United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 01-2182
RICARDO RAMOS-FALCÓN; RICARDO RAMOS-HERNANDEZ; IRMA FALCÓN,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
AUTORIDAD DE ENERGÍA ELÉCTRICA,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Juan M. Pérez-Giménez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Selya, Circuit Judge.
Antonio Bauza Torres for appellants.
Lionel E. Santa-Crispín, Puerto Rico Electric Power
Authority, for appellee.
August 20, 2002
PER CURIAM. Plaintiff-appellant Ricardo Ramos Falcón
filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the
District of Puerto Rico alleging violations of the Americans With
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Ramos Falcón
contends that defendant-appellee Autoridad de Energía Eléctrica
(PREPA) deprived him of a reasonable accommodation when it forcibly
expelled him from its parking lot. The district court entered a
default judgment against PREPA. Following a post-default hearing
on damages, however, the court dismissed Ramos Falcón's ADA claim.
We vacate the dismissal and remand for further proceedings on the
ground that the court failed to provide notice to Ramos Falcón that
it was taking evidence concerning the merits of his case at the
damages hearing.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff-appellants are Ricardo Ramos Falcón and his
father, Ricardo Ramos Hernandez, and mother, Irma Falcón. Ramos
Falcón depends on a wheelchair to get around.
In his complaint, Ramos Falcón alleges that on
February 23, 1999, he entered a parking lot maintained by PREPA for
its customers in order to pay his monthly electric bill. The
automobile in which he was riding carried his wheelchair and was
driven by his father, Ricardo Ramos Hernández. In the parking lot,
Ramos Hernández stopped the car in order to unload his son's
wheelchair. A parking lot employee ordered Ramos Hernández to move
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the car. Father and son tried to explain to the employee why it
was necessary to park the automobile where it was. They asked the
employee for permission to unload the wheelchair so Ramos Falcón
could proceed to PREPA's office.
The employee, in a violent and aggressive manner,
insisted on the removal of the wheelchair and the car and pushed
the wheelchair with Ramos Falcón still seated in it. Ramos Falcón
was thrown to the pavement and his wheelchair landed on top of him.
As a result, he experienced severe pain and suffering, underwent
medical treatment and therapy for two years, and suffered
additional physical limitations. Ramos Hernández alleges severe
emotional harm as a result of witnessing the events.
The complaint alleged, inter alia, "No other reasonable
accommodations were available to Plaintiffs in order to unload
Ramos Falcón and his wheelchair from the car."
PREPA failed to answer Ramos Falcón's complaint or
otherwise appear. Accordingly, the court entered a default on
September 7, 2000. On January 11, 2001, the court held a hearing
on default and damages, at which it heard evidence concerning,
inter alia, two handicap parking spaces available at the PREPA
parking lot. PREPA failed to appear for the trial.
On January 24, 2001, PREPA filed a motion to set aside
the entry of default, which the court denied. On June 20, 2001,
the court dismissed Ramos Falcón's complaint on the merits. In
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support of this holding, it held that the existence of the two
handicap parking spaces provided "equal opportunity of enjoying the
premises or services."
DISCUSSION
After entry of a default judgment, Fed. R. Civ.
P. 55(b)(2) provides as follows:
If, in order to enable the court to enter
judgment or to carry it into effect, it is
necessary to take an account or to determine
the amount of damages or to establish the
truth of any averment by evidence or to make
an investigation of any other matter, the
court may conduct such hearings or order such
references as it deems necessary and proper
and shall accord a right of trial by jury to
the parties . . ..
The court also may examine a plaintiff's complaint, taking all
well-pleaded factual allegations as true, to determine whether it
alleges a cause of action. Quirindongo Pacheco v. Rolón Morales,
953 F.2d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1992).
Additionally, the court may conduct a hearing to
"establish the truth of any averment" in the complaint. Id.
However, "[i]n this circuit, we have stated that this is
appropriate only if the court has made 'its requirements known in
advance to the plaintiff, so that [he] could understand the
direction of the proceeding and marshall such evidence as might be
available to [him].'" Id. (quoting McGinty v. Berenger Volkswagen,
Inc., 633 F.2d 226, 229 (1st Cir. 1980)).
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In this case, the post-default hearing involved evidence
concerning, inter alia, the complaint's allegation that PREPA
provided no reasonable accommodations to unload Ramos Falcón and
his wheelchair from the car. Central to the court's dismissal of
the ADA claim was its determination that PREPA had satisfied its
obligation to provide "equal opportunity" by making available
handicap parking spaces. The record does not show, however, that
the district court provided adequate notice to Ramos Falcón that it
intended to address this issue at the post-default damages hearing.
In the absence of such notice, the district court erred in
dismissing the ADA claim. See Quirindongo Pacheco, 953 F.2d at 16.
Accordingly, we VACATE the entry of judgment in favor of
PREPA and REMAND this matter to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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