United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 02-1329
02-1475
IN RE PROVIDENCE JOURNAL COMPANY, INC.,
Petitioner.
____________________
ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF MANDAMUS
TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Selya and Lipez, Circuit Judges.
Howard A. Merten, with whom Gordon P. Cleary and Vetter &
White, Inc. were on brief, for petitioner.
Jerry Elmer and Goldenberg & Muri LLP on brief for Rhode
Island Affiliate — American Civil Liberties Union, amicus curiae.
Lucy A. Dalglish on brief for The Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press, American Society of Newspaper Editors, The
Society of Professional Journalists, Radio-Television News
Directors Association, and Newspaper Association of America, amici
curiae.
William L. Patton, with whom Joan McPhee, Michele T. Perillo,
and Ropes & Gray were on brief, for respondent (Hon. Ernest C.
Torres).
June 12, 2002
SELYA, Circuit Judge. This proceeding is an outgrowth of
the widely publicized political corruption case brought by the
federal government against Providence mayor Vincent A. ("Buddy")
Cianci, Jr., and several codefendants. During the trial, a daily
newspaper filed serial mandamus petitions seeking to remediate
perceived violations of First Amendment and common-law rights of
access to documents, videotapes, and other materials that comprise
part of the court record. These petitions present, in essence,
three important questions (some of novel impression).
The first question pertains to public access to memoranda
of law that counsel are required by local rule to submit in
connection with motions. These memoranda contain the substance of
a movant's argument or a nonmovant's opposition: pertinent facts,
case law, statutory references, and legal reasoning. As to this
question, we conclude that the District of Rhode Island's
longstanding practice of refusing to place these memoranda in the
case file, available for public perusal, violates the First
Amendment. The second question pertains to the manner in which the
district court has handled such memoranda in the Cianci case. We
uphold most — though not all — aspects of the praxis employed by
the district court. The third question involves the newspaper's
request for copies of videotape and audiotape evidence introduced
at the trial. Given the circumstances, we conclude that the
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district court's refusal to accede to this request did not
constitute an abuse of discretion.
I. BACKGROUND
Although the two petitions share a common nucleus of
operative fact, they constitute discrete requests for relief.
Accordingly, we describe each petition separately.
A. The First Petition.
On April 2, 2001, a federal grand jury indicted Mayor
Cianci, along with five other individuals, on a variety of charges.
The linchpin of the indictment was a RICO conspiracy count that, in
effect, charged the defendants with operating City Hall as a
racketeering enterprise that demanded bribes, sometimes thinly
disguised as "campaign contributions," as a prerequisite to doing
business with the municipality and its agencies. The indictment
itself came as no surprise: some details of the federal probe,
dubbed "Operation Plunder Dome," had surfaced earlier, and a number
of other persons already had been indicted on related charges.
Both before and after the Cianci indictment, Operation
Plunder Dome received pervasive publicity. During the grand jury
investigation that culminated in this indictment, leaked
information proved to be a persistent problem. To cite one
example, a local television station broadcast a videotape that had
been presented to the grand jury as evidence. To cite another, an
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Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) played an FBI surveillance
tape for several of his friends.
The Cianci indictment brought heightened attention to the
scandal. Determined to ensure the protagonists' right to a fair
trial, the district court sanctioned the wayward AUSA, appointed a
special prosecutor to investigate whether criminal contempt charges
should be brought against whomever was responsible for the grand
jury leaks, and reminded counsel of their obligation to refrain
from publicly disseminating information that threatened the
integrity of the upcoming trial. See D.R.I. R. 39 (precluding
release of information if there exists a "reasonable likelihood
that it imposes a serious and imminent threat of interference with
a trial or action"); R.I. R. Prof'l Conduct, R. 3.6 (precluding
extrajudicial statements that have a "substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding").
The capstone of the court's efforts was the issuance, on
May 15, 2001, of a non-dissemination order. Citing the "intense
media coverage" surrounding the Cianci case, the court foresaw "a
substantial risk of prejudicing the parties' right to a fair
trial." To diminish that risk, the court prohibited the
dissemination of, inter alia, any information regarding the
testimony, character, credibility, or reputation of any witness;
any information presented to the grand jury; and any information
concerning plea negotiations. The order (which contained an
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exception for information "presented at trial or during the course
of any hearing conducted in open court") was to remain in effect
pending the disposition of all charges against all defendants.
In the same order, the court instituted a procedure with
respect to the filing of any documents that might contain
references to restricted information. Each such document was to be
filed under seal, accompanied by a separate descriptive document
that, inter alia, stated the reasons why the submitted document
should be sealed. The court, acting sua sponte or on the motion of
any party, could order any document to be unsealed if it determined
that, notwithstanding any references to restricted information,
insufficient justification existed for keeping that document
confidential.
On May 23, 2001, the district court issued an order
amending this procedure (we henceforth refer to the May 15 order,
as modified by the May 23 order, as the non-dissemination order).
The May 23 order changed the ground rules in three respects.
First, counsel were instructed to refrain from making any reference
to restricted information in motions or oppositions to motions.
Second, the author of any legal memorandum submitted in connection
with a motion was directed to file a certification as to whether
the memorandum contained information subject to the non-
dissemination order. Third, the order stated that if the court's
subsequent review of any particular legal memorandum revealed that
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the memorandum contained no restricted information, it would be
placed on file in the clerk's office and made available for public
inspection. The order made clear, however, that the court would
not undertake to "redact or edit any memorandum."
The district court's treatment of legal memoranda in the
Cianci case represented a departure from the prevailing practice in
the District of Rhode Island. Although the court's local rules
seem to provide for the filing in the clerk's office of legal
memoranda supporting or opposing motions, see D.R.I. R. 12(a)(1)-
(2), the District of Rhode Island has a longstanding practice —
dating back to the early 1980s — of docketing such memoranda but
not placing them in the case files maintained by the clerk's
office. Instead, they are transmitted directly to the judge to
whom the case is assigned and kept in the judge's chambers
(inaccessible to public scrutiny except upon request). We discuss
the propriety of this practice infra.
The Cianci case generated a blizzard of paper, and
numerous documents were submitted to the court in accordance with
the procedures established by the non-dissemination order. The
state's major newspaper, THE PROVIDENCE JOURNAL (THE JOURNAL ), chafed
under this regime. On February 19, 2002, THE JOURNAL filed a motion
seeking access to 42 previously filed memoranda that it claimed had
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not yet been made public.1 In the same motion, THE JOURNAL sought
further modifications of the non-dissemination order, asserting
that the district court's general practice of denying access to
legal memoranda reversed the presumption of openness applicable to
judicial records. THE JOURNAL implored the court to deem all such
memoranda public when filed unless, in a particular instance, a
motion to seal was docketed and the court, after individualized
inquiry, made specific record findings justifying confidentiality.
THE JOURNAL also asked the court to consider redaction on a document-
by-document basis as a less restrictive means of balancing the need
for confidentiality against the public's right to know.2
Shortly before the start of trial, the district court
denied virtually all of THE JOURNAL 's requests. See United States
v. Cianci, Crim. No. 00-083-T, slip op. at 14 (D.R.I. Mar. 15,
2002) (unpublished) [hereinafter "D. Ct. Op."]. After outlining
1
This was not THE JOURNAL 's first expression of dissatisfaction
with the district court's handling of access to documents in the
Cianci case. THE JOURNAL earlier had sought access to an FBI agent's
affidavit submitted in support of a request for a search warrant.
Based upon its determination that public disclosure of the
affidavit's contents prior to trial would prejudice the defendants'
Sixth Amendment rights, the district court denied THE JOURNAL 's
motion. United States v. Cianci, 175 F. Supp. 2d 194, 198, 205
(D.R.I. 2001).
2
Although the non-dissemination order applied to more than
legal memoranda (e.g., it imposed stringent restrictions on
extrajudicial statements by the parties and their counsel), THE
JOURNAL has only challenged the order insofar as it pertains to the
treatment of legal memoranda. Consequently, we express no opinion
anent any other feature of the non-dissemination order.
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the traditional treatment of legal memoranda in the District of
Rhode Island, id. at 1-4, the court described the special
procedures that it had instituted in the Cianci case and noted that
11 of the 42 memoranda at issue already had been placed on file in
the clerk's office, id. at 4-5. Of the remaining 31 memoranda, 17
(related to discovery motions) had been referred to a magistrate
judge; 3 dealt with mundane matters that the court believed were of
no conceivable interest to THE JOURNAL ; and the final 11 could not
"properly be made part of the public record before trial" because
they referred to "grand jury matters and/or matters, the
dissemination of which would prejudice the parties' rights to a
fair trial." Id. at 6-7.
The district court then denied most aspects of THE
JOURNAL's request to modify the non-dissemination order. The court
characterized its treatment of legal memoranda in the Cianci case
as "perfectly consistent" with THE JOURNAL 's proposal to make all
legal memoranda public unless otherwise directed by the court. Id.
at 9. It rejected the suggested reinstitution of formal motions to
seal on the ground that the suggestion already had proven
unworkable. Id. Relatedly, the court expressed its unwillingness
to rely exclusively on counsel's representations in determining
whether to place legal memoranda on file in the clerk's office.
Id. at 11-12. The court reiterated that redaction was infeasible
both because the forbidden matters were "almost invariably
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dispersed throughout the memoranda and inextricably intertwined
with the references to applicable legal authority," and because the
mechanics of redaction would squander scarce judicial resources.
Id. at 13. Finally, the court agreed to amend the non-
dissemination order to furnish a specific, on-the-record finding in
support of any subsequent decision to withhold a particular
memorandum. Id. at 14.
Trial commenced on March 23, 2002. Two days later, THE
JOURNAL filed a mandamus petition with this court seeking: (1)
access to legal memoranda previously submitted in the Cianci case
but not yet made public; (2) a directive requiring all future
memoranda to be placed on file in the clerk's office on the date of
submission; and (3) modification of the non-dissemination order to
require redaction when feasible (as a less restrictive alternative
to sealing).
B. The Second Petition.
The second mandamus petition centers on 71 videotapes and
audiotapes of secretly recorded conversations with various
bureaucrats (including some of the defendants). Putting this
petition into perspective requires an understanding of how the
parties presented these videotapes and audiotapes during the Cianci
trial.
In preparation for trial, the government transferred the
entire contents of the 71 tapes onto CD-ROMs. After loading the
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CD-ROMs onto the hard drive of a laptop computer, the government
employed a software program called Sanctions to excerpt
conversations for playback. Using this technology, the government
introduced selected passages from these conversations into evidence
in the course of trial. As the excerpts were played on the
government's laptop computer, they were simultaneously broadcast
via the district court's state-of-the-art audiovisual system to
monitors in both the courtroom and a remote viewing room (the
overflow room). As a taped excerpt was played, a transcript was
simultaneously scrolled across the bottom of the screen.
Before trial, the media sought copies of the videotape
and audiotape evidence. Discussions ensued between representatives
of the press and David DiMarzio, the clerk of court, regarding
possible methods by which the tapes could be copied and distributed
to the media after they had been introduced into evidence. The
clerk initially suggested that the parties could be required to
submit an extra copy of each tape and the associated transcript for
delivery to the media at an appropriate time. The district court
vetoed this suggestion. Next, the media representatives proposed
that the clerk's office copy the exhibits for the media. The clerk
rebuffed this proposal on the ground that copying might damage the
original tapes. At that point, the negotiations stalled.
Shortly after the trial began, THE JOURNAL moved for access
to copies of the videotape and audiotape evidence. The court held
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a hearing that focused on the practicalities of complying with that
request. THE JOURNAL argued that other courts, in other criminal
trials, had provided copies of taped evidence to the media in one
of three ways: (1) by requiring court staff to copy the tapes; (2)
by requiring the parties to submit duplicates; or (3) by
rerecording the tapes as they were being played to the jury in open
court.
Ruling from the bench, the district court scotched all
three options. The court rejected the first based on concerns
expressed by the clerk. It rejected the second because it was
unwilling to impose upon the parties the "significant undertaking"
of creating and supplying extra copies of the taped evidence. It
rejected the third option based upon the clerk's representation
that there was no feasible way to rerecord the tapes as they were
being played over the court's evidence presentation system. In a
written addendum, the court delineated an additional reason for its
decision:
The recordings being presented are in the form
of audio and video tapes that include not only
the conversations that have been played for
the jury; but, also, additional conversations
that have not and may not be admitted into
evidence. Moreover, the Court is informed
that the same is true with respect to the CD
ROM's being used by counsel. Thus, providing
The Providence Journal with recordings of the
conversations played for the jury would
require both editing and duplication of the
tapes being offered in order to create
something that does not presently exist.
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On April 26, 2002, THE JOURNAL filed its second petition
for a writ of mandamus. This petition sought to require the
district court to supply the press with copies of all videotape and
audiotape evidence played to the jury during the Cianci trial on a
contemporaneous basis. We consolidated THE JOURNAL 's two mandamus
petitions for hearing. The district judge, through counsel, filed
an opposition to each petition. We heard oral argument while the
Cianci trial was ongoing (the district court sent the Cianci case
to the jury on June 12, 2002).
II. APPELLATE JURISDICTION
There is a threshold question as to whether THE JOURNAL
should be proceeding by appeal or by mandamus. Compare, e.g.,
United States v. Ladd (In re Associated Press), 162 F.3d 503, 507
(7th Cir. 1998) (appeal), with, e.g., Oregonian Publ'g Co. v.
United States Dist. Ct., 920 F.2d 1462, 1464-65 (9th Cir. 1990)
(mandamus). In the circumstances of this case, however, all roads
lead to Rome.
Under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, "[a] federal
court of appeals has the power to treat an attempted appeal from an
unappealable (or possibly unappealable) order as a petition for a
writ of mandamus." United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 769 (1st
Cir. 1994). On this basis, we exercised mandamus jurisdiction in
United States v. Hurley (In re Globe Newspaper Co.), 920 F.2d 88
(1st Cir. 1990). In that case, a newspaper sought access to
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records relating to a criminal trial. The district court rejected
both the newspaper's demand for access and its motion to intervene.
Id. at 90. The newspaper pursued an appeal and simultaneously
petitioned for a writ of mandamus. Id. We declined to decide the
jurisdictional question, but, rather, granted relief under the
aegis of the All Writs Act and dismissed the appeal as moot. Id.
The petitions now before us are of the same general
character as the petition in In re Globe Newspaper Co. Here, as
there, the petitions pose important questions bearing upon the
constitutional and common-law rights of public access to judicial
records in criminal proceedings. Here, as there, the petitions are
consonant with the historic use of mandamus as a means to check
ostensible judicial usurpations of power. See In re Pearson, 990
F.2d 653, 656 (1st Cir. 1993). Because we believe that the issues
raised by THE JOURNAL are worthy candidates for mandamus review, we
exercise our discretion to entertain both petitions under our
mandamus jurisdiction.3
III. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
We next discuss the case law concerning rights of access
to judicial records. We begin with first principles.
3
Along with its mandamus petitions, THE JOURNAL prudently filed
a protective appeal. In view of our decision to exercise mandamus
jurisdiction, we will follow the course charted in In re Globe
Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d at 90, and enter a separate order
dismissing that appeal as moot.
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Courts long have recognized "that public monitoring of
the judicial system fosters the important values of quality,
honesty and respect for our legal system." Siedle v. Putnam Inv.,
Inc., 147 F.3d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1998) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). This recognition has given rise to a
presumption that the public has a common-law right of access to
judicial documents. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S.
589, 597 (1978). This presumptive right of access attaches to
those materials "which properly come before the court in the course
of an adjudicatory proceeding and which are relevant to that
adjudication." FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404,
412-13 (1st Cir. 1987). It follows, then, that the common-law
right of access extends to "materials on which a court relies in
determining the litigants' substantive rights." Anderson v.
Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 1986).
Apart from the prerogatives attendant to the common-law
right of access to judicial records, the public and the press enjoy
a constitutional right of access to criminal proceedings under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super.
Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 603-06 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575-80 (1980) (plurality op.). The
constitutional right of access is not limited to the actual trial
itself, but also encompasses most pretrial proceedings. See Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Super Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1986) (Press-
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Enterprise II); In re Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d 47, 52 (1st
Cir. 1984); see also Anderson, 805 F.2d at 11 (collecting cases).
We have held that this constitutional right — which serves to
ensure a "full understanding" of criminal proceedings, thereby
placing the populace in a position "to serve as an effective check
on the system" — extends to documents and kindred materials
submitted in connection with the prosecution and defense of
criminal proceedings.4 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d
497, 502 (1st Cir. 1989) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Although the two rights of access are not coterminous,
courts have employed much the same type of screen in evaluating
their applicability to particular claims. See, e.g., United States
v. Soussoudis (In re Wash. Post Co.), 807 F.2d 383, 390 (4th Cir.
1986). This overlap is understandable because the jurisprudence
discussing the First Amendment right of access to criminal
proceedings has been derived in large measure from the
jurisprudence that has shaped the common-law right of access. See
Anderson, 805 F.2d at 13.
4
This holding comports with case law from our sister circuits.
E.g., United States v. Biaggi (In re N.Y. Times), 828 F.2d 110, 114
(2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Soussoudis (In re Wash. Post Co.),
807 F.2d 383, 389-90 (4th Cir. 1986). We note, however, that the
Supreme Court has not yet passed upon whether the constitutional
right of access in criminal proceedings extends to judicial
records.
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IV. ANALYSIS: THE FIRST PETITION
The first mandamus petition attacks both the District of
Rhode Island's overall treatment of legal memoranda and the trial
court's handling of those memoranda in the Cianci case. We address
these points separately. First, however, we focus on the
applicable standards of review.
A. Standards of Review.
Despite the common ancestry shared by the two rights of
access, the standards of review referable to those rights differ.
On the one hand, the denial of a claimed right of access under the
common law engenders review for abuse of discretion. Id. at 13.
A district court can abuse its discretion by "ignoring a material
factor that deserves significant weight, relying on an improper
factor, or, even if it mulls only the proper mix of factors, by
making a serious mistake in judgment." Siedle, 147 F.3d at 10.
Since "only the most compelling reasons can justify non-disclosure
of judicial records" that come within the scope of the common-law
right of access, Standard Fin. Mgmt., 830 F.2d at 410 (citation
omitted), this review is more rigorous than garden-variety abuse of
discretion review.
On the other hand, constitutional access claims engender
de novo review. In re State-Record Co., 917 F.2d 124, 127 (4th
Cir. 1990). In such cases, the presumption in favor of access can
only be overcome "by an overriding interest based on findings that
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closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest." Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super.
Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984) (Press-Enterprise I). This last
requirement adds a new dimension and makes the First Amendment
standard even more stringent than the common-law standard. Thus,
courts have tended to employ the First Amendment standard in
situations in which both rights of access are implicated. E.g., In
re Wash. Post Co., 807 F.2d at 390.
Against this backdrop, we turn to the legal memoranda
that parties are required to file in conjunction with motions
submitted in the District of Rhode Island. The local rules specify
that those memoranda must contain the critical elements of the
parties' arguments. See D.R.I. R. 12(a)(1)-(2). It follows that
those memoranda constitute materials on which a court is meant to
rely in determining the parties' substantive rights. In a criminal
case, therefore, they are subject to both common-law and First
Amendment rights of access. Accordingly, we review the district
court's treatment of them under the First Amendment's heightened
standard of review.
B. The Traditional Practice.
The respondent notes, correctly, that legal memoranda in
the Cianci case have been made available to the public so long as
they do not contain restricted information. Building on that
foundation, he argues that the District of Rhode Island's
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traditional method of treating memoranda is not properly before us.
We do not agree.
The district court has made clear that its handling of
legal memoranda in the Cianci case represents an ad hoc exception
to the District of Rhode Island's standard practice. Absent
mandamus review, the constitutional questions stemming from this
standard practice — a practice that amounts to a blanket nonfiling
policy — are likely to recur and to evade effective resolution.
Moreover, an immediate adjudication of the matter will clarify
matters for judges, litigants, lawyers, and journalists in a wide
range of cases.
On suitable occasions, we have employed advisory mandamus
to resolve issues "which are both novel and of great public
importance." In re Recticel Foam Corp., 859 F.2d 1000, 1005 n.4
(1st Cir. 1988). The considerations enumerated above lead us to
conclude that the blanket nonfiling policy is a suitable candidate
for advisory mandamus. E.g., Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104,
109-12 (1964); Horn, 29 F.3d at 769-70.
Having concluded that we have an institutional interest
in oversight of the District of Rhode Island's standard practice
vis-à-vis the handling of legal memoranda, we turn to the validity
of that practice. Motions and objections filed in the District of
Rhode Island typically become part of the case file (and, thus,
available for public inspection) at the moment they are filed in
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the clerk's office. Legal memoranda submitted in conjunction with
such motions are treated differently: those memoranda do not
become part of the case file, but, rather, go directly to the judge
to whom the case is assigned. This leaves the question of access
solely in the discretion of the trial judge and places on persons
desiring access the onus of initiating action. Whether viewed as
a restriction on access or as a practical inconvenience, this
protocol reverses the constitutional presumption of public access
to documents submitted in conjunction with criminal proceedings.
Cf. Pokaski, 868 F.2d at 507 (indicating that a statute that
restricts public access to judicial records in criminal cases by
"plac[ing] on the public the burden of overcoming inertia" is
impermissible).
The respondent attempts to justify the blanket nonfiling
policy on five bases. First, the legal memoranda are directed to
the judge. Second, and relatedly, routing memoranda directly to
the judge's chambers lessens the need for the judge to requisition
the entire case file. Third, incorporating memoranda into the case
files maintained in the clerk's office would "needlessly burden
. . . already taxed storage facilities." Fourth, a blanket
nonfiling policy serves to discourage overzealous counsel from
attempting to gain an "unfair tactical advantage" by improperly
influencing the public. Finally, memoranda submitted in connection
with criminal proceedings might disclose grand jury testimony or
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refer to other matters prejudicial to a defendant's right to a fair
trial. None of these reasons justify the constitutional intrusion
that results from the District of Rhode Island's standard practice
of treating legal memoranda as presumptively nonpublic.
The respondent's first asserted justification proves too
much. Although legal memoranda are directed to the judge, so are
virtually all the other papers filed in the case (including motions
and objections). The second asserted justification is no
justification at all: requiring legal memoranda to be filed in the
clerk's office would not mean that the judge would have to haul the
entire case file into chambers whenever he or she wished to check
a particular point. Copying is a routine exercise in most clerks'
offices, and at any rate the district court's local rules require
counsel to file memoranda in duplicate. See D.R.I. R. 12(d). That
would permit placing one copy in the case file and routing the
other directly to the judge.
Nor does the third asserted justification withstand
scrutiny. While storage limitations may well have prompted the
adoption of the blanket nonfiling policy two decades ago, the
recently-completed renovation of the Federal Courthouse in
Providence, coupled with the court's acquisition of the adjacent
Pastore Building, have eliminated any intractable problem in that
regard.
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We are equally unpersuaded that the court's policy of
keeping all legal memoranda hidden from public view is warranted
based upon hypothetical concerns about overzealous counsel behaving
badly. Judges deal every day with the need to ensure that lawyers
play fair and square, and we are unwilling to assume, without hard
evidence, that lawyers who practice in the District of Rhode Island
are so unruly that ordinary antidotes to fractiousness (e.g.,
sanctions, contempt, loss of the right to practice) will prove
impuissant.
As to the district court's fifth concern, we acknowledge
that specific cases may pose greater risks of prejudicial
disclosures (and, thus, may warrant special treatment). But there
is no need to discard the baby with the bath water. Safeguards
against prejudice can be implemented on a case-specific basis.
Where a particularized need for restricting public access to legal
memoranda exists, that need can be addressed by the tailoring of
appropriate relief. As contrasted with the District of Rhode
Island's existing practice of treating all legal memoranda as
presumptively nonpublic, this would be a considerably less
restrictive, but equally effective, means for dealing with the
specter of potential prejudice. Cf. Pokaski, 868 F.2d at 506-07
(rejecting blanket sealing rule on ground that case-by-case
evaluation of defendants' sealing requests represented a viable
less restrictive means).
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We hold, therefore, that the District of Rhode Island's
blanket nonfiling policy — its standard practice of refusing to
place memoranda submitted in conjunction with motions on file in
the clerk's office when tendered — violates the First Amendment.5
C. The Procedure Employed Here.
In the Cianci case, the trial court deviated from the
District of Rhode Island's blanket nonfiling policy. Thus, its
methodology invites a separate analysis.
The constitutional right of public access is a qualified
right that may be outweighed by competing interests in a given
case. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 511 n.10; In re Globe
Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d at 52. Certainly, in a case in which
public attention is quite high, a court deliberating about whether
to restrict broadly public access to materials submitted in
connection with criminal proceedings ordinarily ought to afford
interested parties an opportunity to be heard on the question of
impoundment. See, e.g., United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1361
n.18 (3d Cir. 1994). The court would normally be expected to
5
Although the Supreme Court has not established whether the
constitutional right of access attaches to civil cases in general,
the common-law right of access extends to judicial records in civil
proceedings. Standard Fin. Mgmt., 830 F.2d at 408 & n.4. As said,
that right encompasses legal memoranda. Because none of the
respondent's rationales for rendering legal memoranda presumptively
nonpublic rise to the level of a compelling reason sufficient to
justify the nondisclosure of those documents, our invalidation of
the District of Rhode Island's blanket nonfiling policy vis-à-vis
legal memoranda applies in civil as well as criminal proceedings.
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identify and balance the competing interests involved, and weigh
reasonable alternatives to sealing, making findings where
necessary. In re State-Record Co., 917 F.2d at 127-29; In re Wash.
Post Co., 807 F.2d at 391.
Here, THE JOURNAL has not complained about a lack of
notice, so we turn to the task of identifying and balancing the
competing interests involved. The district court clearly
registered its concern that the unrestrained disclosure of certain
types of information about the Cianci case would create a
substantial risk of prejudicing the parties' right to a fair trial.
This disquietude impelled the court to implement, and then fine-
tune, the non-dissemination order. An accused's Sixth Amendment
right to a fair trial plainly rises to the level of a compelling
interest. See Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 508. When that
right collides head-on with the public's right of access to
judicial records, the defendant's fair trial right takes
precedence. In re Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d at 53.
That does not mean, however, that the public's (and the
media's) right to know can be frustrated by the mere invocation of
a threat to the accused's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.
A court faced with an impending collision between these rights
must, on a case-specific basis, construct a balance. Press-
Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510-11 & n.10. That weighing must
proceed on the assumption that restrictions on access to
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presumptively public judicial documents should be imposed only if
a substantial likelihood exists that the accused's right to a fair
trial will otherwise be prejudiced. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S.
at 14. We caution that this inquiry requires specific findings;
the First Amendment right of public access is too precious to be
foreclosed by conclusory assertions or unsupported speculation.
United States v. Kirk (In re Memphis Publ'g Co.), 887 F.2d 646,
648-49 (6th Cir. 1989); In re Wash. Post Co., 807 F.2d at 392-93 &
n.9; United States v. Martin, 746 F.2d 964, 972 (3d Cir. 1984).
Political corruption cases tend to attract widespread
media attention, and the Cianci case is a paradigmatic example.
Here, moreover, the district court cited book and verse,
cataloguing specific incidents that fueled its concerns that the
defendants' ability to receive a fair trial was in danger of being
substantively compromised by unrestrained disclosures. The court
alluded specifically to leaks of information in violation of Rule
6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and misbehavior by
the lead prosecutor. In view of the notoriety of the case and the
incidents recounted by the district court, we are convinced that
the court's perception of a threat to the defendants' fair trial
rights was objectively reasonable. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
443 U.S. 368, 392-93 (1979) (concluding that the trial court
properly appraised legitimate concerns that open proceeding posed
-24-
reasonable probability of prejudice to defendants' fair trial
rights).
Having found that the defendants' fair trial rights
represent a compelling interest, we next must decide whether the
non-dissemination order is drawn as narrowly as practicable. The
threshold question is whether a trial court, in a particular case,
can adopt a procedure that reverses the presumption of public
access and automatically seals all subsequent filings until the
judge determines that a specific document poses no undue risk to
the defendant's fair trial rights.
THE JOURNAL argues that the decision in Associated Press
v. United States Dist. Ct., 705 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1983), requires
that this question be answered in the negative. In that case, the
district court, responding to extensive press coverage of a high-
profile criminal matter, issued a sua sponte order directing the
parties to submit all future filings under seal in order to permit
the court "to initially review them and to make a determination
with regard to disclosure." Id. at 1144. The trial court
subsequently imposed a 48-hour time limit within which it would
rule upon the need for a given filing to remain sealed. Id. at
1145. The Ninth Circuit nonetheless struck down the procedure and
directed the district court to vacate its order. Id. at 1147.
In our view, Associated Press is a horse of a different
hue. There, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court
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had failed to make specific findings showing that "access to
pretrial documents will create a substantial probability of
irreparable damage to defendants' fair trial rights." Id. at 1146.
The presence of such findings here readily distinguishes this case.
We find more helpful the opinion in United States v.
McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806 (10th Cir. 1997). There, the court
acknowledged that a high-profile criminal case may "impose[] unique
demands on the trial court, and require[] the court to establish
procedures for dealing effectively, efficiently and fairly with
recurring issues such as whether documents should be placed under
seal or redacted." Id. at 813. This is exactly what transpired
here. In response to a cognizable threat to the defendants' Sixth
Amendment rights, the district court adopted a practical procedure
that enabled it effectively and efficiently to safeguard those
rights. Nothing in the case law prevents a court from establishing
this sort of prophylaxis. And given the circumstances of this
case, the district court's implementation of a general procedure to
seal all memoranda temporarily appears narrowly tailored.
Turning our attention to the specifics of the non-
dissemination order, we hold that the district court's insistence
on reviewing each memorandum before deciding whether it should
remain under seal did not constitute reversible error. Although we
question the court's apparent reluctance to rely on counsel to
separate wheat from chaff in accordance with the non-dissemination
-26-
order — experience teaches that most lawyers will cooperate with
the court and, in all events, will be loath to defy a court order
— nothing precludes the district court from assuming that burden.
This does not mean that we regard the non-dissemination
order as a textbook model. We have four specific concerns. First,
where, as here, a court undertakes to screen documents before they
are placed in the case file, the procedure should incorporate a
specific timetable obligating the court to perform its self-imposed
screening responsibilities promptly and to render a timely decision
as to whether a particular document is fit for public disclosure.
Second, and relatedly, the court below decided to refrain from
reviewing each individual memorandum to decide whether it could be
made available to the public until after the time had expired for
the submission of any possible reply memorandum. This
unnecessarily prolongs the process. Each individual memorandum
either contains restricted information (in which case it is subject
to redaction or sealing) or it does not (in which case it does not
pose a threat to the defendants' Sixth Amendment rights). Third,
the order contains no provision as to whether the court intends to
unseal retained memoranda at some point after the trial has ended
(and if so, when).
Finally, we think that the district court's refusal to
consider redaction on a document-by-document basis is
insupportable. Courts have an obligation to consider all
-27-
reasonable alternatives to foreclosing the constitutional right of
access. In re Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d at 56. Redaction
constitutes a time-tested means of minimizing any intrusion on that
right. See United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir.
1995) (stating "that it is proper for a district court, after
weighing competing interests, to edit and redact a judicial
document in order to allow access to appropriate portions of the
document"); see also United States v. Biaggi (In re N.Y. Times),
828 F.2d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1987) (rejecting "wholesale sealing" of
papers partly because "limited redaction [might] be appropriate").
Here, moreover, our ability to assess whether the
district court was justified in refusing to redact the 11 documents
that remain sealed is hampered by a lack of specific findings. See
In re Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d at 56 (requiring a trial court
that rejects alternatives to sealing to make specific findings to
facilitate appellate review). The court did say, generally, that
"in those rare cases where counsel find it necessary to refer to
grand jury matters or other matters not properly disclosable, those
references are almost invariably dispersed throughout the memoranda
and inextricably intertwined with the references to applicable
legal authority." D. Ct. Op. at 13. But the First Amendment
requires consideration of the feasibility of redaction on a
document-by-document basis, and the court's blanket
characterization falls well short of this benchmark.
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Having pointed out these defects in the non-dissemination
order, we leave the matter of correction to the district court.
Consistent with the core purpose of advisory mandamus, the
principal value of our rulings is in terms of future cases. In
respect to the Cianci case itself, the court is at the end of a
lengthy trial; once the dust has settled, we are confident that the
district court will set a reasonable timetable for determining
whether previously submitted memoranda are to be placed on file in
the clerk's office (with or without redaction); and, as to any
memorandum withheld from filing, will enter specific findings as to
the need for that restriction and the impracticality of redaction
as an alternative to sealing. Within a reasonable time after the
Cianci case and all related proceedings have ended — there is a
"severed" defendant yet to be tried — we anticipate that the
district court will consider the release of all documents and other
materials then remaining under seal. Should the district court
fail to act in a timely manner to effectuate the principles
endorsed in this opinion — a contingency that we doubt will occur
— THE JOURNAL is free to petition for ancillary relief.
V. ANALYSIS: THE SECOND PETITION
We next grapple with THE JOURNAL 's request for copies of
the videotapes and audiotapes played at trial. In Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-97 (1975), the Supreme Court
concluded that the media has a First Amendment right to publish
-29-
information contained in court records that are open to public
inspection. A few years later, however, the Court rejected the
argument that the First Amendment right of access allowed the media
to obtain copies of tapes that had been entered into evidence at a
criminal trial. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 608-10.
Elaborating on this point, the Justices explained that the
constitutional right to attend criminal trials morphed into a right
to attend the trial sessions at which the tapes were played and to
report upon what was seen and heard in the courtroom, but did not
confer the right to replicate evidentiary materials in the custody
of the court. Id. at 609.
Warner Communications is directly applicable here. As in
that case, the district court has not restricted media access to,
or the publication of, any information in the public domain.
Indeed, the district court has gone to great lengths to facilitate
access to the trial proceedings by, for example, reserving seats in
the courtroom for members of the press and providing an overflow
room for remote viewing. By affording interested members of the
media ample opportunity to see and hear the tapes as they are
played for the jury, the court has fulfilled its pertinent First
Amendment obligations. See United States v. Beckham, 789 F.2d 401,
407 (6th Cir. 1986).
The demise of THE JOURNAL 's First Amendment claim does not
end the matter. The question remains whether the common-law right
-30-
to inspect and copy judicial documents affords a basis for relief.
As said, this right of access extends to "materials on which a
court relies in determining the litigants' substantive rights."
Anderson, 805 F.2d at 13. Thus, videotapes and audiotapes on which
a court relies in the determination of substantive rights are
within its reach. See United States v. Graham, 257 F.3d 143, 151-
53 (2d Cir. 2001). Because the videotapes and audiotapes that THE
JOURNAL seeks to copy have been admitted into evidence, they fall
into this category.
Viewed in this light, the question reduces to whether the
common-law right of access is fulfilled by permitting the press and
the public to see and hear such tapes, but not to copy them. To
answer this question, THE JOURNAL cites a plethora of instances in
which courts have allowed media outlets to obtain copies of tapes
used in judicial proceedings. E.g., id. at 155-56; United States
v. Myers (In re Application of Nat'l Broad. Co.), 635 F.2d 945,
952-54 (2d Cir. 1980). But this compendium only serves to prove
that a trial court may allow the media to copy tapes that have been
admitted into evidence; none of the constituent cases stands for
the much different proposition that a trial court must afford such
access.
Moreover, this case offers a unique twist. Here, the
government has not merely played individual tapes, but, rather, has
used cutting-edge technology (the Sanctions software) to play for
-31-
the jury medleys of selected excerpts from the universe of taped
material stored on its laptop computer. As a result, there is no
electronic medium — no tape or CD-ROM — currently in existence that
contains the precise medleys of taped excerpts that have been
played in open court. Consequently, we must decide whether the
common-law right of access compels a court to create (or order the
creation of) a new medium that contains only taped excerpts that
have been played in open court. This is a question of first
impression at the appellate level.
Historically, the common-law right of access permitted
the public to copy the contents of written documents. In re
Application of Nat'l Broad. Co., 635 F.2d at 950. Over time, the
right has been extended to accommodate technological advancements
in document reproduction such as photography, photocopying, and the
replication of videotapes and audiotapes. Id. Invariably,
however, these accommodations have covered materials that are "in
a form that readily permits sight and sound reproduction." Id. at
952.
When, as now, the media seeks access to materials that do
not exist in readily reproducible form, a new variable enters the
equation. We are reluctant to hold that the common-law right of
access necessarily compels the creation (and, thus, the copying) of
such materials. We prefer instead to leave this decision, like
many other decisions as to how best to effectuate the common-law
-32-
right of access, to the informed discretion of the trial court, so
that it may be exercised with due regard for the idiosyncratic
facts and circumstances of a specific case. See Warner
Communications, 435 U.S. at 599; Anderson, 805 F.2d at 13. This
approach seems especially appropriate here because the task of
assessing whether the creation of an excerpt-only recording entails
mere reproduction as opposed to extensive editing demands a
particularized, fact-intensive inquiry.
This brings us to the ruling below. The district court
denied THE JOURNAL 's motion, holding that the common-law right of
access did not mandate the creation of something not already in
existence (i.e., a tape or CD-ROM containing only those excerpts
played in open court) and finding replication infeasible. In this
regard, the court made a number of specific findings highlighting
difficulties inherent in THE JOURNAL 's proposals for physical access
to the taped excerpts. The court concluded, for example, that
editing the source material to create a tape or CD-ROM containing
only those excerpts played at trial was a far more daunting task
than merely duplicating existing source materials. The court also
found that the editing required to create tapes or CD-ROMs
containing only the hundreds of taped conversations being played in
open court would impose an appreciable burden on the court's staff,
the parties, or both.
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We decline THE JOURNAL 's invitation to second-guess these
findings. In the first place, the parties' representations as to
how the software operates and how difficult it would be to
reproduce the evidence seen and heard by the jurors are sharply
conflicting. As a result, the record before us is hopelessly
imprecise — and the Sanctions software package is not part of it.
In the second place, the fact that the public and the press have
had ample opportunity to see and hear the evidentiary tapes when
those tapes were played in open court during trial takes much of
the sting out of the district court's decision. Given these
considerations, we cannot say that the district court abused its
discretion in denying THE JOURNAL 's request to compel the creation
and production of excerpt-only tapes or CD-ROMs mimicking the
materials actually played to the jury.6 Cf. Valley Broad. Co. v.
United States Dist. Ct., 798 F.2d 1289, 1295 & n.8 (9th Cir. 1986)
(explaining that substantial administrative burdens alone may
justify denial of access).
6
We understand that written transcripts of the tapes have been
marked as exhibits for identification in the Cianci trial. At
first blush, it would seem that providing the media with copies of
these transcripts might represent a relatively straightforward
means of furthering access without imposing any significant burden
upon the district court or the litigants. THE JOURNAL , however, did
not raise the matter of the transcripts in either of its mandamus
petitions, and, therefore, we decline to order this relief. Cf.
Pratt v. United States, 129 F.3d 54, 62 (1st Cir. 1997) ("It is
firmly settled in this circuit that arguments not advanced and
developed in an appellant's brief are deemed waived.").
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THE JOURNAL has a fallback position. It argues that the
medleys of excerpts can be rerecorded as they are played in open
court. The district court rejected this proposal based upon the
clerk of court's representation that it was infeasible to tap into
the audio/video feed to the broadcast monitors to rerecord the
materials as they were being played in open court. The clerk
explained that consultations with the court's technical staff and
representatives of the vendor that had installed the courtroom
presentation system had not yielded a practicable and cost-
effective method of rerecording the audio/video transmission to the
overflow room. The district court accepted this representation.
THE JOURNAL disputes the accuracy of the clerk's
conclusion. Its position rests on a supplementary affidavit
submitted on the eve of oral argument in this court. That
affidavit suggests the existence of what THE JOURNAL describes as a
technologically feasible method of rerecording the audio and video
excerpts as they are played in open court. We decline to consider
this belated proffer. See United States v. Slade, 980 F.2d 27, 30
(1st Cir. 1992) ("It is a bedrock rule that when a party has not
presented an argument to the district court, she may not unveil it
in the court of appeals."). THE JOURNAL is, of course, free to ask
the district court to evaluate this new proposal.
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VI. CONCLUSION
A high-profile, multi-defendant political corruption case
is bound to test the mettle of the most experienced trial judge.
We admire the manner in which Chief Judge Torres has responded to
that challenge. Although we, with a luxury of time that district
judges rarely enjoy, have concluded that the court's non-
dissemination order must be modified in certain respects, that
conclusion in no way detracts from our overall assessment of the
district court's exemplary performance.
We need go no further. To recapitulate, we strike down
the District of Rhode Island's blanket nonfiling policy for the
handling of legal memoranda. We uphold the district court's non-
dissemination order, but direct the court, should it enter such
orders in future cases, to include certain specified safeguards.
As to the Cianci case itself, we leave the specifics of corrective
action to the district court, consistent with the teachings of this
opinion. Finally, we deem the district court's refusal to provide
THE JOURNAL with copies of videotapes and audiotapes an appropriate
exercise of the court's discretion, given the peculiar
circumstances of this case.
It is so ordered.
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