[NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 02-1217
MICHAEL B. FORTE,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
THOMAS REILLY, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Michael A. Ponsor, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Howard, Circuit Judges.
Michael B. Forte on brief pro se.
Thomas F. Reilly, Attorney General, and Eva M. Badway,
Assistant Attorney General, on brief for appellee.
August 8, 2002
Per Curiam. Plaintiff Michael Forte was convicted of
various state crimes back in 1987. Although he has since been
released from prison, he wishes to bring a damages action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 to obtain redress for various constitutional
violations that allegedly tainted that criminal proceeding.
Under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), however, he cannot
do so unless and until one or more of his underlying
convictions have been invalidated. Accord, e.g., Figueroa v.
Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 80-81 (1st Cir. 1998). Recognizing this
fact, Forte has filed a multitude of actions in state and
federal court seeking to accomplish that task--all without
avail. A recent such effort consisted of a petition for
declaratory relief which the state court denied in 2001 on
statute-of-limitations grounds. Claiming that he is entitled
under Heck to a state-court adjudication of his constitutional
claims on the merits (as a foundation for a future § 1983
action), Forte now seeks a federal court injunction compelling
the state court to undertake such review. The district court
dismissed. We affirm.
As we understand his argument, Forte apparently
believes that § 1983 and Heck and the Due Process Clause, in
concert, create a federal right to have constitutional
challenges to a conviction heard on the merits in state court--
a right enforceable by injunctive relief in federal court.
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That belief would seem clearly misplaced. Cf. Spencer v.
Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998) (rejecting view "that a § 1983
action for damages must always and everywhere be available").1
But we need not decide the point, inasmuch as Forte did obtain
substantive review of his claims as part of the collateral
proceeding brought under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30. See Forte v.
Commonwealth, 429 Mass. 1019, 1020 (1999) (rescript) (so
noting).2 There is no conceivable basis for an injunction here
designed simply to provide Forte with a second round of such
review. His complaint thus fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Affirmed.
1
We note that there has been no suggestion here of any
"illegal blocking [of] access to state post-conviction remedies."
Hoard v. Reddy, 175 F.3d 531, 533 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
970 (1999).
2
Forte's failure to obtain review by the state's highest
court in that regard was due to his own dereliction. See Forte,
429 Mass. at 1020 ("Although he could have applied for further
appellate review, he did not do so.").
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