United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 00-1722
DAVID WILSON,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
DONALD SHUMWAY
in his official capacity as Commissioner of the New Hampshire
Department of Health and Human Services,
PAUL GORMAN
in his official capacity as Director of the Division of
Behavioral Health Services,
CHESTER BATCHELDER
in his official capacity as Superintendent of the
New Hampshire Hospital,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
and Stahl, Senior Circuit Judge.
Pamela Jermyn-Kaley, with whom Ronald K. Lospennato, were on
brief, for appellant.
Daniel J. Mullen, with whom Philip T. McLaughlin, Attorney General
and Andrew B. Livernois, Assistant Attorney General, were on brief,
for appellees.
September 10, 2001
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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Appellant David Wilson sued
various officials in charge of New Hampshire's mental health system
alleging constitutional and statutory violations relating to the
authority of his court-appointed guardian to approve the administration
of anti-psychotic drugs without Wilson's consent. On a motion for
summary judgment, the district court dismissed the suit for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
David Wilson suffers from mental illness which has been
diagnosed as, among other things, paranoid schizophrenia. On
February 6, 1997, following an incident in which Wilson apparently
threatened a neighbor with a loaded gun, the Merrimack County Probate
Court of New Hampshire ordered Wilson to be involuntarily confined to
New Hampshire Hospital for up to three years. While under such
confinement, the State petitioned the Belknap County Probate Court to
appoint a guardian for Wilson, due primarily to Wilson's refusal to
take the anti-psychotic medication Haldol as recommended by his
psychiatrists. Among the responsibilities sought to be assumed by the
guardian were decisions relating to Wilson's living arrangements and
medical treatment options. The probate court granted this request on
May 19, 1997. In re Guardianship of David Wilson, No. 1997-0171
(order) [hereinafter Guardianship I].
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On March 20, 1997, Wilson filed a pro se complaint in the
federal court in New Hampshire seeking injunctive relief and monetary
damages. The crux of his charge was that the forced administration of
anti-psychotic medication violated his constitutional rights. The
magistrate judge assigned to review Wilson's complaint dismissed most
of the claims except for those alleged under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
On November 10, 1997, Wilson was conditionally discharged
from New Hampshire Hospital. This discharge has since been revoked
several times due to refusal of medication, depression, and suicidal
ideation, resulting in admissions to either New Hampshire Hospital or
Cypress Center. Because of Wilson's continued refusal to take anti-
psychotic medication, his guardian has approved the forced
administration of Haldol to Wilson.
On December 23, 1997, Wilson filed a Petition to Terminate
Guardianship in Belknap County Probate Court pursuant to N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 464-A:39 II. Concurrently, he filed an Assented to Motion
to Stay Proceedings in the federal district court pending a
determination on the motion to terminate the guardianship. On June 8,
1998, the probate court denied Wilson's Petition to Terminate
Guardianship, finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that:
(a) David Wilson continues to be incapacitated.
(b) Guardianship is necessary as a means of
providing for the ward's continuing care,
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supervision and rehabilitation. (c) There are no
available alternative resources which are
suitable with respect to the ward's welfare,
safety and rehabilitation. (d) Guardianship is
appropriate as the least restrictive form of
intervention consistent with the preservation of
the ward's civil rights and liberties.
In re Guardianship of David Wilson, No. 1997-0171 at 2 (order)
[hereinafter Guardianship II]. In addition, the court held that Wilson
continued to be incapable of exercising the rights that had been
assigned to the guardian in the initial determination. As such,
Wilson's guardian retained the authority to make decisions regarding
his medical treatment, including the administration of anti-psychotic
medication. Wilson's notice of appeal to the New Hampshire Supreme
Court was denied on January 29, 1999.
Subsequent to the second guardianship determination, the
voluntary stay was lifted from the federal lawsuit, and Wilson filed an
amended complaint naming as defendants: Donald Shumway, in his official
capacity as the Commissioner of the New Hampshire Department of Health
and Human Services, Paul Gorman, in his official capacity as Director
of the Division of Behavioral Health Services, and Chester Batchelder,
in his official capacity as Superintendent of New Hampshire Hospital.
The claims were brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12132 et seq., and invoked
Wilson's rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
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More specifically, Wilson alleged that the forcible
administration of anti-psychotic medication: (1) violated his right to
personal privacy and bodily integrity; (2) violated his right to
freedom of speech and association; (3) violated his right to
substantive due process; (4) deprived him of his ability to make an
informed judgment regarding anti-psychotic medication based on his
mental illness, thus not affording him the benefit of New Hampshire
law, in violation of the ADA; and (5) violated his right to procedural
due process in not giving him notice and a hearing prior to the forced
medication. Wilson requested a preliminary and permanent injunction
preventing the defendants from forcibly medicating him unless a serious
and immediate physical threat to himself or others existed, a judgment
declaring that defendants' actions violated the above enumerated
constitutional rights and the ADA, attorneys fees, and any other
appropriate relief.
The district court dismissed Wilson's case, holding that,
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,1 the federal court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to rule on the substance of his claims. Wilson v.
Shumway, No. Civ. 97-099-B, 2000 WL 1499469 (D.N.H. May 8, 2000) (mem.
and order). The district court characterized Wilson's federal action
as an "attempt[] to appeal adverse rulings in the state guardianship
1 A full explanation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine will be provided
in the Discussion section of this Opinion.
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proceedings." Id. at *1. Examining the proceeding in the probate
court, the district court noted that Wilson had asked the probate court
to determine whether vesting the decisionmaking power regarding
medication in a guardian violated Wilson's rights under the First
Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and the ADA. Thus, "Wilson's
primary argument in the probate court was that the guardianship denied
him his rights under the Constitution and the ADA to refuse anti-
psychotic medication." Id. at *2. The district court went on to find
that the claims that had been asserted in the federal case were
"inextricably intertwined" with those that were litigated in the
guardianship proceeding, because a favorable decision would require the
district court to conclude that the probate court had erred in its
opinion. Id. Citing First Circuit precedent, the district court
further held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claims.
DISCUSSION
Our review of a dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction is de novo. Corrada-Betances v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 248
F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir. 2001).
A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine takes its name from two Supreme
Court cases: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and,
six decades later, District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
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460 U.S. 462 (1983). In Rooker, the Court was asked to declare a
judgment of the Indiana state courts null and void as a violation of
the Contract, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the United
States Constitution. The Court affirmed the district court's
conclusion that jurisdiction was lacking, stating that: "Under the
legislation of Congress, no court of the United States other than this
court could entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify the judgment
[of a state court] for errors of that character." Rooker, 263 U.S. at
416.
The Feldman case expanded in some significant ways upon the
relatively non-controversial principle that only the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to review decisions of state courts. The plaintiffs, Marc
Feldman and Edward Hickey, Jr., had both sought admission to the
District of Columbia bar. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 465, 471. Standing in
their way was an admissions rule requiring applicants to have graduated
from an ABA-approved law school, id. at 464; Feldman had pursued an
apprenticeship-type program with a practicing attorney in Virginia, id.
at 465, while Hickey had attended a non-accredited law school, id. at
470. After being denied admission by the Committee on Admissions of
the District of Columbia Bar, Feldman petitioned for a waiver of the
requirement to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Id. at 465-
66. Hickey also petitioned for a waiver. Id. at 471. Both requests
were denied in per curiam orders. Id. at 468, 472.
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Feldman and Hickey then filed suit in federal district court
challenging the denials of their waiver petitions and the
constitutionality of the admission rule. Id. The district court
dismissed the complaint, holding that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed, Feldman v. Gardner, 661 F.2d 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
and appeal followed to the Supreme Court.
After making a preliminary determination that the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals' denials of the waiver petitions were
judicial proceedings,2 Feldman, 460 U.S. at 479, the Supreme Court held
that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review issues that were
either resolved by the waiver decisions or "inextricably intertwined"
with those issues that were decided:
If the constitutional claims presented to a
United States District Court are inextricably
intertwined with the state court's denial in a
judicial proceeding of a particular plaintiff's
application for admission to the state bar, then
the District Court is in essence being called
upon to review the state court decision. This
the District Court may not do.
Id. at 482 & n.16. On the other hand, the district court did have
subject matter jurisdiction over the general constitutional challenge
2 The Court held that the proceeding was judicial, rather than
administrative or ministerial, reversing the conclusion of the D.C.
Circuit that the denials of waiver were not judicial in nature. Since
there is no claim that the probate court determination was anything but
a judicial proceeding, we treat it as such in this appeal.
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to the bar admission rule, provided that no review of Feldman or
Hickey's individual denials resulted. Id. at 486. The Supreme Court
remanded the case for a determination on the merits on the issue of
whether the requirement that Bar members have degrees from ABA-approved
schools was unconstitutional. Id. at 487-88.
Following the parameters of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as
articulated by the Supreme Court and this circuit,3 we proceed to the
question of whether Wilson's federal claims are "inextricably
intertwined" with those of the state probate court proceeding, or if
any general challenges to New Hampshire's guardianship laws have been
presented.
B. Deconstructing Wilson's Federal Lawsuit
Not surprisingly, Wilson characterizes his federal claims as
involving general constitutional challenges to New Hampshire's
procedure for permitting a guardian to authorize the involuntary
administration of anti-psychotic drugs to a ward. First, Wilson
emphasizes that he is not contesting the appointment of a guardian by
the probate court. Instead, he argues that the current statutory
scheme relating to involuntary medication lacks constitutionally-
3 E.g., Sheehan v. Marr, 207 F.3d 35, 39-40 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding
adjudication of appellant's federal ADA suit not barred by prior state
involuntary retirement proceeding); Hill v. Town of Conway, 193 F.3d
33, 39-40 (1st Cir. 1999) (affirming lack of subject matter
jurisdiction); Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados de P.R., 917 F.2d 620,
628-29 (1st Cir. 1990) (affirming jurisdiction over a "general"
constitutional challenge to a statutory requirement of bar membership).
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guaranteed procedural due process mechanisms. Specifically, Wilson
claims that before a recommendation that a ward be forcibly medicated
can be submitted to a guardian for authorization, a ward is entitled
to: (1) notice that such a recommendation will be made, with legal and
factual reasons for the recommendation explicitly provided; (2) notice
of a right to a hearing before an impartial arbiter in which the need
for medication must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) notice
of the right to be represented by counsel at that hearing.
Appellees, in contrast, interpret Wilson's federal complaint
as nothing more than a thinly-veiled attack on the state guardianship
proceeding. Because Wilson's federal complaint focuses on forcible
medication as applied to him, and seeks personal, rather than general,
relief, appellees charge that Wilson's claim of a "general" challenge
is merely an attempt to avoid the Rooker-Feldman bar to jurisdiction.
Finally, appellees argue that the injury Wilson complains of would not
exist if not for the probate court's determination that guardianship
was appropriate. His federal case, then, seeks to undo the
consequences of the state court judgment, and such jurisdiction is
prohibited under Rooker-Feldman.
After reviewing the arguments of both sides, as well as
Wilson's amended complaint, we conclude that the district court was
correct in dismissing Wilson's complaint for lack of jurisdiction. In
so holding, we are unpersuaded by Wilson's claim that he has mounted a
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general constitutional challenge to the New Hampshire provisions for
authorizing the involuntary administration of anti-psychotic drugs. We
turn first to the non-procedural claims alleged in Wilson's complaint,
and then proceed to his primary appellate argument.
Most of the claims asserted in Wilson's federal lawsuit are
obviously barred by the Rooker-Feldman principle that lower federal
courts lack jurisdiction to review decisions of the state courts.
Wilson implicitly concedes as much by not addressing them in his brief
to this Court. Among the "disputed issues of law" submitted to the
probate court in Wilson's pre-trial statement were "[w]hether an order
of guardianship which denies Mr. Wilson his right to refuse
psychotropic medication discriminates against him . . . contrary to the
Americans with Disabilities Act," and "violates the First Amendment,
and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." These arguments presented to the state probate court
essentially mirror those made in Wilson's federal amended complaint.
The district court thus properly refrained from deciding whether the
forcible administration of drugs to Wilson violates the Constitution
and/or the ADA, because retaining jurisdiction would have put the
district court in the position of reviewing the probate court's
decision. See, e.g., Wang v. N.H. Bd. of Registration in Med., 55 F.3d
698, 703 (1st Cir. 1995).
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Turning to the main argument that Wilson asserts on appeal:
that his federal suit includes a general allegation that a ward is
constitutionally guaranteed certain notice and procedures, we examine
Wilson's amended complaint to determine whether a general
constitutional challenge arguably not barred by Rooker-Feldman was
actually made. See Patmon v. Mich. Sup. Ct., 224 F.3d 504, 510 (6th
Cir. 2000); Stern v. Nix, 840 F.2d 208, 212 (3d Cir. 1988). To open
his complaint, Wilson states that the purpose of his lawsuit is "to
enjoin the administration of psychotropic or other mood altering
medications against his will," and that forcing him to take those drugs
violates his rights under the Constitution. As for the specific
procedural due process violation claim, Wilson again couches his
allegations in personal and individual terms. See Patmon, 224 F.3d at
510. The substance of Wilson's claims reference the personal
circumstances of his case, that given his ability to make an informed
choice about whether or not to consent to medication, forcible
administration violates his constitutional rights. See Musslewhite v.
State Bar of Tex., 32 F.3d 942, 947 (5th Cir. 1994). Similarly, all of
the relief sought would only impact Wilson individually: an injunction
preventing the defendants from forcibly medicating him and a judgment
declaring that defendants' acts violated Wilson's constitutional rights
and his rights as guaranteed by the ADA. Finally, any reference to the
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allegedly offending New Hampshire regulation is wholly absent from
Wilson's complaint. See Patmon, 224 F.3d at 510.
"This is about substance, not about form." Musslewhite, 32
F.3d at 947. It is fairly obvious that Wilson's arguments to this
Court and in his appellate brief represent an attempt to carve a
general constitutional challenge out of his federal lawsuit in order to
escape the jurisdictional bar of Rooker-Feldman. Cf. Stern, 840 F.2d
at 212-13 ("as the proceedings continued, the veneer of the 'general
challenge' became increasingly thin"). Wilson has not brought any such
general challenge to the New Hampshire policies and practices governing
involuntary administration of anti-psychotic medication, but instead
seeks only to remedy his current guardianship situation. See Patmon,
224 F.3d at 510. This issue has been considered and resolved in the
New Hampshire court system and cannot be re-litigated here.
C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Wilson claims that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine should not be
applied to cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While acknowledging
that this circuit has dismissed § 1983 suits pursuant to Rooker-
Feldman, Wang, 55 F.3d at 703, Wilson urges us to overrule this
precedent for the reason that § 1983 has its own jurisdictional
provision granting original jurisdiction to the federal district
courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3). We are not persuaded by this argument
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and decline to reverse our prior determination that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine is applicable to cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the district court dismissing the case for
lack of federal court jurisdiction based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
is affirmed.
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