[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 01-1764
ALLAN D. CANTRELL,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
JANET RENO, ET AL.,
Respondents, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
Allan D. Cantrell on brief pro se.
Michael J. Sullivan, United States Attorney, and Dina
Michael Chaitowitz, Assistant U.S. Attorney, on Motion for
Summary Disposition for appellee.
January 29, 2002
Per Curiam. Allan D. Cantrell, a federal prisoner
serving a 70-month sentence for conspiring to manufacture and
distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 846, and
manufacturing methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 841, appeals the
district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2241. His habeas petition
sought to challenge the validity of his federal conviction
on two grounds: (1) that the district court lacked
jurisdiction over the offense because Congress had not
enacted 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846 into law, and the offenses
had not occurred on U.S. property, but within the state of
Missouri; and (2) his conviction and sentence violated the
rule announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466
(2000), because the indictment did not reference a drug
quantity.
The government has filed a motion for summary
disposition of the appeal. We conclude that the district
court properly determined that Cantrell could not raise his
claims challenging the validity of his federal conviction
through a habeas petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 as he does not meet the requirements of the savings
clause contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Moreover, Cantrell has
not demonstrated that he is actually innocent as his claims
fail upon an examination of the merits. Thus, we grant the
government’s motion and affirm the dismissal of the habeas
petition.
Cantrell is mistaken in his belief that Congress
did not enact 21 U.S.C. § 841. On October 27, 1970, Congress
enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, Tit. II, §§ 401, 406, 84
Stat. 1260, 1265, codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846.
Thus, the crimes embodied by these statutes do not represent
mere regulations promulgated by the Attorney General.
Cantrell’s claim that the district court lacked
jurisdiction because his criminal conduct occurred in a state
(and not on federally owned land, a territory, or the
District of Columbia) also fails. Congress has provided
that: “The district courts of the United States shall have
original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States,
of all offenses against the laws of the United States.” 18
U.S.C. § 3231. The trial court’s jurisdiction under 18
U.S.C. § 3231 is not restricted to crimes occurring on
federally owned property. United States v. Munat, 29 F.3d
233, 237 (6th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Prou, 199
F.3d 37, 45 (1 st Cir. 1999) (“a federal district court
plainly possesses subject-matter jurisdiction over drug
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cases”); United States v. Lussier, 929 F.2d 25, 26 (1st Cir.
1991) (rejecting “territorial” jurisdiction argument in
criminal tax case).
To the extent that Cantrell’s claim can be
construed as a general challenge to the constitutionality of
the statutes of conviction, we note that the statutes at
issue, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846, were not enacted pursuant to
Congress’s general police powers over its territories and the
District of Columbia, but, rather, under Congress’s power
to regulate commerce. With this in mind, we have upheld
their constitutionality. See United States v. Zorilla, 93
F.3d 7, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1996)(holding that drug trafficking is
precisely the kind of economic enterprise that substantially
affects interstate commerce and that, therefore, comes within
Congress's regulatory power under the Commerce Clause).
Cantrell’s Apprendi argument would fail even if
Apprendi could be considered retroactively applicable to
cases on collateral review (which is not the case). The rule
in Apprendi is that, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to
a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. at
490. This rule has not been violated because Cantrell’s 70-
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month sentence fell far below the 20-year maximum statutory
sentence applicable to drug crimes without reference to drug
quantity. See United States v. Campbell, 268 F.3d 1, 7 (1st
Cir. 2001)(finding no Apprendi violation when the district
court sentences a defendant below the default statutory
maximum applicable to crimes without reference to drug
quantity); see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (setting default
statutory maximum). Likewise, his three-year term of
supervised release was within the default statutory maximum.
Affirmed. Loc.R. 27(c).
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