[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 00-2339
ARTHUR JACKSON,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
RALPH C. MARTIN, II; CHARLES J. BARTOLONI; KEVIN CURTIN;
MICHAEL CHINMAN; MATTHEW M. ROSINI; JOHN DOE;
TANIS M. YANNETTI; EUGENE HURLEY; COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS; THOMAS F. REILLY,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Robert E. Keeton, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
Arthur Jackson on brief pro se.
Merita A. Hopkins, Corporation Counsel, and William J.
Donahue, Assistant Corporation Counsel, City of Boston Law
Department, on brief for appellee Eugene Hurley.
Thomas E. Reilly, Attorney General, and Elizabeth Klein
Frumkin, Assistant Attorney General, on brief for the
Prosecutorial appellees and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
July 10, 2001
Per Curiam. Arthur Jackson appeals the district
court's dismissal of his complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6). We review such a dismissal de novo. Calero-
Colon v. Betancourt-Lebron, 68 F.3d 1, 2 n.3 (1st Cir.
1995). The district court dismissed the complaint without
prejudice, as premature under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994). We have considered the parties' briefs and the
record on appeal. We affirm, essentially for the reasons
stated in the district court's Memorandum and Order, dated
September 11, 2000.
On appeal, Jackson refocuses his claim specifically
to the 28 day period between his detention on the armed
robbery warrant (January 2, 1997) and the grant of his new
trial motion on the receiving stolen property conviction
(January 30, 1997). This newly emergent argument was not
made to the district court below and, therefore, is waived.
See United States v. Slade, 980 F.2d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 1992)
("a party is not at liberty to articulate specific arguments
for the first time on appeal simply because the general
issue was before the district court"). This appeal does not
warrant excusing the raise-or-waive rule. Jackson is unable
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to show actual, compensable injury, see Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. at 487 n.7, because, should he be convicted of the
armed robbery charges, he will be credited with the time
served during this 28 day period (indeed, he will be
credited with the entire period he served on the receiving
stolen property conviction) towards any sentence he might
receive on the armed robbery charges.
Affirmed.
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