United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 00-2551
DONALD E. SULLIVAN,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
RAYTHEON COMPANY,
RAYTHEON DISABILITY TRUST, AND
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella and Lipez, Circuit Judges,
and Stearns, District Judge.*
Frederick T. Golder, with whom Bernstein, Golder & Miller,
P.A., was on brief for appellant.
Stephen S. Churchill, with whom James F. Kavanaugh, Jr. and
Conn, Kavanaugh, Rosenthal, Peisch & Ford, LLP were on brief for
appellees.
* Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
August 29. 2001
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Donald Sullivan appeals from the
judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in
favor of his employer, Raytheon, on claims of employment
discrimination and violations of the Employee Retired Income
Security Act (ERISA). Sullivan alleges that Raytheon
discriminated against him on the basis of disability and age in
refusing to reinstate him to his position at Raytheon. Sullivan
also argues that Raytheon's failure to reinstate him constituted
discriminatory retaliation for Sullivan's application for
workers' compensation benefits and his filing a charge with the
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD). In
addition, Sullivan asserts that Raytheon and the claims
administrator of Raytheon's long term disability benefits plan,
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife), wrongly denied
his application for disability benefits and violated ERISA in
not furnishing him documents about Raytheon's disability plan.
Finding no error in the determinations of the district court, we
affirm.
I. Background
Sullivan began his employment as a security guard with
Raytheon in 1965. Between 1971 and 1990, he suffered seven
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industrial accidents that caused injuries to his neck, lower
back, and legs. Sullivan sought medical treatment for some of
these injuries and occasionally missed work. Shortly after
Sullivan's seventh accident in 1990, his absenteeism from work
increased. After giving him a written warning in June 1990 and
imposing a suspension for abuse of Raytheon's sick leave policy
in September 1991, Raytheon terminated Sullivan's employment on
March 31, 1992.
Sullivan filed a grievance pursuant to the collective
bargaining agreement between Raytheon and his union, the
Raytheon Guards Association (the Union), challenging his
termination. After a hearing on August 10, 1995, the arbitrator
found that Sullivan had been terminated without just cause.
However, noting that "on a current and prospective basis,
[Sullivan] is not able to work," the arbitrator ordered Sullivan
reinstated retroactive to March 31, 1992 on "inactive employment
status" so that Sullivan could apply for disability benefits
under Raytheon's long term disability plan (the LTD plan).
Shortly after the arbitrator's decision, Sullivan wrote to
Raytheon and requested information about the long-term
disability plan so that he could apply for benefits.
Under Raytheon's LTD plan, benefits are payable for
twenty-four months for an employee who is "fully disabled"; they
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are payable indefinitely for an employee who is "totally
disabled." In statements provided to plan participants,
employees are informed that they are fully disabled if "because
of a sickness or an injury you cannot do your job." An employee
is totally disabled if "because of sickness or injury: (a) you
can not do your job; and (b) you can not do any other job for
which you are fit by your education, your training, or your
experience."
Sullivan submitted an application for long-term
disability benefits in November 1995. MetLife, the claims
administrator responsible for determining a participant's
eligibility under the plan, denied his claim in March 1996.
Metlife stated that there was "inadequate evidence of a
disabling condition that would prevent him from performing his
occupation as a Guard from April 1, 1992 through the present."
In addition, MetLife concluded that Sullivan's application for
benefits was untimely. Sullivan appealed the denial of benefits
to MetLife.
Sullivan also applied for workers' compensation
benefits.1 On August 4, 1994, an administrative law judge for
1
It is not clear from the record when Sullivan applied for
workers' compensation. Because the decision awarding him
benefits states that Sullivan's claim was conferenced on July
18, 1994, we assume that his application was dated prior to that
time.
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the Massachusetts Department of Industrial Accidents (DIA) found
that Sullivan was partially disabled as of March 22, 1992, and
totally disabled as of October 12, 1994. Sullivan received
workers' compensation benefits until 1998, when he exhausted his
entitlement to them.
Sullivan requested reinstatement to Raytheon by letter
dated June 18, 1996. In that letter, he stated that either he
was totally disabled, in which case he should receive long-term
disability benefits, or he was not disabled, in which case he
sought reinstatement to a position with or without reasonable
accommodation. By letter dated July 10, 1996, Raytheon advised
Sullivan that it would not consider reinstating him until after
MetLife considered Sullivan's appeal from its denial of his
claim for benefits. Sullivan filed a charge of discrimination
with the MCAD on October 9, 1996.
On October 17, 1997, MetLife determined that Sullivan
was fully disabled for the first twenty-four months of his
disability through April 30, 1994 because he was not capable of
performing his job as a security guard, and thus entitled to
benefits during that time.2 In this respect, MetLife's decision
2 Although MetLife stated in its letter of October 1997 that
it was "reinstating" Sullivan's claim to benefits through April
30, 1994 because he was fully disabled, he did not actually
receive any benefits under the plan because his social security
benefits and workers' compensation benefits reduced his benefits
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of October 1997 differed from its denial of benefits in March
1996. However, MetLife affirmed its previous determination that
Sullivan was not totally disabled because he was not disabled
from all occupations for which he was fit by his training or
experience. Accordingly, MetLife terminated his benefits.
Sullivan's appeal of that determination to MetLife was denied.
Sullivan filed suit in Massachusetts Superior Court on
November 3, 1998. His three-count complaint included the
following claims: (1) that Raytheon discriminated against him on
the basis of disability and age and engaged in discriminatory
retaliation in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B; (2) that
Raytheon retaliated against him for filing a worker's
compensation claim in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, §
75B; and (3) that Raytheon violated his rights under the
Employees Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §
1140. Raytheon removed the case to federal district court.
In October 1999, the district court granted Raytheon's
motion to dismiss the retaliation claims in count one and two.
Because the parties submitted evidence outside the pleadings in
arguing this motion, we treat the district court's ruling as one
on summary judgment. See Davis v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 251 F.3d
227, 231 (1st Cir. 2001). The district court granted summary
under the plan to zero.
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judgment in favor of Raytheon on the remaining counts in October
2000. Sullivan appeals these rulings.
II. Claims of Discrimination
Sullivan argues that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of Raytheon on his claims of
disability and age discrimination and retaliation. We review
the district court's entry of summary judgment de novo, viewing
the record in the light most favorable to Sullivan. See
Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46,
52 (1st Cir. 2000). "Summary judgment is appropriate only if
'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact' and 'the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Id.
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c)).
A. Disability Discrimination
To establish a prima facie case of disability
discrimination under chapter 151B of Massachusetts law, Sullivan
must demonstrate that he is a "qualified handicapped person."
See August v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 981 F.2d 576, 580 (1st
Cir. 1992); Labonte v. Hutchins & Wheeler, 678 N.E.2d 853, 859
(Mass. 1997). Chapter 151B defines this term as "a handicapped
person who is capable of performing the essential functions of
a particular job, or who would be capable of performing the
essential functions of a particular job with reasonable
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accommodation to his handicap." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, §
1(16). Thus, Sullivan must demonstrate that he is capable of
performing, with or without reasonable accommodation, the
essential functions of the position of security guard at
Raytheon.
As the district court noted in its written memorandum
and order, Sullivan has "continually and consistently claimed
that he was totally disabled." In a 1994 deposition, Sullivan
stated that he believed he was totally disabled from March 1992
(when Raytheon terminated his employment) to the present time.
In another deposition six years later, Sullivan stated that his
condition had stayed the same or worsened since his 1994
deposition. Sullivan also represented that he was disabled in
applications for social security disability insurance and
workers' compensation benefits. Additionally, he stated on his
tax returns for the years 1995 through 1998 that his occupation
was "disabled."
These claims of disability do not necessarily preclude
Sullivan's ability to argue now that he is capable of performing
his job with reasonable accommodation. See Cleveland v. Policy
Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 797 (1999) (holding that pursuit
of benefits under Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI)
"does not automatically estop the recipient from pursuing an ADA
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claim"). However, to defeat Raytheon's motion for summary
judgment, Sullivan must explain why the representations of total
disability he has made in the past are consistent with his
current claim that he could perform the essential functions of
a security guard at Raytheon with reasonable accommodation. See
id. at 798 ("To survive a defendant's motion for summary
judgment, [the plaintiff] must explain why that SSDI contention
is consistent with her ADA claim that she could 'perform the
essential functions' of her previous job, at least with
'reasonable accommodation.'"). Sullivan has offered no evidence
to explain this discrepancy. Accordingly, Sullivan has not
demonstrated that he is a "qualified handicapped person" for
purposes of chapter 151B, and summary judgment in favor of
Raytheon was proper. See August, 981 F.2d at 584 ("Having
conceded that he was totally disabled at all relevant times,
[the plaintiff] cannot now establish that he was a 'qualified
handicapped person' and thus cannot make the prima facie case
required to prevail on his claim under Mass. Gen. L. ch. 151B,
§ 4(16)."). Compare D'Aprile v. Fleet Servs. Corp., 92 F.3d 1,
5 (1st Cir. 1996) (rejecting the reasoning of August where the
plaintiff "never claimed to have been totally disabled during
the time she requested her accommodation, and demonstrated her
ability to work with the accommodation she requested").
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Sullivan also contends that the district court erred
in granting summary judgment because Raytheon did not engage in
"an interactive process" with Sullivan to determine an
appropriate accommodation that would allow him to return to his
position as a security guard. As Raytheon points out, the ADA's
interpretive regulations "may require an employer 'to initiate
an informal, interactive process' with the individual seeking
accommodation." Soto-Ocasio v. Federal Express Corp., 150 F.3d
14, 19 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)).
However, there is no such requirement under Massachusetts law in
chapter 151B. Moreover, even if Raytheon were required to have
engaged Sullivan in such an interactive process, we found in
Soto-Ocasio that an interactive process is not necessary where,
as here, no reasonable trier of fact could have found that the
employee was capable of performing the job, with or without
reasonable accommodation, for which he was seeking
reinstatement. See id. Because Sullivan has presented no
evidence to indicate that he was capable of returning to work as
a security guard, even with a reasonable accommodation, Raytheon
was not required to engage with him in an interactive process.
B. Age Discrimination
Sullivan also appeals the district court's entry of
summary judgment in favor of Raytheon on his claim of age
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discrimination under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(1B). 3
Sullivan alleged in his complaint that he was more than forty
years old at the time Raytheon refused to reinstate him and that
Raytheon "hired younger persons to fill positions for which
Sullivan was qualified to fill." To establish a prima facie
case of discrimination under this statute, Sullivan must prove
"by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) he was a member of
the protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position in
question; (3) he was denied the position; and (4) his employer
sought to fill the position by hiring a younger individual with
qualifications similar to those of the plaintiff." Lehman v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 74 F.3d 323, 327-28 (1st Cir. 1996)
(footnote omitted). As we have explained in our discussion of
his claim for disability discrimination, Sullivan failed to show
that he was qualified for the position he sought at Raytheon.
Accordingly, he cannot establish a prima facie case of age
discrimination, and the district court properly entered judgment
in favor of Raytheon.
3 Chapter 151B, § 4(1B) provides that it is unlawful "[f]or
an employer in the private sector, by himself or his agent,
because of the age of any individual, to refuse to hire or
employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such
individual, or to discriminate against such individual in
compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of
employment, unless based upon a bona fide occupational
qualification."
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C. Discriminatory Retaliation
1. Retaliation for filing a charge of discrimination
Sullivan further claims that Raytheon violated his
rights under chapter 151B, § 4(4)4 by engaging in retaliatory
discrimination in not reinstating him after he filed a charge of
discrimination with the MCAD. To establish a prima facie case
for retaliation, Sullivan had to show that: (1) he engaged in
conduct protected under Massachusetts or federal law; (2) he
"suffered an adverse employment action"; and (3) "a causal
connection existed between the protected conduct and the adverse
action." McMillan v. Mass. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty
to Animals, 140 F.3d 288, 309 (1st Cir. 1998). Sullivan's claim
falters on the third prong of this test. He has not
demonstrated a causal connection between his protected conduct
- filing a charge of discrimination with the Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination in October 1996 - and
Raytheon's refusal to reinstate him to his position as a
security guard in July 1996. Indeed, Sullivan concedes this
chronology in the facts section of his brief when he states:
"When Sullivan was not given disability benefits, and was not
reinstated to a suitable position at Raytheon, he filed a Charge
4 Chapter 151, § 4(4) makes it illegal for an employer "to
discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any person
because he has . . . filed a complaint."
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of Discrimination with the Massachusetts Commission against
Discrimination on October 9, 1996." Because Sullivan's
protected action - filing a charge of discrimination - occurred
after the adverse employment action, we affirm the district
court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Raytheon on the
retaliation claim.
2. Retaliation for filing for workers' compensation
Sullivan also claims that the district court should not
have dismissed his claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 75B.5
Section 75B "bars discrimination against qualified handicapped
workers exercising their rights under the workers' compensation
law, which includes procedures for filing claims for injuries,
receiving payments, and determining re-employment." Fant v. New
England Power Serv. Co., 239 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2001). The
district court found that this state law claim was preempted
under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA),
29 U.S.C. § 185.6 We agree.
5 Chapter 152, § 75B provides in pertinent part: "No
employer or duly authorized agent of an employer shall
discharge, refuse to hire or in any other manner discriminate
against an employee because the employee has exercised a right
afforded by this chapter." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 75B(2).
6 Section 301 of the LMRA establishes federal jurisdiction
for "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and
a labor organization representing employees in an industry
affecting commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
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"Section 301 [of the LMRA] completely preempts a state
law claim, 'if the resolution of [the] state-law claim depends
upon the meaning of a collective bargaining agreement.'"
Magerer v. John Sexton & Co., 912 F.2d 525, 528 (1st Cir. 1990)
(alteration in original) (quoting Lingle v. Norge Division of
Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06 (1988)). With respect to
the Massachusetts workers' compensation statute, "the
protections of § 75B are subordinate to the terms of any
collective bargaining agreement" between Sullivan's union and
Raytheon. Fant, 239 F.3d at 14. See also Magerer, 912 F.2d at
529 ("[S]uch claims [under section 75B] are, by the express
terms of the statute, subject to the terms of any applicable
collective bargaining agreement."). The statute provides: "In
the event that any right set forth in this section is
inconsistent with an applicable collective bargaining agreement,
such agreement shall prevail." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, §
75B(3). We have said that this language
makes clear that to the extent that the
collective bargaining agreement provides
standards to govern the conduct underlying
plaintiff's retaliatory discharge claim, the
claim will be governed by the standards of
the agreement, rather than by the standards
of ch. 152 § 75B. And to that extent,
claims under section 75B will require
interpretation of the agreement and,
therefore, will be preempted by Section 301.
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Magerer, 912 F.2d at 529. We need not find explicitly that the
collective bargaining agreement at issue here is inconsistent
with section 75B to find Sullivan's claim under that statute
preempted. See Fant, 239 F.3d at 16. In similar circumstances,
we have found claims under section 75B preempted "not because
the collective bargaining agreement is inconsistent with the
state claims asserted, but because it may be so and requires
interpretation." Martin v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc., 105 F.3d
40, 44 (1st Cir. 1997); see also Fant, 239 F.3d at 16 (finding
retaliation claim brought under section 75B preempted by the
LMRA).
Here, the collective bargaining agreement between
Raytheon and the Union contained a management rights clause
providing that "the management and control of the Company's
business and operations, working force and plant, as well as the
direction, supervision and assignment of duties of the Guards,
is vested exclusively in the management of the Company." This
broad grant of supervisory discretion to Raytheon could conflict
with the provisions of section 75B that place limits on
Raytheon's ability to refuse to reinstate employees after they
have filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. Because
we would have to interpret the agreement to determine whether
this clause conflicts with section 75B, Sullivan's claim is
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preempted. See Martin, 105 F.3d at 43-44 (finding claim under
chapter 75B preempted because of a potential conflict with the
management rights clause of the collective bargaining
agreement); Magerer, 912 F.2d at 530 (finding that management
rights clause "could be construed to govern the conduct
underlying plaintiff's retaliatory discharge claim").
Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that
Sullivan's section 75B claim was preempted by § 301 of the LMRA.
We have recognized that this outcome - finding a claim
under chapter 75B preempted because of a potential conflict with
the management rights clause in a collective bargaining
agreement - seems "faintly troubling." Martin, 105 F.3d at 44.
However, the union may bargain to avoid this outcome in the
future:
If all else fails, the union is free to
negotiate language that eliminates this
issue the next time it renews its labor
agreement. . . . All that it would take to
prevent preemption is an explicit provision
stating that nothing in the agreement is
intended to create management rights
inconsistent with any workers' rights under
sections 75A and 75B.
Id. Moreover, even if we found that Sullivan's claim under
chapter 75B was not preempted, no rational factfinder could
infer a discriminatory animus on Raytheon's part because
Raytheon refused to reinstate him more than two years after
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Sullivan filed for workers' compensation. See Mesnick v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 828 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding that
period of nine months "suggests the absence of a causal
connection between the statutorily protected conduct and the
adverse employment action").
III. Termination of Benefits
The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of Raytheon, MetLife, and the Trust with respect to Sullivan's
claim that MetLife's termination of his disability benefits was
arbitrary and capricious. The parties agree that MetLife had
discretion to determine Sullivan's eligibility for benefits.
Where a benefits plan grants discretionary authority to the plan
administrator, we review the administrator's decisions to
determine whether they are arbitrary and capricious. See Pari-
Fasano v. ITT Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 230 F.3d 415,
418 (1st Cir. 2000); Terry v. Bayer Corp., 145 F.3d 28, 40 (1st
Cir. 1998). "This standard means that [the administrator's]
decision will be upheld if it was within [the administrator's]
authority, reasoned, and 'supported by substantial evidence in
the record.'" Doyle v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 144 F.3d 181,
184 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting Associated Fisheries of Maine, Inc.
v. Daley, 127 F.3d 104, 109 (1st Cir. 1997)). Substantial
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evidence exists if it is "reasonably sufficient to support a
conclusion." Id.
There is evidence in the record that is reasonably
sufficient to support MetLife's conclusion that Sullivan was not
disabled from all occupations for which he was fit to perform by
his training and experience. Network Medical Review completed
a review of Sullivan's claim file in September 1996. Based on
Sullivan's copious medical records, NMR concluded: "The medical
evidence, both subjective and objective, would support a
sedentary work environment for Mr. Sullivan. . . . [A] sedentary
work environment would not significantly exacerbate this
claimant's discomfort or pain, and would not cause further
worsening of his medical conditions." MetLife asked NMR to
review Sullivan's file again after providing NMR with two
additional medical reports7 of his capabilities. In its second
report dated October 23, 1996, NMR stated: "Our initial
assessment concluded that Mr. Sullivan's physical restrictions
prevented him from performing his own occupation, but not from
performing any occupation. The new information does not provide
evidence that would alter this conclusion."
7
MetLife provided NMR with the reports of Dr. Maureen
Norman and Dr. George Hazel for this second review. We discuss
both of these reports below.
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The evaluation of Sullivan's own physician reflects a
similar assessment of his capabilities. In January 1996, Dr.
Maureen Norman completed an evaluation of his condition at
MetLife's request. While Dr. Norman indicated on her report
form that Sullivan was disabled from his own occupation as a
security guard, she also indicated that she could not determine
whether he was totally disabled from any occupation. Dr. Norman
also reported that Sullivan was a candidate for "vocational
rehabilitation (retraining for a different occupation)" and
physical rehabilitation.
In trying to prove that he is totally disabled within
the meaning of the LTD plan, Sullivan relies on the medical
opinion of Dr. George Hazel, a physician asked to evaluate him
in October, 1994 for the DIA in connection with his claim for
workers' compensation. In that report, Dr. Hazel stated that
"at the present time [Sullivan] is medically disabled and that
the disability is permanent and the level of activity [of] the
patient is significantly restricted." However, Dr. Hazel also
noted that Sullivan had "numerous unassociated somatic
complaints which makes evaluation difficult." For this reason,
NMR declined to find, based on Dr. Hazel's evaluation, that
Sullivan was totally disabled under the LTD plan. In reviewing
Dr. Hazel's report, NMR also noted that some of the symptoms
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described by Dr. Hazel were dependent on subjective factors such
as Sullivan's willingness to cooperate with the exam.
Based on this evidence, we cannot conclude that
MetLife's decision to terminate Sullivan's disability benefits
was arbitrary and capricious. The reports from NMR, while
acknowledging that Sullivan's work environment should be
structured to avoid aggravating his disability, indicate that
Sullivan is capable of working in some occupation for which he
is trained. See Doyle, 144 F.3d at 186 (affirming denial of
long-term benefits where the evidence indicated the plaintiff
"was not 'totally disabled from any occupation' because he
retained a 'sedentary' work capacity and a potential for further
rehabilitation"). Moreover, the report most favorable to
Sullivan's claim of total disability, Dr. Hazel's assessment,
evaluated his capacity in the context of his claim for workers'
compensation benefits and did not consider whether Sullivan was
totally disabled from every occupation for which he was fit by
training or experience. 8 Therefore, MetLife's decision to
8 Putting the shortcomings of Dr. Hazel's evaluation aside,
his conclusion that Sullivan's disability is permanent does not
compel a finding that MetLife's termination of Sullivan's
benefits was arbitrary and capricious. As we have said,
sufficiency of the evidence to support MetLife's determination
"does not disappear merely by reason of contradictory evidence."
Doyle, 144 F.3d at 184.
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terminate Sullivan's disability benefits under the LTD plan was
not arbitrary and capricious.
IV. Penalties for Failure to Provide Plan Documents
Finally, Sullivan appeals the district court's decision
not to impose penalties against MetLife pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §
1132(c)(1)9 for failing to provide documents about the long term
disability plan. The district court noted that there was
disputed evidence about whether Sullivan did or did not receive
the documents, but found that "whether or not he had the plan
documents, Sullivan exercised his rights under the plan and
provided the type of [medical] information that was required for
a decision to be made." Because MetLife "carefully analyzed the
medical evidence and relied on it," the district court concluded
that Sullivan had not been prejudiced even if Raytheon had not
furnished the documents he requested. We review the court's
determination for abuse of discretion. See Rodriguez-Abreu v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 986 F.2d 580, 588 (1st Cir. 1993).
9 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1) provides in pertinent part: "Any
administrator . . . who fails or refuses to comply with a
request for any information which such administrator is required
by this subchapter to furnish to a participant or beneficiary .
. . may in the court's discretion be personally liable to such
participant or beneficiary in the amount of up to $100 a day
from the date of such failure or refusal, and the court may in
its discretion order such other relief as it deems proper."
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As the district court found, Sullivan has offered no
evidence that MetLife acted in bad faith in not providing him
with the documents in a more timely fashion. Additionally,
Sullivan has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by any
delay in receiving the documents. We agree with Sullivan that
showings of bad faith and prejudice are not necessary for a
court to award penalties under § 1132(c)(1). See id. at 588
("[P]rejudice and bad faith are not prerequisites for imposition
of penalties."). However, the district court did not require
Sullivan to prove that Raytheon acted in bad faith or that he
was prejudiced. Instead, the court appropriately cited the
absence of those factors among the reasons for its decision not
to award penalties. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion
in the district court's ruling. See id. at 588-89 (finding no
abuse of discretion where the district court considered the
absence of prejudice and bad faith in declining to award
penalties).
Affirmed.
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