[NOT FOR PUBLICATION - NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT ]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 01-1683
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL B. THOMPSON,
Respondent, Appellant.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lynch, and Lipez, Circuit Judges.
Peter K. Levitt, with whom Michael J. Sullivan, United States
Attorney, and Cynthia W. Lie, Assistant U.S. Attorney, were on
brief, for appellee.
Syrie D. Fried, Attorney, Federal Defender Office, for
appellant.
August 30, 2002
PER CURIAM. Respondent Michael B. Thompson was scheduled
to be released from the Federal Medical Center at Devens,
Massachusetts on December 23, 2000, after serving a three-year
sentence for illegally possessing a firearm. On December 22, the
United States petitioned the district court to stay Thompson's
discharge, citing the respondent's deteriorating mental condition
and the belief of the staff at the medical center that Thompson
would pose a substantial risk of harm to other persons or property
if he were released. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246, the district
court conducted a hearing to assess Thompson's mental condition and
the risks posed by his release. At the conclusion of the hearing,
the court agreed that Thompson should remain in the government's
custody, and ordered the Attorney General to "make all reasonable
efforts" to arrange treatment for Thompson at a facility in Maine,
where respondent is domiciled. United States v. Thompson, C.A. No.
00-MC-10516-MLW, Order at 1 (D. Mass. March 19, 2001).
Thompson challenges the district court's order on three
grounds. First, he claims that the court erroneously construed 18
U.S.C. § 4246 to require only an initial certification that no
suitable arrangement for treating the respondent in Maine was
available. Thompson argues that the statute obligates the
government to prove the absence of suitable treatment options in
Maine at the commitment hearing. In a second related challenge,
Thompson argues that his due process rights were violated by the
district court's exclusion of evidence that he offered challenging
the factual basis for this particular certification by the medical
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center. Finally, respondent claims that the district court erred
in finding by clear and convincing evidence that Thompson's
discharge would present a substantial risk to persons or property,
as required by 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d). For the reasons set forth
below, we reject respondent's challenges and affirm the decision of
the district court.
Thompson points to two pieces of legislative history to
support his first claim of error; favorable language in the statute
that preceded the current version of 18 U.S.C. § 4246, see 18
U.S.C. §§ 4243, 4247 (prior to 1984 amendment), and a House report
purporting to construe section 4246 after its most recent amendment
in 1984. H.R.Rep. No. 98-1030, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3433. However, this circuit has previously noted that the
language of section 4246 unequivocally limits the scope of the
commitment hearing to two questions: 1) Whether the person in
custody is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect, and
2) Whether the existence of a mental disease or defect creates a
substantial risk that the person will injure other persons or
property if released. United States v. Ecker, 78 F.3d 726, 728 n.2
(1st Cir. 1996). As the district court observed in its thorough
and well-reasoned decision, we do not employ legislative history as
an aid in interpreting a statutory provision that is unambiguous on
its face. Id. at 730.
Our resolution of Thompson's statutory challenge is
dispositive of his due process claims. Because 18 U.S.C. § 4246
denied Thompson the right to litigate the issue of alternative
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placement, he suffered no due process injury from the district
court's exclusion of evidence proffered in support of an argument
that could not be advanced at the commitment hearing.
Turning to Thompson's third claim, we find after
reviewing the record that the district court's assessment of the
risks presented by respondent's conceded mental illness was
supported by clear and convincing evidence. The three doctors who
testified at the commitment hearing, including respondent's own
medical expert, agreed that in his present mental condition
Thompson satisfied the statutory requirements for continued
detention.
Accordingly, the decision of the district court is
Affirmed.
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