[NOT FOR PUBLICATION — NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 01-2128
LESLIE ELLEN BOYLE,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
COWTOWN BUS CHARTERS,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
Stephen F. Reardon on brief for appellant.
Edward J. Barshak and Sugarman, Rogers, Barshak & Cohen,
P.C. on brief for appellee.
Per Curiam. This personal injury action arises out of
a highway accident that occurred in Texas. The district court
determined that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, a Texas firm, and dismissed the action on that basis.
The court thereafter denied the plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration.
We have scoured the record and carefully considered the
parties' briefs and arguments. We conclude that this appeal is
timely only as to the district court's denial of the plaintiff's
motion for reconsideration. 1 See Rodriguez-Antuna v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 871 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989). Given the
exiguous showing made by the plaintiff, that denial plainly was
within the district court's discretion. See id. at 3
("Plaintiffs, if they had a case to make, should have made it in
a timely fashion.").
We add, moreover, that even if we were to consider the
underlying question of personal jurisdiction, we would uphold
1
While a motion to alter or amend a judgment may toll the
running of the appeal period, the plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration was not filed within ten days of the date of the
entry of the judgment and, thus, did not operate to toll the
appeal period. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (fixing ten-day
window). Since the plaintiff's notice of appeal was filed more
than thirty days after the date of entry of judgment, it is
untimely vis-à-vis the judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1).
The notice of appeal was, however, filed within thirty days of
the district court's denial of the motion for reconsideration.
It is, therefore, timely as to that order.
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the district court's order of dismissal. The plaintiff's
reliance on the unsupported allegations in her complaint and
memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss is manifestly
insufficient to make out a prima facie case for in personam
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Barrett v. Lombardi, 239 F.3d 23, 26-
27 (1st Cir. 2001); Boit v. Gar-Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671,
675 (1st Cir. 1992); see also Donatelli v. Nat'l Hockey League,
893 F.2d 459, 463 (1st Cir. 1990) (explaining that a finding of
general personal jurisdiction requires a showing of "continuous
and systematic contacts" with the forum state).
We need go no further. This appeal is groundless and,
therefore, the judgment below may be summarily affirmed. See
1st Cir. R. 27(c).
Affirmed.
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