United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 02-1695
JAMES W. CAMPBELL,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
BANKBOSTON, N.A.; BANKBOSTON SEPARATION PAY PLAN; HELEN DRINAN,
administrator; BANKBOSTON CASH BALANCE RETIREMENT PLAN;
RETIREMENT PLAN COMMITTEE, administrator,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Morris E. Lasker,* Senior U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Circuit Judge,
Farris, Senior Circuit Judge,**
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
Robert O. Berger for appellant.
Robert B. Gordon with whom Joseph P. Mingolla and Ropes
& Gray were on brief for appellees.
March 7, 2003
*
Of the Southern District of New York, sitting by
designation.
**
Of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. At the heart of this case is the
debate over cash balance pension plans, a new type of plan that
favors, in many cases, younger workers over those closer to
retirement age. The plaintiff, James W. Campbell, is a former
employee of BankBoston, a business that switched from a traditional
defined benefit plan to a cash balance system. He sued, alleging
violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),
29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2000), and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. We affirm the
district court's entry of summary judgment for the defendants.
I.
There is no dispute as to the facts. Campbell was
continuously employed by BankBoston, N.A. and its corporate
predecessors for thirty-seven years, through September 30, 1998.
For the entirety of his employment, he worked in the domestic
institutional custody business, which held and traded securities
for mutual, pension, and endowment funds. Campbell had reached the
position of senior fiduciary specialist; he was primarily
responsible for ensuring compliance with Regulation 9 of the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, in the United States Treasury
Department. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 9 (2002) (regulating the fiduciary
activities of national banks).
Two different plans are at issue in this case. The first
is a Separation Pay Plan, adopted in 1996 and amended in 1998.
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Campbell says he was entitled to benefits under the Plan. The
second is the retirement plan, which BankBoston converted to a cash
balance plan in 1989 and amended in 1997. The effect of the
conversion and amendment, in practice, was to reduce Campbell's
retirement benefits by about $3,000 a year from what he would have
expected to receive had the plan not been amended in 1997.
A. Separation Pay Plan
BankBoston's predecessor, the First National Bank of
Boston, adopted a Separation Pay Plan on June 15, 1996, which
provided compensation for employees "whose employment is terminated
as a result of work force reduction or job elimination." It did
not apply to those who voluntarily left the company. It also
required employees to make a "reasonable and effective effort to
secure a comparable position" of employment, defined as one with a
base salary within 10% of the current job and which "requires a
reasonably similar employment background and skill set." The plan
paid two weeks base pay for each full year of service. The Plan
Administrator was given sole discretion to establish rules to
administer the plan, to interpret and construe it, and to determine
eligibility. Moreover, the administrator had the power to amend,
modify, or discontinue the plan for any reason at any time.
On July 20, 1998, BankBoston announced the sale of its
domestic institutional custody business to Investors Bank and Trust
(IBT). IBT is not a national bank and thus does not fall under the
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scope of Regulation 9. See id. § 9.1(c). The agreement with
BankBoston required IBT to offer comparable jobs to all BankBoston
custody employees. The sale closed on October 1, 1998.
BankBoston announced that it would treat a refusal to
accept a position with IBT as a "voluntary resignation" under the
separation plan, thus denying the severance package to those
custody employees who did not accept a job with IBT. Many
employees complained that this interpretation was contrary to the
severance plan, which only denied benefits if employees did not
pursue "comparable internal job opportunities." The employees took
that phrase to mean BankBoston jobs, not job offers from other
companies. In response, on September 30, 1998, the last day of
employment for those working in the custody business, the plan
administrator, Helen Drinan, amended the plan. The new amendment
excluded those who refuse an offer of employment from "an employer
who acquires any of the assets or operations of a BankBoston
company or business."
Campbell was offered a position at IBT. Because IBT was
not a national bank, it did not need to comply with Regulation 9;
thus, the job IBT offered to Campbell was not a Regulation 9
compliance position. IBT instead offered Campbell the position of
Compliance Manager within its Trust and Custody Unit. Campbell
declined the offer of employment. As a result, BankBoston did not
pay Campbell under the severance plan. At stake was two weeks of
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pay for each of the thirty-seven years that Campbell had worked for
BankBoston, a total of more than $100,000.
B. The Cash Balance Plan
BankBoston's retirement plan prior to 1989 was a
traditional defined benefit plan. A defined benefit plan pays an
annuity1 based on the retiree's earnings history, usually the most
recent or highest-paid years, and the number of completed years of
service to the company. The BankBoston plan was determined by a
formula which factored in the retiree's years of service, the five-
year average compensation at time of retirement, and the retiree's
Social Security primary benefit.2
On January 1, 1989, BankBoston adopted the Cash Balance
Retirement Plan. Cash balance plans are a type of defined benefit
plan that guarantee an employee a certain employer contribution
level, usually an annual percentage of salary, plus a fixed
percentage of interest. Cash balance plans may superficially
resemble defined contribution plans, in which an employer deposits
a fixed amount into an account. However, cash balance plans are
1
An annuity is simply an obligation to pay a fixed sum of
money periodically. See Black's Law Dictionary 88 (7th ed. 1999).
The BankBoston plan provided for a monthly benefit.
2
More specifically, the plan multiplied the average of the
five highest years of salary by the years of service; the
retirement annuity was 1.75% of that number, offset by various
other factors such as a reduction for retirement before age 62 and
an offset for Social Security payments. Campbell's five-year
average salary was $70,408.39 at the end of 1996 and $74,418.38 by
October 1, 1998.
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actually defined benefit plans, because the level of interest is
guaranteed.
The plan version adopted in 1989 contained a "Benefit
Safeguard Minimum Benefit" guaranteeing that, for long-term
employees such as Campbell, the retirement benefits would be at
least as much as would have been payable had the previous defined
benefit plan still been in place upon their retirement. One effect
of this provision was that the benefits due under the previous plan
continued to accrue for those long-term employees protected by the
grandfather clause.
In 1995, BankBoston commissioned a study of its benefits
program, which concluded that this grandfather provision would cost
the company a significant amount of money. Thereafter, on January
1, 1997, BankBoston again amended its retirement plan; this
amendment eliminated the continued accrual of benefits under the
previous defined benefit plan after December 31, 1996. There is no
contention that this amendment lacked Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) approval. All accrued benefits were converted to cash
balance accounts by calculating the value of accrued benefits as of
the end of 1996 and crediting that amount in separate conversion
accounts, where they continued to earn interest. Because Campbell
would receive less under a cash balance formulation than under the
Benefit Safeguard, even after that provision had ceased to accrue
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benefits, the December 31, 1996 amendment had the effect of ending
Campbell's pension accrual altogether.
After the sale of BankBoston's custody business to IBT,
Campbell applied for retirement benefits. Under the retirement
plan in place before January 1, 1997, Campbell's benefit under the
older defined benefit plan would have kept accruing until his
retirement on September 30, 1998. He would therefore have expected
to receive $31,882.12 per year. However, under the 1997 plan
amendment, Campbell was due only $28,798.10 per year, an annual
difference of $3,084.02.3
II.
Campbell filed a complaint in federal court on December
10, 1999. The original complaint named only BankBoston as a
defendant; Campbell later amended the complaint to include
additional defendants: the Separation Pay Plan; Helen Drinan, the
plan administrator; the Cash Balance Retirement Plan; and the
Retirement Plan Committee. The amended complaint contained seven
causes of action. Campbell alleged that the Separation Pay Plan's
denial of benefits constituted a violation of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001 et seq., and a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. He alleged that the Retirement Plan's replacement of the
3
These annual benefits represent the amount Campbell would
receive under a single life annuity, payable until death.
BankBoston's plan also permitted other annuity options, such as
joint and survivor annuities.
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older defined benefit plan with a cash balance plan violated ERISA,
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and ADEA. Campbell
also alleged that he was wrongly terminated because he was not
permitted to continue to work for BankBoston following the sale of
the custody business to IBT, and that he was discriminated against
on the basis of age because he and other highly compensated
employees were not permitted to participate in an early retirement
program.
On May 17, 2002, the district court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment on all seven counts.
Campbell v. BankBoston, N.A., 206 F. Supp. 2d 70, 73 (D. Mass.
2002). Campbell appeals the grant of summary judgment as to his
ERISA challenge to BankBoston's pension plan, his ERISA challenge
to the denial of payment of separation plan benefits, and his age
discrimination challenge to the retirement plan.4
III.
A. Standard of Review
We review a grant of summary judgment "de novo,
construing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant
and resolving all reasonable inferences in that party's favor."
Rochester Ford Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 287 F.3d 32, 38 (1st
Cir. 2002). When reviewing the actions of plan administrators for
4
Campbell does not appeal his wrongful termination claim, his
claim of discrimination based on the early retirement program, or
either claim based on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
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challenges to denials of benefits under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B),
the standard of review depends on the discretion afforded the
administrator. If the benefit plan grants the administrator
"discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or
to construe the terms of the plan," we review only to ensure that
the administrator's decision is not "arbitrary or capricious"; if
the plan does not grant such discretionary authority, we review
benefit decisions de novo. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,
489 U.S. 101, 109-15 (1989); see Terry v. Bayer Corp., 145 F.3d 28,
37 & n.6 (1st Cir. 1998). We need not decide which standard
applies because, for reasons we explain below, we do not reach the
issue of Campbell's only challenge to a plan administrator's
decision.
B. Separation Pay Plan
Campbell contends that at the time his position at
BankBoston was terminated, he was owed severance pay under the
Severance Pay Plan. He challenges the denial of severance plan
benefits under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), which creates an action
for plan participants or beneficiaries to recover benefits due.
The severance plan amendment adopted on September 30,
1998, clearly and unequivocally denied Campbell severance pay upon
his refusal to accept a job offer from IBT. Campbell's challenge,
then, depends both on a claim that the severance plan was
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impermissibly amended, and that he was due severance pay under the
original plan.
The Separation Pay Plan listed seven exceptions to
separation pay eligibility. One of these exceptions included
employees who "accept a position with another Bank of Boston
company or continue employment with an employer who acquires any of
the assets or operations of a Bank of Boston company or business."
On September 30, 1998, Drinan modified this exception to include
employees who "accept a position with another BankBoston company or
continue employment with, or refuse an offer of employment by, an
employer who acquires any of the assets or operations of a
BankBoston company or business."
Campbell argues that the amendment was invalid because
the plan administrator owes fiduciary duties to him. Thus, he
says, his right to severance pay should be determined under the
text of the plan before it was amended.
Fiduciary duties do attach to persons who exercise
discretionary authority or control respecting "management of [the]
plan or . . . management or disposition of its assets." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(21)(A). A person has such fiduciary duties only when
fulfilling these defined roles. The act of amending the terms of
a plan is not one to which a fiduciary duty applies. See Curtis-
Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995) (applying
this distinction to welfare benefit plans such as severance plans);
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see also Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890-91 (1996)
(extending this rule to pension benefit plans). This is true even
when the employer's amendment effectively makes a decision "such as
who is entitled to receive Plan benefits and in what amounts or how
such benefits are calculated." Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson,
525 U.S. 432, 444 (1999).
Campbell argues that the existence of a fiduciary duty
depends not on the type of action taken but on the identity of the
actor: whether the plan sponsor or an independent administrator is
amending the plan. Because the plan administrator, Drinan, was a
fiduciary with regard to the management and distribution of the
assets, Campbell rationalizes, her fiduciary duty also applied to
her amendment of the plan. This argument fails. The ERISA
fiduciary duty doctrine envisions that one entity will have
fiduciary duty attach to some activities but not others; the
existence of a duty turns not on who acts but on the nature of the
action. See, e.g., Lockheed Corp., 517 U.S. at 890; Curtiss-Wright
Corp., 514 U.S. at 78. Though Drinan's management decisions were
under the auspices of fiduciary duty, her decision to amend the
plan was not. The fact that here the plan administrator was a
natural person and not a corporation -- as in many of the Supreme
Court decisions -- is of no moment; ERISA defines "person" to mean
both individuals and organizations, such as corporations, 29 U.S.C.
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§ 1002(9). As a result, that is not a relevant distinction under
ERISA.
There are statutory limits, imposed by ERISA, on the
ability of an employer to amend a plan involving vested benefits.
For example, amendments may not decrease the accrued benefit of a
participant. 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g).5 Until they are paid, however,
severance plan benefits have not vested. A severance plan is
defined as a "welfare benefit plan," see id. § 1002(1);
Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 116 (1989), and as such,
severance plans are exempted from the vesting and funding sections
of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051(1), 1081(a)(1); see Allen v. Adage,
Inc., 967 F.2d 695, 698 (1st Cir. 1992). Thus, employers may amend
or eliminate a severance pay plan at any time. Curtiss-Wright
Corp., 514 U.S. at 78; Reichelt v. Emhart Corp., 921 F.2d 425, 430
(2nd Cir. 1990).
Because the plan administrator was not acting as a
fiduciary when she amended the severance plan, and because
employers have the right to amend or end a welfare benefit plan at
any time, the September 30, 1998 amendment to BankBoston's
Separation Pay Plan was proper. Campbell does not contest that,
under the terms of the amendment to the plan, he was not owed
5
Cf. Cogan v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 238, 242 (1st
Cir. 2002) (holding that this section does not apply to unfunded
"top hat" plans).
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severance pay. It was not a violation of ERISA for Campbell not to
have been paid benefits under the Separation Pay Plan.6
C. Retirement Plan
1. Background
The adoption of cash balance plans, and in particular the
transition to such plans from more traditional annuity-based
defined benefit plans, has become increasingly controversial. The
first cash balance plan was adopted in 1985. Since that time,
hundreds of companies have converted to the newer cash balance
plans.
In traditional defined benefit retirement plans, such as
BankBoston's pre-1989 plan, a large share of the pension benefits
are reaped by older employees in their final years of service.
This is because the benefits are calculated based on years of
service to the company and on the average of the highest years of
salary, which usually occur in the final years. By contrast, in a
cash balance system, much of the pension benefit is gained in the
early years of service, because the pension account earns interest.
The more time there is until retirement, the more a given amount in
the account will grow. Thus, even though early additions to the
pension account may be based on a percentage of a much smaller
6
Because we find that the amendment to the plan was proper
under ERISA, we need not consider Campbell's contention that he was
owed severance pay under the plan version which existed before the
amendment.
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salary, the effects of time mean that these additions will
contribute to the final total much more than larger additions to
the account entered closer to retirement.
There are many reasons why companies may wish to switch
to a cash balance plan. Cash balance plans favor younger workers,
while traditional defined benefit plans favor experienced employees
who plan on staying with one company. Cash balance plans are also
more portable than annuity-based plans, because they can be taken
as a lump sum upon leaving the company. Thus, a move to a cash
balance plan is one way for a company to attract younger and more
mobile workers. Furthermore, if a company has an older workforce,
a cash balance plan may be a cheaper plan to administer. Under a
traditional plan, the largest benefits are earned in the years
immediately preceding retirement. Because there is little time for
interest to accrue, an annuity purchased to secure those benefits
will be more expensive. Cash balance plans award benefits earlier
in an employee's career, and so they may be less expensive for
employers.
If begun from scratch, cash balance plans would not be
terribly controversial. The controversy engenders from the
transition from traditional defined benefit plans. Older workers,
such as Campbell, expected to see their pension benefits rise
dramatically as a result of their service just before retirement.
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Instead, as a result of their companies' adoption of cash balance
plans, their pension increases under the old plans ceased.
Under some plans, these workers whose traditional
benefits have ceased to accrue are at least entitled to cash
balance plan benefits. However, some transition schemes, including
that employed by BankBoston, include a "wear-away" provision. This
provision specifies that employees' pension entitlement does not
grow until their pension benefits, as calculated under the new cash
balance system, equal their actual accrued benefits under the old
system. Benefits already earned under an old plan may not be taken
away, see I.R.C. § 411(d)(6)(A) (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g), but
benefits expected but not yet accrued are not similarly protected.
The result is that for many workers, including Campbell, their
pension benefits stop accruing completely in their final years of
service, when their expectation was that during these years, the
benefits would build up the most. See generally E.A. Zelinsky, The
Cash Balance Controversy, 19 Va. Tax Rev. 683, 695-99, 702-04
(2000).
2. Accrued Benefits
As a result of BankBoston's conversion to a cash balance
plan with a wear-away provision, Campbell's annual pension was
$3,084.02 less than it would have been had the old plan been kept
in place until his retirement. He argues that this reduction
amounts to a forfeiture of an accrued benefit in violation of 29
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U.S.C. § 1054(g). There was no forfeiture, because no accrued
benefits were reduced; only expected benefits were reduced, which
BankBoston could, under the law, modify or eliminate.
The ERISA anti-cutback provision protects against the
erosion of "accrued benefits." Id. That term, in the defined
benefit context, means "the individual's accrued benefit determined
under the plan." Id. § 1002(23)(A). That amount is "equal to the
employee's accumulated contributions." Id. § 1054(c)(2)(B).
The reduction of pension benefits of which Campbell
complains was merely the elimination of future expected accruals of
benefit. The December 31, 1996 amendment to the plan protected all
of the pension benefit based on Campbell's work for the company up
to that point; it merely ceased accruals under the old plan based
on employment from that point forward. This was an elimination of
an expected, not accrued, benefit. There was no ERISA violation.
3. ERISA Age Discrimination: 29 U.S.C. §
1054(b)(1)(H)(i)
Campbell next makes to us a more sophisticated charge
against BankBoston's cash balance plan: that BankBoston's cash
balance plan violates the anti-discrimination provision of ERISA.
This charge is a serious one, and its answer depends on an
interpretation of the complex ERISA statutory scheme. Because
Campbell did not raise this argument before the district court, he
has waived it. This anti-discrimination challenge to cash balance
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plans will doubtless be raised again before this or another court,
and so we briefly describe the controversy.
ERISA has its own anti-age discrimination provision, 29
U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(H)(i), which states that a defined benefit plan
does not meet the requirements of ERISA if "an employee's benefit
accrual is ceased, or the rate of any employee's benefit accrual is
reduced, because of the attainment of any age." See also I.R.C. §
411(b)(1)(H)(i) (containing an identical provision).7 Campbell's
challenge to BankBoston's cash balance plan, based on the work of
Professor Edward Zelinsky, is that cash balance plans violate this
provision because of the manner in which accrued benefits are
calculated.
For defined benefit plans, the term "accrued benefit"
means "the individual's accrued benefit . . . expressed in the
form of an annual benefit commencing at normal retirement age." 29
U.S.C. § 1002(23)(A) (emphasis added). This measure is quite
sensible as applied to traditional defined benefit plans, which
provide an annual benefit upon retirement.
Cash balance plans such as BankBoston's are instead
defined by a lump sum account balance, instead of the annual
7
There is also a similar provision in the ADEA. See 29
U.S.C. § 623(i)(1)(A) (establishing that defined benefit plans may
not require or permit "the cessation of an employee's benefit
accrual, or the reduction of the rate of an employee's benefit
accrual, because of age").
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benefit to be paid upon retirement. In this respect they appear
very much like defined contribution plans. If BankBoston's plan
was in fact a defined contribution plan, benefit accrual would be
measured by the balance in the individual's account. See id.
§ 1002(23)(B). Were that the case, there would be no question that
BankBoston's plan does not violate the age discrimination provision
of ERISA, because the plan donates a percentage of salary to the
account; age is never calculated into the amount contributed by the
employer.
The problem arises because cash balance plans are defined
benefit accounts; thus, the argument goes, benefit accrual must be
measured in terms of an annuity providing an annual benefit. In
order to translate a cash balance lump sum into an annuity
beginning at normal retirement age,8 the age of the individual is
very much relevant, because of the time value of money. An amount
of money donated to a younger employee will have a longer time to
accrue interest, and result in a larger annuity upon retirement,
than the same amount donated to an employee closer to retirement
age. Campbell argues that this effect means that under
BankBoston's cash balance plan, using a metric which measures an
annuity at retirement, older workers accrue less pension benefits
solely due to age. See Zelinsky, supra, at 719-22.
8
This calculation is a simple accounting function, though it
does depend both on the current interest rates and the mortality
tables.
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This conclusion is by no means uncontroverted. First,
the ERISA age discrimination provision may not even apply to
workers younger than the age of normal retirement. The Internal
Revenue Code contains an identical provision, I.R.C. §
411(b)(1)(H); the heading to that provision reads: "Continued
accrual beyond normal retirement age." The legislative history
surrounding the enactment of the provision buttresses this
argument. See Eaton v. Onan Corp., 117 F. Supp. 2d 812, 827 (S.D.
Ind. 2000). Second, even if the age discrimination applies to
employers younger than normal retirement age, such as Campbell,
critics of the age discrimination argument have contended that
there are various methods for determining benefit accrual rates
under ERISA, and it is by no means clear that the annuity method is
the only permitted method in this context. See R.C. Shea, M.J.
Francese & R.S. Newman, Age Discrimination in Cash Balance Plans:
Another View, 19 Va. Tax Rev. 763, 767 (2000).
The IRS has also reviewed the challenge to cash balance
plans under the age discrimination provision of ERISA. On December
11, 2002, the IRS issued proposed regulations which attempt to
address, among other issues, the proper definition of the rate of
benefit accrual for cash balance plans for purposes of IRS approval
of a plan. See Reductions of Accruals and Allocations because of
the Attainment of any Age: Application of Nondiscrimination Cross-
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Testing Rules to Cash Balance Plans, 67 Fed. Reg. 76,123 (proposed
Dec. 11, 2002).
We need not resolve this complicated issue, for Campbell
did not raise it before the district court. While his amended
complaint generally alleges that the retirement plan violates ERISA
provisions, it did not allege this theory in fact or in law. His
count for "Discrimination" references ADEA, not ERISA. When
defendants moved for summary judgment, his opposition argued only
the forfeiture argument to the district court, and not the argument
he now wishes to pursue. If the issue had been fairly raised in
the district court, other evidence and argument would have been
introduced into the record. "[I]ssues first asserted on appeal
must be deemed waived." Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Weathermark Invs.,
Inc., 292 F.3d 77, 81 (1st Cir. 2002); see Sandstrom v. ChemLawn
Corp., 904 F.2d 83, 87 (1st Cir. 1990). We do not consider
Campbell's challenge to BankBoston's cash balance plan based on the
ERISA age discrimination provision.
4. ADEA
Finally, Campbell has alleged a violation of the ADEA.
He argues that BankBoston knew that the decrease in pension
benefits as a result of the conversion to the cash balance plan
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would be particularly adverse to older workers.9 This claim is
procedurally foreclosed.
Campbell's claim is barred because the charge was filed
beyond the limitations period. Campbell did not file a complaint
with the EEOC until December 13, 1999. EEOC charges must be filed
within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practice; if there is an
applicable state age discrimination law and agency, as there is
here, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B (2002), the time period is
extended to 300 days. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). Campbell was aware of
the amendment to BankBoston's pension plan and the resulting effect
on his benefits no later than October 14, 1998, when he wrote a
letter to the Retirement Committee. In that letter, Campbell
referred to the description of his benefits earlier provided by
BankBoston and challenged the benefits calculation. The filing of
the EEOC charge in December 1999 was well beyond the 300-day
limitations period.
Campbell attempts to circumvent this limitations period
by arguing that the statute of limitations requirement is met if at
least one act in an ongoing pattern of discrimination falls within
the 300-day period. For this proposition, Campbell cites to AMTRAK
v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2000), which held that for Title VII
9
The parties disagree as to whether Campbell is asserting a
disparate impact or a discriminatory treatment claim. This circuit
doubts that ADEA may be used to raise an impact claim. Mullin v.
Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 703-04 (1st Cir. 1999). Our resolution
on other grounds means we do not need to sort through this issue.
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hostile environment claims, if any act that is part of the hostile
work environment falls within the limitations period, the employee
may include all other related acts in the charge. Id. at 125.
Campbell's reliance on this case as support for his position is
misplaced. The Supreme Court specifically found that hostile work
environment claims were fundamentally different, id. at 123, and
reiterated the rule that for other discrimination claims, "discrete
discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when
they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges." Id. at
122. Moreover, acts must be "independently discriminatory." Id.
The only act about which Campbell complains which is
within the time limitations period is the August 11, 1999 final
denial of his request to correct his benefits. This act was not
independently discriminatory. The alleged discrimination occurred
when the decision concerning Campbell's pension benefits was made
and communicated to him in October 1998. The limitations period
began then, not when the grievance procedure to correct that
decision was terminated. See Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S.
250, 261 (1980). By December 1999, that limitations period had run
its course.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district
court's grant of summary judgment to defendants.
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