United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 02-2276
No. 02-2311
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
v.
ANTHONY BOVA,
Defendant, Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Morris E. Lasker,* U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
Syrie D. Fried, Federal Defender Office, for defendant.
Cynthia A. Young, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Michael J. Sullivan, United States Attorney, was on brief for the
United States.
November 25, 2003
*
Of the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
BOUDIN, Chief Judge. Anthony Bova, convicted in the
district court for lying in the course of court testimony in an
earlier matter, now appeals. He claims that his perjury grew out
of a violation of his right to counsel; the government cross
appeals on a sentencing issue. We describe briefly the background
events and prior proceedings, reserving further detail for
discussion of the two quite different claims on appeal.
Well before the events that gave rise to this case, Bova
was convicted in February 1993 in federal court in Nevada for a
conspiracy involving the possession of stolen credit cards, served
a term in prison, and was on supervised release in Massachusetts in
early 1995. On September 1, 1995, he was arrested for an asserted
supervised release violation (an alleged stabbing). While in
custody on that charge, he was accused of beating a fellow
prisoner, Paul Hurley, on November 6, 1995.
A district judge found the initial stabbing charge not
proven and Bova was set free on February 9, 1996, still on
supervised release. Three days later, on February 12, 1996, Bova
allegedly used a knife to assault one Walter Tauro in Somerville,
Massachusetts. Bova was then re-arrested for violating supervised
release conditions and brought before a magistrate judge on March
15, 1996, for a hearing on bail. Bova initially sought to
represent himself but was persuaded to accept appointed counsel and
the hearing was adjourned.
-2-
The following Monday, March 18, 1996, the hearing
resumed. Although Bova faced charges that could end his supervised
release, the sole question at the resumed hearing was whether Bova
should be released on bail or detained (as the government sought)
pending resolution of the new charges. Bova now sought to
represent himself with his new attorney acting as standby counsel;
the magistrate judge said that he would not approve this option and
that Bova must have counsel or simply represent himself. Saying
that he was better prepared than his counsel, Bova insisted upon
representing himself.
In the hearing, Bova cross-examined the government's
witness, Probation Officer John Perry, and then testified on his
own behalf, denying that he had assaulted either Hurley or Tauro.
The magistrate judge ended by finding probable cause to believe
that Bova had committed both assaults and detained him as a danger
to the community. Later, the district court found Bova responsible
for both assaults, as well as a third assault on a guard committed
on February 15, 1996, and sentenced him for violating his
supervised release conditions.1
1
In July and August 1999, Bova was given concurrent six-month
sentences in state court after pleading guilty to assaulting and
threatening to kill Tauro and entering an Alford plea to the charge
of assault and battery on Hurley. See North Carolina v. Alford,
400 U.S. 25 (1970).
-3-
On March 15, 2001, a federal grand jury indicted Bova for
two counts of perjury, 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (2000), and one of
obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2000), based on his
testimony at the March 18, 1996, bail hearing. The perjury counts
were based on his denials under oath that he had assaulted Hurley
and Tauro; the obstruction charge related to the threatened effect
of these lies on the proceeding. After the district court declined
to suppress the perjurious statements, United States v. Bova, 170
F. Supp. 2d 96 (D. Mass. 2001), Bova entered a conditional plea of
guilty to all counts, reserving the right to appeal on the
suppression issue. He was thereafter sentenced to 30 months
imprisonment. This appeal by Bova followed; the government cross
appealed as to the sentence.
We begin with the suppression issue. Bova claims that he
was denied his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment by the
magistrate judge; that this caused his false statements in the bail
hearing; and that the proper remedy is the suppression of those
false statements, thus effectively barring the case against him.
It is highly unlikely that Bova has a valid Sixth Amendment claim,
but it is even plainer that any supposed violation in the context
of this case would not warrant suppression.
Although Bova declines to elaborate on his theory of a
Sixth Amendment violation, we think it well to lay to rest any
suggestion that Bova had a right to represent himself and to enjoy
-4-
the benefit of standby appointed counsel. See McKaskle v. Wiggins,
465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984). True, courts often appoint standby
counsel for a defendant who insists on self-representation–-partly
in the hope that proceedings will flow more smoothly--but no case
suggesting that the defendant has a constitutional right to
represent himself and enjoy appointed counsel has been called to
our attention.
One circuit has clearly stated that no right to standby
counsel exists. McQueen v. Blackburn, 755 F.2d 1174, 1178 (5th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 852 (1985). Language from an
earlier decision in this circuit points in the same direction. See
United States v. Betancourt-Arretuche, 933 F.2d 89, 95 (1st Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 959 (1991). "Although appellate
courts have suggested that appointment of standby counsel is to be
preferred, it is not constitutionally required." 3 Lafave,
Criminal Procedure, § 11.5(f), at 589 (2d ed. 1999).
Bova's better argument, and seemingly the one he has in
mind, is a fact-specific claim that Bova was forced to represent
himself because the magistrate judge supposedly confronted Bova
with an unfair choice between self-representation and the
assistance of a counsel who had not been given adequate time to
prepare. In lengthy dialogue we have omitted (because we do not
plan to decide this "unfair choice" question), Bova and his
initially-appointed counsel said at the March 18, 1996, hearing
-5-
that they had spoken together only for an hour before the court
session because counsel had not been able to meet with Bova over
the intervening weekend.
Why the magistrate judge did not volunteer that Bova and
his counsel could have more time to confer is a mystery; but
neither Bova nor his new counsel asked for additional time and the
magistrate judge certainly did not foreclose a request. This is
why we are skeptical that there is any Sixth Amendment claim,
although it is clear in retrospect (the vantage from which most
things are clear) that a postponement of the hearing to allow more
time would have been a good practical resolution.
Still, we will assume arguendo that the magistrate judge
did make some arguable mistake of constitutional dimension that
could be developed on a fuller record (say, by leading Bova to
believe that he had to represent himself or be content with
inadequately prepared counsel). Even so, on the present facts that
would not come close to licensing Bova to take the stand and
falsely deny under oath that he had committed two assaults.
The government says that even if there was a Sixth
Amendment violation (which it denies), that violation may have
"caused" Bova to represent himself but it did not "cause" him to
take the stand and tell clear-cut lies about his prior assaults.
Causation rhetoric is of some use in focusing upon the different
choices with which Bova was faced (whether to represent himself
-6-
versus whether to lie). But it does not entirely resolve the legal
controversy in favor of the government, as it might if the supposed
constitutional violation followed the perjury rather than preceded
it.
"Causation" is one of the terms used in the law that is
notorious for multiple meanings. Yes, a supposed denial of
appointed counsel would not force Bova to lie; but it could
certainly be a "but for" cause of his perjury if we suppose–-not
without some basis–-that a competent lawyer who represented Bova in
the hearing would almost certainly have persuaded Bova not to take
the stand and compound his problems by denying the assaults. In
this sense a wrongful denial of counsel to an interrogated suspect
is said to have "caused" the confession that followed. Cf. Massiah
v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964).
The issue here is not one of "but for" causation but (as
with proximate cause) a policy choice as to the legal consequences
that judges want to impose upon a fault or flaw. The main policy
in this case is that courts very much do not want people to tell
deliberate lies on the witness stand and, in general, take the view
that defects in the steps that may bring witnesses to the stand are
not adequate reason for tolerating the lies and foregoing
punishment. A number of Supreme Court decisions reflect this
general policy.
-7-
Thus, in Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966),
convictions for filing false non-Communist affidavits were
sustained, the Court holding that it did not matter whether the
underlying statute that required them violated the First Amendment.
Id. at 867; see also Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 72
(1969). Similarly, in United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564,
576, 584 (1976), and United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 176-78
(1977), the respective failures to give a grand jury witness a
Miranda warning (in one case) or a warning as to the privilege
against self-incrimination (in the other) were held not to excuse
the subsequent perjury of the witness. Other cases are to the same
effect.2
Admittedly, evidence secured by the police in violation
of constitutional rights is often suppressed; the classic cases are
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth Amendment), Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Fifth) and United States v. Massiah,
377 U.S. 201 (1964) (Sixth). But these cases do not immunize later
perjury by the defendant even if prompted by unlawfully obtained
evidence. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (Miranda
2
E.g., United States v. Olmeda, 839 F.2d 1433, 1437 (11th Cir.
1988) (Sixth Amendment violations in securing grand jury testimony
cannot be used to suppress perjurious testimony in a later perjury
prosecution); United States v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204, 208 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983) (same). Cf. United
States v. Masters, 484 F.2d 1251, 1253-54 (10th Cir. 1973) (lack of
counsel at an evidentiary hearing part of a habeas corpus
proceeding does not excuse perjury.)
-8-
violation "cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way
of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior
inconsistent utterances"); United States v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838,
845 (1st. Cir. 1983) (unlawful search and seizure cannot be used to
suppress the perjurious statement stemming from it). Bova's
remedy, if he thought that his right to counsel was being denied,
was to avoid perjury from the denial of bail.
Bova relies upon United States v. Doss, 545 F.2d 548 (6th
Cir. 1976), where the prosecutor summoned a target before the grand
jury and did not tell him that he was already the subject of two
indictments. Later the defendant was indicted for perjury for a
false response to a grand jury question relevant to the crimes for
which he had already been secretly indicted. Id. at 549. The
Sixth Circuit viewed this as tantamount to questioning an indicted
defendant about his charged offenses outside the presence of his
counsel and, describing this as a Sixth Amendment violation, barred
the perjury prosecution. Id. at 552.
The Sixth Circuit said in substance that the asserted
Sixth Amendment violation rendered the grand jury proceeding
"void", id. at 552, which is (at best) a conclusory epithet burying
a debatable policy judgment. Admittedly, Doss is not the only case
in which misconduct by the prosecutor has prompted a court to bar
a prosecution for the ensuing perjury. See Brown v. United States,
345 F.2d 549, 554-56 (9th Cir. 1957). Yet other courts, including
-9-
this one, have been reluctant to excuse grand jury or other perjury
on the ground that it was prompted by misconduct of the
prosecutor.3 Here, of course, we are not concerned with any such
misconduct.
Perhaps in some extreme situation a prosecutor's
interference with the right to counsel might seem so egregious and
functionally related to the perjury as to provide an arguable case
for such a sanction. But rules designed to deprive the police or
the prosecutor of incentives to misbehave make little sense where
we are dealing with the putative error of a judicial officer who
has no such incentives. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
916-17 (1984). The naked perjury in this case provides no
encouragement to plough new ground.
We turn next to the government's cross appeal contesting
the district court's calculation of the sentence. The guidelines
provide that simple perjury has a base offense level of 12.
U.S.S.G. § 2J1.3(a) (2001).4 Although Bova had lied in the bail
3
E.g., United States v. Babb, 807 F.2d 272, 279 (1st Cir.
1986); United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 777, 785-86 (2d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985); United States v. Crocker, 568
F.2d 1049, 1053-55 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Williams, 874
F.2d 968, 973-75 (5th Cir. 1989).
4
The practice is to use the guidelines in effect at the time
of sentencing, not those in effect when the crime was committed, as
long as there are no ex post facto concerns. United States v.
Aymelek, 926 F.2d 64, 66 n.1 (1st Cir. 1991). Here, there are no
such concerns because the two versions of the sentencing guidelines
are identical for the provisions relevant in this appeal. We
therefore refer to the 2001 guidelines, the guidelines in effect at
-10-
hearing as to two different prior assaults, counts are grouped–-and
only the higher offense level considered–-where the counts involve
"the same victim" and the same acts or transactions linked by a
common plan. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2.
Here, the district court treated the two lies as directed
to a single "victim" (the United States) and part of a single
effort by Bova to get bail and avoid revocation of his supervised
release status; reduced the resulting combined offense level of 12
by 2 levels for acceptance of responsibility; and refused the
government's request for an upward departure. The resulting
offense level of 10, coupled with Bova's criminal history, produced
a guideline range of 23 to 30 months and the district court imposed
the 30 month maximum, to be served concurrently with a 30 month
sentence for obstruction of justice.
On this appeal, the government says that the district
court should have followed the probation officer's calculation and
applied the cross reference in the perjury guideline which provides
as follows:
(c) Cross Reference
(1) If the offense involved perjury, subornation of
perjury, or witness bribery in respect to a criminal
offense, apply § 2X3.1 (Accessory After the Fact) in
respect to that criminal offense, if the resulting offense
level is greater than that determined above.
U.S.S.G. § 2J1.3(c).
the time Bova was sentenced.
-11-
A rough translation of this language is that where the
cross reference applies, the perjurer is sentenced as if he were an
accessory after the fact to the substantive criminal offense or
offenses about which he has lied. See United States v. Suleiman,
208 F.3d 32, 38-39 (2d Cir. 2000). This makes sense where, for
example, the perjurer testifies at the trial of a confederate,
falsely asserting that the confederate did not commit the
underlying crime; but the cross reference's language is not limited
to such a case.
Here, application of the cross reference would have had
two dramatic effects on Bova's sentence. First, Bova's lies
related to two assaults, each fairly described as at least an
aggravated assault, and the guidelines treat such assaults as
having a base offense level of 15, subject to further specific
offense adjustments (e.g., for harm caused and weapons used) that
can boost the levels further. U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2. The probation
officer calculated that the adjusted level would be 20 for the
Tauro assault and 25 for the Hurley assault (which the government
corrects to 24).
Second, under the grouping rules for multiple counts,
assaults cannot be treated as closely related counts. U.S.S.G. §
3D1.2(d). This does not mean that the separate offense levels for
each are added together but it does mean that they are combined so
that the combined offense level is often higher than the single
-12-
highest count, U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4; in this case the probation officer
computed a combined offense level of 26. Since an accessory after
the fact is sentenced at 6 levels less than the perpetrator,
U.S.S.G. § 2X3.1, this would give Bova an offense level of 20 or,
after acceptance of responsibility, 18, U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.
This approach would have given Bova a much higher
guideline range and the government asserts that this approach was
dictated by the cross reference. The government concedes that
direct precedent is scarce but says that the cross reference
language–-"in respect to a criminal offense"–-is broad and applies
here because here the perjury was about the assaults. In truth,
phrases like "in respect to" or "in connection with" are highly
elastic and any sensible construction invites inquiry into what the
drafter was trying to accomplish. See United States v. Conley, 186
F.3d 7, 25 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1017 (2000).
The cross reference is based on the potential of the
perjury to derail or miscarry a judicial or similar proceeding
directed to another crime. Suleiman, 208 F.3d at 39. Where the
other crime is substantially more serious than generic (offense
level 12) perjury, the guideline drafters obviously thought that
the guideline sentence for that crime better reflected the gravity
of the perjury itself, subject to a discount to reflect the fact
that the perjurer was an accessory after the fact rather than a
perpetrator. This explains why the cross reference applies only to
-13-
raise the offense level above 12 and also explains the 6 level
reduction from the cross-referenced crime's offense level.
This purpose is not a narrow one: it seemingly applies
wherever the perjury is directed to the investigation or trial of
a criminal offense even where common-law accessory doctrine would
normally not apply. Consider the case of perjury in a criminal
trial to inculpate an innocent third party rather than to exculpate
a confederate. Still, as the Second Circuit stated, "the purpose
of the 'in respect to' enhancement is to treat more severely
perjuries that risk an incomplete or an inaccurate investigation or
trial of a criminal offense." Suleiman, 208 F.3d at 39.
In this case, the perjury occurred in a bail hearing in
an overall proceeding designed to determine whether Bova's
supervised release should be revoked. The government has not
argued that such a bail hearing is, or is part of, a proceeding to
adjudicate a criminal offense; if it were, perjury at the hearing
would be "in respect to a criminal offense" and the cross reference
would arguably apply. But whether or not such an argument could be
made, it was not made in the district court nor is it pressed in
this court.
Rather, the government says in substance that the cross
reference applies simply because the perjury was about a criminal
offense, namely, the assaults. But it misses the point to make the
subject matter of the perjury, rather than its connection to the
-14-
prosecution of a criminal offense, the decisive consideration. A
material lie about any subject in a criminal trial could sensibly
trigger the cross reference; a lie in a civil or other non-criminal
proceeding about a criminal act, at least if not a direct threat to
a criminal trial or investigation, deserves no more punishment than
a lie about a non-criminal act.
The government has a long and exceedingly complicated
discussion of the legislative history of the perjury guideline, an
associated obstruction of justice guideline, and a specific offense
characteristic in the perjury guideline providing for a fixed 3-
level increase if the perjury "resulted in substantial interference
with the administration of justice . . . ." U.S.S.G. § 2J1.3(b)(2).
The discussion is almost beyond summary and it is enough to say
that this winding and intricate history takes us nowhere solid.
As it happens, the specific offense characteristic just
mentioned–-essentially for obstructing justice–-comes much closer
to a suitable adjustment for Bova's lies. His lies had little
potential to interfere with prosecution of the crimes lied about
which is why their seriousness is not a suitable measure of Bova's
perjury; but they did have a capacity to obstruct the bail hearing
and so came pretty close to warranting an adjustment for
obstructing that proceeding.
Presumably such an enhancement was not sought because the
obstruction adjustment is more narrowly framed than the counterpart
-15-
criminal offense of obstruction of justice. While the obstruction
statute applies to one who "endeavors" to obstruct court
proceedings, 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a)(2000), the specific offense
adjustment in the perjury guideline applies only to perjury that
"resulted" in a "substantial interference" with the proceeding,
U.S.S.G. § 2J1.3(b)(2). The government may have thought that lies
so quickly brushed aside by the magistrate judge had no such
effect.
The judgment and sentence of the district court are both
affirmed.
-16-