United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 01-1516
01-1845
EMMETT S. MULDOON,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
C.J. MULDOON & SONS, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Stahl, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
Emmett S. Muldoon on brief pro se.
Christopher G. Betke and Ryan, Coughlin & Betke on brief for
appellees.
January 28, 2002
Per Curiam. Emmett S. Muldoon appeals from the
district court’s dismissal of his action for benefits under
section 510 of the Employees Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1140, as time-barred (No. 01-1516) and
from the district court’s denial of his subsequent motion to
amend the judgment (No. 01-1845). The two appeals have
previously been consolidated by order of this court.
Because Congress did not provide a statute of
limitations in the ERISA statute for section 510 claims,
federal courts must apply the limitations period of the
state-law cause of action most analogous to the federal
claim. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985).
Muldoon contends that the most analogous Massachusetts
statute is M.G.L.A. c. 260, § 2, which states:
Actions of contract, other than those to
recover for personal injuries, founded
upon contracts or liabilities, express
or implied, except actions limited by
section one or actions upon judgments or
decrees of courts of record of the
United States or of this or of any other
state of the United States, shall,
except as otherwise provided, be
commenced only within six years next
after the cause of action accrues.
The district court determined that Muldoon’s claim was more
analogous to M.G.L.A. c. 260, § 2A, which is entitled “Tort,
contract to recover for personal injuries, and replevin
actions” and provides:
Except as otherwise provided, actions of
tort, actions of contract to recover for
personal injuries, and actions of
replevin, shall be commenced only within
three years next after the cause of
action accrues.
Although we have not previously addressed the issue
of the applicable statute of limitations in the context of
a section 510 claim, several other circuits have, and they
have determined that section 510 claims for benefits are
most analogous to state law actions for wrongful termination
or retaliatory discharge. See Sandberg v. KPMG Peat
Marwick, 111 F.3d 331, 334-35 (2nd Cir. 1997); McClure v.
Zoecon, Inc., 936 F.2d 777, 778-79 (5th Cir. 1991); Taylor v.
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 38 F.3d 1216, 1994 WL 573913
at *1 (6th Cir. 1994) (unpublished); Teumer v. General
Motors Corp., 34 F.3d 542, 549-50 (7th Cir. 1994); Burrey v.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 159 F.3d 388, 397 (9th Cir. 1998);
Held v. Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp., 912 F.2d 1197,
1205 (10th Cir. 1990); Musick v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
Inc., 81 F.3d 136, 137-39 (11th Cir. 1996). We agree with
-3-
these courts’ characterization of the section 510 claim for
benefits. We specifically agree with the district court’s
determination that Muldoon’s section 510 claim for benefits
based upon his allegation of wrongful termination is most
analogous to M.G.L.A. c. 260, § 2A. Because Muldoon’s cause
of action accrued in April 1993, the date on which he
alleges he was wrongfully terminated, and he did not file
his section 510 action in the district court until March
1999, his action was time-barred pursuant to M.G.L.A. c.
260, § 2A. The district court did not err in dismissing
Muldoon’s complaint on this basis.
In an effort to characterize his claim as sounding
in general contract (and not to recover for personal
injury), Muldoon additionally asserts that his amended
complaint alleged a violation of section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185, as well as
a section 510 claim, and that the LMRA may not be
“preempted” by ERISA § 510. This argument lacks merit.
Although the amended complaint makes reference to a
collective bargaining agreement in its factual allegations,
it contains no support for Muldoon’s contention that he has
asserted a breach of the collective bargaining agreement in
-4-
support of a section 301 claim. In this context, Muldoon’s
legal argument that ERISA may not preempt the LMRA is a non-
issue.
Finally, Muldoon’s assertion that the district
court abused its discretion by denying his request for oral
argument on his claim also is unavailing. Because he had
adequate opportunity to provide the district court with
evidence supporting his position, and he did so, Muldoon has
made no showing of prejudice. See Bratt v. International
Business Machines Corp., 785 F.2d 352, 363 (1st Cir. 1986).
The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
-5-