co-conspirators to distribute
cocaine for profit when he purchased the kilogram from Negrón.
Such a tacit understanding is sufficient for Rivera to be guilty
of conspiracy. See Echeverri, 982 F.2d at 679.
Rivera relies on our decision in United States v.
DeLutis, 722 F.2d 902 (1st Cir. 1983), to support his contention
that a single act is insufficient to hold an individual
criminally accountable for conspiracy. In DeLutis, however,
there was no drug transaction, no evidence of an intent to sell
the defendant a large quantity of cocaine, and only an inference
that the defendant intended to buy an undetermined amount of
cocaine. See 722 F.2d at 907. Still, we reaffirm the general
proposition advanced in DeLutis that "a single sale of drugs
-16-
without more does not establish a conspiracy." Id. at 906.
Here there was enough additional evidence to establish the
conspiracy charged and to withstand Rivera's sufficiency
challenge.
III. Amendment to the Indictment
Rivera argues that he was prejudiced because the
government, prior to trial, amended the indictment to correct a
clerical error. In the overt acts charged under Count VI, the
conspiracy charge, the government amended the language to
substitute "UCC No. 1" for "UCC No. 2," and vice versa, in every
paragraph except one. In other words, the indictment wrongly
referred to Negrón, UCC No. 1, as UCC No. 2 in the description
of the overt acts, and similarly referred to Ramírez, UCC No. 2,
as UCC No. 1. The correction simply required a substitution of
"No. 1" for "No. 2" and "No. 2" for "No. 1." Rivera has not
explained how this correction failed to give him notice of the
conspiracy charge against him. Moreover, the government was not
even required to prove any overt acts in furtherance of the
conspiracy. See Portela, 167 F.3d at 702. Thus, correcting
this clerical error did not deprive Rivera of notice of the
charge against him.
IV. Variance
-17-
In a claim closely related to his claim about the
amendment to the indictment, Rivera argues that his conviction
should be vacated because there was a variance between the
conduct alleged in the indictment and the proof offered at
trial. "To be sufficient grounds for reversal, a variance must
be severe enough to affect the defendant's substantial rights."
Portela, 167 F.3d at 700. We review this question de novo. See
id.
As we just explained, the government amended the
indictment prior to trial to exchange the words "UCC No. 1" for
"UCC No. 2" in the description of the overt acts, except for
paragraph four of that description, which remained unchanged.
The relevant portions of the corrected indictment, described as
the overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, read as
follows:
3. On or about April 15, 1991 at
approximately 7:30 p.m., UCC No. 1 called
Carlos Rivera-Ruiz to offer him one (1)
kilogram of cocaine for the price of
thirteen thousand five hundred dollars
($13,500.00). Rivera-Ruiz agreed and on the
following date April 16, 1991 UCC No. 1
delivered to Rivera-Ruiz one (1) kilogram of
cocaine located at Road 4406, Anones ward,
Las Marías, Puerto Rico.
4. On or about April 16, 1991 at
approximately 8:00 a.m., UCC No. 1 sold and
delivered to Carlos Rivera-Ruiz one (1)
kilogram of cocaine and was paid for
thirteen thousand five hundred dollars
($13,500.00).
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Rivera argues that paragraphs three and four of the amended
indictment charge him with purchasing two kilograms of cocaine
from Negrón, while the evidence presented at trial established
only that he purchased one kilogram.
We reject this claim. Based on a reasonable reading
of paragraphs three and four, we conclude that the purchase of
one kilogram of cocaine on the morning of April 16 is simply
described twice. The indictment does not allege two separate
purchases. There was no variance. Moreover, as noted, the
prosecution was not required to prove overt acts in order to
establish Rivera's guilt on the conspiracy charge. See Portela,
167 F.3d at 702. Thus, even if we were to adopt Rivera's
strained reading of paragraphs three and four, that reading
would not warrant reversal of his conviction because such an
error in the recitation of the overt acts did not affect his
substantial rights.
V. Closing Arguments
Rivera contends that the prosecutor deprived him of due
process of law by making several improper remarks during his
closing argument. Specifically, he identifies four comments
that he claims could have led the jury to convict him on an
improper basis. Because Rivera did not object to these comments
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at trial, we review his claim for plain error. See Fed. R.
Crim. P. 52(b); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
731 (1993); United States v. Baldyga, 233 F.3d 674, 681 (1st
Cir. 2000). To correct the alleged error, "we must conclude
that there was error, that the error was plain, and that it
affected the substantial rights of the defendant." Baldyga, 233
F.3d at 681. We may find that the allegedly improper remarks
affected Rivera's substantial rights only if we conclude that
the prosecutor's comments affected the outcome of Rivera's
trial. See id. at 682.
As we noted in our discussion of the sufficiency of the
evidence, Rivera objects to one comment about his ownership of
multiple properties and to another comment where the prosecutor
argued that Negrón would not have called Rivera if the two men
were not in the same business ("the supermarket comment"). We
have already ruled that there was nothing improper about these
remarks. Although Rivera quotes the other two challenged
remarks at length in his brief, we need not discuss these
passages separately because we are convinced that the
prosecutor's closing argument did not affect the outcome of
Rivera's trial, and hence there was no plain error in the
remarks.
VI. Sentencing
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Finally, Rivera appeals the sentence of 121 months
imposed by the district court, arguing that the court
erroneously based this sentence on the understanding that Rivera
purchased two kilograms of cocaine, rather than only one. We
review this claim for plain error because Rivera did not object
at the time of sentencing. See United States v. Torres-Rosa,
209 F.3d 4, 8 (1st Cir. 2000). Because we find that Rivera
faced a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years regardless of
the amount of cocaine for which he was held accountable, see 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B),8 we conclude that there was no plain
error.
More than one year prior to trial, the government filed
an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851 9 to establish that
Rivera had a prior conviction for importing cocaine into Puerto
Rico. The document served to notify Rivera that the prosecution
intended to seek an increased sentence pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(B) because of this prior conviction. Thus, as
8 Section 841(b)(1)(B) provides: "If any person commits such
a violation after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense
has become final, such person shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years."
9 Section 851 provides, in pertinent part: "No person who
stands convicted of an offense under this part shall be
sentenced to increased punishment by reason of one or more prior
convictions, unless before trial . . . the United States
attorney files an information with the court . . . stating in
writing the previous convictions to be relied upon."
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Rivera concedes in his brief to this court, he faced a mandatory
minimum sentence of ten years regardless of the amount of
cocaine attributed to him by the sentencing court. Accordingly,
his challenge to the amount of cocaine attributed to him is
irrelevant to his sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Tavano,
12 F.3d 301, 307 (1st Cir. 1993) ("It is unnecessary to address
a dispute over drug quantity if, and to the extent that,
adjudicating it will not . . . bring a different mandatory
minimum sentence into play.").
Judgment and Sentence Affirmed.
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