United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 00-1663
MARISOL ADAMES, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
EXECUTIVE AIRLINES, INC. and/or
AMERICAN EAGLE, etc., ET AL
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Juan M. Pérez-Giménez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Stahl, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
Richard P. Wrede, Association of Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO,
for appellants.
Harry A. Rissetto, with whom Vicente J. Antonetti, Goldman,
Antonetti & Cordova, P.S.C., Angel Castillo, Jr., Kara A. Standen and
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, were on brief for appellees.
July 19, 2001
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LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Marisol Adames and some ninety-three
other flight attendants sued Executive Airlines ("Executive") in July
1999 for violation of various Puerto Rico labor laws. Adames1 argues
that she is entitled to compensation and benefits commensurate with the
provisions of Commonwealth law dealing with wages, overtime pay,
maternity benefits, meal periods, days off, vacation, bonuses, and sick
leave. She asserts that her right to these benefits exists
independently of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement with
Executive. In response, Executive argues that the claims under the
labor laws of Puerto Rico are preempted by the Railway Labor Act
because they cannot be resolved without interpreting the collective
bargaining agreement. The district court agreed with Executive,
dismissing Adames's claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We
affirm.
I.
Background
Executive Airlines is a regional air carrier serving various
locations in the Carribean. The plaintiffs work at least fifty percent
of their time within the territorial jurisdiction of Puerto Rico and
consider Puerto Rico their domicile. Adames claims that Executive owes
her compensation for the following employment practices, pursuant to
1We generally use the name Adames in referring to all of the
plaintiffs in this case.
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the following Commonwealth labor law provisions: requiring
uncompensated work time (duty time and standby time) and denying
appropriate overtime pay (29 L.P.R.A § 274, et seq.); failing to
provide for appropriate maternity leave (29 L.P.R.A § 467); failing to
provide compensated meal periods (29 L.P.R.A § 283); failing to provide
one day of rest following six days of work and sufficient vacation time
(29 L.P.R.A. § 295 and Mandatory Decree No. 38); failing to compensate
for sick leave accrued in excess of 26 days (Mandatory Decree No. 38);
and failing to pay Christmas bonuses (29 L.P.R.A § 501).
This case was initially filed in the courts of the
Commonwealth. Executive then removed the action to federal court,
asserting that the claims were preempted by the Railway Labor Act
(RLA), 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., because the dispute required
interpretation of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
("CBA" or "Agreement"). Though Adames asserted that the rights claimed
under state law existed independently of the Agreement, the district
court dismissed her claim on the basis of its prior decision in Burgos
v. Executive Air Inc., 914 F. Supp. 792 (D.P.R. 1996).
In Burgos, the district court evaluated some claims by a
former Executive flight attendant seeking compensation for overtime,
accrued vacation time, and rest and meal periods. The court concluded
that "vindication of the Commonwealth-based right that Burgos asserts
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requires interpretation of the CBA, with the consequence that the Court
must find the claim preempted by the RLA." Id. at 796.
The plaintiffs did not appeal the Burgos decision. Instead,
the Association of Flight Attendants of the AFL-CIO, also supporting
the flight attendants here, filed a grievance with the American Eagle
Airlines' Flight Attendant System Board of Adjustment ("Board"), as
prescribed in the RLA. 45 U.S.C. § 184. In its petition to the Board,
the flight attendants framed their grievance as follows: "Whether
certain provisions of the collective bargaining agreement conflict with
and are thus preempted by Puerto Rican law? In the event this is found
to be true, does Puerto Rican law control in those situations?"
Opinion of American Eagle Airlines Flight Attendants System Board of
Adjustment, Executive Airlines, Inc. and Association of Flight
Attendants, AFL-CIO, Grievance No. 29-99-02-02-87 (Herbert Fishgold,
Neutral Chairman, June 22, 1999) [hereinafter System Board of
Adjustment Opinion]. Apparently troubled by jurisdictional issues
raised by this framing of the grievance, the neutral chairman of the
Board worked with the parties in an attempt to clarify the issue before
the Board. However, the parties remained at odds, prompting the chair
to ask for written submissions on the jurisdictional issue. The Board
ultimately concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to resolve the
dispute before it, stating: "Whether or not particular labor laws of
Puerto Rico are applicable to the Company's San Juan-based flight
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attendants is not [] an issue for this Board." Id. However, the Board
reserved the possibility of later consideration "[s]hould the
Association raise an arbitral issue concerning the interpretation of
the parties' Agreement." Id.
Following this setback, the flight attendants returned to the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico court with a new lawsuit involving Adames
and her fellow plaintiffs. This lawsuit revived the claims made in
Burgos and added to the array. As noted, Executive removed the action
to the district court and opposed successfully the motion of the
plaintiffs to remand on preemption grounds under the RLA.2 Simultaneous
with that ruling, the court, citing to its decision in Burgos,
dismissed the claims of the plaintiffs for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction "on account of the RLA's prescribed grievance mechanism
for settlement of all 'minor disputes.'" Burgos, 914 F. Supp. at 797.
Plaintiffs then filed this appeal. Essentially, this is the appeal not
taken in Burgos. Indeed, plaintiffs explicitly ask us to rule that
Burgos was wrongly decided. We review the district court's
determination de novo. See Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. Telecomm.
Regulatory Bd., 189 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1999).
II.
2 Congress extended the benefits and obligations of the RLA to
cover the air transportation industry in 1936, see 45 U.S.C. §§ 181-88,
and henceforth the courts have applied the federal law to airline labor
disputes before the courts. See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, AFL-CIO v.
Cent. Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682, 685 (1963).
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Railway Labor Act Preemption
A. Legal Framework
Under the RLA, disputes involving the interpretation and
enforcement of agreements covering "rates of pay, rules, or working
conditions" are deemed "minor" disputes. 45 U.S.C. § 151a; see also
Consol. Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299,
303 (1989). These minor disputes are resolved by an industry-specific
dispute resolution mechanism, in this case arbitration by the System
Board of Adjustment. See Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co.,
406 U.S. 320, 324 (1972); Consol. Rail, 491 U.S. at 303-04; Rosa
Sanchez v. Eastern Airline, Inc., 574 F.2d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 1978).
"Congress' purpose in passing the RLA was to promote stability in
labor-management relations by providing a comprehensive framework for
resolving labor disputes . . . . [A] determination that [a party's]
complaints constitute a minor dispute would preempt [] state-law
actions." Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252-53
(1994).
Given that a state law claim requiring interpretation of the
CBA is preempted, the key question becomes whether resolution of a
dispute "hinges upon" such interpretation. Flibotte v. Penn. Truck
Lines, Inc., 131 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 1997); see also Hawaiian
Airlines, 512 U.S. at 253. If "the asserted state-law claim plausibly
can be said to depend upon the meaning of one or more provisions within
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the collective bargaining agreement," federal law preempts the claim.
Flibotte, 131 F.3d at 26.
However, state law claims may exist independently of the CBA;
in fact, "establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional
police power of the state." Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482
U.S. 1, 21 (1987). While "substantive protections provided by state
law, independent of whatever labor agreement might govern, are not pre-
empted under the RLA," Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 257 (involving
wrongful discharge), other state law rights can be "waived or altered
by agreement of the parties." Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S.
202, 213 (1985). State law claims requiring only consultation with the
CBA, versus actual interpretation, should not be extinguished. See
Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124 (1994); Lingle v. Norge Div. of
Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413 n.12 (1988) ("Although federal law
would govern the interpretation of the agreement to determine the
proper damages, the underlying state-law claim, not otherwise pre-
empted, would stand."). For instance, "'purely factual questions'
about an employee's conduct or an employer's conduct and motives do not
'requir[e] a court to interpret any term of a collective-bargaining
agreement.'" Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 261 (quoting Lingle, 486
U.S. at 407).3 In addition, a state law claim may rely, in part, on
3 While Lingle articulated the CBA interpretation test for
preemption pursuant to the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
141-87, see 486 U.S. at 407-11, Hawaiian Airlines adopted the test for
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interpretation of the CBA, but also involve a separate and distinct
state law analysis, thereby preserving the claim. See Lingle, 486 U.S.
at 413.
In many cases, however, the state law claims are
"inextricably intertwined" with the meaning of terms in the CBA and are
thus preempted by federal labor law. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213.
In such instances, state law "must yield to the developing federal
common law, lest common terms in bargaining agreements be given
different and potentially inconsistent interpretations in different
jurisdictions." Livadas, 512 U.S. at 122.
Other circuits considering state law claims for overtime pay
and vacation time almost always find that interpretation of the
agreement is necessary for resolution of the claim if the agreement
addresses those same subjects and the meaning of the statutory language
as applied to the terms of the CBA is unclear. See Firestone v.
Southern Cal. Gas Co., 219 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2000) (the state
claim is not independent of the CBA because the parties "disagree on
the meaning of the terms in the collective bargaining agreement for
purposes of California law."); Penn. Fed'n of the Brotherhood of
Maintenance of Way Employees v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 989 F.2d
112, 116 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding "travel time" compensation statute
preempted due to need for CBA interpretation); Nat'l Metalcrafters v.
application to RLA cases raising the same issue. 512 U.S. at 263.
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McNeil, 784 F.2d 817, 824 (7th Cir. 1986) (state law claim for vacation
pay preempted unless "the particular contractual provision is so clear
as to preclude all possible dispute over its meaning").
B. Application
This suit inescapably involves the relationship between
various labor laws of the Commonwealth and certain terms of the CBA
addressing the same subject as the Commonwealth laws. For example,
Puerto Rico law relies on conventional pay mechanisms, such as hourly
wages, which may not reflect methods of remuneration in the airline
industry. The peculiarities of industry-specific wage and benefit
structures are apparent in the collective bargaining agreement between
the flight attendants and Executive. Nevertheless, Adames argues on
appeal that the state law claims can be resolved independently of any
CBA interpretation, with simple reference to "the map, calendar, and
the clock"4 for determining the percentage of work conducted in Puerto
Rico5 and the amount of work performed in excess of statutory
4This formulation derives from Justice Souter's decision in
Livadas, where "a calendar" governed assessment of a penalty, not the
CBA. 512 U.S. at 124.
5 The percentage of work performed within the jurisdiction of
Puerto Rico is important because of a 1977 opinion from the
Commonwealth's Secretary of Justice stating that overtime laws do not
apply when more than 50 percent of flight attendants' work occurs
outside of Puerto Rico. Likewise, in 1992, the Department of Labor and
Human Resources concluded that minimum wage laws do not apply to pilots
working more than 50 percent of the time outside of Puerto Rico. For
discussion, see the System Board of Adjustment Opinion.
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requirements. To assess this argument, we must look at each claim
separately to determine whether the factual predicate triggering
application of the relevant Commonwealth labor law requires
interpretation of the CBA. If so, the claim is preempted by the RLA.
1. Overtime Pay
Executive's flight attendants are compensated on a monthly
basis according to "hourly applicable rates of pay for scheduled or
applicable hours flown whichever is greater." Agreement Between
American Eagle Airlines, Inc. and the Flight Attendants [hereinafter
"Agreement"], Sec. 4. They receive their pay upon fulfillment of a
base seventy-two hours of "flight time," calculated as the time between
closure of the airplane doors and disembarkation at the destination.
Flight time can be rendered for other blocks of time, such as
"deadheading," which pertains to transit time for purposes of covering
a trip assignment. Flight attendants can be scheduled for no more than
ninety-one flight hours per month and each duty period may not exceed
fourteen hours.
Noting this compensation scheme in Burgos, the district court
analyzed it perceptively and persuasively in concluding that Puerto
Rico's law on overtime could not be applied without first interpreting
the Agreement:
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[P]laintiff's status under Puerto Rico law
depends upon the interaction of three separate
articles of the CBA. Whether she "worked" –
broadly defined as hours "on duty" – more than
the statutorily prescribed maximums is not
dispositive of her claim since her pay was not
tied to hours worked, but rather to her
guarantee. Determining whether she was under-
paid would require ascertaining her "flight time"
both for that week and for the month, as well as
her on-duty time. After calculating these
figures, the CBA would need to be consulted to
determine both base and overtime pay. Then, her
total pay, separating her guarantee from overtime
pay, would need to be compared to on-duty time in
order to calculate her effective hourly salaries
(base and overtime). Only at this point could
Burgos' status under the law be determined. Such
analysis . . . is interpretation.
914 F. Supp. at 796-97.
As in Burgos, the Commonwealth law claim for overtime pay is preempted.
2. Uncompensated Work Time
In addition to "flight time," flight attendants are required
to fulfill "duty time" by reporting one hour prior to departure and
completing other ground-time tasks. Agreement, Sec. 7(C). They are
accorded some flight-time credit for duty time. Agreement, Sec 4(C).
Adames argues that to resolve the claim for uncompensated work time,
"the court need only compare the amount of time Adames spent at work
within the jurisdiction of Puerto Rico in conjunction with the clock."
Executive asserts that, as with the overtime calculations, the
Agreement must be interpreted "to determine whether the hourly rate
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that the Flight Attendants receive for flight hours also comprises
their compensation for all other on-duty hours." Executive also
suggests that this determination may require examination of industry
standards and extrinsic evidence related to the collective bargaining
process. In Hawaiian Airlines, the Supreme Court noted that cases
sometimes turn on "a norm that the parties have created but have
omitted from the CBA's explicit language, rather than a norm
established by a legislature or a court." 512 U.S. at 264. We agree.
Resolving the claim for uncompensated time under the law of Puerto Rico
first requires resort to the Agreement and related material.
3. Compensation for Standby Time
The scheduling of flight attendants requires them to perform
a certain amount of "reserve time," which can be either "standby
reserve" at the airport or "ready at home" time when they are on call.
Agreement, Sec. 9. These blocks of time are not counted toward the
"flight time," which is the basis for the flight attendants'
compensation. Adames argues that the flight attendants receive no
compensation for this standby time. Executive replies that the
compensation scheme is intended to cover "reserve time" and that this
determination requires CBA interpretation and consideration of industry
practices. We agree.
4. Maternity Leave
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Puerto Rico's statute allows a pregnant woman to take one to
four weeks of prenatal rest and four to seven weeks of postnatal rest.
29 L.P.R.A. § 467. The CBA provides that "[m]aternity leave shall be
granted in accordance with Company policy and applicable law."
Agreement, Sec. 18(F). The meaning of the terms "Company policy" and
"applicable law" is not self-evident. Determining that meaning
requires interpretation of the CBA. That interpretation must precede
any judgment about the maternity leave status of flight attendants
under Puerto Rico's law.
5. Compensated Meal Periods
Puerto Rico requires the provision of a "meal period" to
employees "not before the conclusion of the third, nor after the
commencement of the sixth consecutive hour of work." 29 L.P.R.A. §
283. Furthermore, the law requires that employers who permit work
during the meal period "shall be bound to pay for such period or
fraction thereof at a wage rate equal to double the rate agreed upon
for regular work hours." Id. Again, Adames recommends that the claim
be resolved by "the calendar and the clock." Executive suggests that
any determination on the meal period entitlement requires
"interpretation of the Agreement's 'duty time' requirements and the
various types of duty status," as well as industry-specific practices,
including the need to have flight attendants available throughout a
flight's duration. (The Agreement does give flight attendants leave to
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snack in flight or on the ground following flight time. Agreement,
Sec. 27(I).) Even if the flight attendants are required to work
through a statutory "meal period," Executive noted that it would be
impossible to assess the remedy, payment at twice the hourly rate,
without "interpreting the Agreement to establish what the applicable
'regular' rate would be." Again, we agree.
6. Compensation for Work on Day of Rest
Puerto Rico requires that employees be paid double wages for
working on the day of rest, which is defined as one day for every six
working days. 29 L.P.R.A. §§ 295, 296. With no elaboration, Adames
argues that "once the territorial jurisdiction of Puerto Rico is
resolved for purposes of coverage of the labor laws, resolution of this
claim depends upon a reference to the calendar." This argument evokes
the now familiar response. The Agreement defines employees' on-duty
days and days off. To assess whether the Puerto Rico law provisions
for a "day of rest" are triggered, there must be an interpretation of
duty time under the Agreement.
7. Vacation
Puerto Rico prescribes seventeen days of vacation leave per
year, at a rate of 1 5/12 days per month when at least 100 hours of
work are performed. Mandatory Decree No. 38, Article VI. Under the
Agreement, the parties have established a specific mechanism for
accrual of leave time, as well as the procedures for using these
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benefits. For instance, the CBA allows for rest-time during travel to
other jurisdictions, as well as ten days off per month in the flight
attendant's domicile. Agreement, Sec. 7. Also, there is a mechanism
for selecting and bidding for vacation blocks, based in part on
seniority, with the possibility of trading. Agreement, Sec. 10.
Adames argues that any issue involving compensation for vacation leave
can be resolved by consultation with the calendar and employees' pay
records. Executive counters that interpretation of several elements of
the CBA would be required to assess any vacation leave claim,
"specifically, how and why the Agreement: defines the period of flight
attendant's duties; fixes the guarantee at seventy-two flight hours .
. . ; provides for additional allowances for rest-time in other
jurisdictions; provides for the selection and bidding of vacations; and
accrues and limits . . . vacation leave." We agree that determining
entitlement to vacation leave requires interpretation of the Agreement
rather than mere reference to it. 8.
Christmas Bonuses
Puerto Rico law requires employers to grant "employees who
have worked seven hundred (700) hours or more. . . a bonus equivalent
to 2% of the total wages. . . ." 29 L.P.R.A. § 501. The CBA includes
a "side letter" executed by Executive in March 1998 agreeing to
grandfather the current practice of paying a "'Christmas Bonus' to only
those Flight Attendants who are based in the San Juan domicile on the
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date of signing this Agreement." Agreement, Letter N. Once again,
Adames suggests that the CBA is not relevant and that examination of
the company's financial records will resolve this claim. Executive
argues that the letter establishing bonus eligibility must be
interpreted, followed by a determination of what portion of flight
attendants' compensation constitutes 'total wages' for purposes of the
law. Again, we agree.
9. Sick Leave
The Commonwealth provides for thirteen sick days with pay per
year, accrued at a rate of 1 1/12 days for each month involving at
least 100 hours of work. Mandatory Decree No. 38, VII. Under the CBA,
paid sick time accrues monthly, at a rate of 2 1/2 hours for each month
of active service, but the arrangement may differ for probationary
flight attendants. Agreement, Sec. 11. As with vacation leave,
several elements of the CBA must be interpreted to evaluate any claim,
including assessment of flight versus duty hours and the method for
accruing and limiting sick leave.
III.
Conclusion
The Commonwealth law claims asserted by Adames cannot be
resolved independently of the CBA. They require more than mere
reference to the terms of the Agreement, or to a calendar and a clock.
Instead, the factual predicates triggering the applicability of the
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Commonwealth laws at issue require an interpretation of the Agreement.
The law is well-settled that "interpretation of collective-bargaining
agreements remains firmly in the arbitral realm; judges can determine
questions of state law involving labor-management relations only if
such questions do not require construing collective-bargaining
agreements." Lingle, 486 U.S. at 411 (footnote omitted). The district
court ruled correctly, in conformity with its earlier ruling in Burgos,
that the claims of the plaintiffs involved "minor disputes" within the
meaning of the RLA. As such, they were preempted and subject to
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because of the
prescribed mechanism for resolving minor disputes before the System
Board of Adjustment.
Affirmed.
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